Getting to justice?

This article addresses whether Albert Weale’s view in Democratic Justice and the Social Contract (OUP 2013) fits into one of two strands of social contract traditions, and how his account stands up to critics. He claims to stand in the contractarian tradition, which seeks to justify normative principles of justice from non-moral premises. The alternative is the contractualist tradition which assumes that individuals are also motivated by other-regarding moral considerations. The aim of the latter theories is often limited to systematise and specify vague and contested normative judgements concerning shared institutions. There are tensions in Weale’s account as to whether it addresses the question of concern to contractarians or rather that of contractualists. A second challenge concerns Weale’s attempt to extrapolate principles of justice from common property resource regimes within the basic structure of society to that basic structure of a ‘great society’ itself. The impact of the basic structure on individuals is so pervasive that the principle Weale proposes seems misapplied. A claim to the marginal product in complex modes of production supplemented by a social insurance scheme says little about the distributive principles for assessing how the basic structure as a whole should engender the distribution of marginal products among us.     

正义的社会:是现实的批判还是理想的建构——从马克思和罗尔斯的自由平等的正义观谈起

马克思与罗尔斯对正义社会的要求是自由平等的,但是二人对于自由平等观的正义社会是不同的,马克思是从现实社会出发,是一种批判的正义观,而罗尔斯是根据一种社会契约来建构正义的社会,建构的是理想社会的正义观,通过对二人正义观的比较,我们能够得出对于现行社会的启示。     

Does justice stand alone?

A common feature of leading liberal-egalitarian political theories is the sharp priority they attribute to justice, and to distributive justice in particular. In this article, I argue that liberal egalitarians have yet to offer a persuasive argument for prioritizing justice, and distributive justice in particular, in this way. I focus on assessing arguments advanced in the seminal work of John Rawls and employ the pluralist liberalism of Isaiah Berlin to illustrate that Rawls’ arguments are not even persuasive for reasonable liberals like Berlin, let alone for non-liberals. The upshot of my argument is not that liberals should abandon the pursuit of greater equality of wealth and income, but only that such goals should still be balanced against the claims of other fundamental values, such as individual liberty and the common good (contrary to those who want to give sharp priority to distributive justice).     

What do we Need to be Part of Dialogue? From Discursive Ethics to Critical Social Justice

Abstract

The main goal of critical social justice is to ensure the agency of citizens, which enables them to take part, not only in public discussions about how resources are distributed, but also about matters such as what should be produced, how to do it and through what kind of production, among others. Critical social justice can be best formulated within the foundation programme of discursive ethics, in particular within Apel's version specified in his principle of co-responsibility. This principle establishes a telos that operates as a normative guide to formulate the constructive question about which the necessary conditions are for someone to be able to become a subject of dialogue. Answering this question leads, on the one hand, to the development of some constitutive elements of critical social justice and, on the other hand, to the identification of the social relations and structures that undermine the possibilities of a person to effectively participate in the discussion of the topics they consider relevant. As its constitutive elements, I propose reciprocal recognition autonomy, the metric of capabilities and a sufficientarian principle of justice, which work together with the well-known difference principle. These elements constitute a normative net that allows contemporary societies to be criticized from the perspective of justice.     

Recognition as Redistribution

Abstract

This paper aims to explore and examine the implied commitment to the premises of recognition in Rawls’s account of redistributive justice. It attempts to find out whether or not recognition relations that produce humiliation and cultural injustice can be followed to their logical conclusion in his theory of redistribution. This paper makes two claims. Firstly, although Rawls does not disregard the harms of misrecognition as demonstrated in his notion of self-respect being the most important primary good, he cannot liberally accommodate the idea of humiliation as a case of injustice without compromising the basic premises of his theory. Secondly, while resource distribution produces indirect side effects that can impact upon cultural injustice, addressing recognition issues through the prism of redistribution can inadvertently result in further misrecognition. The paper concludes that in the final analysis Rawls wrongly takes redistribution as the overarching principle of justice to which recognition is but a subservient principle.     

Falling into the justice gap? Between duties of social and global justice

The literature on cosmopolitan justice has yet to address what principles to adopt when duties of global justice and duties of social justice are in conflict. In this paper, I address David Miller’s contention that some may fall into the justice gap since we need to prioritize duties of social justice in cases of conflict. I argue that Miller’s analysis depends on three stipulations: the incommensurability of the values underlying duties of social justice and those of global justice; the need to justify duties of justice to their holders; and the need to consider the necessary institutions to realize and implement justice obligations. I argue against the incommensurability clause by showing that both conceptions of justice pursue moral equality as the underlying and commensurate value. Instead, I propose that the currencies of justice we employ in the two contexts of justice are different. Discussing the justifiability clause I agree with the stipulation that we have to justify decisions that affect the realization of justice to those who have to carry the burden of realizing them. This implies, however, that we may have to accept that some prioritize duties of global justice over duties of social justice. If this is the case, it seems as though the state has little recourse to prioritize duties of social justice. Finally, discussing Miller’s institutional clause I ask why the justice relevant institutions can only be those of the state. It is plausible to say that in our current world, institutions of humanitarian aid are effective means to satisfy duties of global justice.     

评世界主义者对罗尔斯国际正义理论的批判

由于缺乏足够的阐释和论证,兼之世界主义思潮的影响,当前西方学界对罗尔斯的国际正义理论总体上仍持批判意见。这些批判主要涉及理论旨趣、人民观、人权清单和援助责任等四项焦点问题:前三种批判揭示了罗尔斯理论的疏漏之处,但通过对其思想脉络和观点立场的同情式理解,在既有理论框架内加以翔实阐释,这些理论疏漏可以在一定程度上得到回应和辩护;围绕援助责任的争论,则集中展现了罗尔斯与世界主义者之间的观点分歧,双方在可欲性和可行性两个层面各有优劣。相比之下,容纳二者优势并有所超越的人类命运共同体理念能够为全球正义的理论探讨提供一个更为有效的支点。     

Distributive Justice and the Politics of Difference

Abstract

This essay identifies a point of convergence between economically oriented, distributive approaches to social justice and culturally oriented, identitarian ones. The primary problem of difference politics, I claim, is insuring that disadvantaged groups have equal abilities to participate in the social processes that construct and value identities. I argue that this is best accomplished through a conception of equality promoting human agency in both the cultural and economic spheres.     

Transforming (but not transcending) the state system? On statist cosmopolitanism

Can states become committed and competent agents of cosmopolitan justice? The theory of ‘statist cosmopolitanism’ argues that they can: their citizens can be turned towards a commitment to cosmopolitan principles and actions by moral entrepreneurs constituting a ‘cosmopolitan avant-garde’, and can be sustained in their commitment to those principles by their pre-existing attachment to the state as a political community. Taking cosmopolitan principles as axiomatic, this paper subjects statist cosmopolitanism to critique. First, I question the scale of the transformation that a cosmopolitan avant-garde can engender given the complexity of the causal chains the avant-garde seek to elucidate, as well as the countervailing potency of the state itself which reinforces particularistic attitudes in its citizens. Second, I argue that even if, contra my preceding argument, the cosmopolitan avant-garde were to be successful, states would find it desirable to federally integrate in order to be better able to realise their cosmopolitan commitments. Such integration is compatible with statist cosmopolitanism’s motivational theory, even if not its institutional vision. Finally, I re-characterise the cosmopolitan avant-garde as agitators for the transcendence, rather than just transformation, of the state system.