论政府失信成本的控制

研究政府信用缺失过程中过高的成本闲境,有利于我们找到正确的降低成本的路径.政府失信成本过高根源于政府信用建设的滞后性,这种滞后性导致政府在制度、组织以及职能层面上的信用缺失.损害了政府的行政质量,增加了政府的成本支出和社会的资源浪费.控制政府失信成本的路径主要是加强信用建设,恢复政府在制度、组织和职能上的信用,实现成本资源的优化.     

物业服务企业成本管控分析

随着我国房地产市场的成熟和发展,物业服务企业已经从单纯的外延数量拓展,转向内在质量提升,而这一市场的竞争也将愈演愈烈。物业服务企业的工作具有空间分散、时间连续、内容复杂等特点,其成本管控不能脱离这个实际情况,同时也要考虑到物业服务企业未来的发展。本文从我国物业服务企业的收支分析入手,探讨物业服务企业成本管控的完善和发展。     

Transactions costs and the optimal instrument and intensity of air pollution control

Conclusions To what extent do the transactions costs of implementing alternative instruments for pollution control affect the choice of the optimal instrument and the efficient intensity of control under that instrument? In a comparison of Least-Cost Regulatory Standards and Revenue-Neutral Pigouvian Taxes, it is the higher transactions costs of implementing the taxes that make Pigouvian Taxes the more costly of the two instruments. However, a more practical comparison of instruments is between Politically Feasible Standards, Marketable Discharge Permits, and Revenue-Raising Pigouvian Taxes. Here, the relationship between the transactions costs of implementation and total pollution costs are in an almost linear inverse relationship. The lower the pollution costs associated with a particular instrument, and therefore the more desirable the instrument, the higher the transactions costs of implementation. Other factors such as political distortion and welfare gains prove to be more important than the transactions costs of implementation.Assuming that variable transactions costs decrease with the optimal level of pollution for regulatory standards but increase with the optimal level for market oriented instruments, an accounting of transactions costs results in less stringent control in the case of regulatory standards and more stringent control in the case of market oriented instruments. However, the percentage effect is very small. Moreover, it is smaller in both cases if marginal pollution damage rises with the level of pollution, as it is usually presumed to do, rather than remain constant as assumed in this paper for purposes of aggregation. A major conclusion of this paper is that Pigouvian Taxes are the superior instrument for pollution control when the raising of public revenues is a desired objective. However, the various conclusions of this paper should be viewed as tentative because the data on which they are based are no longer current. Moreover, the critical estimates of transactions costs are somewhat dubious. It is hoped that new data will be collected for answering the questions raised in this paper. When this is done, a more powerful approach, one that obviates the need for the artificial, one-dollar-damaging, aggregate pollutant, would be an expanded linear programming model in which the transactions costs are treated as separate coefficients of the individual pollution control methods. Separate sets of such coefficients, each corresponding to a different policy instrument such as Least-Cost Regulatory Standards, Revenue-Neutral Pigouvian Taxes, etc., would enable the investigator to directly derive solutions that specify the optimal policy instrument as well as the optimal set of pollution control method activity levels.I am grateful to William Ascher, Murray Weidenbaum, and two anonymous referees for helpful guidance on the paper.     

Cost disease versus Leviathan explanations of rising government cost: An empirical investigation

In this paper we reexamine the apparently conflicting empirics of Borcherding et al. (1977) versus those of Barry and Lowery (1984). The latter, designed to test the cost disease versus bureau voting power hypotheses on US Citibase annual data between 1947 to 1979, was retested for the longer period available through 1989. Second, and more importantly, we isolate and test for the presence of a second channel for the exercise of bureaucratic power. That channel is the bureau's ability to use its information advantage to capture a portion of newly generated government rents through higher personal benefits (such as higher salaries). Such an analysis (following West, 1991) requires first that those factors generating new rents for government actually result in successful bureaucratic rent-seeking in the form of higher compensation levels. In addition, the analysis requires that these “artificial” increases in bureaucratic wages show up as significant determinants of the higher cost of providing government services. Incorporating a constructed Kau/Rubin variable into the Barry and Lowery database is then shown to improve the predictive power of both the cost disease and bureaucratic power hypotheses for US annual data between 1948 and 1989.     

Institutional contexts of environmental management: Water pollution control in Guangzhou,China

In the past decade, Guangzhou (Canton), China, has produced mixed results in water pollution control: it has been successful in limiting pollution from industrial sources than from domestic ones. This article examines the case by reference to a growing body of literature in institutional analysis. The central arguments are that institutions affect the governance and management of natural resources by allocating decision-making authorities among different individuals, agencies and levels of governments, by affecting whether rules and regulations can be effectively enforced and by creating different incentive structures. These arguments help to explain the divergent governmental efforts and outcomes in the two types of water pollution control in Guangzhou. The article concludes by discussing the case's theoretical and practical implications.     

Blunt force regulation and bureaucratic control: Understanding China's war on pollution

In the past decade, China has increasingly resorted to top‐down, “blunt force” solutions to environmental problems; officials forcibly shutter or destroy factories to reduce pollution, at immense cost to local growth and employment. Why would a high capacity state like China resort to such a costly method of pollution control? I argue that blunt force enforcement is targeted at overcoming principal–agent problems in the bureaucracy. When institutions are too weak to hold bureaucrats accountable, political leaders increase oversight by drastically reducing the number of steps and resources required to produce a regulatory outcome—resulting in blunt force measures. I illustrate this logic through case studies from China's multiyear war on pollution. Using original data on blunt force measures, I then show how localities with lower bureaucratic compliance face greater blunt force pollution enforcement. These findings reveal that when bureaucratic accountability is weak, states pay a very high cost for cleaner air.     

Currency convertibility, cost of capital control and capital account liberalization in China

This paper provides a synthetic view of the capital account liberalization, capital control and currency convertibility issues in China. A quantitative analysis following Henry’s study¹ fails to provide clear links between liberalization, diminishing capital controls and Chinese stock market returns. An institutional explanation is then offered to complement the quantitative analysis. We suggest that the property rights regime is an indispensable institutional variable when studying this topic. Originating from the current property rights regime; price distortion, moral hazard and monetary overhang are the main impediments towards capital account liberalization and full convertibility. Therefore, property rights reform should be given the first priority in Chinese economic reform. He is the author ofProperty Rights, Renminbi Full Convertibility and Economic Development [Chanquan Zhidu, Renminbi Ziyou Duihuan yu Jingji Fazhan] (Wuhan, China: Wuhan University Press, 2003). This research is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No. 70273030). The authors thank Dr. Sujian Guo, Mr. Robin Child and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and Miss Cate Bain and Mrs. Patricia Merton for their proofreading. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.     

Lowering the Cost of Pollution Control Versus Controlling Pollution: A Comment

Dwight Lee (1999) shows that thecollectivity may be better, not worse off,when a technically ``inefficient'' pollutionabatement technology is adopted. Thepurpose of this note is twofold. First, toshow that once rent-seeking is incorporatedinto the analysis, Lee's qualified supportfor a technically inefficient pollutionabatement technology is at bestproblematic, and at worst flawed. Second,to demonstrate that it is possible to makea less problematic normative case in favourof the adoption of the technicallyinefficient abatement policy.     

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

The paper analyzes the coalition formation process in a global emission game with asymmetric countries where the number of signatories, the abatement target and the policy instrument are chosen simultaneously. Exemplarily, a uniform emission reduction quota and an effluent charge are considered. Stability is analyzed in a supergame framework by applying the concept of coalition-proofness. The analysis also considers the impact of impatient agents, restricted and simple punishment profiles. Two main results may be mentioned: First, paradoxically, IEAs achieve only little (if signed at all) if the externality problem is distinct. Second, our model helps to explain the frequent appearance of emission quotas in international pollution control despite the recommendations by economists to use market-based instruments like effluent charges.     

On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. For total costs the results support conventional wisdom, namely that the costs of regulations tend to be overestimated. This is true for 14 of the 28 rules in the data set discussed, while for only 3 rules were the ex ante estimates too low. For unit costs, however, the story is quite different. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit cost estimates are often accurate, and even when they are not, overestimation of abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, unit costs are consistently overestimated. The difference between the total‐cost and the unit‐cost results is caused by frequent errors in estimates of the effects of individual rules, which suggests, in turn, that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven both by difficulties in determining the baseline and by incomplete compliance. In cases of unit‐cost overestimation, unanticipated technological innovation appears to be an important factor — especially for economic incentive rules, although procedural and methodological explanations may also apply. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

A rational-voter explanation of the cost of ruling

It is well known that the average government loses votes — the so-called cost of ruling. We show that the loss can be explained as a perfectly rational demand for change in a median voter model, once the model is amended to let the two parties be visibly different.