Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies

Provisions for a parliamentary investiture vote have become increasingly common in parliamentary democracies. This article shows that investiture provisions were largely introduced when new constitutions were written or old ones fundamentally redesigned. It also shows that the constitutions that endowed executives with strong legislative agenda powers also endowed parliaments with strong mechanisms to select the executive. It is argued that constitution makers’ decisions can be seen in principal–agent terms: strong investiture rules constitute an ex ante mechanism of parliamentary control – that is, a mechanism to minimise adverse selection and reduce the risk of agency loss by parliament. The findings have two broad implications: from a constitutional point of view, parliamentary systems do not rely exclusively on ex post control mechanisms such as the no confidence vote to minimise agency loss; parliamentarism, at least today and as much as presidentialism, is the product of conscious constitutional design and not evolutionary adaptation.     

宪政法治文明形成与发展的四大特征

本文着重从双重的人性假设、成熟的公民社会、现代的宪政文化、健全的法律制度——来论述宪政法治文明是如何形成并发展起来的。     

论宪政约束下的电子政府模式

随着数字技术、信息技术和网络技术的发展,电子政府正在成为一场政府改革运动.本文认为,电子政府建设使信息控制权成为影响宪政结构的权力因素,同时对公民也提出了更高的素质要求,影响了公民权利平等;要使电子政府服务于宪政,服从于宪政对国家权力的安排和公民平等的基本原则,就需要对信息控制权进行宪政规划,对政府的边界进行改造,这在我国电子政府建设初期,尤其重要.     

Local Government in Transformation: The Case of Constitutional Reform in Yugoslavia

The previous communal system in Yugoslavia (since 1955) did not prove viable. Owing to its great size (nearly 500 km² and more than 40,000 inhabitants), municipality in this period didn't affirm itself as a real community. Having many abilities in developmental planning, it was at the same time dependent on the state in the spheres of finance and normative regulations. The difference between the sphere of local government (LG) and state politics was substantially blurred.
Given the changing social conditions (introduction of market economy, political pluralism and the forms of parliamentarian democracy), the need for repeated establishment of the system of local government based on the altered position of citizens in the political system becomes evident. In this environment it is necessary to reestimate the experiences of LG in particular Yugoslav regions (republics) before World War II, and simultaneously, take selectively into account the experiences and development in other developed European countries.
This article compares the constitutional regulations of LG among particular Yugoslav republics, and between them and the characteristic orientations in other European countries, enlightening it with the aspect of actual processes and demands of centralization and decentralization, regionalism, moving the regulation of communal and other everyday needs closer to the people in LG, all in the sense of post-behavioristic trends of the "bottom-up" approach to the processes of decision-making.     

宪政背景下公共财政的本质

公共财政是一种财政制度。财政制度的变迁就是从专制、人治财政走向民主、法治财政的过程。公共财政的生成与现代民主政治体制与市场经济体制的产生是同一个过程,它们互为前提,互相促进。宪政背景下,公共财政的本质就是民主财政。建立科学、民主的公共财政制度,既是经济体制改革的任务,更是政治体制改革的任务。     

Breaking the Constitutional Silence: the Public Services Industry and Government

Analysis of constitutional arrangements has been too narrow in the past, confined to examination of explicitly governmental arrangements. But corporate enterprises perform such important public functions, especially in the age of outsourcing, that they need to be incorporated into the constitution. The article develops this argument and proposes a framework for such incorporation.     

Local Government Complexity: Consequences for County Property-Tax and Debt Policies

This article examines the consequences of local government complexityon county revenue decisions in fourteen Texas counties comprisingthe Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston metropolitan areas. Thereare significant differences in the configuration of local governmentsin the two areas traceable to when cities, school districts,and special districts were created. County revenue decisionsare also affected by the different configuration of governmentsin the two areas. These findings challenge the conventionalwisdom that states create local governments. Local choices areinstrumental in shaping local government complexity. What government-typesare chosen, and when, produce distinctive patterns of governancefrom one metropolitan area to the next, even in the same state.Consequently, reforms aimed at making the county the "localgovernment of the future" would require perhaps insurmountablechanges in state and local structures     

From Semi-presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland

Within the framework of a 'mixed constitution', the Finnish political system wavered during a period of 80 years between genuine parliamentarism and effective semi-presidential rule. The new constitution, adopted in the parliament almost unanimously and carried into effect on 1 March 2000, aimed to reduce the powers of the president and to bind the exercise of the president's remaining powers more tightly to the cooperation of the parliamentary government. The constitution will act as a buffer, preventing any recurrence of the presidential activism of the 1960s and 1970s, and the political climate is in fact amenable to the further development of parliamentary modes of operation. It is clearly to be expected that the strengthening of the parliament–government axis and the reduction of the president's powers will distance the head of state from the everyday policy making and emphasize his or her role as a support of the government of the time, a moderator in conflicts and a mirror of popular opinion. In the future, the functioning of the political system will not be directed so much by reference to the political capital and personal activities of the president, but rather by reference to the parliamentary constellation, party interrelations and the ebb and flow of governing coalitions.     

宪政与法治之浅析

建立真正的民主法治国家 ,理解法治、把握宪政以及解读宪政与法治之间的关系 ,是非常必要的。法治更多的是一种理念上的东西 ,要实现这个理念 ,就需要建立相应的制度 ,而宪政制度就是其中的一个制度层面。可以说宪政安排是实现法治的最重要的制度安排。     

Government Formation in the Nordic Countries: The Electoral Connection

Government formation is guided by several principles, such as majority, plurality and electoral principles. According to the electoral principle, parties that increase their share of seats in the elections should form the government, parties that lose seats joining the opposition. We analyse the fulfilment of this principle in the five Nordic countries. In Denmark, Finland and Iceland the majority of governments contained parties that both won and lost in elections, whereas in Sweden nearly half of the governments included only parties that lost seats. Only in Iceland and Denmark does election success translate to an increased probability of a government place in an increasing way. In Norway and particularly in Sweden big losers have better chances of being in government than big winners. Party system attributes are not related to the fulfilment of the electoral principle. To shift our analysis to individual parties, prime ministers come more likely from parties that are big winners. Winning does not explain the probability of becoming a coalition partner. If a party wants to be in government it is more important to avoid losing seats than to be an actual winner. Coalition partners are more likely to be mid–sized parties, a finding probably explained by the desire of the formateur party to maximise its policy influence in the government.     

论社会主义宪政的基本内涵

宪政的基本内涵是限制政治权力,保护人民的自由。社会主义宪政的基本内涵是:我国依据体现民主法治精神的社会主义宪法进行政治治理的过程,以及以维护保障公民权利和科学规范国家权力运作为目的的政治运行过程,其本质是以中华人民共和国宪法为基本出发点与前提,以建设社会主义政治文明为目标,以党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国、人权保障、限制公共权力为特征的社会主义国家关于实施、维护和发展完善宪法的政治思想、政治制度,政治运行状态的有机整体。     

The Three As of Government Formation: Appointment,Allocation, and Assignment

How does the Prime Minister organize her government so that she can implement her policy agenda? In our model, a Prime Minister appoints individuals to her cabinet, allocates their portfolios, and assigns their policy tasks—that is, she decides the relevant jurisdiction of departments and the type of proposals a minister can make. Upon appointment, ministers obtain expertise on policies specific to their jurisdiction and strategically communicate this information to the Prime Minister before a policy is implemented. Assignment allows the Prime Minister to implement her agenda even when she is constrained to appoint ministers whose policy preferences are far from her own. A Prime Minister weakly prefers a diverse cabinet. In equilibrium, the Prime Minister is indifferent between delegating policy or implementing policy herself.