Political performance and types of democracy: Findings from comparative studies

Abstract. This essay explores the relationships between political performance profiles and major types of democracy from a comparative perspective. The article focuses attention mainly on the political performance of majoritarian and non-majoritarian government, democracies with small and large numbers of veto players, hybrid regimes, presidentialism and parliamentary government, referendum democracy and representative government, and established as apposed to partial democracies. The findings point to relatively robust and significant patterns of relationships between performance and type of democracy. Types of democracy are important constraints and represent at the same time enabling conditions of policy choices. However, a caveat must be added: types of democracy do not determine policy choices and they also do not determine the outcome of these choices.     

Consenting to Exclude? Empirical Patterns of Democracy and Immigrant Integration Policy

Studies explaining immigrant integration policies commonly focus on single aspects such as right-populist party politics or the immigration legacy of a country. This neglects the overall character of the democratic system within which policy-making unfolds. Research on empirical patterns of democracy, in turn, suggests that consensus democracies pursue ‘kinder and gentler’ policies and outperform majoritarian democracies in terms of minority representation. The article tests whether this conclusion holds for the specific group of immigrant minorities and analyses the relationship between patterns of democracy and immigrant integration policy using a new dataset on empirical democracies in 30 European and North American countries. Simultaneously estimating the character of democratic systems in terms of power dispersion and its effect on integration policies, the analysis reveals a distinct ‘Janus-faced’ pattern: while proportional power dispersion tends to coincide with more inclusive immigrant integration policies, pronounced veto structures tend to foster exclusion.     

What's at stake? A veto-player theory of voter turnout

Turnout is theorized to reflect elections' policy stakes. All else equal, a highly constrained policymaking context is expected to lower the potential policy stakes of a given election. This study tests if such contexts, which are characterized by multiple veto players, reduce electoral participation. According to time-series cross-sectional autoregressive dynamic lag models of turnout in 311 elections in 21 advanced industrialized democracies, additional veto players decrease turnout in both the short and long run. Moreover, the results suggest veto players conceptually fine-tune and empirically contribute to existing models of cross-national turnout. Hence this study has crucial implications for the students of electoral participation and scholars interested in the democratic outcomes of institutional design.     

Churches as Societal Veto Players: Religious Influence in Actor-Centred Theories of Policy-Making

The article argues that the study of western democracies benefits from a conceptualisation of Christian churches as societal veto players characterised by three features: their power, which depends on their potential for mobilisation; their preferences, which can be deduced from churches' official statements and which are often outside the political spectrum; and their coherence, which determines the size of their indifference curve. Conceptualised as societal veto players, churches can be included in actor-centred theories of policy-making. Particular attention should be paid to veto points, church–state relations and religious parties, as these are the features of the political system that affect churches' behaviours. A comparative study of churches' roles in stem-cell policies illustrates the use of the concept. The study shows that the Catholic Church is a ‘stronger’ veto player than protestant churches, but that this stronger role can have paradoxical effects on the resulting policies and the policy process.     

Democracies: Forms, performance, and constitutional engineering

Abstract. The conventional wisdom concerning the choice between majoritarian electoral systems and proportional representation (PR) – and, more broadly, between majoritarian and consensus forms of democracy – is that there is a trade-off: PR and consensus democracy provide more accurate representation and better minority representation, but majoritarianism provides more effective government. A comparative analysis of 18 older and well-established democracies, most of which are European democracies, shows that PR and consensus democracy indeed give superior political representation, but that majoritarian systems do not perform better in maintaining public order and managing the economy, and hence that the over-all performance of consensus democracy is superior. This conclusion should also be tested among the growing number of slightly newer non-European democracies, which are already old enough to have proved their viability and can be studied over an extended period of time. If its validity is confirmed – and the evidence so far is very promising – it can have great practical significance for the future of democracy in the world.     

The Democratic Quality of Institutional Regimes: a Conceptual Framework

Lijphart's spectrum of democracies – recently expanded by Jack Nagel to a sub-majoritarian sphere of pluralitarian systems which use disproportional electoral systems in order to manufacture majority governments from minorities in the electorate – is based on only one dimension: inclusion of preferences. Political scientists in the Lijphartian tradition wrongly assume that inclusion of preferences, which is an input characteristic, automatically leads to responsiveness, which refers to actual policy decisions and hence is an output characteristic. We therefore add 'responsibility' as a second input characteristic and employ it alongside the inclusiveness of institutional regimes. We argue that in representative democracies there exists a trade-off between inclusiveness and responsibility. This trade-off helps us to measure the democratic quality of institutional regimes. The now expanded spectrum of democracies based on these two dimensions shows that majoritarian democracy proper – in which governments represent a majority of individual preferences but not more than necessary – is the best possible combination of the two democratic values.     

The favourable factors for consociational democracy: A review

Abstract. The favourable factors for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy are among the most contested elements of consociationalism. The debate concerns both the favourable factors themselves and their status. The debate over the former is provoked by the inductive character; the debate over the latter can be traced back to an unresolved conflict between deterministic and voluntaristic elements in consociational theory. What is at stake is a trade–off between the empirical explanatory and predictive power of the consociational model on the one hand and its normative usefulness on the other. Shifting the focus from contextual variables to a theory of elite behavior may present a way out of the current stalemate. This would be in line with the recent interest in crafting democracies.     

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi‐Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Previous studies report that semi‐democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi‐democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi‐democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi‐democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi‐democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single‐party regimes.     

And the peace goes on? Consociational democracy and Belgian politics in the twenty-first century

Belgium has long been considered a copybook example of consociational democracy. In this article we first explore the nature of this ‘old’ Belgian consociationalism. We conclude that consociational decision-making was not a permanent feature of the system, but rather a technique of decision-making at moments where deep conflicts severely threatened the stability or even survival of the political system. Next, we ask whether Belgium can still be labelled a consociational democracy today. If so, one must be aware of the fact that the societal segments are in the first place territorial. It is the federal construction that still displays the typical characteristics of consociational decision-making. However, its stability so far cannot be simply explained by referring to elite attitudes, but rather to institutional features making the absence of a negotiated compromise unattractive to all partners.     

Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations

Abstract. In spite of a large number of disagreements concerning methodological and classificatory questions between Klaus Armingeon and myself, our substantive conclusions are very similar. Armingeon concludes that all three aspects of his negotiation democracy (consociationalism, corporatism, and counter-majoritarian institutions) result in superior government performance in selected areas – a finding that I interpret as supportive of my similar claims for the executives-parties dimension of consensus democracy (which consists of consociationalism plus corporatism) as well as for the federal-unitary dimension (which is the same as Armingeon's counter-majoritarian institutions). We are therefore also in broad agreement on the advice we can give to democratic constitutional engineers.     

American Democratic Practice,France, and Russia: Institutions,Values, and Alternative Democratic Experience

The US emphasis on democratic procedures and property rights profoundly distinguishes the American polity from nearly all consolidated and newly emergent democracies; democracies that place stress on more egalitarian notions of social justice. Interrelating institutional arrangements and democratic values through an application of George Tsebelis's veto players theory and Isaiah Berlin's notions of positive and negative liberty, we juxtapose the American and French democracies as we assess Russia's post-Soviet democratic consolidation. We focus on the policy-making proclivities of these three states, and a combined application of the veto players framework and positive-negative liberty dichotomy reveals a US policy bias toward the status quo as contrasted with a French and Russian system bias facilitating more substantial policy change. The 1993–1995 Clinton health-care initiative, the 1997–2002 Jospin-Left program, with attention to the 35-hour workweek and associated policies, and the 2000–2006 Putin policy agenda, with attention to health care and housing measures, serve as national case studies to illuminate our arguments.     

Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered

Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political‐institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context‐specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.     

Malapportionment and democracy: A curvilinear relationship

This article examines electoral malapportionment by illuminating the relationship between malapportionment level and democracy. Although a seminal study rejects this relationship, we argue that a logical and empirically significant relationship exists, which is curvilinear and is based on a framework focusing on incumbent politicians' incentives and the constraints they face regarding malapportionment. Malapportionment is lowest in established democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes with an overwhelmingly strong incumbent; it is relatively high in new democracies and authoritarian regimes with robust opposition forces. The seminal study's null finding is due to the mismatch between theoretical mechanisms and choice of democracy indices. Employing an original cross-national dataset, we conduct regression analyses; the results support our claims. Furthermore, on controlling the degree of democracy, the single-member district system's effects become insignificant. Australia, Belarus, the Gambia, Japan, Malaysia, Tunisia, and the United States illustrate the political logic underlying curvilinear relations at democracy's various levels.     

Normative Modelle, institutionelle Typen und beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster: Ein Vorschlag zum Vergleich parlamentarischer Demokratien

The article proposes a two-dimensional, institutional determination of types of parliamentary democracy, with respect to the proportionality of the electoral system and (quasi-)legislative veto points. Three basic types of parliamentary democracy are distinguished: pluralitarian, majoritarian and supermajoritarian. The typology has important advantages over the approach of Arend Lijphart. It has a consistent two-dimensional conceptual foundation, it can be directly related to central controversies in normative democratic theory, it can be systematically linked to action theory approaches such as Veto Player Theory, and it highlights the characteristics of democracies with majoritarian constitutions, which are systematically downplayed in Lijphart’s approach. The most important variant of this type uses a proportionality principle in the electoral system and a majoritarian principle in the legislative system. It is shown that in these democracies, legislative majority rule can itself contribute to “consensual” patterns of behavior.     

Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy

This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their “one‐time opportunity to get rich.” After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that “all politicians are crooks” and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by “acting like crooks,” even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation‐driven failure of accountability, which I call the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low‐quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.     

Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services

Why do some local governments deliver public services directly while others rely on providers from the private sector? Previous literature on local contracting out and on the privatization of state-owned enterprises have offered two competing interpretations on why center-right governments rely more on private providers. Some maintain that center-right politicians contract out more because, like Adam Smith, they believe in market competition. Others claim that center-right politicians use privatization in a Machiavellian fashion; it is used as a strategy to retain power, by ??purchasing?? the electoral support of certain constituencies. Using a unique dataset, which includes the political attitudes of over 8,000 Swedish local politicians from 290 municipalities for a period of 10 years, this paper tests these ideological predictions together with additional political economy factors which have been overlooked in previous studies, such as the number of veto players. Results first indicate support for the Machiavellian interpretation, as contracting out increases with electoral competition. Second, irrespective of ideological concerns, municipalities with more veto players in the coalition government contract out fewer services.     

Towards a professional civil service in post‐transition Romania

To what degree and under what conditions can a young democracy build a competent, politically neutral public bureaucracy? A crucial component of the transition from communist party rule to democracy is the creation of a professional civil service. Success along this dimension of state‐building generates administrative capacity: non‐elected public officials ensure the implementation of reforms initiated by political leaders. In the communist party‐led regimes of Eastern Europe, forging this new administrative class from its highly politicised predecessor took place as new democracies sought to overcome historical legacies and integrate with the European Union. A case study of administrative reform in Romania during the post‐1989 period suggests the importance of external influences in forming a civil service more closely adhering to the Weberian ideal of an expert, rules‐based bureaucracy. Through analysis of survey data from a nationally representative sample of the Romanian civil servants, the public bureaucracy has professionalised insofar as educational and training credentials rather than political affiliation are significant predictors of salary levels. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alternative patterns of welfare state development: The case of public assistance in the Netherlands

Among the numerous studies of the development of welfare states, less attention has been paid to the smaller European democracies. In an attempt to address this problem, this article investigates the development of public assistance programmes in the Netherlands. The historical record shows that the development of the Dutch public assistance programme has been more contentious than the development of similar programmes in other countries. An explanation for political controversy surrounding Dutch public assistance focuses on the manifestation of corporatism in a policy area that involved private charity organisations, rather than labour and capital interests. The incorporation of private charities permitted them to slow state encroachment on their activities. Implications of the case for the study of corporatism in other countries are discussed.     

The End of a Distinctive Model of Democracy? Country‐diverse Orientations among Young Adult Scandinavians

International research into democracy has uncovered severe changes in patterns of political engagement and participation. Even political institutions such as political parties and voluntary organisations have undergone major alterations. Scandinavian democracies hitherto have been regarded as exceptionally stable and strong due to their homogenous qualities of mass-based class politics, strong political parties, high degree of associationalism, peaceful labour market relations and developed welfare policies. However, three official democratic audits recently revealed that Scandinavian democracies have also been severely affected by both exogenous and endogenous constraints. In addition, Scandinavian democracies appear to be diverging heterogeneously from the assumed 'pan-Scandinavian' model. This article examines whether the distinctive country characteristics uncovered by the commissions can be traced among young adults. Three dimensions of attitudes of young adults are analysed – political trust, political engagement and political equality – using survey data obtained from students in academic programmes at the upper secondary level in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2000. Generally, the results not only confirm a country diversity that threatens to jeopardise Scandinavian homogeneity, since the Danes stand out as superior in most measures of political participation, but also, from an international perspective, young Scandinavians cannot be characterised as the most politically interested or participative between elections or even as the most multiculturally tolerant among today's youth.     

Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement

Abstract The ongoing use of the concept of 'corporatism' in industrial democracies has been stretched to include overlapping but still distinctive realities, which in turn often produce different 'lists'of corporatist economies. Consequently, this analysis sets out to disentangle the concept of corporatism and to suggest a replacement. It includes a comparative classification of 24 long–term industrial democracies in terms of the corporatism scores given by 23 different scholarly analyses. The divisions in scoring certain important but problematic cases (such as Japan) can be explained by noting differing emphases in the term. I then propose an alternative, more focused summary measure of economic integration which is clearly linear and which has no 'problem cases'. Precise scores on economic integration are given for four time periods from the late 1960s through the mid–1990s. It will be seen that the industrial democracies have always been dichotomised between integrated and non–integrated (or 'pluralist') economies.