Measuring portfolio salience in Eastern European parliamentary democracies

Abstract.  This article presents the results of an expert survey of 14 Eastern European countries on the subject of portfolio salience. Respondents provided ratings of the relative value of all ministerial portfolios in these countries over the years 1990–2002. The ratings are unique in the study of Eastern Europe and appear to possess the characteristics of comprehensiveness and reliability. Comparing the results with a similar survey of Western Europe indicates that individual portfolios are rated nearly identically in both regions. Some significant differences, however, emerge when we look separately at more advanced and less advanced Eastern European countries. Various suggestions are made for how scholars can use these new data in future work.     

European Commission merger control: Combining competition and the creation of larger European firms

The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the ‘neoliberal’ Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding ‘national champion’ firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a ‘merger‐constraining’ policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an ‘integrationist policy’ of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are ‘likely’ for the ‘merger‐constraining’ view – banking, energy and telecommunications – and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former ‘national champion’ firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the ‘industrial policy’ aim of aiding the development of larger European firms.     

The anatomy of autonomy: Reassessing the autonomy of the European Commission

Abstract.  The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive institution of the European Union (EU). Yet, the factual autonomy of the Commission remains largely unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it. This study reassesses the behavioural autonomy of the Commission, as well as organisational conditions thereof. The article utilises one under-researched laboratory of the Commission: temporary officials (SNEs). SNEs may serve as a crucial test-bed of Commission autonomy due to their ambiguous affiliation towards the Commission. Whereas past studies claim that SNEs have a predominantly intergovernmental behavioural pattern, this study demonstrates that the SNEs blend departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby safeguarding their behavioural autonomy. Understanding Commission autonomy requires that the organisational anatomy of the Commission organisation be carefully considered. The organisational anatomy is measured by considering four independent variables: the organisational composition of the Commission services; organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance; recruitment procedures of Commission officials through a so-called 'submarine' approach; and socialisation dynamics inside the Commission. The autonomy of the Commission is organisationally contingent and not only subject to what has been called 'actors' conspicuous desire for autonomy'.     

Government-opposition dynamics in the European Union: The Santer Commission resignation crisis

Abstract.  This article seeks to shed light on the sources of government-opposition dynamics in the European Union (EU). It considers the ideological left-right divide and the sovereignty-integration dimension as potential sources of a government-opposition cleavage in the EU, as well as a 'representation dimension'. The empirical evaluation of these propositions is based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the political crisis leading to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission. The article finds that government-opposition dynamics in the EU are related to the sovereignty-integration dimension of EU politics and to representation in EU executive institutions, rather than a left-right divide. Both political beliefs and opportunistic motivations determine government-support and opposition in the EU.     

The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization

The idea of an inevitable process of centralization in the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) is a myth. Also, the metaphor of “creeping competences,” with its suggestion of a surreptitious but continuous growth of the powers of the Commission, can be misleading. It is true that the functional scope of EC/EU competences has steadily increased, but the nature of new competences has changed dramatically, as may be seen from the evolution of the methods of harmonization. The original emphasis on total harmonization, which gives the Community exclusive competence over a given policy area, has been largely replaced by more flexible but less “communitarian” methods such as optional and minimum harmonization, reference to nonbinding technical standards, and mutual recognition. Finally, the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam explicitly excluded harmonization for most new competences. Thus, the expansion of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU has not automatically increased the powers of the Commission, but has actually weakened them in several respects. In addition, the progressive parliamentarization of the Commission risks compromising its credibility as an independent regulator, without necessarily enhancing its democratic legitimacy. Since the member states continue to oppose any centralization of regulatory powers, even in areas essential to the functioning of the internal market, the task of implementing Community policies should be entrusted to networks of independent national and European regulators, roughly modeled on the European System of Central Banks. The Commission would coordinate and monitor the activities of these networks in order to ensure the coherence of EC regulatory policies. More generally, it should bring its distinctive competence more clearly into focus by concentrating on the core business of ensuring the development and proper functioning of the single European market. This is a more modest role than that of the kernel of a future government of Europe, but it is essential to the credibility of the integration process and does not overstrain the limited financial and legitimacy resources available to the Commission.     

The European Parliament and the Commission Crisis: A New Assertiveness?

This article examines two claims made about the "Commission crisis" of 1999: first, that the accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament (EP) was significantly increased; and, second, that the model of parliamentary government in the European Union (EU) was advanced by events in 1999. In analyzing the crisis and its consequences, this article focuses upon the powers of dismissal and appointment, and what these powers reveal about the capacity of the EP both to hold the Commission responsible for its collective and individual actions and to influence its policy agenda. If a parliamentary model is to develop in the EU, the negative parliamentary powers of censure and dismissal have to be balanced by the positive powers of appointment and enhanced executive responsiveness. On both counts—dismissal and appointment—the 1999 "Commission crisis" did not point to the clear and unambiguous dawning of a "genuine European parliamentary democracy."     

The missing piece: Measuring portfolio salience in Western European parliamentary democracies

Abstract.  Although much has been discovered concerning the resources and preferences that parties take into the coalition formation game in Western European parliamentary democracies, we know a good deal less about the payoffs they receive. Portfolios constitute an important payoff, not just because they provide access to patronage, but because influence over policy decisions tends to go with control over the key government portfolios. It is easy to discover which and how many portfolios each party holds in any government, but what is missing is accurate measurement of the value or salience of these portfolios. Some attempts have been made to measure portfolio salience, but they have lacked one or more of the following properties: cross-national scope, country-specific measurement, coverage of the full set of postwar portfolios, measurement by multiple experts and measurement at the interval level. In this article, we present a new data contribution: a set of portfolio salience scores that possesses all of these properties for 14 Western European countries derived from an expert survey. We demonstrate the comprehensiveness and reliability of the ratings, and undertake some preliminary analyses that show what the ratings reveal about parliamentary government in Western Europe.     

The Compound Machinery of Government: The Case of Seconded Officials in the European Commission

This article explores the compound machinery of government. Attention is directed toward decision making within the core executive of the European Union—the European Commission. The article studies seconded national civil servants (SNEs) hired on short‐term contracts. The analysis benefits from an original and rich body of surveys and interview data derived from current and former SNEs. The decision‐making dynamics of SNEs are shown to contain a compound mix of departmental, epistemic, and supranational dynamics. This study clearly demonstrates that the socializing power of the Commission is conditional and only partly sustained when SNEs exit the Commission. Any long‐lasting effect of socialization within European Union's executive machinery of government is largely absent. The compound decision‐making dynamics of SNEs are explained by (1) the organizational affiliations of SNEs, (2) the formal organization of the Commission apparatus, and (3) only partly by processes of resocialization of SNEs within the Commission.     

Institutional Change Through Policy Learning: The Case of the European Commission and Research Policy

Research initiatives to enhance knowledge‐based societies demand regionally coordinated policy approaches. By analyzing the case of the European Commission, Directorate‐General Research and Innovation, this study focuses on examining the cognitive mechanisms that form the foundation for institutional transformations and result in leadership positions in regional governance. Drawing on policy learning theories, the study emphasizes specific mechanisms of institutional change that are often less noticeable but can gradually lead to mobilizing diverse groups of stakeholders. Through historical and empirical data, this study shows the importance of policy learning through communication processes, Open Method of Coordination initiatives, and issue framing in creating a stronger foundation for policy coordination in European research policy since the 2000s.     

Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

The "modernization" reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.     

How pre‐ and postrecruitment factors shape role perceptions of European Commission officials

Individuals' role perceptions are central guides to their behavior and choices as members of an organization. Understanding organizational dynamics thus requires knowledge about the determinants of such role perceptions, as well as whether—and when—organizations can influence them. This article brings forward a theoretical framework allowing for both prerecruitment (extraorganizational) and post‐recruitment (intraorganizational) determinants of individuals' role perceptions, and examines its empirical implications using a large‐N data set of temporary officials in the European Commission. We find that intergovernmental and epistemic role perceptions are strongly linked to pre‐recruitment factors (such as educational and professional background), whereas postrecruitment factors (such as length of affiliation and embeddedness within the Commission) are the main driving force behind supranational and departmental role perceptions. This heterogeneity in the importance of pre‐ and postrecruitment factors for distinct role perceptions has important consequences for conceptualizing organizational change.     

Theorizing Implementation of Public Management Policy Reforms: A Case Study of Strategic Planning and Programming in the European Commission

As a measure to rectify the European Commission's "management deficit," the institution's authorities decided to introduce new forms of commission-wide strategic planning and programming in 2000. Drawing on semistructured interviews with Commission officials, this article tracks the key turning points, trajectories, and outcomes of events within the implementation stage of this part of the Commission managerial reform. As an instrumental case study, the article begins to theorize the process of implementing public management policy change. Major conceptual issues addressed include how reform decisions serve to activate the social mechanism of actor certification and how actor conduct amplifies such certification. Actor certification provides a link from reform choices to organizational change. In this respect and others, the research argument contrasts and integrates social theory mind-sets deriving from institutionalism and social interactionism (processualism) in line with research trends in historical sociology, organization science, and public management.     

Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption

The inspection game as formulated by Tsebelis (Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83:77–91, 1989) has the counterintuitive implication that crime is unaffected by the magnitude of the penalty. This paper demonstrates that to attain this outcome, it is necessary to assume independence of enforcer and offender payoffs. Given correlated payoffs, the comparative statics of the equilibrium yield an inverse relationship between crime and the severity of the sanction. In an application, we enrich the framework of Tsebelis by adding corruption stages and show that this can imply such a correlation of payoffs. Another interesting finding is that harsher anticorruption measures can increase crime incentives.     

Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games

We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric and asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the asymmetric sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest when payoff disadvantaged players move first.     

European Union enlargement: Power distribution implications of the new institutional arrangements

Abstract. It is argued that enlargement challenges institutional balances and in particular relative powers of national actors within the European Union (EU). This article concentrates on the impact of future enlargement (with the current negotiating 12 candidates) on power distribution in the Council of Ministers of the European Union and the European Parliament based on the decisions taken at the Nice Summit in December 1800. It uses the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices to evaluate past and emerging power distributions in both the Council and in the Parliament. A brief section on Turkey (the thirteenth, non-negotiating, official candidate) is included to evaluate its possible impact in the case of admission to the Union.     

Much ado about money and how to spend it! Analysing 40 years of annulment cases against the European Union Commission

This article analyses four decades of annulment cases against the European Commission brought before the European Court of Justice by dissatisfied Member States. Annulment cases are interpreted as incidents of a struggle between Member State governments and the Commission about policy decisions. Studying annulment cases for the first time in comparative perspective, three important patterns of variation are identified: with respect to the evolution of annulment cases over time, as regards the Member States as plaintiffs and in view of policy fields. Subsequently the data are interpreted on the basis of structure, agency and policy field specific explanatory mechanisms. Leaving the aggregate level, the two policy areas that account for more than 80 per cent of annulments are analysed: EU agriculture and competition policy. In the vast majority of cases, the dominant rationale behind annulments is not national objections to the supranational exercise of delegated powers per se or in specific policies (as most structural theories would expect) but to the way the Commission uses these competences to restrict how national governments may allocate European or national funding.