Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control

Research Summary

Focused deterrence strategies are increasingly being applied to prevent and control gang and group‐involved violence, overt drug markets, and individual repeat offenders. Our updated examination of the effects of focused deterrence strategies on crime followed the systematic review protocols and conventions of the Campbell Collaboration. Twenty‐four quasi‐experimental evaluations were identified in this systematic review. The results of our meta‐analysis demonstrate that focused deterrence strategies are associated with an overall statistically significant, moderate crime reduction effect. Nevertheless, program effect sizes varied by program type and were smaller for evaluations with more rigorous research designs.

Policy Implications

The available empirical evidence suggests these strategies generate noteworthy crime reduction impacts and should be part of a broader portfolio of crime reduction strategies available to policy makers and practitioners. Investments still need to be made, however, to strengthen the overall rigor of program evaluations and improve our understanding of key program activities associated with observed crime reduction impacts.     

Taking Deterrence Seriously: The Wide-Scope Deterrence Theory of Punishment

A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant.

This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more plausible deterrence theory of punishment—the wide-scope deterrence theory. The wide-scope theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, the article develops a deep deterrence theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. It describes how internal sanctions deter potential offenses and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism’s respect for neutrality.     

Deterrence and avoidance

This paper explores the effects of public enforcement, in general, and punishment, in particular, on crime levels if offenders can engage in avoidance activities. Avoidance reduces the probability or magnitude of punishment. In general, offenders can reduce their expected punishment either by substituting legal activities for criminal activities (the deterrence effect) or by increasing avoidance activities. This paper shows that increasing the direct costs of crime – by either increasing punishment or enforcement efforts – does not necessarily deter criminal activity and may actually trigger increased crime if avoidance is possible. Furthermore, this paper shows that increasing the opportunity costs of crime (e.g. by subsidizing legal alternatives or through educational and vocational programs) reduces both crime and avoidance and thus, in this respect, is advantageous. The conditions for these outcomes are identified, the economic mechanisms are explained, and an underlying intuitive approach for these results is proposed.     

Deterrence and arrest ratios

In the limited research on the origins of sanction threat perceptions, researchers have focused on either the effects of actively engaging in crime or the effects of formal sanctioning but rarely on both (i.e., the arrest ratio or the number of arrests relative to the number of crimes committed). This article extends this line of research by using a sample of Colorado inmates and measures arrest ratios and sanction perceptions for eight different crime types. Analyses reveal that the offenders report both significant experiential and arrest ratio effects. Theoretical and policy implications, limitations, and directions for future research are outlined.     

Auto Theft and Restrictive Deterrence

Although researchers have examined the attributes that make offenders more or less responsive to sanction threats, far less attention has centered on the manner in which responsiveness can lead to less detectible crime, or perhaps even more overall crime. Restrictive deterrence is the concept that explains this paradox. We explore it here using qualitative interviews with 35 active auto thieves. Findings suggest that auto thieves' restrictively deterrent decision-making strategies fell into three broad categories: discretionary target selection, normalcy illusions, and defiance. Discussion focuses on the data's conceptual implications for restrictive deterrence and offender decision-making.     

Deterrence and the tipping effect

Previous research has focused on certaintyznty of punishment as one. factor. upon which any dzterrent effect of punishment might be contingent and Auggested that it must reach a critical tipping level before the deterrent effect becomes evident. Using data on index crimes and clearance. rates for. Virginia cities and counties, bupport was found for both the. deterrent effect and the exlstenee of a tipping level. Attention was directed towand a more precise specification of the form of the tipping effect, suggesting that there is a single critical tipping level and that it occurs at a relatively low level of certainty of punihment.     

Deterrence: A Panel Analysis

Recently, two research groups have tested the deterrence model using longitudinal designs (Saltzman, et al. 1982; Minor and Harry 1982). They suggest that most cross-sectional survey research on deterrence is so methodologically flawed as to be arguably irrelevant. Moreover, using a research strategy which is clearly more appropriate to test the model, they uncover no evidence of deterrent effects. This paper represents a partial replication and extension of these studies, using two-wave panel data from a sample of 2,147 adolescents. Unlike the prior panel research, the findings here support the viability of the deterrence model. They also indicate that there are significant differences in responsiveness to the perceived threat of sanctioning in terms of sociodemographic characteristics of potential offenders. The methodological and theoretical implications of the research are discussed.     

饮水安全

地表水安全大城市居民的日常生活用水主要来自于地表水。为居民集中取水的水域被称为水源地,主要分布于江河湖泊中。黄浦江是上海居民的水源地,打捞出数千头死猪就属于水源地污染问题。在2013年3月25日环保部召开的常务会议上,环保部宣布将定期发布饮用水水源地水质状况。环保部还表示,将加大饮用水源保护、污染源排查清理力度,定期发布饮用水水源地水质状况。什么样的水源地才算是干净合格的?     

Deterrence and Individual Differences Among Convicted Offenders

Conflicting evidence exists on how criminal propensity moderates deterrent effects, and there is little empirical evidence on this issue from relatively experienced offenders. This study tested how variation in criminal propensity (operationalized as “low self-control”) moderates deterrent effects in a sample of convicted offenders in New Jersey’s Intensive Supervision Program in 1989 and 1990. Offenders’ perceptions of the risks and consequences from violating ISP were associated with whether they successfully completed ISP. Moreover, lower self-control did not diminish, and if anything, enhanced these deterrent effects.

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Aggressive Policing and the Deterrence of Crime

Recent analyses of the relationship between crime and an aggressive patrol strategy have led to no single conclusion concerning the deterrent power of aggressive policing. This research adds to that debate by exploring the effects of a variety of aggressive patrol tactics on several different crimes. The empirical analysis, based on cross-sectional data from sixty urban neighborhoods, indicates that there appears to be no stable complex of police actions that constitute an aggressive patrol strategy. However, one form of police action usually included under the rubric of aggressive patrol—suspicion stops—may indeed deter certain types of criminal activity.