The risk of birth defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and parents' right to know.

This Article discusses the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Jacobs v. Theimer that the parents of a defective child had a cause of action for damages against a physician for alleged negligent failure to inform the mother during pregnancy that she had contracted rubella and therefore might have a defective child, thereby causing her to lose the opportunity to have an abortion. The Article raises a number of questions that post-Jacobs courts probably will confront concerning the duty of physicians and genetic counselors to keep their clients informed; describes some social and medical developments--including recent progress in medical genetics and prenatal diagnosis--which are likely to make Jacobs a significant precedent; evaluates the court's decision to allow a damage suit only for the costs of treating and caring for the child's defects; and briefly addresses the question of whether the Jacobs case comes within the sphere of suits for what has come to be known as "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life."     

Why wrongful birth actions are right

A wrongful birth action is a claim in negligence brought by parents of a child against a doctor who has "wrongfully" caused their child to be born. These claims can be divided into two categories: those where a doctor performs a failed sterilisation procedure that leads to a healthy child being born; and those where a doctor fails to provide sufficient information to allow parents to choose to abort a handicapped child. The recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 77 ALJR 1312 falls into the former category. The decision to allow the parents to receive damages for the costs of raising and maintaining their child has generated much public debate. Despite the endorsement of this "wrongful birth" action, there are indications that the legislature will overturn the decision. This article examines whether there is a sound doctrinal basis for recognising wrongful birth actions.     

Abandoning the common law: medical negligence, genetic tests and wrongful life in the Australian High Court

The Australian High Court recently found that the common law could allow parents to claim tortious damages when medical negligence was proven to have led to the birth of an unplanned, but healthy, baby (Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1). In Harriton v Stephens (2006) 80 ALJR 791; [2006] HCA 15 and Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan (2006) 80 ALJR 846; [2006] HCA 16 the High Court in a six-to-one decision (Kirby J dissenting) decided that no such claim could be made by a child when medical negligence in failing to order an in utero genetic test caused the child severe disability. In an era when almost all pregnancies will soon require patented fetal genetic tests as part of the professional standard of care, the High Court, by barring so-called "wrongful life" (better termed "wrongful suffering") claims, may have created a partial immunity from suit for their corporate manufacturers and the doctors who administer them. What lessons can be learnt from this case about how the Australian High Court is, or should be, approaching medical negligence cases and its role as guardian of the Australian common law?     

Limiting your risks in the new Russian roulette--discharging employees

Time was when an employer had the freedom to discharge employees for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. As more and more employees bring claims of "wrongful discharge" to courts, however, employers' discretion to terminate employees at will is being restricted. This is particularly so where cases are presented before juries, which tend to be more sympathetic to the employee's plight. In the following article, the author examines the circumstances under which courts are now finding employers responsible for wrongful discharge. He also discusses ways in which employers can limit their exposure to wrongful discharge claims.     

Healthy law makes for healthy children: Cattanach v Melchior

When courts are forced to consider issues surrounding birth and the sanctity of life, it is inevitable that divergence of judicial, academic and public opinion will result. However, the issue of whether parents can recover the expenses of rearing a healthy child has long vexed judges and commentators of law, ethics and medicine both in Australia and globally, with considerable disunity. A cogent example is the recent High Court of Australia decision in Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, where the court split four to three and handed down no less than six individual judgments. The case involved the birth of a healthy child following an unplanned pregnancy resulting from a failed surgical sterilisation. By allowing parents to recover the reasonable expenses of rearing an unintended child until the age of 18 years, the decision has provided some limited and temporary legal clarity to the issue of wrongful pregnancy in Australia. It is seen by some as a victory for the reproductive freedom of women and the rights of the child. However, with uncertainty remaining on the issue of wrongful life claims in Australia and with legislative changes in Queensland and New South Wales that partly reverse the High Court's decision, there remains doubt about the future of such claims in Australia.     

Wrongful birth in New Zealand

Wrongful birth cases have been a feature of the common law. In this article the author examines wrongful birth cases against the background of the New Zealand accident compensation scheme. Initially cases were accepted under the scheme, but after major changes to the legislation in 1992, wrongful birth cases were declined cover. The author argues that this should continue to be the case, and that, as a result, New Zealand courts will have to make the same policy decisions in this area as those made by other Commonwealth courts.     

惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼研究

通过个别诉讼行使惩罚性赔偿请求权,难以对经营者形成足够的威慑力,消费者协会、检察机关提起惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼的必要性客观存在。即使将消费者协会提起公益诉讼的"公益性职责"与检察机关提起公益诉讼的"职权"勉强解释为立法者赋予消费者协会、检察机关以形式性惩罚性赔偿请求权,以该请求权为基础的惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼也只是受害消费者享有的惩罚性赔偿请求权的集中行使方式。除非立法机关为消费者协会、检察机关另行创设实质性惩罚性赔偿请求权,惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼注定与特定受害消费者存在密切联系,无法从根本上破解惩罚性赔偿金的计算及其发放难题。因而,惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼对行政处罚与刑事罚金仅构成补充,在完善惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼制度的同时,应当强化惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼与其他消费者权益保护手段之间的协作机制。     

Carney v Newton: expert evidence about the standard of clinical notes

In Carney v Newton [2006] TASSC 4 the Tasmanian Supreme Court heard a claim that the defendant breached his duty of care by failing to properly diagnose and treat a node positive carcinoma in the plaintiff's breast tissue. At trial, argument turned on the actual dialogue that took place during the initial consultation, with significant reliance on the clinical notes of the defendant. The court gave considerable weight to "expert" witnesses in ascertaining the acceptability of the defendant's conduct concerning the maintenance and interpretation of his clinical notes. This raises important questions in relation to proof of quality of medical records as part of the current professional standard of care, as modified by recent legislation in most jurisdictions.     

Plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility: Implications for compensatory and punitive damage awards

A criticism of the civil jury is that jurors' decisions about damages are capricious and arbitrary. In particular, critics point to the skyrocketing nature of punitive damage assessments as evidence of a system run amok. The purpose of this study was to examine the factors that influence jurors' decisions about compensatory and punitive awards. We assess whether, as the law intends, jurors' decisions about compensation are influenced by the severity of the plaintiff's injury but not by the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, and whether assessments of punitive damages are related to the defendant's conduct but not to the plaintiff's injury. Across three cases, mock jurors generally utilized relevant information and ignored irrelevant factors in their decisions about damages. Results are discussed in terms of the extent to which juror decision making comports with legal doctrine.     

What Is The Wrong Of Wrongful Disability? From Chance To Choice To Harms To Persons

The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing or future person––cannot account for that wrong since the choice to produce such a child cannot, under the logic of the nonidentity problem, harm that child. The authors propose that we supplement the person-affecting approach with an “impersonal” principle that takes the form of their well-known principle N. In this paper, I argue that the authors are mistaken to suppose that a plausibly articulated person-affecting approach cannot account for the wrong of wrongful disability. We can retain an intuitive, comparative, “worse for” account of harm and still identify serious harms imposed by the choice of wrongful disability. In particular, I argue that harm, both to the impaired child and to others, comes not in the form of that procreative choice’s procreative effect but rather in the form of its many distributive effects. I also argue that the rare, residual case in which a person-affecting approach would approve of the choice of wrongful disability does not function as a counterexample to that approach. As a separate matter, I address legal claims for wrongful disability, which are closely akin to claims for wrongful life. The legal claim is brought by the impaired child, not against the parents, but rather against health care providers whose negligent failure to diagnose or inform parents of an increased risk of a genetic or congenital impairment results in the birth of the impaired child. The authors’ treatment of the moral wrong that is done as impersonal in nature suggests that courts are correct to dismiss any such claim. Once we identify harm, however, the person-affecting approach can identify a clear foundation in the law for the wrongful disability claim.     

The moral status of wrongful life claims

A wrongful life action is a claim brought by a disabled child who asserts that but for a physician's negligence he or she would not have been born, thereby being spared the suffering of life. The action is inherently controversial because the alternative to an impaired life is non-existence. Lord Griffiths has described such claims as 'utterly offensive; there should be rejoicing that the hospital's mistake bestowed the gift of life upon the child.' This paper cuts through the rhetoric that the debate has generated and analyses whether there is a sound doctrinal basis for recognizing wrongful life actions.     

Harriton, Waller And Australian negligence law: is there a place for wrongful life?

Following the decision by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Harriton and Waller, the controversial action for wrongful life has been thrown back into the public spotlight. This article examines the legal and public policy dilemmas arising from a wrongful life claim in light of the Court of Appeal's reasons for its decision in the jointly heard cases of Harriton (by her tutor) v Stephens; Waller (by his tutor) v James; Waller (by his tutor) v Hoolahan (2004) 59 NSWLR 694 and analyses whether there is a sound doctrinal basis for recognising the claim within the Australian tort system. It will be argued that each of the legal elements comprising the claim fall squarely within the traditional tort framework and that public policy considerations favouring recognition of the claim outweigh those raised against it.     

Against Lumley v Gye

The Lumley v Gye tort of inducing a breach of contract is the foundation of strike law, although it also has a wider commercial role. We should reject the view that Lumley liability follows automatically from general contractual liability. Contract law is optional. Imposing its obligations on unwilling parties requires special justification. We should also be sceptical about the claim that Lumley liability increases confidence that contracts will be enforced. Such scepticism should be enhanced by parallels between Lumley liability and restitutionary damages for breach of contract. Some Lumley cases illustrate the point that 'efficient breach of contract' has a moral core, not just an economic core. For example, it can sometimes be unreasonable and unjust for parties to insist on precise contractual performance when they know that circumstances have changed in ways that the contract did not anticipate. For all these reasons the justification defence to Lumley should be widened.     

Wrongful life actions: the legal and ethical hurdles

This article discusses the various legal and ethical issues arising out of the cause of action for wrongful life. This action involves a claim by a child that but for the negligence of the doctor, hospital or other medical institution, his or her mother would have terminated the pregnancy and he or she would not have been born. The courts have generally rejected this cause of action on the basis of legal, ethical and policy considerations. The author proposes that the legal hurdles can be overcome and that the ethical and policy considerations do not outweigh the desirability of upholding wrongful life claims.     

错误出生损害赔偿问题探讨

在错误出生之诉中,因医生的过失未检测出胎儿有严重的疾病,致使孕妇生下有缺陷的婴儿,使父母为缺陷儿支付了大量的医疗费、照顾费和抚养费,同时遭受了精神上的痛苦。对这些损害,父母有权要求赔偿。在我国,可以适用侵权法和合同法来处理此类诉讼。     

Rogers v. Whitaker

The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales' determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is, or should be, cognizant that the particular patient would express concern about the risk. The trial court overruled the precept that a doctor could not be found negligent in warning a patient if the doctor acted within the purview of common practice, even though other practitioners may follow different procedures and regardless of the particular patient's concerns. In this case, Maree Whitaker became essentially blind after an unsucessful operation on her right eye caused sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although there was no question that the surgery had been performed with the requisite skill and care, Ms. Whitaker petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the ophthalmologist, Dr. Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility (approximately 1 in 14,000) that the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could develop. The trial court's award of damages was affirmed because, in spite of Ms. Whitaker's expressed specific concern that her "good eye" not be harmed, Dr. Rogers did not inform her of the potential risks associated with the surgery.     

Wrongful birth and the politics of reproduction: West German and English law considered

This article considers the law relating to compensation in tort and contract for failed sterilizations and failed abortions leading to the birth of an unplanned but healthy child in the Federal Republic of Germany and England. It uses a policy-based analysis which takes the social construction of gender as a significant factor in judicial decision making. It criticizes existing literature for failing to take into account gender divisions in society and points to ways in which both the framework within which wrongful birth cases are discussed generally and the limitations which have been placed on recovery specifically reflect gender stereotyped notions of female and male behaviour and sexuality. I conclude that there are three main areas of concern in the wrongful birth cases: a) the inadequate recognition which the law accords to women's work in the home when awarding damages for maintenance of the unplanned child to majority; b) the awarding damages exercised by the politics of abortion, which can lead to undue restrictions on recovery; and c) the difficulties which the law experiences when attempting to conceptualize an interference in a woman's procreative autonomy in the same terms as an interference in a typically 'male' sphere of life, such as professional autonomy. Thus there is an urgent need to reconsider the categories of the law of obligations such as 'damage' and 'compensation', which are central to the principle of individual responsibility for harm caused, in order to reveal their gendered content and differential effects.     

错误的生命之诉的法律适用

错误的生命之诉是近年来出现的一种新型诉讼。目前,法国、美国五个州的最高法院准许了原告就此提起的财产损害赔偿请求,而英国、美国19个州的最高法院、加拿大的两个省、德国联邦宪法法院均驳回了原告的损害赔偿请求。但实际上,全部或部分驳回原告方诉讼请求所持的理由并不成立,原告的确受到了侵害,受侵害的客体是拥有充分知情的父母的利益。