Having One's Cake and Eating It Too: Cameron's Conservatives and Immigration

The May 2010 general election represented a change in tone on immigration and asylum policy for the Conservative party. Although its manifesto still contained a promise to limit numbers and expressed concern about the abuse of student visas, the Party's previous fixation with asylum seekers had disappeared. This article considers the rationale for these developments in the light of David Cameron's election as leader in late 2005 and his efforts from then on to reposition his party. Cameron's initial silence on this issue and his appointment of a moderate as immigration spokesman were part of an attempt both to shift the focus onto the economic impact of migration and, more broadly, to ‘decontaminate the Tory brand’ in order to gain ‘permission to be heard’ by small‐l liberals who were critical to the Party's electoral recovery but alienated by hard‐line stances. That said, immigration was never entirely forgotten even in this early period and was always seen, so long as it was carefully handled, as an issue capable of benefitting the Tories. As such, it was skilfully factored back into the Party's offer from late 2007 onwards. In government, the Conservatives may have the upper hand on immigration over their junior coalition partner, but this is no guarantee that they will be able to deliver the outcomes they promised     

Mis-marketing the Conservatives: The Limitations of Style over Substance

Every Tory leader since 1997 has made significant attempts to use marketing; the most recent, Michael Howard, appointed the first ever UK party Marketing Director to head a specialised Marketing Department. However, whilst the Conservatives have made use of the tools of marketing (polling, focus groups, public listening exercises, communication) they have misunderstood the concept of political marketing, which is concerned with creating a unified political product that is responsive to voter demands. Political marketing has hitherto not worked for the Conservative party. This is because there is a lack of a supportive internal culture that accepts the party change necessary to produce a market-orientated political product including policy, leadership and candidates. If political marketing is only used to sell a product that the party elite rather than the British public wants, it will never help the Conservatives regain control of government.     

Welsh Devolution and the Union: Reform Debates after Brexit

The survey addresses three key reform debates relating to devolution in Wales. These concern first, the case for the further devolution of powers, notably those over criminal justice and policing; second, the defence of Wales’ devolved powers in the context of Brexit; and third, the rooting of devolution in new constitutional ideals, primarily the Welsh government’s preferred model of the UK as a voluntary association of nations, or the alternative pressed by the independence movement. In each case, there are strong pressures within Wales for resolutions which sustain and develop devolution; and in the case of independence, have the potential, with reform debates elsewhere, to transform the UK Union. However, there are also grounds for reflecting on the contested nature of further change, the long road that a case for independence may yet have to travel, and the interests of UK government.     

A Changing UK in a Changing Europe: The UK State between European Union and Devolution

Two issues currently dominate the UK's constitutional landscape: the UK's membership of the European Union (EU) on the one hand; and the unsettled constitutional settlements between the UK and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the other. This article considers these two issues in concert. It stresses the distinct relationships between the EU and the devolved territories within the UK—concerning both devolved and non‐devolved policy areas—highlighting the salience of a devolved perspective in any consideration of UK–EU relations. Despite its importance, sensitivity to this has been lacking. The article explores the implications of a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome on the future of the internal territorial dynamics within the UK. While there are too many unknowns to be certain of anything, that there will be knock‐on effects is, however, beyond doubt.     

The Free Economy and the Schizophrenic State: Ideology and the Conservatives

This article focuses on Michael Howard's ideas to illustrate ideological developments within the Conservative party. It recognises that the ideas of a democratic organisation cannot be represented by the thoughts of a single individual, but Howard provides useful insights. He won the leadership unopposed in November 2003 partly because he seemed likely to perform well in debates with Tony Blair, but also because he offered the prospect of policy reform on a range of issues without a radical departure from the Thatcher legacy.
Soon after becoming leader Howard issued an unusually detailed statement of his beliefs. This showed him to be a convinced economic liberal, whose thinking has been heavily influenced by America. The main departure from Thatcherism is that he is even more antipathetic towards the state. This is difficult to reconcile with his support for UK 'sovereignty' within the EU, his hard line on law and order issues, and his insistence that there are no plans to privatise the NHS. It is unlikely to provide a platform for a significant Tory recovery.     

Bicameralism in the European Union: parliamentary scrutiny as a tool for reinforcing party unity

During recent years, the European Union has increasingly been portrayed as a bicameral political system in which political parties build bridges across the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. From this perspective, national parties’ representation in the Council should affect their members’ voting behaviour in the EP. Survey evidence reveals that most members of the EP (MEPs) frequently receive voting instructions from ‘their’ ministers. Accordingly, these MEPs should have a higher likelihood of defecting from their European Political Group. The observed voting instructions imply that the voting preferences of MEPs and their ministers differ. This article argues that parliamentary scrutiny may be one way effectively to coordinate on a common position at an early stage and, consequently, reinforce party unity at the voting stage. However, effective scrutiny depends on national parliaments being strong enough. On the empirical side, this article studies the voting behaviour of MEPs from eight member states during the Sixth EP. We include four national parliaments which the literature conceives of as being strong (DK, DE, SF, SK) and four parliaments conceived of as being weak (FR, IE, IT, UK). Overall, the results support the theoretical argument, thereby demonstrating how domestic-level scrutiny affects EU-level voting behaviour.     

Responding to the crisis: Eurosceptic parties of the left and right and their changing position towards the European Union

At the time of the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2014, the European Union (EU) was heavily affected by a multifaceted crisis that had – and still has – far-reaching implications for the political system of its member countries, but also for the European level of governance. Against the background of the strong Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 EP elections, this study aims to investigate in which way Eurosceptic parties of the left and the right respond to the multiple crises of the EU. Using data from the Euromanifesto Project from 2004/2009 and 2014, changes in the party positions towards the EU are analysed in the shadow of the multiple crises and the reasons thereof are explored. The findings show a general anti-European shift among the two types of Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, the changes in the EU polity tone are not determined by issue-based repercussions of the multiple crises, but by the EU-related evaluation – the polity mood – of the national citizenry. For far-right Eurosceptic parties, the shift is moderated by the level of public support for EU integration in their national environment. Among far-left Eurosceptic parties, by contrast, it is moderated by the more specific public attitudes about the monetary union policy of the EU. Consequently, political parties when drafting their manifestos for EP elections are not so much guided by the objective severity of political problems or by the evaluations of these problems by the citizenry. What matters in the end is the link that citizens themselves are able to establish between the severity of political problems, on the one hand, and the responsibility of the EU for these problems on the other. This has important consequences for understanding of the nature and substance of political responsiveness within the EU system of multilevel governance.     

Better Off Out? Britain and Europe

The largest ever rebellion of Conservative MPs on Europe took place in October 2011 with 81 Conservative MPs defying the Conservative whip to vote for a referendum on Britain's continued membership of the European Union. This resurgence of dissent over Europe has been fuelled by the crisis in the eurozone. The Conservative party is now an overwhelmingly Eurosceptic party, but Conservative Eurosceptics are divided over whether the Government should use the opportunity of the eurozone crisis to take Britain out of the European Union, or whether it should seek to negotiate a looser arrangement, or do nothing at all. Conservative policy on Europe has been further complicated by the coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and by the consequences for the British economy if the eurozone disintegrates. Public opinion is also divided. British policy on the European Union remains ambivalent and muddled because British aims are inconsistent, and because there is no consensus on where Britain's interests truly lie.     

European integration and electoral democracy: How the European Union constrains party competition in the Member States

The assignment of policy competencies to the European Union has reduced the divergence of party policy positions nationally, leaving the electorate with fewer policy options. Building upon insights from spatial proximity theories of party competition, the convergence argument predicts convergence particularly in policy domains with increasing EU competence. As the policy commitments that derive from EU membership increase, parties become more constrained in terms of the feasible policy alternative they can implement when in office. The analysis uses manifesto data at the country‐party system level for nine policy domains. It uses ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with country fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable and country corrected standard errors. Controlling for other factors that could plausibly explain policy convergence, the models also assess whether the convergent effect of party positions varies across different types of parties. The main finding is that in policy domains where the involvement of the EU has increased, the distance between parties' positions tends to decrease. The constraining impact of EU policy decisions differs between Member and non‐Member States. This effect is more apparent for the policy agendas of larger, mainstream and pro‐EU parties in the Member States.     

His(Tory): why British History needs Conservatives

British academia today is overwhelmingly left-leaning in its political orientation and especially pro-Labour. This article examines what impact this is having on British political history. It begins by demonstrating just how recent this left-wing preponderance is and how, as late as the 1990s, there remained a strong grouping of right-leaning political historians. This, the article argues, helps in part explain the relative vibrancy of political history in that era compared to today. Turning to the advantages a larger number of conservative voices would bring to the sub-discipline, the article identifies how those on the right are more likely to subscribe to different methodological approaches, have different historical interests and be interested in different kinds of political questions from their left-leaning colleagues. Most of all, it stresses how political diversity would help historians of every persuasion better recognise the ideological frameworks that inform their own work.     

Looming Issues for Scotland and the Union

The minor electoral gains for the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 2007, which made it the largest party but a minority Scottish Executive administration, have provoked a fundamental review of Scottish devolution. Political imperatives rather than reasoned argument seem to dominate the actions of those pushing for independence and/or greater powers for the Scottish Parliament. The renaming of the Scottish Executive by the SNP as the Scottish Government is creating confusion. The Scottish Executive's plans to move to independence are inadequate for the significance of the intended outcome. The unionist opposition parties could not agree to form a majority coalition but have launched a major review of devolution which includes the possibility of increased tax powers for the Scottish Parliament even when existing tax powers are not used. Federalism has been proposed by the Liberal Democrats and others but evidence from other states suggests that this is by no means a stable or certain solution.     

Measuring Party Identification: Britain, Canada, and the United States

The article proposes an empirically based reflection on how to measure party identification cross nationally, using data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study, the 1997 British Election Study, and the 1996 American National Election Study. These studies included both traditional national questions and a new common one, which allows for an assessment of the effects of question wording on the distribution and correlates of party identification. We show that the distribution of party identification is strongly affected by question wording and that the relationship between party identification and variables such as party and leader ratings, and voting behavior does not quite conform to theoretical expectations. We point out problems in the wording of party identification questions and propose an alternative formulation.     

Money Matters: The Financing of the Conservative Party

The article examines the financing of the Conservative Party in the aftermath of the 2001 general election. An examination of the party's income and expenditure shows that pre-2001 patterns remain - the Conservatives are the poorer of the two main parties but continue to be the principal recipient of corporate and in-kind donations. However, the article also demonstrates that income rose sharply in the aftermath of the change of leadership in 2003, suggesting that this change may have stimulated donations. Also, as for other parties, questions of probity continue to arise following larger donations but, like Labour, the Conservatives oppose any caps on political giving.     

The Extra-Parliamentary Tory Party: McKenzie Revisited

This chapter almost coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of Robert McKenzie's British Political Parties , a study which contested that power in the Tory party was centralised in its Parliamentary leadership, with its constituency members having only a marginal influence. The chapter revisits McKenzie's analysis in the light of developments since 2001, particularly the victory of Iain Duncan Smith in that year's 'democratised' Conservative leadership contest.
The chapter argues that Duncan Smith's victory strengthened McKenzie's claim that democratised parties are seldom popular, and describes how IDS, ironically, spawned reforms that diminished his extra-Parliamentary supporters. But the chapter is also an updated reminder that McKenzie underrated grass root power in certain areas - notably candidate selection - and suggests a lesson from the Tories' short-lived revival under Michael Howard, namely that long-term party recovery requires an energised party membership as well as a competent party leader.     

From Ted to Ed: Electing British Party Leaders

Since 1965, British political parties have radically, and repeatedly, changed the ways in which they choose their leaders. In this article, I explain how and why these changes occurred and assess the consequences of the ‘new’ selection procedures adopted by four ‘mainstream’ parties: Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democrats. In the first section, following Sjoblom and Stark, I outline a theoretical framework which purports to explain the criteria used by parties in parliamentary systems when choosing their leaders. I then examine the four parties in turn and consider two questions. First, how and why has the process of selecting British party leaders changed over time; and secondly, to what extent, and why, have the ‘new’ selection procedures adopted since 1965 produced different outcomes, resulting in the election of leaders who would not have been chosen had the decision rested with their party's elites and/or MPs alone?     

Office and Policy at the Expense of Votes: Plaid Cymru and the One Wales Government

This paper will examine Plaid Cymru's experience in government from 2007 to 2011. Drawing on literature on autonomist parties, parties in government for the first time, and Strøm and Müller's policy/office/votes framework, the paper examines where strategic 'trade-offs’ were made and what the consequences of such trade-offs were. The paper takes a qualitative approach, using semi-structured interview and documentary data. The paper finds that Plaid Cymru valued the policy-seeking potential of office at the expense of vote-seeking ones because of the importance of 'autonomist' goals, namely the 2011 referendum which saw primary law-making powers granted to the Welsh Assembly. Furthermore, the experience of governmental office exposed organizational vulnerabilities in the party's leadership structures which undermined the ability to construct an effective vote-winning strategy at the 2011 Welsh election, where the party lost four seats.     

Enoch Powell and the Conservative Party: Reflections on an Ambiguous Legacy

This article examines Enoch Powell's ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in relation to the Conservative party. Powell's speech created an additional challenge to a Conservative party already weakened by the loss of the 1964 and 1966 elections and by the failure of the newly elected leader, Edward Heath, to impress his authority decisively on the party. Powell had some parliamentary support but his real following was concentrated in the Conservative grass roots. Powell lost the support of the liberal‐minded Shadow Cabinet; but after 1968 the Conservatives nevertheless moved to the right on the issue, especially after Mrs. Thatcher became leader in 1975. His speech has cast a long shadow as the party has sought to modernise in more recent times and to appeal to a more racially diverse electorate.     

Doomed to Defeat? Electoral Support and the Conservative Party

This article recaps the main trends in public opinion and electoral support for the Conservative party since the last general election in June 2001 by examining the overall polling data relating to party popularity. The article also considers by-elections, local elections and leadership change, as well as the most recent elections in 2004. The various challenges the party faces as it attempts to position itself as a credible alternative government to the Labour party under Tony Blair are considered.
Given the clear biases of the electoral system used for the House of Commons, which are certain to benefit Labour substantially even if the Conservatives get close to them in terms of overall vote share, or indeed even overtake them, it still seems unlikely that such success will be sufficient to achieve much more than to reduce Tony Blair's House of Commons majority in 2005.     

Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.