Class Power and Participatory Equality: Attitudes towards Economic Democracy in Denmark and Sweden*

Proposals for capital sharing (i.e. the spreading of ownership rights to productive assets), also known as 'economic democracy', have been advanced by the trade unions in both Denmark and Sweden. In view of their redistributive intent, these schemes have met surprisingly little enthusiastic response in traditional labor constituencies. The article makes an attempt to explain why . An examination of wage earner attitudes (which goes into greater detail for Denmark) shows that the presently entertained proposals appeal in a cross-cutting manner to conflictual notions of class power and participatory opportunity. The result is a fragmentation of wage earner support.     

Power and Democracy in Denmark: Still a Viable Democracy

In its final report, the Danish Democracy and Power Study (1998–2004) pointed to a number of serious democratic problems such as declining political party membership, a growing gap between a competent and resourceful majority and a marginalised minority, the growing influence of the media, the transfer of power from the political to the judicial system, and the democratic deficit associated with European Union membership. However, the report also concluded that overall democratic development in the last 30–40 years has been surprisingly positive. This article assesses the development of democracy in Denmark in relation to the parliamentary chain of governance: the standard used in the final report of the majority of the Norwegian power study group. The conclusion is that, in the case of Denmark, democratic development has not – as the parliamentary committee initially expected – resulted in a systematic weakening of the parliamentary chain of governance.     

The Competent Cabinet? Ministers in Sweden and the Problem of Competence and Democracy

The competence of Cabinet members in general, and of Swedish Cabinet members in particular, is frequently put into doubt despite the fact that little systematic research exists on the topic. The meaning of 'competence' in this context is of course controversial. This study is confined to the occurrence of 'expertise': indicators of professional experience from the subject areas for which the minister is responsible. The sample includes 182 Swedish Cabinet appointments from 1917 to 2004, covering the full range of ministers concerned with economic and social affairs. The indicators used include previous political experience from the relevant policy field as well as relevant educational and professional backgrounds. When these measures are used, the resulting pattern is that few government ministers are truly amateurs at the time of entering the Cabinet. Moreover, there are few signs that the level of expertise so understood has undergone any dramatic changes during the time period. These results speak against the views endorsed by some scholars that 'the problem of power of politicians is power without competence'. If it is true that political experience has the potential to breed expertise in particular policy fields, it cannot also be true that the recruitment of full-time politicians as Cabinet Ministers indicates the absence of expertise.     

People and Power: Democracy after Brexit

The result of the 2016 European Union (EU) referendum revealed a disconnect between policy makers and the public, particularly those who could be considered part of Britain’s contemporary working class. Whilst there has been significant attention paid to the parliamentary activity to agree the terms under which Britain will leave the EU, there has been comparatively less attention paid to the causes of the vote, and what can be done to improve public trust in democracy. This article proposes a new public attitudes‐led policy‐making model, using democratic innovations and design thinking, to reconnect policy making to the public and improve political equality.     

From Majoritarian Democracy to Vertical Separation of Powers: Sweden and the European Union

The key problem in constitutional politics in the established democracies may be said to pertain to finding the right balance between majoritarian democracy, constitutionalism and effective decision making. From that perspective this essay examines the Swedish polity before and after the accession to the European Union in 1995. From 1917 onwards majoritarian democracy and parliamentarism were the praxis of the Swedish polity. But this mode of goverment was not written into the 1809 Instrument of Government, which was characterised by the separation of powers between the king and the parliament. It was first in the new Instrument of Government, adopted in 1973–74, that the praxis of majoritarian democracy and parliamentarism was codified. But in the 1990s a new form of dualism was introduced into the Swedish polity as a result of the country's accession to the European Union. On the one hand, there is an Instrument of Government characterised by the principle of majoritarian democratic rule. On the other, accession to the EU involves a vertical separation of powers on a major scale. Two conflicting fundamental elements, majoritarian democracy and vertical separation of powers, are currently incorporated in the Swedish polity.     

Post‐Democracy,Press, Politics and Power

Transnational media corporations now wield enormous power and influence. Never has this been displayed so starkly and so shockingly as in the revelations that emerged during the Leveson Inquiry into the culture and ethics of the press in the UK. This paper considers the implications of the relationship between media elites and political elites for democratic culture and media reform. The paper argues that the culture of press–politician mutual interest in which media executives and party leaders collude will continue as long as the solutions proffered focus on the ethical constraints of professional journalists rather than wider structural issues relating to plurality of ownership and control and funding of news in the public interest.     

Power and Democracy in Norway: The Transformation of Norwegian Politics1

The Norwegian Power and Democracy Project concluded that the parliamentary chain of government is weakened in every link; parties and election are less mobilizing; minority governments imply that the connection between election results and policy formation is broken; and elected assemblies have been suffering a notable loss of domain. Popular participation has moved from long‐term organisations and political parties to short‐term action groups and associations with immediate concerns. The judicialisation of politics has strengthen the legal system and weakened the autonomy of local democracy, while the expansion of market forces further affects the span of parliamentary rule. The mass media has become politically more independent, while adapting more closely to economic forces and the quest for return of investment. There has, accordingly, been centralisation of economic power through mergers and acquisitions following the globalisation of the Norwegian economy. The so‐called ‘Scandinavian’ (or ‘Nordic’) model is increasingly strained, while corporatism is partly weakened and partly restructured. After the end of the Cold War, there has also been a consistent strategy in foreign policy for the branding of Norway as a champion for peace and human rights. There is a cluster of corporate bureaucratic agencies around the high‐profile peace mediation and humanitarian engagement.     

城市基层民主动力分析——以上海市R社区居委会换届选举为例

城市基层民主的实际运行情况在某一事件的关键点上是清晰可见的,而居委会的换届选举以选举为基点将城市基层民主的状况凸现出来。其核心问题就是民主的动力问题,进一步说就是有关民主与选举的关联。因此,解读基层政治实际运转中民主的现实,需要探究基层民主,特别是在民主选举中的人、制度与利益等种种因素体现出来的动力问题。     

"民主的质和量"与党内民主建设

列宁曾提出过一个对民主建设具有重要意义的观点,这就是关于民主的质和量。民主的质就是民主的阶级规定性,民主的量则是民主的社会实现度;民主的质决定民主的量,而民主的量反过来又可以影响民主的质。因此,有着更高水平特质的党内民主,应该通过量的更大扩张,而不断地得到加强和发扬。     

Democracy as Procedure and Democracy as Regime

In the intellectual confusion prevailing since the demise of Marxism and "marxism", the attempt is made to define democracy as a matter of pure procedure, explicitly avoiding and condemning any reference to substantive objectives. It can easily be shown, however, that the idea of a purely procedural "democracy" is incoherent and self-contradictory. No legal system whatsoever and no government can exist in the absence of substantive conditions which cannot be left to chance or to the workings of the "market" but must be posited as objectives of political activity. The confusion results from a deficient understanding of what makes a society and an empty idea of "freedom". The objective of politics is not happiness, an affair to be left to the individuals, but it certainly is liberty understood as participation in the governance of the polity; it is also the pursuit of the common good, defined as the sum of the prerequisites and facilitations of individual autonomy depending on collective action, and as the realization of commonly agreed collective goals.