Geico and Google settle trade mark/keyword advertising lawsuit

Google's sale of GEICO's trade marks for use in keyword-triggered‘sponsored link’ advertising did not create a likelihoodof confusion where the keyword-triggered advertisements didnot include GEICO's marks in the headings or text, but a settlementbetween the parties prevented the court from deciding Google'sliability for trade mark infringement for keyword-triggeredadvertisements that use GEICO's marks.     

Whose trade mark rights? What the Microsoft case means for trade mark owners

Legal context. The article considers the influence of the commissionruling in the Microsoft case, forcing Microsoft to use its WINDOWS-trademark for an ‘unbundled’ version of the program inthe light of the trade mark owner's properties rights. The scopeof these rights is determined by the function of the trade markand the rights that the trade mark laws confer to the ownerin case of infringement. Key points. Trade marks are protected as property rights undercommunity law. They are the embodiment of past investments andtransform the reputation of the owner into a bankable asset.Consumers rely on trade mark owners' control over quality. Thisis mirrored by the rights of the trade mark owner to stop interferencewith quality and image, in particular in the context of resaleof altered products. Any interference that would be considereda trade mark infringement if committed by a private party shouldbe considered an interference with the protected property rightif caused by a government agency. This interference is not justifiedby the public interest because trade mark rights also embodyimportant public interests. Practical significance. If the analysis proposed in the articleis followed, intellectual property rights have to be given greaterweight in shaping antitrust remedies.     

A Case for Applying the Theoretical Semiotics in the Practice of Trade Mark Law

The application of semiotics in trade mark law is an interdisciplinary endeavour in its infancy. The author traces its genesis in recent years and situates it within the context of general theoretical approaches, in particular of an interdisciplinary kind, appearing in the trade mark law literature in the past. The purposes for which such theories are applied, and questions of methodology arising from this, are examined. In particular, it is observed that semiotic theory has, by and large, been used for the purpose of debating legal policy in trade mark law (especially in the United States), and that this has given rise to argument about the extent to which semiotic theory can exert any normative force of its own upon the law. This article offers a different perspective. It is sought to demonstrate the usefulness of theoretical semiotics in solving trade mark law questions in practice. The author emphasises that this involves no threat to orthodox legal problem-solving methodology (whatever one may think of the orthodoxy), and in particular does not require the normative use of semiotic theory. Taking as a starting point the concept of ‹trade mark use’, and having regard to trade mark law and literature in Europe, the United States and Australia, the author proceeds to demonstrate the proposed approach by reference to some current problems in trade mark infringement.     

Common sense prevails in trade mark transfer dispute

The High Court of Justice has interpreted Article 17(2) of theCommunity Trade Mark Regulation, which provides that ‘[a]transfer of the whole of the undertaking shall include the transferof the Community trade mark’, in a commonsense mannerthat provides that the Community trade mark shall follow thetransferred business. The Court gave great weight to facts andcircumstances of the relevant transactions in giving effectto the transfer of the trade mark rights.     

Keywords,case law and the Court of Justice: the need for legislative intervention in modernising European trade mark law

Recent preliminary references to the CJEU on online keyword advertising and registered trade mark infringement have exposed the challenges facing EU registered trade mark law in its response to new technologies. These cases and the challenges they pose provide a timely prism through which to examine the European trade mark law-making process and the role of the CJEU within that process. This article will employ an analysis of the way in which the CJEU has developed certain key new aspects of the law on ‘infringing use’ to explore concerns over the CJEU's role and approach. It will be argued that, driven by policy considerations, the CJEU has acted creatively to develop the law of infringement in ways that cannot be sustained by the TMD and CTMR and which are likely to cause increasing uncertainties going forward. With the European Commission currently considering reform of Trade Marks Directive 2008/95/EC and Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009/EC, this paper will argue that there is a need for more comprehensive and forward-looking legislative intervention than has yet been proposed and that such intervention will be essential to restoring balance in the European trade mark law-making process.     

Post-sale confusion

Legal context: Recent case law has established that post-sale confusion isrelevant to determining whether registered trade mark infringementhas occurred under UK law. This raises questions as to whatthat relevance is in practice and as to whether the common lawof passing off should develop accordingly so as to take post-saleconfusion into account. Key points: In this article, the authors review the case law on the relevanceof post-sale confusion to actions for trade mark infringementand passing off. They conclude that U K law does regard post-saleconfusion as relevant to trade mark infringement, provided thatthere is also sufficient similarity on a mark-for-sign basisat the point of sale. They argue that the tort of passing offshould develop in the same way. Practical significance: Brands can be harmed even where there is no confusion at thepoint of sale. The law's development to recognize this providesimportant weapons for brand owners, particularly in the contextof ‘look-alike’ products.     

VORSPRUNG DURCH TECHNIK ineligible for CTM registration

OHIM refused registration as a Community trade mark of the wordsVORSPRUNG DURCH TECHNIK in the name of Audi AG for goods andservices in Classes 9, 14, 25, 28, 37–40, and 42 on thegrounds that the mark was devoid of any distinctive character.Audi's action for annulment of this decision was dismissed bythe CFI.     

Fleeting fame under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006

Legal context: When Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in1996, it intended to create a uniform federal cause of actionfor trade mark dilution. Unfortunately, the statutory languageselected by Congress created certain ambiguities, includinghow famous a trade mark had to be to merit dilution protectionunder the statute. Confusion developed as to whether a markmerely needed renown in a limited geographic area or industry—aconcept that became known as ‘niche fame’—orwhether it needed national renown to qualify as a ‘famousmark’. Key points: In 2006, Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision Actand therein provided a concrete definition for a famous markthat ostensibly removed the ability to qualify for dilutionrelief where the mark was famous only within a particular niche.It was uncertain how courts that had previously favoured theniche fame theory would apply Congress's new definition. However,a district court in the Ninth Circuit, one of the strongestproponents of niche fame, recently held that niche fame is nolonger a viable theory under the Lanham Act or California statelaw as a result of the 2006 amendment. Practical significance: This decision portends that courts will fall in line with Congress'samendment and will deny dilution relief under federal law toparties whose marks are famous only in a particular geographicarea or industry. Additionally, the decision provides some guidanceand predictability as to how states may interpret the viabilityof niche fame under their respective dilution statutes in lightof Congress's 2006 amendment.     

Proof of use, continuity of functions in inter partes proceedings, and three-dimensional marks: Europe in review

Legal context: This article reviews the recent CFI and ECJ case law on proofof use and continuity of functions in the context of oppositionproceedings as well as the strict approach to three-dimensionalmarks. Key points: Unlike the situation in many common law jurisdictions, the Communitytrade mark regime is not a use-based system. Nevertheless, oncea mark has been registered for more than five years, the rightsthat it seeks to protect may only be enforceable to the extentthat the sign has been used for the goods and services it covers.In the context of opposition proceedings, applicants may callfor evidence that the opponent has actually used the mark onwhich the opposition is based. The concept of ‘genuineuse’ - which must be demonstrated in order to show thata mark has actually been used - has come before the Court ofJustice for further clarification. Where proof of use is adducedfor the first time before the Board of Appeal, the Court ofFirst Instance believes that, because of the principle of thecontinuity of functions, it is not out of time. That analysishas not been supported by the recent opinion of Advocate GeneralSharpston in the Arcol case and there is now considerable uncertaintypending a final pronouncement on the issue by the Court of Justice.In the meantime, the case law from Luxembourg continues to insiston three dimensional marks being like any other type of mark,whilst taking a very strict approach to the registrability ofsuch signs. Practical significance: The evidence of use to be adduced need not be quantatively significantand the ‘hurdle to be jumped’ is somewhat ‘lower’than was previously the case. Whether negligent representativesmay continue to use the continuity of functions principle tojustify recouping missed deadlines on appeal (particularly,when presenting proof of use), remains to be seen. However,what is certain is that three-dimensional marks will continueto be difficult to register.     

Advocate General says comparative advertising is not a matter of trade mark law

According to Advocate General Mengozzi, trade mark infringementis not relevant in assessing the legality of a third party'suse of an identical trade mark or similar sign in comparativeadvertising, but such advertising is governed exhaustively byArticle 3a of the Misleading Advertising Directive (84/450),as amended by the Comparative Advertising Directive (97/55)(‘CAD’).     

CFI upholds 'compulsory licences' of Green Dot trade mark

The European Commission was justified under competition lawin restricting the terms of trade mark licences for the GreenDot trade mark and, contrary to the view of the owner, thisdid not constitute a ‘compulsory licence’ of themark.     

It may look or smell like a 'free ride' but it is not 'unfair competition'

‘Free-riding’ on another product's reputation andbenefiting from the efforts put into promoting it can amountto trade mark infringement, even without much apparent damageto that product, but the law of passing off does not supportclaims of unfair competition where no deception or misrepresentationis involved.     

Significant 2007 case law on the Community trade mark from the ECJ and the CFI

Legal context: This article looks at the important decisions of 2007 on theCommunity trade mark made by the Luxembourg courts. Key points: The cases discussed concern the application of Council Regulation(EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark(the ‘CTMR’), Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2868/95of 13 December 1995 implementing the CTMR (the ‘CTMIR’),and the Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 (‘Directive89/104’). Practical significance: The purpose of this article is to give a quick overview of themost significant trade mark cases decided in 2007 by the Luxembourgcourts. The article has a practical bias and is aimed at readerswho wish to find quickly the key decisions of 2007.     

Trade marks plus? the role of trade marks in the global economy and the danger of over-protection

This article examines the economic role of the trade mark, both as a structuring device and as a means of adding value to products. It shows how its role as a flexible structuring device that provides a distinct focus for goodwill derives from the special meaning of the term “origin” or “trade origin” in trade mark law, this being what a trade mark is supposed to indicate. Firms can control the identity that a trade mark signifies and confers on the products with which it is used without being tied to any particular set of production arrangements. This article also considers how goodwill can be a source of economic benefit both through reducing transaction costs and, in some cases, through adding value to products. This article then examines the economic rationale for the legal protection of trade marks and shows how this is analogous to the rationale for awarding property rights over tangible resources and different from that for other forms of intellectual property right. The pressure to expand the legal protection of stronger trade marks is explored and it is accepted that there is an economic case for doing so. However, it is argued that the additional protection must be carefully calibrated through definitions that take account of its economic rationale and avoid the danger of over-extending it. In particular, this danger of over-protection arises from making a false analogy between stronger trade marks and the kind of intangible output that is the subject of the other forms of intellectual property right.     

Spanish court rules in 'Accessorize' trade marks case

The Barcelona Court of First Instance No. 1 found in favourof the claimants, owners of the famous registered trade mark‘Accessorize’ in their action for trade mark infringement,trade mark cancellation, unfair competition, and damages inrespect of the use by the defendants of the Accessori, Mr Accessoriand Accessori trade marks.     

Editors' Note

Thomas Mann wrote ‘time has no divisions to mark its passage,there is never a thunderstorm or blare of trumpets to announcethe beginning of a new month or year’. Well, that maybe true in his world; but in the world of the Capital MarketsLaw Journal we think differently. So for our first issue of2007, we do indeed start with a blaze