Socialization and generational political trajectories: an age,period and cohort analysis of political participation in Britain

The role of political socialization in explaining disengagement from specific modes of activism beyond voting remains largely unexplored, limited to date by available data and methods. While most previous studies have tended to propose explanations for disengagement linked to specific repertoires of political action, we propose a unified theory based on the different socialization experiences of subsequent generations. We test this theory using a new dataset of collated waves of the British Social Attitudes Survey and by applying age–period–cohort models for repeated cross-sectional data and generalized additive models to identify generational effects. We show that generational effects underlie the participatory decline across repertoires. Consistent with our expectations, the results reveal that the generation of “Thatcher’s Children” are much less likely to engage in a range of repertoires of political action than “Wilson/Callaghan’s Children”, who came of age in the more politicized 1960s and 1970s. Significantly, and in line with our theoretical expectations, the “Blair’s Babies” generation is the least politically engaged of all. We reflect on these findings and highlight the concerning implications of falling levels of activism for advanced democracies.     

Analyzing the representativeness of internet political participation

Political participation researchers have developed several evaluative techniques to assess the representativeness of political participation patterns. Yet, while the Internet has become a mainstream avenue for political participation in the United States, current assessments of online participation insufficiently apply these methods. To incorporate these methods we begin by drawing upon resource theory to inform two-stage ordered-logit models of online and offline political participation. Our results suggest that the factors predicting online participation often differ from the factors that predict offline participation. Even so, we find that those from higher socioeconomic backgrounds tend to disproportionately possess these distinct online determinants. Next, we use a wide spectrum of political opinion questions to determine whether online participators opinions reflect or distort those of the general population. Overall, we find that online participation tends to relate moderately with liberal preferences. However, because offline participation relates to political attitudes similarly, the Internet only marginally advantages the political voice of liberals. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results.     

Regulatory Errors with Endogenous Agendas

How do a regulator's decisions depend on the characteristics and strategies of its external clients? We develop a theory of approval regulation in which an uninformed regulator may veto the submission of a better‐informed firm. The firm can perform publicly observable experiments to generate product information prior to submission. We find that when experimentation is short, Type I errors (approving bad products) are more likely for products submitted by firms with lower experimentation costs (larger firms), while Type II errors (rejecting good products) should be concentrated among smaller firms. These comparative statics are reversed when experimentation is long. We perform a statistical analysis on FDA approvals of new pharmaceutical products using two different measures of Type I error. We find consistent support for the counterintuitive hypothesis that, under particular conditions, errors are decreasing in the size of the firm submitting the product.     

On-line processing in candidate evaluation: The effects of issue order,issue importance,and sophistication

This article reports the results of a study that replicates and extends the impression-driven model of candidate evaluation reported in Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989). This model holds that evaluations are formed and updated on-line as information is encountered, and that as a result, citizens need not rely on specific information available from memory to form their candidate evaluations. In the present work we explore whether the order in which information is encountered, as well as whether information that is personally important, influences the weight accorded to evidence in on-line processing. In addition, differences in information-processing strategies due to political sophistication are examined. The results indicate that important information receives more weight than unimportant information. In addition, the evidence suggests that political sophisticates are more efficient on-line processors than are less sophisticated individuals. The implications of these results for models of candidate evaluation are discussed.     

Social policy in rich and poor countries: socio-economic trends and political-institutional determinants

Abstract. To what extent can the dramatic differences in social policy efforts in rich and poor countries be accounted for by genuinely political explanations? The hypothesis that is advanced in this article rests upon the combination of two schools of thought in comparative social policy analysis: socioeconomic models which focus attention on levels of economic wealth, need and demand for social security, and models of a comparative-historiographic and political-institution-alist nature. Empirical applications of socio-economic models with lagged dependent variables reveal the existence of two deviant families of nations: overspenders in social policy (such as overspenders of socialdemocratic complexion and of Christian democratic composition) and underspenders (such as the superpowers in East and West as well as Japan and East Germany). The residuals that can be derived from these models are amenable to an explanation which resides in comparative-historiographic political analysis of social policy.     

Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948–1994

We test the ``war of attrition'' models of fiscalperformance on the sample of Italian governments from1948 to 1994. We control for conditioning phenomena,like government stability, majority size, central bankindependence, political budget cycle and externaleconomic constraints, as well as for business cycleindicators. We improve on the standard specificationsof war of attrition models by considering the role ofthe opposition and by using ex ante measures ofcoalitions fragmentation. Once these phenomena areaccounted for, data support the implications of ourversion of the war of attrition models.     

What explains the dynamics of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy? An integrated framework for panel data

Literature on political support broadly offers three micro-level models: socio-economic status, democratic process evaluations, and political performance evaluations explain people's differences in satisfaction with democracy. While tests show that these explanations complement each other, we do not know how. We combine for the first time all three models into one common longitudinal framework by explicitly considering aspects of time. We argue that relatively stable factors, such as socio-economic status, only explain general levels, whereas more time-sensitive factors, such as evaluations, explain differences between citizens at specific points in time. The results of latent growth curve modelling applied to nine-wave panel data support our general hypothesis of a common longitudinal framework. These results also show that economic evaluations play a prominent role as do some (but not all) electoral results. The findings have theoretical and methodological implications, and they offer a new perspective on the meaning of ’satisfaction with democracy’.     

In Defense of Comparative Statics: Specifying Empirical Tests of Models of Strategic Interaction

Christopher Zorn Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 e-mail: zorn{at}sc.edu e-mail: ccarrub{at}emory.edu (corresponding author) Beginning in 1999, Curtis Signorino challenged the use of traditionallogits and probits analysis for testing discrete-choice, strategicmodels. Signorino argues that the complex parametric relationshipsgenerated by even the simplest strategic models can lead towildly inaccurate inferences if one applies these traditionalapproaches. In their stead, Signorino proposes generating stochasticformal models, from which one can directly derive a maximumlikelihood estimator. We propose a simpler, alternative methodologyfor theoretically and empirically accounting for strategic behavior.In particular, we propose carefully and correctly deriving one'scomparative statics from one's formal model, whether it is stochasticor deterministic does not particularly matter, and using standardlogit or probit estimation techniques to test the predictions.We demonstrate that this approach performs almost identicallyto Signorino's more complex suggestion. Authors' note: We would like to thank Randy Calvert, Mark Hallerberg,Andrew Martin, Eric Reinhardt, Chris Stanton, and Craig Voldenfor their valuable feedback on this project. All remaining errorsare our own. Replication materials are available at the PoliticalAnalysis Web site.     

Reigniting the fire: a contemporary research agenda for social,political and nonprofit marketing

The paper reports on the core challenges faced by the nonprofit, political and social marketing disciplinary areas and suggests a series of research agendas to develop theory and practice to meet these challenges.

• Social marketing's research agenda involves the continued adaptation of the new developments in commercial marketing, whilst building a base of social marketing theory and best practice benchmarks that can be used to identify, clarify and classify the boundaries of social marketing against social change techniques.
• Nonprofit marketing is pursuing the dual research agenda of developing the theory and practice of social entrepreneurship whilst seeking deeper consumer‐based research to understand motivations for charitable behaviour and gift giving.
• Political Marketing's research agenda looks for an increase in the level of background research, core data and market research to use as a basis for developing more advanced theoretical and practical models. In addition, as political marketing is being transferred internationally between a range of political and electoral systems, there is a need for comparative research into both the relevance and effectiveness of these techniques to isolate nation independent and nation dependent political marketing strategies and campaigns.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory

According to a growing tradition in International Relations, one way governments can credibly signal their intentions in foreign policy crises is by creating domestic audience costs: leaders can tie their hands by publicly threatening to use force since domestic publics punish leaders who say one thing and do another. We argue here that there are actually two logics of audience costs: audiences can punish leaders both for being inconsistent (the traditional audience cost), and for threatening to use force in the first place (a belligerence cost). We employ an experiment that disentangles these two rationales, and turn to a series of dispositional characteristics from political psychology to bring the audience into audience cost theory. Our results suggest that traditional audience cost experiments may overestimate how much people care about inconsistency, and that the logic of audience costs (and the implications for crisis bargaining) varies considerably with the leader's constituency.     

Analyzing Computational Models

Computational models have been underutilized as tools for formal theory development, closing off theoretical analysis of complex substantive scenarios that they would well serve. I argue that this occurs for two reasons, and provide resolutions for each. First, computational models generally do not employ the language or modes of analysis common to game‐theoretic models, the status quo in the literature. I detail the types of insights typically derived from game‐theoretic models and discuss analogues in computational modeling. Second, there are not widely established procedures for analysis of deductive computational models. I present a regularized method for deriving comparative statics from computational models that provides insights comparable to those arising from game‐theoretic analyses. It also serves as a framework for building theoretically tractable computational models. Together, these contributions should enhance communication between models of social science and open up the tool kit of deductive computational modeling for theory building to a broader audience.     

当政治遇上历史:比较历史分析方法(CHA)介绍

当代西方比较政治研究由于过分迷信大样本计量统计和形式模型而忽视了许多人类社会生活中的实质性重要问题。作为一种有着深厚学术传统的研究范式,比较历史分析是部分西方学者对这一方法论危机的重要回应。相对而言,比较历史分析的研究特别致力于为大规模社会结果提供有历史深度的社会科学因果解释。它们不仅关注宏大的历史问题,而且试图为这些问题提供因果性解释;不仅运用案例间的比较确定历史问题的因果效应,同时重视案例内的分析探寻背后的因果机制;不仅热衷于追寻经济社会结果的长历史原因,同时强调历史时序的重要性。尽管国内政治学界一向擅长历史的研究,但由于缺乏规范的方法意识而鲜有比较历史分析的佳作。借助比较历史分析方法,中国学者不仅可以对本土政治问题开展跨国性的比较,同时可以整合不同研究方法的长处,繁荣中国的比较政治研究。     

Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech

Participation in legislative debates is among the most visible activities of members of parliament (MPs), yet debates remain an understudied form of legislative behavior. This study introduces a comparative theory of legislative speech with two major implications. First, party rules for debates are endogenous to strategic considerations and will favor either party leadership control or backbencher MP exposure. Second, in some systems, backbenchers will receive less time on the floor as their ideological distance to the party leadership increases. This leads to speeches that do not reflect true party cohesion. Where party reputation matters less for reelection, leaders allow dissidents to express their views on the floor. We demonstrate the implications of our model for different political systems and present evidence using speech data from Germany and the United Kingdom.     

Self-deception as the root of political failure

I consider models of political failure based on self-deception. Individuals discard free information when that information damages their self-image and thus lowers their utility. More specifically, individuals prefer to feel good about their previously chosen affiliations and shape their worldviews accordingly. This model helps explain the relative robustness of political failure in light of extensive free information, and it helps explain the rarity of truth-seeking behavior in political debate. The comparative statics predictions differ from models of either Downsian or expressive voting. For instance, an increased probability of voter decisiveness does not necessarily yield a better result. I also consider political parties as institutions and whether political errors cancel in the aggregate. I find that political failure based on self-deception is very difficult to eliminate.     

Poor Nations, Rich Nations: A Theory of Governance

This article argues that the difference between poor countries and rich countries has to do with governance rather than resources. In emphasizing the importance of public administration in explaining economic success and failure, the author examines three general theories of governance (organizational, cultural, and structural‐functional) presented in Ferrel Heady's textbook in comparative administration. Political elasticity theory is introduced as a way to reconcile and overcome the weaknesses of these theories and to explain a number of unresolved questions in the literature having to do with decentralization, corruption, democracy, culture, and globalization, using comparative case studies (the Netherlands and Ghana, Singapore and Jamaica, and Japan and Nigeria). The implications of political elasticity theory for foreign aid are suggested at the conclusion, illustrated by a comparison of Spain and Mexico. What ties these case studies together is the heretofore unnoticed and/or unexplained fact that as countries prosper, political power takes on “rubber‐band” and “balloon” characteristics.     

Can my religion influence my conception of justice? Political liberalism and the role of comprehensive doctrines

In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This ‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.     

When parties go abroad: Explaining patterns of extraterritorial voting

As more countries grant political rights to their emigrants and more politicians look beyond national boundaries for support, scholars are beginning to explore the drivers and implications of voting from abroad. We use an original dataset of overseas campaigning by political parties in 108 elections in 24 countries to provide the first cross-national test of how party mobilization shapes turnout beyond national borders. Using fractional regression and inverse probability weighting with regression adjustment (IPWRA), we find that party mobilization increases extraterritorial voter turnout. Our results remain robust when controlling for emigrant profiles, institutional barriers to participation, and political context and correcting for self-selection bias.     

Do Moderate Voters Weigh Candidates’ Ideologies? Voters’ Decision Rules in the 2010 Congressional Elections

Models of voting behavior typically specify that all voters employ identical criteria to evaluate candidates. We argue that moderate voters weigh candidates’ policy/ideological positions far less than non-moderate voters, and we report analyses of survey data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study that substantiate these arguments. Across a wide range of models and measurement strategies, we find consistent evidence that liberal and conservative voters are substantially more responsive to candidate ideology than more centrist voters. Simply put, moderate voters appear qualitatively different from liberals and conservatives, a finding that has important implications for candidate strategies and for political representation.     

How reliable is pooled analysis in political economy? The globalization-welfare state nexus revisited

Abstract.  This article analyzes various pitfalls that arise in the application of panel data methods in comparative political economy. Empirically, we refer to the debate on the globalization-welfare state nexus by re-assessing a study by Garrett and Mitchell ('Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD', European Journal of Political Research 39(1) (2001): 145–177). We discuss the properties of specifications with time invariate political variables, dynamic models with nonstationary data, and autocorrelated residuals. We demonstrate that the findings of previous empirical studies are often driven by mis-specifications. Presenting a statistically well-behaved model, we find evidence that government spending is primarily driven by the state of the domestic economy. Neither partisan effects nor the international economic environment have affected public expenditure considerably.     

What consideration sets can teach us about electoral competition: A two-hurdle model

Consideration set models (CSMs) offer a novel way to study electoral behavior. Until now, they have been mostly studied at the micro-level of the voter's decision process. By contrast, we focus on the implications of CSMs for understanding the phenomenon of party competition. We propose a two hurdle model whereby parties compete for both consideration and selection, pursuant the consideration and choice stages of the CSM. We operationalize these hurdles in terms of a party's inclusivity—is it being considered?—and exclusivity—is it considered on its own?—and formally derive lower- and upper-bounds for the electoral fortunes of the party. We also show how consideration set data can be used to sketch the competition landscape in an election and to characterize the system-wide competitiveness of a political system. We illustrate our concepts and ideas using data from the 2010 Dutch and 2014 Swedish parliamentary elections.