The Rehnquist Court and Federal Preemption: In Search of a Theory

In the 1980s, the U. S. Supreme Court was expected to becomemore solicitous of "states' rights" and to reconsider doctrinesof federal preemption of state and local laws. Those expectationswere built on the Court's ruling in National League of Citiesv. Usery and reinforced by the Reagan administration's rhetoricand Court appointments. The record ofthe Rehnquist Court, however,demonstrates that it has backed away from vigorously enforcingthe Tenth Amendment and has erected only minor constitutionalbarriers, as in New York v. United States, to the Congress'power over the states. Moreover, the Court has not retreatedfrom finding implied statutory preemptions or from imposingits own dormant-commerce clause power on the states. The articleconcludes by considering a number of explanations for the Court'srecord and rulings on federal preemption.     

Indigenous Rights, Global Governance, and State Sovereignty

This article discusses indigenous rights within the context of global governance. I begin by defining the terms ??global governance?? and ??indigenous peoples?? and summarizing the rights that are most important to indigenous peoples. The bulk of this article studies the global governance of indigenous rights in three areas. The first example is the creation of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A second example involves violations of indigenous rights brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. A third case looks at a relatively new international regime created by indigenous peoples themselves??the Inuit Circumpolar Council. I conclude by using theories of sovereignty to assess the relative successes and failures of indigenous efforts to secure their rights.     

The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting

This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision‐making process to show signs of an SOP effect.     

The Reconstitution of American Federalism? The Rehnquist Court and Federal-State Relations, 1991-1997

This article surveys the U.S. Supreme Court justices' recentopinions on federal-state relations with a special focus theCourt's 1996 term. Contrary to some claims, the Rehnquist Courtis not reconstituting definitions of American federalism orthe function of the Court in defining federal-state relations.What has occurred is a revitalization of a long-standing interpretiveconflict about the deployment of government power within a legallyconstituted regime. Therefore, the debate in such cases as Printzv. United States, Camps New found/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,City of Boerne v. Flores, and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe isabout how the political principles contained in the nation'sfoundational legal and historical texts, such as The Federalistand other records of the American Founders, ought to be interpretedby the justices. However, despite the limited focus on interpretativetechnique, the justices' debate about federalism still has importantpolitical consequences that will affect future discussions aboutcongressional and state government power.     

The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy

A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which ideological divergence between the Court and Congress can explain variation in Supreme Court decision making. However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship. Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial-congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. An original dataset identifying all Court-curbing legislation proposed between 1877 and 2006 is then used to assess the influence of congressional hostility on the Court's use of judicial review. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self-restraint. When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court.     

Inter-Institutional Dynamics: Assessments of the Supreme Court in a Separation of Powers Context

Using data collected from a survey experiment, we examine whether information about the nature of the interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress influences respondents’ assessments of the Court. We find that political sophistication is key to understanding how individuals incorporate the separation of powers context into their evaluations of the Court. Political sophisticates give the Court its highest assessments when told that the Court and Congress are often in disagreement, and that Congress is most responsible for this disagreement. Assessments of the Court are significantly lower, however, when sophisticates believe that high levels of disagreement between the Court and Congress are due to the Court’s actions and when these respondents believe that the Court and Congress agree a high proportion of the time. These results suggest that for political sophisticates, the Court’s institutional standing is related to the balance it strikes between deference to Congress and judicial independence.     

Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) boasts one of the strongest oversight systems in international human rights law, but implementing the ECtHR??s rulings is an inherently domestic and political process. This article begins to bridge the gap between the Court in Strasbourg and the domestic process of implementing the Court??s rulings by looking at the domestic institutions and politics that surround the execution of the ECtHR??s judgments. Using case studies from the UK and Russia, this article identifies two factors that are critical for the domestic implementation of the Court??s rulings: strong domestic, democratic institutions dedicated to implementing the ECtHR??s judgments and an overarching sense of responsibility to set a good example at home and abroad for respecting human rights and the rule of law. This article concludes with a discussion of the steps necessary to facilitate better implementation of the ECtHR??s rulings.     

A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous Rights in Fennoscandia

The historic claim of the Sami to lands that they have traditionally used and occupied – an issue that has long been dormant – is emerging as a significant public issue in Finland, Sweden and Norway. This article develops a control-consociationalism typology to analyze bow each of the three states responds to Sami claims to their historic rights. Under a control situation, the cultural identity of a minority is almost exclusively determined by the laws, regulations and administrative procedures of the state. Under a consociationalism model, there would be a continuing dialogue between a stale and a minority within an administrative framework that the minority has had a major role in developing. The typology traces more than two centuries of administrative control by the three states and examines how existing institutions deal with the Sami minority. Interviews indicate that most authorities see collective minority rights as a component of human rights and, furthermore, that the Sami constitute an indigenous minority. However, the concept of aboriginal land title divides politicians and administrators; many oppose it or maintain that it is not really necessary. Many Sami rights activists, on the other hand, see it as a fundamental issue – even one of moral justice – that ultimately must be addressed by each state.     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,the Separation of Powers,and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation

Numerous studies have found that elite and popular preferences influence decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court; yet, uncertainty remains about when, how, and why the Court is constrained by external pressure. I argue the justices are constrained, at least in part, because they fear nonimplementation of their decisions. I test this theory by utilizing a recent study of judicial power, which finds the Court enjoys greater implementation power in “vertical” cases (those involving criminal and civil liability) than in “lateral” cases (all others; e.g., those involving schools or government agencies). I find that Court constraint is strongest in important lateral cases—those cases in which implementation depends on support from nonjudicial actors. My findings suggest that Supreme Court constraint is driven by the justices' fear of nonimplementation and is, therefore, dependent on institutional context.     

Reinventing the Governance of Public Finances in Remote Indigenous Australia

The economies of remote Indigenous settlements are dominated by public finances. The current system of governing public finance is highly saturated, fragmented and centralised, and this has a corrosive effect on local governance capability. The political accountability of leaders to their constituents is weakened in favour of an administrative accountability ‘upwards’ to higher authorities. New Public Management reforms have promoted administrative deconcentration, over political devolution, and this has been accompanied by an influx of public servants, Non‐Government Organisations (NGOs) and private contractors, and a decline in Indigenous organisations and local government. The end result in many settlements is a marked disengagement of Indigenous people in their own governance. There is evidence of considerable political capabilities existing within local government electorates. Decentralised financing arrangements can be used to catalyse these capabilities and then address deficits in administrative and technical performance.