Imminent Capture and Noncompliance: Probing Deterrence in Extreme Environments

Abstract

Understanding how deterrence operates under extreme conditions is both elusive and important. Studying suspect noncompliance in the form of flight during police-involved vehicle chases provides the opportunity to do this. These are crimes where the certainty of detection could not be higher, yet noncompliance is the end result and arguably comes because of the enhanced sanction risk rather than the obverse (deterrence) or in spite of it (defiance). Drawing from a qualitative sample of 25 auto thieves who have fled from the police, we explore their pre-chase perceptions, their motives for flight, and their decision-making processes during flight to probe the theoretical boundaries of perceptual deterrence. To this end, we pay particular attention to the mediating role of ambiguity aversion and belief updating in reconciling two seemingly inconsistent theoretical perspectives: risk framing and rational choice.     

Modeling Change in Perceptions about Sanction Threats: The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory describes a process of offender decision making that consists of two linkages—one in which official sanctions and other information affect a would-be offenders perceptions about the risks of criminal conduct, and another in which such perceptions influence the decision whether or not to offend. Decades worth of empirical research has concentrated virtually exclusively on this latter linkage, and in so doing, has produced an incomplete account of the deterrence process. This article develops a model of how perceptions of sanction certainty are modified in response to an individuals involvement in criminal activity and the consequences (if any) therefrom. Implications of the model are tested with data from a multi-wave, panel survey of 1,530 high school students from the southeastern U.S. Key findings include: the manner in which new information affects perceived certainty depends on the level of perceived certainty before the new information is received, and the extent of peer offending was one of the most influential factors in determining change in perceived sanction certainty over time.     

ON AMBIGUITY IN PERCEPTIONS OF RISK:IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND DETERRENCE*

Deterrence theorists and researchers have argued that the critical dimension of sanction certainty is its level—increasing the certainty of punishment from a lower to a higher level will inhibit criminal conduct. However, the true certainty of punishment is rarely known with much precision. Both Sherman (1990) and Nagin (1998) have suggested that ambiguity about the level of punishment certainty is itself consequential in the decision to commit or refrain from crime. Here, we investigate this proposition. We find some evidence that individuals are “ambiguity averse” for decisions involving losses such as criminal punishments. This finding means that a more ambiguous perceived certainty of punishment is a greater deterrent of some crimes than a nominally equivalent but less ambiguous one. However, this effect depends on how large an individual's risk certainty perception is initially. That is, we find evidence for “boundary effects” (Casey and Scholz, 1991a, 1991b) in which this effect holds for lower probabilities but reverses for higher ones. For higher detection probabilities, individuals become “ambiguity seeking” such that a less ambiguous detection probability has more deterrent value than a nominally equivalent but more ambiguous detection probability. Results are presented from two distinct, but complementary, analysis samples and empirical approaches. These samples include a survey to college students with several hypothetical choice problems and data from the Pathways to Desistance study, a longitudinal investigation of serious adolescent offenders transitioning from adolescence to young adulthood.     

Re-Examining the Functional Form of the Certainty Effect in Deterrence Theory

In this paper we explore the functional form of the risk-certainty effect for deterrence. Using a sample of serious youth offenders, we first estimate a simple linear model of the relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and self-reported offending. Consistent with previous literature we find evidence of a moderate deterrent effect. We then examined whether, consistent with a linear model, the effect of perceived risk is truly constant at different ranges of the risk continuum. Estimating a nonparametric regression model that makes no a priori assumption about the functional form of the model but allows the data itself to yield the appropriate functional form, we found marked departures from linearity. Our examination showed evidence of both a tipping effect, whereby perceived risk deters only when it reaches a certain threshold (between an estimated risk of .3 and .4) and a substantially accelerated deterrent effect for individuals at the high end of the risk continuum. Perceived sanction threats did, however, have a non-trivial deterrent effect within the mid-range of risk. The implications of our findings for both theory and additional research are discussed.     

THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro‐level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual‐level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self‐reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link—ignored in previous research—is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty‐four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence‐based rationales for more punitive crime control policies.     

The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.     

Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions

Sanctions for regulation violations are used to deter conduct which could potentially result in great social harms. This practice over-deters low-risk entities and under-deters high-risk entities, which leads to social losses. This paper analyzes whether and how such social losses can be mitigated. I show that this can be achieved by allowing regulatees to purchase passes exempting them from regulations at appropriate prices, although they remain liable for any harm they cause.     

严打政策的政治经济学分析

利用虚拟变量法对严打政策的计量经济学研究发现,严打政策对暴力犯罪产生了显著的威慑效应,而且还存在着后续威慑效应。但对财产犯罪和总犯罪的威慑效应并不明显,这和严打的重点打击对象以及暴力犯罪的占比是有关系的。严打的威慑效应是严打长期存在的技术基础,官员面临的现有博弈格局和成本收益状况则是严打长期存在的根本原因。     

我国民法中惩罚性赔偿制度新探

惩罚性赔偿的思想不仅仅只存在于普通法系之中,它是一种世界性意义的赔偿规则(罚则)。一般民事责任与惩罚性赔偿责任的社会功能相差甚远,且适用范围不一。我国历来民事立法中就有惩罚性赔偿的法律文化传统,当前在我国民事立法中的几个惩罚性赔偿条文不仅不能为当前市场诚信程度不高的信用环境起到充分的弥补作用,而且它们本身设计上也不尽合理。我们应当秉持开放的眼光,对惩罚性赔偿制度进行结构上的重构,这也是我国法学理论和司法实践亟待解决的问题。