Shifting Dimensions of Citizen Control1

European politics is still dominated by representative and parliamentary national systems of policy making. These systems can be seen as chains of political delegation from citizens through parliamentarians and executive office holders to civil servants. In these chains, a major trend for the past thirty years, and more strongly during the second half of that period, is a strengthening of agents' accountability to the principals. But, simultaneously, citizens' ability to exercise accountability through parliamentary democracy is eroding because of a decline in political party cohesion. Concurrently, constraints external to both the constitutional chain and political parties are growing stronger.
The changes along these three dimensions lead to a situation in which democratic principals commonly decide more about less. Thus, while reforms have strengthened the constitutional parliamentary chain of governance, there is also an ongoing de-parliamentarisation of modern politics. The main motivation for this special issue is to investigate this general phenomenon through a set of focused case studies of the Nordic (here known as 'Scandinavian') countries. These analyses show important differences in how these trends have been manifest. In one country, Finland, the parliamentary chain has actually grown in strength and importance in the last decade.     

Do Belgian parties undermine the democratic chain of delegation?

The Belgian party-archy violates the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in many ways, insofar as political parties play a predominant role at each stage. They channel the delegation of power from voters to MPs, from Parliament to the cabinet, from the collective cabinet to individual ministers, and from ministers to their civil servants. Hence, they can be considered the effective principals in the polity, and many actors of the parliamentary chain of delegation, such as MPs, ministers, and civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents. The extreme fragmentation of the Belgian party system in combination with its increasing need for multilevel coordination have further enhanced the position of political parties in the Belgian polity. Yet, at the same time (since the early 1990s), Belgium has also witnessed a gradual decline in the informal system of partitocratic delegation and clientelistic excesses, thereby giving back part of their autonomy to some formal agents, such as the cabinet, top civil servants and some MPs. Still, one can wonder whether these corrections are sufficient to counter the strong outburst of public dissatisfaction with the way parties have run the country in past decades.     

Norway: Madisonianism Reborn

This article discusses citizen control in Norwegian parliamentary democracy, and specifically the changes that have recently taken place. Around 1960 Norway had reached a constitutional form that, apart from the consequences of proportional representation, looked much like a Westminster system. From that point on, however, Norwegian democracy has generally moved away from this model. A series of minority governments has given rise to parliamentary reassertion. The Norwegian party system has fragmented, and the individual parties have atrophied as mass membership organizations. A wave of corporatism and later a heightened assertiveness on the part of the judiciary have helped to contain parliamentary power. Two critical European Union membership referendums in 1972 and 1994 have firmly established the role of direct democracy in critical political decisions. And despite the results of these two popular consultations, international constraints have become ever more significant. Compared with most others in Europe, however, Norway is a relatively unconstrained polity. There are few important ways in which the citizenry is partitioned into multiple democratic principals, and the country is a reasonable fit to the parliamentary ideal type of an unfettered hierarchy controlled by the median voter. At the same time, the trend is unmistakably one towards greater policy‐making complexity and increasing constraints on policy makers. Norway's reluctant but seemingly inevitable incorporation into a larger Europe is the greatest and most decisive of these constraints, but it is not the only one. Judicial institutions are likely to play an increasingly important political role, and direct democracy perhaps likewise. And although central bank independence has met with greater scepticism than in most other European countries, it is not likely to be reversed. All in all, it seems that Norwegian parliamentary governance is becoming at least a little more Madisonian and a little less Westminsterian.     

Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median,Ministerial Autonomy,and the Coalition Compromise

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking—the preferences of coalition parties often diverge significantly, but the government can adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This fact raises a critical question that has far‐reaching implications for the quality of democratic representation: Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing answers to this question derived from the theoretical literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that coalition policies reflect a compromise between government parties rather than the preferences of the ministers proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the legislature.     

Iceland: Searching for Democracy along Three Dimensions of Citizen Control

This article scrutinises delegation and accountability in Iceland. In a healthy democracy, the representatives serve the wishes and interests of the main principal, the people. In an ailing democracy, the agents of the people primarily serve themselves.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, the semi-presidential constitutional framework places the voters in a central role. They vote in two systems, electing MPs in the parliamentary system and the president by a national vote. The open primary, adopted by the main political parties, gives the voters the opportunity to participate in the selection of candidates in parliamentary elections. The central role of the voters is, however, often made difficult by the fluctuation and complexity of this dual system of representation. Second, citizen control through party organisations and party membership has all but disappeared. Instead, political parties cater to the fickle electorate and produce government policy aiming at economic stability and economic growth. Third, external constraints – the political presidency, judicial activism and Iceland's membership of the European Economic Area – all weigh in and sometimes override decisions reached by the parliamentary system of government.
The final conclusion is that the Icelandic system of governance has become a rather messy and complicated political arrangement, thereby resembling the situation in other modern democracies.     

Portfolio allocation patterns and policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments

Although minority coalition has become a relatively frequent form of governance, it is often considered politically ineffective in policy making. To obtain sufficient support in parliament, government bills must go through the scrutiny activities initiated by coalition partners and overcome the concerns of external support parties in opposition. By examining parliamentary scrutiny on government bills, this paper explains the surprising policy-making effectiveness in minority coalition governments. Specifically, we argue and show that different patterns of portfolio allocation with the specific ideological locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and the external supporter, structure the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in parliament, and therefore, the effectiveness of the minority coalition on managing and implementing policies. We empirically examine bills initiated by 256 ministries in 13 Danish minority coalitions between 1985 and 2015, and we reveal robust evidence that corroborates our argument.     

The Danish welfare state under bourgeois reign

From 1982 to 1993, a decade of tight economic constraints, the Danish welfare state was governed by bourgeois parties. The expectation of the power resources model, the most prevalent theory about the Scandinavian welfare states, was that the Danish welfare state would be turned further in a residual direction. Those expectations were, however, never fulfilled – on the contrary, the Danish welfare state was further expanded in a social democratic direction. A focus on how the bourgeois governments, often in a difficult parliamentary situation, tried to adapt the popular Danish welfare state to less favorable economic conditions accounts for important aspects of this development. The bourgeois governments relied on a combination of increased benefits to large groups of voters and well-hidden measures to strengthen public finances.     

Parties and policy in Belgium

Abstract. An overview of the literature on the party-policy link suggests a weak, non-existent or even perverse relationship between parties in government and governmental policies in Belgium. It is argued that this weak relationship could be due to the methodology applied in this type of research, i.e. the treatment of the party variable on a much too high level of aggregation. The relative strength of the coalition parties, the parties' general ideological profile on a specific moment, the relative strength of the factions within the parliamentary party and in the Cabinet are not taken into account. On the other hand, several organisational factors with regard to the relation between parties, parliamentary groups, ministers and the administration tend to facilitate the impact of parties on policies in Belgium. Interview data with ministers suggest that the policy variable also needs further disaggregation. In particular, the qualitative aspects of policies should be more closely investigated.     

Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies

Abstract. Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced by politicians and especially by the scholarly community but remains less widely understood. In this essay, I identify the institutional features that define parliamentary democracy and suggest how they can be understood as delegation relationships. I propose two definitions: one minimal and one maximal (or ideal–typical). In the latter sense, parliamentary democracy is a particular regime of delegation and accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory, which allows us to identify the conditions under which democratic agency problems may occur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, and relies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism has certain advantages, such as decisional efficiency and the inducements it creates toward effort. On the other hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantages such as ineffective accountability and a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies. And whereas parliamentarism may be particularly suitable for problems of adverse selection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard. In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism is facing the challenges of decaying screening devices and diverted accountabilities.     

Institutional change in parliament through cross-border partisan emulation

Institutional responses of parliaments to international developments are widely regarded as efficient changes because they tend to be unaffected by partisan preferences and benefit all members of parliament equally. This article challenges that common notion by providing evidence that the institutional responses of national parliaments to European integration are in large part the result of international partisan emulation. Spatial regression analyses robustly show that parliamentary EU oversight institutions diffuse across member states whose majority parties have similar constitutional preferences. A parliament is more likely to emulate the EU oversight institution of another parliament if their majority parties have similar ideas about the territorial distribution of power and institutional framework for policy making. This result has important implications for our understanding of institutional change in parliament. Responses of parliaments to external developments may appear non-partisan at first sight but unfold partisan characteristics if one looks beyond the domestic level.     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

Power and Democracy in Denmark: Still a Viable Democracy

In its final report, the Danish Democracy and Power Study (1998–2004) pointed to a number of serious democratic problems such as declining political party membership, a growing gap between a competent and resourceful majority and a marginalised minority, the growing influence of the media, the transfer of power from the political to the judicial system, and the democratic deficit associated with European Union membership. However, the report also concluded that overall democratic development in the last 30–40 years has been surprisingly positive. This article assesses the development of democracy in Denmark in relation to the parliamentary chain of governance: the standard used in the final report of the majority of the Norwegian power study group. The conclusion is that, in the case of Denmark, democratic development has not – as the parliamentary committee initially expected – resulted in a systematic weakening of the parliamentary chain of governance.     

Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work

Abstract. In modern democracies political parties exist because (1) they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collective action. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice. Party representatives in public office are ultimately the agents of the extra–parliamentary party organization. In order to contain agency loss parties rely on party–internal mechanisms and the institutionalisation of party rights in public rules and, in contrast to US parties, they apply the full range of ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Generally, the role of party is weaker the further down the chain of delegation.     

Strategies of Influence: How Interest Organizations React to Changes in Parliamentary Influence and Activity1

Research has shown that interest organizations seeking influence on public decision making pay increasing attention to parliamentary actors. No distinction has, however, been made between attempts to affect law-making directly and attempts to gain influence on other parliamentary activities such as agenda setting and control of bureaucracy. Drawing on data about organizational approaches to the Danish parliament, this article demonstrates that interest organizations’ influence strategies in relation to different parliamentary activities show dissimilar patterns. Strategies in regard to law-making fluctuate with the strength of parliament vis-à-vis the government, while strategies concerned with more general parliamentary activities depend more on the level of these activities and secondarily on increases in parliamentary resources. The analysis thus confirms that organizations react to changes in the political role of parliament, but takes the understanding of this a step further by emphasizing that changes in direct parliamentary influence on law-making and in more general parliamentary activities affect different aspects of organizations’ influence strategies.     

Blame shifting and blame obfuscation: The blame avoidance effects of delegation in the European Union

The delegation of governance tasks to third parties is generally assumed to help governments to avoid blame once policies become contested. International organizations, including the European Union (EU), are considered particularly opportune in this regard. The literature lacks assessments of the blame avoidance effects of delegation, let alone of the effects of different delegation designs. To address this gap in the literature, we study public blame attributions in the media coverage of two contested EU policies during the financial crisis and the migration crisis. We show that the blame avoidance effect of delegation depends on the delegation design: When agents are independent (dependent) of government control, we observe lower (higher) shares of public blame attributions targeting the government (blame shifting effect), and when agents are external (internal) to the government apparatus, overall public blame attributions for a contested policy will be less (more) frequent (blame obfuscation effect). Our findings yield important normative implications for how to maintain governments’ accountability once they have delegated governance tasks to third parties.     

New Parties: Game Changers or ‘Much Ado About Nothing'?

This article is about the new parties that competed at the Danish parliamentary election of 2019. It addresses three key questions: why did they emerge, what types of parties were they and what impact did they have on Danish party politics. We can identify the causes for their emergence and participation in interplay of relatively lenient rules for party registration, personal ambition, recent events – particularly the Syrian crisis and arrival of refugees – as well as anti-establishment sentiments on the political right. The three new parties shared salient characteristics: they had dominant leaders, were genuinely new, had extraparliamentary origins and were independent of societal organizations. In terms of effects on the party system, the main impact was during the campaign where the strongly anti-immigration agenda proposed by two of the parties dominated the conversation and appeared to cause some movement by established parties in a more immigrant friendly direction. Only one of the far right parties won seats in parliament and its prospects of wielding influence on policy with a Socialdemocratic government are slim.     

ACCOUNTING FOR RESULTS: PORTFOLIO EXPLANATORY NOTES BECOME PROGRAM PERFORMANCE STATEMENTS

Abstract: This paper outlines the place of performance evaluation in the recent administrative reforms and, in that context, assesses the changes made for the 1991–92 Program Performance Statements. The changes constitute a concerted attempt to improve the system of program evaluation throughout the Australian Public Service. Coherent and logical, they are based on a model of governance that seeks to establish a definitive demarcation between policy and administration, and hence confirm traditional notions of ministerial accountability. Analysis of these changes from a parliamentary perspective suggests that, unless there are serious reforms introduced into parliament, there is an increased likelihood that the monitoring of the bureaucratic machinery of government will become inadequate.     

Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction

Abstract. The role of the president is presumed to vary amongst presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems. However, there are a variety of subtypes within semi-presidential systems. Debate often hinges on the prime minister and government, and to whom they are more accountable. However, the accountability of prime ministers and governments to presidents can be rather 'fuzzy'. This article looks through the prism of the president rather than that of the government. After examining definitions of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, several dispositional categories of political regimes will be established. Then presidential power will be assessed through a series of dichotomous measures, and for all electoral democracies with a president. Finally, the character of each category will be assessed. The concept of 'semi-presidentialism' is rejected in favour of more meaningful labels: presidential systems, parliamentary systems with presidential dominance, parliamentary systems with a presidential corrective and parliamentary systems with figurehead presidents.     

Competition ruins the good life

Abstract. Leadership practices in political parties reflect the necessity of delegation as well as the desire by the rank-and-file to control their leaders. Norwegian political parties have traditionally divided their leadership functions between two or even three offices, whose powers have varied between as well as within parties. Non-socialist parties have vested more power in their parliamentary leaders, and socialist parties more in their organizational chairs. The electoral process is in principle open, but contested elections have traditionally been rare. In recent years, however, contested elections have become more common, parliamentary leaders have lost much of their autonomy, and leadership tenure, at least in some parties, has gone down. Heightened electoral competitiveness seems to be driving many of these changes.     

The Importance and Limits of Party Government: Problems of Governance in Denmark*

Pluralist democracies face the dilemma of reconciling representation of interests and government control. The tension between representation and governance is a problem for political parties in particular and has presumably become more important in recent years, at least in Denmark. Using data from questionnaire surveys of Danish political elites it is shown that interest organizations and bureaucrats indeed pose problems for party government. Some institutional changes might lighten the tasks of parties, but there is no way of avoiding the basic democratic dilemma.