Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting

This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision‐making process to show signs of an SOP effect.     

Inter-Institutional Dynamics: Assessments of the Supreme Court in a Separation of Powers Context

Using data collected from a survey experiment, we examine whether information about the nature of the interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress influences respondents’ assessments of the Court. We find that political sophistication is key to understanding how individuals incorporate the separation of powers context into their evaluations of the Court. Political sophisticates give the Court its highest assessments when told that the Court and Congress are often in disagreement, and that Congress is most responsible for this disagreement. Assessments of the Court are significantly lower, however, when sophisticates believe that high levels of disagreement between the Court and Congress are due to the Court’s actions and when these respondents believe that the Court and Congress agree a high proportion of the time. These results suggest that for political sophisticates, the Court’s institutional standing is related to the balance it strikes between deference to Congress and judicial independence.     

三权分立制度

国家的立法、行政、司法三权分别由三个机关独立行使,并相互制衡的制度。三权分立制度是根据近代分权学说建立起来的。近代分权学说由英国的J·洛克倡导,由法国的孟德斯鸠完成。它建立的根据是英国的君主立宪制,理论基础是与社会契约论相结合的近代自然法学说。     

The Semiconstrained Court: Public Opinion,the Separation of Powers,and the U.S. Supreme Court's Fear of Nonimplementation

Numerous studies have found that elite and popular preferences influence decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court; yet, uncertainty remains about when, how, and why the Court is constrained by external pressure. I argue the justices are constrained, at least in part, because they fear nonimplementation of their decisions. I test this theory by utilizing a recent study of judicial power, which finds the Court enjoys greater implementation power in “vertical” cases (those involving criminal and civil liability) than in “lateral” cases (all others; e.g., those involving schools or government agencies). I find that Court constraint is strongest in important lateral cases—those cases in which implementation depends on support from nonjudicial actors. My findings suggest that Supreme Court constraint is driven by the justices' fear of nonimplementation and is, therefore, dependent on institutional context.     

The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics

With its decision on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has handed over another landmark ruling on European integration. The ruling made Germany's ratification of the Treaty conditional upon the passage of a new law giving the Bundestag greater oversight of European affairs. This and the consequences of stronger parliamentary oversight for the German government and the way it conducts negotiations at European level have been the focus of most early comments on the decision. No less important, however, are the ruling's potential repercussions on European judicial politics. Coming after a series of highly controversial judgments by the European Court of Justice, the FCC's Lisbon decision is clearly meant as a warning to Brussels and, above all, Luxembourg. The decision could undermine the Court of Justice's authority and encourage non-compliance on the part of national courts, thus bringing about a constitutional crisis at European level. Alternatively, the decision may compel the Court of Justice to reconsider some of the most controversial aspects of its activist jurisprudence and to exert more restraint in the foreseeable future.     

The Rehnquist Court and Indigenous Rights: The Expedited Diminution of Native Powers of Governance

The U.S. Supreme Court has long played a prominent role in defining,critiquing, and, in some cases, rearranging the political relationshipbetween indigenous peoples and the states and the federal government,and in enlarging or reducing the inherent sovereign status ofnative peoples. This article assesses the most recent SupremeCourt opinions that are systematically, and without referenceto judicial precedent, redefining the political status of tribalnations by reducing their heretofore acknowledged sovereignauthority from an internal perspective and especially from anintergovernmental standpoint. Although the U.S. Congress stilladheres to a policy of tribal self-determination, the Courtis dramatically and permanently minimizing the rights of tribesto practice political, economic, and cultural self-determinationbecause in the opinion of a majority of the justices, thereare only two sovereigns in the United States: states and thefederal government.     

Judicial Review and the Supreme Court of Washington, 1890-1986

The literature on judicial review by state supreme courts suggeststhat from the beginnings of the republic until today, statejudicial review has shifted generally from what can be calleda restraintist departmentalism to an activist "new federalism."Since statehood in 1889, the Supreme Court of Washington hasreacted to constitutional challenges in much the same manneras the high courts of other states. Recently, however, Washington'sjurists have forged an independent course by applying the morerestrictive aspects of the state constitution to private andgovernmental intrusions into personal lives rather than relyingon the guidelines provided by the federal Constitution and theU.S. Supreme Court. The nature of this second "Golden Age" ofstate judicial review, because of its effect on federalism ratherthan the separation of powers, requires appraisal from a newperspective.     

Institutional Legitimacy Building in a Context of Transition: The South African Land Claims Court

The success of societal transformation often depends on the legitimacy of the government institutions developed to mediate the transition. This article examines one case of institutional development and legitimacy building, the South African Land Claims Court. Formed in 1996 to help South Africa resolve land-claim concerns that surfaced as the nation transitioned to a postapartheid society, the court demonstrates the challenges of developing an institution in the context of large-scale societal transformation, reconciliation, and governmental legitimacy building. By tracing the evolution of the court and analyzing its first five years of activities, the article presents the challenges and opportunities of legitimacy building for entities working in transitional political and administrative settings.     

法国大革命前期的三权分立

权力分立并通过权力制衡达到政治自由是法国思想家孟德斯鸠明确提出的资产阶级国家制度的基本原则,但卢梭极度轻蔑赋予国家各组成部分独立权力以相互制约的均衡理论.这种观念上的冲突,在法国大革命时期的前两部宪法中表现得十分鲜明.从实际情况看,法国大革命时期的权力分立有自己的特色:议会至高无上并发展为相当程度的专制,行政权过于弱化而无法与立法权抗衡,司法权根本没有独立地位.因此可以说,法国人基本上没有按照孟德斯鸠的思路去制约权力.     

Confidence in the Judiciary: Comparing the Independence and Legitimacy of Judicial Systems

This contribution investigates the determinants of judicial confidence. It argues that this is the decisive source of legitimacy for the third branch. Fairness and impartiality, i.e. the independence of the judiciary, are paramount in fostering citizens' confidence in the justice system. Through several multilevel analyses, the study tests whether judicial independence promotes the development of an individual's confidence in the justice system. The results show that judicial independence has a positive impact on the development of individual trust. However, public beliefs about the trustworthiness of judicial institutions do not seem to originate from constitutional rules (de jure independence) but from actual events and real life experiences (de facto independence).     

Confirmation Politics and The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Institutional Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the Alito Nomination

Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003a, 2003b, 2005) expound the theory of positivity bias in their analysis of the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore. This theory asserts that preexisting institutional loyalty shapes perceptions of and judgments about court decisions and events. In this article, we use the theory of positivity bias to investigate the preferences of Americans regarding the confirmation of Judge Samuel Alito as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. More specifically, from the theory of positivity bias, we derive the hypothesis that preferences on the Alito confirmation are shaped by anterior commitments to the Supreme Court. Based on an analysis of a national panel survey, we find that those who have a high level of loyalty toward the Supreme Court rely much more heavily on what we term judiciousness—in contrast to ideology, policy, and partisanship—in forming their opinions on whether to confirm Alito. Thus, institutional loyalty provides a decisive frame through which Americans view the activity of their Supreme Court.     

On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public

Conventional wisdom says that individuals’ ideological preferences do not influence Supreme Court legitimacy orientations. Most work is based on the assumption that the contemporary Court is objectively conservative in its policymaking, meaning that ideological disagreement should come from liberals and agreement from conservatives. Our nuanced look at the Court's policymaking suggests rational bases for perceiving the Court's contemporary policymaking as conservative, moderate, and even liberal. We argue that subjective ideological disagreement—incongruence between one's ideological preferences and one's perception of the Court's ideological tenor—must be accounted for when explaining legitimacy. Analysis of a national survey shows that subjective ideological disagreement exhibits a potent, deleterious impact on legitimacy. Ideology exhibits sensible connections to legitimacy depending on how people perceive the Court's ideological tenor. Results from a survey experiment support our posited mechanism. Our work has implications for the public's view of the Court as a “political” institution.     

Presidents,Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior

This article investigates the consequences of fast-track legislation in the European Union. Previous research has explained why fast-track legislation occurs and evaluated its democratic repercussions. This study focuses on the European Parliament (EP)’s intra-organisational response. It first describes how the early adoption of EU legislation has informalised legislative decision-making, transformed inter-organisational relations, and induced power shifts. It then discusses the political response, showing that actors seek to redress power shifts, that reform attempts centre on the control of negotiation authority and information flows, and that reform is highly contested. The research suggests that the chance of successful redress is low in Parliament as a decentralised organisation unless two conditions are met: (i) the extent of fast-track legislation reaches a critical level, and (ii) the organisation goes through a period of wider reform; the former increases the visibility of disempowerment and reputational loss, the latter allows package deals and/or the strategic use of norms. Based on qualitative document analysis and semi-structured elite interviews an analysis is made of how Parliament’s rules of co-legislation have been contested, negotiated and reformed from the formal introduction of fast-track legislation in 1999 to the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of Codecision Procedures in 2009. The analysis also shows that Parliament may have a price to pay for its successful fight for empowerment, namely a challenge to its institutional legitimacy and discontent of its of rank-and-file members. More generally, understanding the conditions for intra-organisational reform can inform the study of other democratic bodies which undergo a similar restriction and seclusion of de facto decision-making.     

The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German Constitutional Court

Modern liberal democracies typically depend on courts with the power of constitutional review to ensure that elected officials do not breach their constitutional obligations. The efficacy of this review, however, can depend on the public observing such breaches. One resource available to many of the world's constitutional courts to influence the public's ability to do so is public oral hearings. Drawing on the comparative judicial literature on separation of powers, public awareness, and noncompliance, I develop a formal model of public oral hearings. The model provides empirical implications for when a court will hold public oral hearings and how hearings correspond to a court's willingness to rule against elected officials. An empirical analysis of hearings at the German Constitutional Court supports the model's prediction that courts use hearings as a resource to address potential noncompliance.     

Supreme Court Legitimacy and Group-Centric Forces: Black Support for Capital Punishment and Affirmative Action

The Supreme Court has addressed capital punishment and affirmative action many times and, as a result, has had sweeping policymaking effects. For that reason, we argue that black opinion on capital punishment and affirmative action will be shaped by diffuse support for the Court. We also recognize the important role of group-centric forces in shaping black opinion. We find that diffuse support for the Court leads blacks with lower levels of race consciousness to be more supportive of capital punishment and less supportive of affirmative action, positions in line with the Court's decisions on these issues but contrary to black interests. The Court, however, is not able to throw its cloak of legitimacy around its policy position for blacks with the highest levels of group consciousness.