关于国家助学金工作中出现的问题及对策思考

在现行的高校助学体系中,助学金是帮助贫困生解决经济问题,顺利完成学业的一项重要资助政策。当前的高校对助学金工作十分重视,但是在助学金实际工作中存在着一些问题尚待解决,影响了助学金的效果。从助学金工作实际出发,提出当前助学金工作中存在的问题和难点,并分析问题产生原因,提出相应的解决对策,使助学金工作的顺利有效开展。     

Categorical Municipal Expenditures with a Focus on the Flypaper Effect

Using data for Wisconsin cities and villages the effects of grants in aid from state government on 10 categories of municipal expenditures are examined. We build on the traditional grants in aid public finance literature by looking for evidence of the flypaper effect. By focusing on the Wisconsin state shared revenues program, a pure grant of considerable size for many Wisconsin municipalities, we offer a clean test of the flypaper effect. We find a positive flypaper effect on 8 of the 10 categorical expenditures. We also find the impact of unconditional grants on categorical expenditures is stronger on nonessential “luxury” goods (e.g., parks and recreation, culture, and educational services) than on essential “normal” municipal goods (e.g., police and fire protection).     

Grant Levels and Debt Issuance: Is There a Relationship? Is There Symmetry?

Although previous work on fiscal federalism and grants has focused on the effects of grants on expenditures, no published research examines the impact of decreasing grants on state financing. This research addresses how decreasing levels of federal grant money to states affect states' long-term debt issuance, and whether the relationship is symmetric for increasing and decreasing grants. The model is tested with time series, cross-sectional data from 1984 to 1999. The results show that grants affect debt issuance, the effect is asymmetric, and direction of the effect differs for different types of debt issuance.     

Can Needs-Based Grants Improve Local Transit Performance? Varying Effects by Level of Control

Needs-based grant programs are budgeting systems that tie grant dollars to the needs of the grantees as determined by objective indicators. Although performance improvement is not an explicit goal of such grants, the associated awards could work as incentives for grantees to meet the grant criteria. In other words, grantees seek to improve their performance to fulfill the criteria, even though the grant-makers intend such grants to support the existing operational needs of the grantees. This study tests these assertions in the context of the small transit intensive cities (STIC) grant that was established as a needs-based grant system by the federal government to support small local transit agencies operating with unusually high service demands. This study argues that these systems would have a stronger impact on indicators over which grantees have more control. This study tests these assertions using a difference-in-differences analysis of 290 transit agencies over 17 years. The findings show that STIC is effective in improving grantee performance, at least on the indicators which are more amenable to control.     

Asymmetric Effects of Intergovernmental Grants: Analysis and Implications for U.S. Welfare Policy

Theories of federal grants to states and localities suggestthat these grants have a stimulative effect on spending, causingrecipient governments to expand and contract programs alongwith changes in the grants. However, policymakers may responddifferently to grant decreases than to grant increases becausethey face political and bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.These asymmetric reactions may depend on specific politicalstructures. Pooled time-series regressions of data from theAid to Families with Dependent Children program across 46 statesfrom 1965 to 1994 demonstrate state government responses togrant changes. Bureaucratic pressures and proposals lead statesto expand their welfare benefits upon increases in federal grants,but not to contract them upon decreases in federal grants. Withregard to the 1996 welfare reforms, this study indicates thatthe switch to block grants will lead to little or no state reductionin welfare payments.     

The political determination of intergovernmental grants in Australia

Intergovernmental grants have been conventionally explained on the basis of either equity/efficiency and/or institutional considerations. This paper seeks to model Australian intergovernmental grants by including both traditional public finance variables and public choice influences; that is, grants are used by federal government politicians to purchase political capital, thereby enhancing their own chances of reelection. The models employed in this paper are tested for six Australian states for the period 1981–82 to 1991–92 using unsystematic grant transfers. The results provide support for these public choice considerations, and highlight the importance of incorporating institutional factors and controlling for misspecification in the error structure in estimates of this type.     

The Impact of Converting Categorical into Block Grants: The Lessons from the 314(d) Block Grant in the Partnership for Health Act

Section 314(d) of P. L. 89–749, (1966), the Partnershipfor Health Act, combined nine categorical health grants intoone block grant for health. The impact of section 314(d), according to data gathered forthis study, can be summarized as follows: the block grant increasedthe administrative flexibility of state health officials; statehealth planning agencies generally did not have a major influenceon the block grant; state health planning agencies located ingovernors' offices had less influence over the block grant thanthose located in state health departments; Congress did notsignificantly increase expenditures for the block grant; nationalinfluence was increased by creating health programs that couldpotentially have been made part of the block grant; and theblock grant did not generally result in a reordering of spendingpriorities. The best explanation for the unspectacular effect of combiningseveral categorical grants into one block grant was that, withoutnew resources, the substantial (and welcome) new administrativeflexibility given state officials was insufficient to producean important substantive reordering of program priorities.     

The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from India

The flypaper effect refers to the phenomenon whereby expenditure stimulus from unconditional grants exceeds that from an equivalent increase in income. The flypaper effect has been described as "money sticks where it hits." The present study empirically tests the flypaper effect for the Indian economy. The study also tests the asymmetry hypothesis that looks at the impact of retrenchment in grants. Results obtained in the present study show the flypaper effect to be vindicated. We find that both capital and revenue expenditures receive a greater stimulus from grants than would an increase in income. Results show that in the prereform period both revenue and capital expenditures are maintained during periods of grant cuts. However, in the postreform period it is only expenditures on revenue accounts that are maintained in periods of grant reduction. We also find that during periods of grant reduction, state governments maintain their expenditure programs by raising their own tax revenue. This suggests that grants from the center have had a disincentive effect and could be a reason that state governments have not exploited their tax potential to the fullest. By bringing to the fore the disincentive effect of grants we wish to emphasize the urgency of taking a closer look at restructuring and redesigning our system of intergovernmental transfers.     

Fiscal Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Analysis of the Intergovernmental Grant Systems in Indonesia and Thailand

Decentralization can inadvertently lead to local fiscal disparity. One type of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, the general-purpose grant, can help equalize local fiscal imbalances. This article examines the extent to which the general-purpose grant systems in Indonesia and Thailand help mitigate local fiscal disparity. The findings show that the general-purpose grant system in Thailand does not effectively address disparities in local fiscal conditions. Localities with more own-source revenues and higher per capita income receive more general-purpose grants than those with weak fiscal capacity. In contrast, Indonesia’s general-purpose grant allocation system provides more resources for economically disadvantaged and conflict-ridden provinces.     

On “Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: Another hypothesis.” by Jody W. Lipford: Comment

This paper develops a positive approach to grant design when the central government and a lobby of local governments are the main agents. It develops the hypothesis that the regressivity or progressivity of per capita grants regarding community size is,ceteris paribus, related to the structure of the lobbying activities of local governments and is independent of hypothetical economies or diseconomies of scale in the production of local public goods. An encompassing lobby organisation using a “one mayor one vote” system of representation supports the regressivity of per capita grants while under “proportional” representation the lobby will support a design of per capita grants which is progressive towards community size. An empirical analysis of lump-sum grants in Portugal supports the politico-economic hypothesis and rejects the hypothesis that economies of scale is the main explanatory cause for the observed regressivity of per capita grants.     

Competitive Advantage in Nonprofit Grant Markets: Implications of Network Embeddedness and Status

This article empirically addresses the effects of network embeddedness on nonprofit organizations’ ability to access financial resources within competitive markets, with a focus in this analysis on the acquisition of foundation grants. We test theory on the role of organizational status in competitive markets using data from a network of nonprofits linked by foundation grants in metropolitan Atlanta during 2000 and 2005. We find that observable characteristics of nonprofits, including size, fundraising expenses, and financial health, explain success in grant markets. However, market status in previous time periods, operationalized as prior relationships with influential foundations in grant markets, additionally explains future grant awards. Our findings suggest that the status conferred through connections to important actors in a network can raise the profile of a nonprofit and increase the probability of grant success.     

Chieftains Delivering: Testing Different Measures of “Pork” on an Irish Data Set of Discretionary Sports Grants

Distributive spending by a state is often thought to have an electoral connection, and the work on pork-barrel politics whereby spending is geographically targeted is extensive. However, there has been mixed empirical support for the two main hypotheses: (a) that it is targeted at marginal constituencies; or (b) that it goes to party strongholds. Using new data on discretionary sports grant spending in Ireland we offer and test a complementary hypothesis that focuses on the responsible minister as primary decision-maker. We find that the grants are targeted at the responsible minister's constituency. Moreover we test these using three measures of the dependent variable: euro value of the grants, success rate of grant applications and the number of grants allocated per constituency. Our hypothesis is supported in all three models, something we argue gives greater credence to the result.     

Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational Political Decisions

Intergovernmental grants are based on the interrelated choicesof: (i) the national government deciding whether to offer thegrant; (ii) the national government determining grant conditions;(iii) the subnational government deciding whether to acceptthe grant; and (iv) the subnational government determining policy,including spending levels, upon grant receipt. Empirically andtheoretically, scholars often study these decisions separately,leading to an incomplete understanding of grant-related behavior.This article develops a noncooperative game theoretic modelthat simultaneously captures all four of these decisions. Thisapproach helps to better explain puzzles surrounding intergovernmentalgrants, including the ‘flypaper effect,’ asymmetricresponses of recipient governments to grant increases and decreases,the grant-acceptance decisions of subnational governments, andtradeoffs between the size of grants and the strings that areattached.     

The (non) equivalence theorem when there are matching grants as well as lump sum grants

In developing their influential equivalence theorem Bradford and Oates (1971) implicitly assume that there is a lump sum grant only. This paper explores whether the equivalence result continues to hold when the lump sum grant is part of a program of grants-in-aid which includes a matching grant. It is shown that the equivalence results as stated by Bradford and Oates does not hold in these more general circumstances; however, a much weaker equivalence result does hold. This finding is important because there has been a tendency in the empirical literature to assume that the equivalence result holds under quite general circumstances. It is also shown here that the combined use of lump sum and matching grants can produce a reverse flypaper effect.     

The Fly Ball Effect: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Impacts of Short‐Term Seed Grants

The federal government has long used grants‐in‐aid to encourage state and local governments to carry out federal policies. Little research has been done that examines how short‐term seed grants affect program continuation. We propose the “fly ball effect” as a theoretical framework for understanding how seed money should impact program maintenance. Our theory suggests that short‐term seed grants by themselves should result in considerable funding uncertainty and program eliminations or stagnation once the initial grant money expires. We use data from drug court start‐ups in four states to provide empirical support for our theory. We argue that understanding the logic of the fly ball effect can help granting governments to improve the effectiveness of their grant funding systems, at least as measured by strong program continuation and expansion.     

Real and perceived effects of changing the grant system from specific to general grants

The paper is based on a study of the 1993 Finnish grant reform, changing from a system with earmarked matching grants to a system with general, non-matching grants. The analysis of cross-sectional data confirms the “fly-paper effect” and also that matching grants have a stronger stimulating effect than non-matching grants on local expenditure. The fly-paper effect is then modified to take account of the distribution of power inside local government. The change to general grants without central government supervision might mean more power to the central management in the local government and a diminished power for sector officers and groups dependent on the sector services. Perceptions of principal actors in the local government budget process were that the reform changed the distribution of power, in some municipalities to the disadvantage of locally small weak groups that could benefit under the old system of earmarked matching grants.     

Political Economy of Grant Allocations: The Case of Federal Highway Demonstration Grants

This article examines the political economy of U.S. federalhighway demonstration grant allocations. Demonstration grantsare a rapidly growing segment of federal highway grants directlyearmarked for a congressional district by Congress, unlike themajority of highway grants where Congress determines a formulaand allocates funds accordingly to states. Our empirical analysis,considering the period 1983–2003, suggests that a state'sability to attract demonstration project grants is positivelyinfluenced by its contributions to the highway trust fund andpolitical variables, and it is not affected by the formula highwayaid and vehicle miles traveled in a state.     

Intergovernmental grants and successful tax limitation referenda

Analyses of fiscal limitation referenda have typically ignored the role of institutional structure in referenda outcomes. This article demonstrates the importance of such structure through the investigation of intergovernmental grants in a model of federal tax rate determination. Tax limitation referenda are shown to depend upon both the use of tax rates as a grant disbursement criterion as well as the size of the proposed tax cut.     

Comment on Jill Khadduri's “should the housing voucher program become a state‐administered block grant?” A housing voucher block grant is a bad idea

Abstract

Khadduri argues for a well‐designed voucher block grant, phased in over several years. But proposals under consideration are more likely to undermine the effectiveness of vouchers than address their limitations. The most important advantage of housing vouchers is that they give recipients the freedom to choose the kind of housing and the location that best meet their needs. Although the current program is not living up to its potential, strategies for making it work better can be implemented without a block grant. Supporters of block grants claim welfare reform as a model, but none of the factors that contributed to declining caseloads under Temporary Assistance to Needy Families apply to housing. The single biggest problem with the housing voucher program is that federal spending for affordable housing is woefully inadequate. Instead of addressing this issue, a block grant would make housing hardship a state rather than a federal problem.     

Evaluating and redesigning subsidy policies for home rehabilitation

A method is developed for empirically estimating the direct leveraging, indirect leveraging, and externality benefits accruing from home rehabilitation subsidy policies. The method is applied to two single-family home rehabilitation subsidy programs administered by Minneapolis from 1976 to 1980. Multivariate statistical analysis of sampled homeowners reveals that for each dollar of grant and loan received, all else equal, participants spent $1.62 and $0.345 more, respectively, of their own funds on home upkeep, all expressed as annual averages for the period. A tentative finding of indirect effects on proximate homeowners' confidence in the neighborhood and concomitant rehabilitation expenditures is also observed. These home improvements, in turn, created an additional aesthetic externality benefit.Benefit-cost analyses employing estimated parameter values are conducted. Results show that both grants and loans are net beneficial from the societal perspective. From the budgetary perspective of the public sector, the grants program was net beneficial. Loan programs involving very low interest rates, deferred payments, and/or lengthy repayment schedules typically were not. Under wide ranges of parameter values, however, subsidized loans can be devised which yield superior budgetary efficiency to grants.These findings suggest that home rehabilitation subsidy policies should be redesigned so that the mix of grants and loans for individual recipients is varied in order to enhance budgetary efficiency. The central principle is to require that recipients who can afford to do so take out loans on terms which render them more net beneficial than grants, before any grants are awarded.