The Sovereignty Game States Play: (Quasi-)States in the International Order

This article discusses the puzzle of sovereign statehood in the context of state failure and anarchy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the first section it suggests to analyse sovereignty as a discursive fact in terms of a Wittgensteinian language game. This renders recognition a pivotal element and rejects foundationalist notions of sovereignty. The second section analyses the ‘quasi-statehood narrative’. Whereas this narrative presents sovereignty as a game, it applies two different notions of games concomitantly. This article argues that the notion of quasi-statehood maintains an empirical kernel as the core of ‘real’ sovereign statehood and as such remains within the conventional sovereignty discourse. The epilogue states that such foundationalism is not an innocent analytical move. It shows how language can have far-reaching political impact in terms of legitimation of political actions, and how, ultimately, the conventional discourse drains international relations of its content. This will be illustrated by U.S. position to state failure in their War on Terrorism.     

Unpopular Sovereignty?

Popular sovereignty was presented in modern constitutional discourse as a mode of collective action. It was supposedly manifest in the power to constitute, control and dismantle governments. Important strands of contemporary constitutional theory, notably legal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy, have taken leave of this tradition. They have severed the connection between sovereignty and action. What remains of popular sovereignty is fundamental rights and values, or dispersed networks of deliberation. This is based on the the idea that the place of power is ‘empty’ and legitimised on the principle of including ‘All-Affected-Interests’. The very concept of sovereignty thus becomes unpopular. This contribution aims to re-establish the link between popular sovereignty and action by examining sovereignty's emancipatory telos, its majoritarian mode of operation and its dependence on political citizenship.     

The Segregative Effects of Discourse

This paper will critically assess thesegregative practices that are ever moreprevalent in the contemporary world from theperspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Thesegregation which will be in question in thispaper concerns the current institutional modeof apprehending the subject by isolating andclassifying the subject on the basis of its`external characteristics'. However, thesegregative effects of discourse, it will beargued, are not simply the consequence of atransitory political or epistemologicalimbalance; for in fact, and as will be shownwith reference to Lacanian psychoanalysis, thelogic of segregation is inherent in the verystructure of language. Indeed, discourse isstructured by means of an exception to itselfwhich indexes the place of the subject assplit: this split in the subject, as an effectof language, situates segregation as the veryprinciple of language. In a second moment, thesegregative effects of discourse will be shownto be further amplified by the emptying out ofthe function of sovereignty. In the moderndemocracy, it is the void that now `occupies'the place of exception.     

Carl Schmitt on the Secularisation of Religious Texts as a Resacralisation of Jurisprudence?

Carl Schmitt, an increasingly influential German law professor, developed a provocative and historically oriented model of “political theology” with specific relevance to legal scholarship and the authorship of constitutional texts. His “political theology” is best understood neither as an expressly theological discourse within constitutional law, nor as a uniquely legal discourse shaped by a hidden theological agenda. Instead, it addresses the possibility of the continual resurfacing of theological ideas and beliefs within legal discourses of, for instance, sovereignty, the force of law and states of emergency (or “exception”) that present themselves as relentlessly secular, even—in the case of Kelsenian jurisprudence—”scientific”. This article illustrates and then critically evaluates Schmitt’s theory in terms of the authorship of constitutional texts in particular. It includes two case studies—genocidal colonial land appropriation and Kelsenian positivism in order to illustrate aspects of his political theology. Whilst Schmitt is defended against reductionist interpretations, I show that there remains considerable unfinished business before a Schmittian approach to legal theory merits full acceptance.     

The efficacy of international regulation of uranium mining: Malawi as a case study

This article explores the basis for an international law framework for the adoption of binding minimum standards to govern the exploitation of uranium mining within States. By focusing on international environmental law, the following discourse exposes, a) the inimical impact of State sovereignty over natural resources to effective regulation of uranium mining; and b) the practical ramification of the impreciseness and wooliness of international regulation of uranium mining. This article suggests a need to re‐evaluate the extent to which States may be subject to standards imposed under international law in their exploitation of natural resources.     

International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?

This is a review of five recent works which deal with internationalcriminal law. By an analysis of those works, the essay querieswhether the relationship between international criminal lawand state sovereignty is always accurately conceptualized. Internationalcriminal lawyers often see sovereignty as the enemy of internationalcriminal law, though frequently failing to discuss in any depththe nature and malleability of sovereignty. Although internationalcriminal law does involve some challenges to sovereignty, italso needs, and in some ways empowers, that sovereignty too.The works under review tend to pay less attention to the substantiveaspects of international criminal law than its institutionalpart. This is unfortunate, as some of the most interesting interactionsbetween international criminal law and sovereignty occur atthis level. The essay finishes with some broader reflectionson how the works under review conceptualize the internationallegal order, regrets the absence at times of engagement withrelevant constructivist scholarship but notes that the answerto the question of the precise relationship between internationalcriminal law and sovereignty is unlikely to be agreed upon soon.     

About the Impossibility of Absolute State Sovereignty

State sovereignty is often thought to be absolute, unlimited. This paper argues that there is no such a thing as absolute State sovereignty. Indeed, absolute sovereignty is impossible because all sovereignty is necessarily underpinned by its conditions of possibility—i.e. limited sovereignty is the norm, though the nature of the limitations varies. The article consists of two main sections: (a) the concept of sovereignty: this section is focused on some of the limitations the concept of sovereignty itself presents; and (b) a historical account of the notion of sovereignty as it was used in the Ancient Times. The particular focus on early notions of a modern concept such as sovereignty has to do with the fact that this early notion has been anthropomorphised with societal evolution. Therein, the current concept of State sovereignty embraces the same limitations it had in its ancient form as a non-fully developed conceptual idea. The implications of understanding State sovereignty as limited rather than absolute are several, both directly and indirectly. A main immediate consequence is that sovereign States can cooperate together, limit their sovereignty and still be considered sovereign.     

Hermeneutical Violence: Human Rights,Law, and the Constitution of a Global Identity

In this paper I want to analyze the process of denationalization of the law, to show how the globalization of the law can be considered as a new form of imperial control, but this time, labeled as acting for the welfare of its victims. In the first part I will analyze the national character of the law and show how it was used as an imperialistic instrument for the benefit of the imperial powers. In the second part I will show how the discourse of human rights and its universality has been the base to deny indigenous communities their right to define their own identity and how this discourse was used to destroy the old conception of sovereignty. The globalization of human rights implies the imposition of a western conception of rights, regardless of the contextual conception of the indigenous people. The discourse of human rights is part of a hermeneutical violence.     

Hopi Tradition as Jurisdiction: On the Potentializing Limits of Hopi Sovereignty

In this article I reconsider Hopi tradition as jurisdiction—reflexive moments of Hopi legal discourse that orient to the limits of Hopi sovereignty, even as they presuppose its power. I explore these themes in two significant moments of Hopi political history. First, I consider the uses of tradition in the creation of the contemporary Hopi tribe through the field notes of the US agent charged with drafting the 1936 Hopi Constitution. Then I consider more contemporary uses of tradition in recent Hopi tribal court cases that extended judicial power over matters reserved for local village leadership. Both instances suggest efforts to potentialize tribal power even as they orient explicitly to the limits of that authority. These traditions are thus, ironically, understood not as replaying Euro‐American logics of nationalist totalities, but as indigenous sociopolitical actions that unsettle static representations of Hopi cultural identity and the sovereignty claimed through them.     

Law And Sovereignty

How is it possible that the idea of sovereignty still features in legal and political philosophy? Most contemporary political philosophers have little use for the idea of ‘unlimited’ or ‘absolute’ power, which is how sovereignty is normally defined. A closer look at sovereignty identifies two possible accounts: sovereignty as the fact of power or sovereignty as a title to govern. The first option, which was pursued by John Austin’s command theory of law, leads to an unfamiliar view of law and the state, which was justly criticised by H. L. A. Hart. The second option, leads to a paradox, because under this view sovereignty is both limited and unlimited. Hence, this argument shows that law and sovereignty are actually incompatible. Where there is law there is no sovereignty, and where there is sovereignty there is no law.     

国际法与国内法关系的主权论

国际法与国内法的关系是国际法的一个根本性问题,也是一个饱受争议的话题,由此形成了不同派别的主张。影响国际法与国内法关系理论与实践的最深层次因素是主权,不同的主权观决定了国际法与国内法关系理论与实践之间的差异。主权又决定于其所处时代的情势。国际法与国内法关系发展的新动向对传统的主权观带来了极大的挑战,从"主权"与"治权"两个维度去理解和构建与之相适应的新的主权观,无疑具有十分积极的现实意义。     

Theorizing Sovereignty and European Integration

This article examines the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the process of European integration. It is argued that the nature of this relationship has been both mutually informative and transformative. As a particular understanding of sovereignty has influenced and determined the perception of European integration, i.e., its conceptualization, so the process of European integration has reflected back on sovereignty and entailed its rethinking. This poses a particular challenge for legal theorists: how to pin down the meaning of sovereignty and European integration so as to put both in the best conceptual and normative light. The article begins by looking at the traditional perspective on sovereignty and how this has been challenged by European integration. The focus then shifts from sovereignty to European integration in order to examine how different perspectives on sovereignty, when used as an epistemic lens for understanding the process of European integration, have produced uneven conceptions of this integration. Finally, the article concludes by making a choice between the various conceptions of sovereignty and European integration. It is argued that the best conception of European integration is offered by the constitutional form of a union founded on pluralist sovereignty.     

The Subject May have Disappeared but its Sufferings Remain

Today there is no sophisticated theory, which continues to rely on subjectivist premises. It is important, however, that anti-humanism theory's disinterestedness in the (imaginary) subject of voluntarism does not lead to an indifference towards being's constitutive non-essence and passivity in the manner of the worst kind of humanism. Emmanuel Levinas' places ‘absurd’ suffering in the place of essence as the knot of subjectivity; his view of the quiddity of suffering as mode of being passively rather than as psychological content and of the modality of disinterested compassion are used in order to formulate the question `who comes after the subject' in ways which allow us to continue thinking of what it means to be affected in an individuated manner without returning us to the subject of self-presence and autonomy. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Sovereignty as Autonomy

Many philosophers, past and present, have attempted to eradicate the notion of sovereignty. The most interesting and most ambitious attempt to do so, comes from those philosophers who claim that sovereignty is in principle incompatible with the rule of law. The purpose of this paper is to repel this latter attack. In order to do so, I investigate the analogy between sovereignty and individual autonomy. The resulting conception of sovereignty, ‘sovereignty as autonomy’, shows that sovereignty and the rule of law are utterly compatible. At the same time, this conception conserves what I believe to be the normative core of our modern notion of sovereignty: when speaking of sovereignty, we invoke the perspective from which a political community can consciously understand itself as an autonomous agent.     

试论中美关系是洛克文化的建构

从1979年中美建交开始,中美两国关系经历了起起落落,特别是从冷战后至今,美国主流媒体对中国的看法以负面为主,其根源之一是基于垄断性意识形态诉求的美国话语霸权,实质则是中美之间诸多因素的建构.中美关系应被视为洛克文化的建构,目前所呈现出的某些霍布斯文化的特征并不占主导地位.中美应在尊重主权的前提下开展竞争,以竞争对手而不是敌手的身份看待对方,来构建具有明显洛克文化特征的中美间安全文化.中美关系主要不是零和博弈和囚徒困境,而是共存共生共荣的洛克文化体系的建构.     

The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule

This article argues that the semiotics of the war on terrorism points at a significant shift in United States' discourses on security. This shift can best be described as a move from defence to prevention or from danger to risk. Whereas the notion of defence is closely connected to the state of war, this article claims that the war on terrorism instead institutionalises a permanent state of exception. Building upon Agamben's notion that the state of exception is the non-localisable foundation of a political order, this article makes two claims. First, it argues that semiotic shifts in United States' security politics point at a general trend that, to some extent, structures international American interventions. In a sense, the semiotic shifts in American security discourse declare the United States as the sovereign of the global order: they allow the United States to exempt itself from the (international) framework of law, while demanding compliance by others. Second, it claims that this production of American sovereignty is paralleled by reducing the life of (some) individuals to the bare life of homo sacer(life that can be killed without punishment). In the war on terrorism, the production of bare life is mainly brought about by bureaucratic techniques of risk management and surveillance, which reduce human life to biographic risk profiles.     

American Indian Tribes: ``Not as Belonging to But as Existing Within'

This article is an extended analysis of the historyand anomalies in the doctrine of American Indiantribal sovereignty. I explain that America gainedindependence, but took Indian land and colonized thetribes just as it had been colonized under theBritish. It asserted sovereignty for itself, butsubordinated the once independent tribes with aparadoxical semi-sovereign status as `dependentdomestic nations', all of this justified by the racialand cultural otherness of Indians. Using a Lacanianperspective, I show that America was founded on a`wound' or inconsistency at the heart of itsideological and constitutional order. In order torectify the inconsistencies that the initial `wound'produces, the law and political order havecontinuously had to adopt fictions (legal and racial). American law and policy has never been able to settlethe ambiguous doctrine of Indian sovereignty. As aresult, the law circles round and round in trying todefine it, and asserting and denying it, all in anunsuccessful attempt to make the constitutional orderwhole. It cannot succeed, however, since the ultimatesolution is an American sovereignty which, like God,admits of no limitation.     

The long slumber of Dicey’s Indian monarch

AV Dicey treated amending power in written constitutions as an adjunct of sovereignty and he treated the body charged with the power of amending the constitution as the repository of sovereignty in the system – not any different in quality from the paradigm: the British Parliament. Debates of a piece with those surrounding parliamentary sovereignty reincarnate in systems with written constitutions as debates about the amending body’s power to amend the written constitution. This essay examines the points of contiguity between the debates about sovereignty in the unalloyed form they take in the British model and that of amending power in India and the methods of limiting parliamentary omnipotence adopted by the two systems. It will be argued that although for a while the Diceyian notion of parliamentary sovereignty reigned supreme, eventually India embraced a view of implied limitations on amending power qualitatively akin to common law constitutionalism that places implied limits on parliamentary sovereignty.     

Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of Polar Sovereignty?

There has been recent discussion on the abandonment of sovereignty in the Arctic and territorial and marine claims in Antarctica in the interests of redefining these regions into global commons with joint management. Global commons refers to a region, or group of valued resources, protected from exploitation in the interests of the global population and future generations. While it may be reasonable to examine the possibility of shifting sovereignty in these regions and locking access to any of the resources, an academic examination must not focus on sovereignty in isolation from existing management regimes. Sovereignty is not displaced easily, and nor are sovereign rights; however there is a large capacity for negotiation, consent and agreement towards how resources and areas may be used and enjoyed while maintaining an indifference to existing or exerted territorial and/or marine claims. Sovereignty and sovereign rights can also be preserved, but their utility minimized in the presence of alternative arrangements, as exemplified in the Antarctic Treaty. In the absence of such arrangements, the self-interest of States is manifest. A false sense of probability is fostered by any examination that only considers sovereignty and disregards State practice or current management initiatives. This article demonstrates that the current governance arrangements are legitimate in a dynamic world, regardless of sovereignty, and identifies the lengths to which the stakeholders go to preserve both their national interest and that of the global community in de facto global commons areas. It concludes by offering a view that cutting the Gordian knot of polar sovereignty is both risky and premature in the absence of suitable alternatives.     

The Sovereign Event in a Nation's Law

This article interrogates the relationship between the sovereign event and a legal decision that purports to place sovereignty beyond law. It argues that sovereignty cannot be regarded as unitary, and elaborates the process of iterability by which the sovereign event is split from the outset. This dynamic is examined through an interrogation of the non-justiciability of sovereignty in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2)(1992). Along with the unitary conception of sovereignty, Mabo (No. 2) deployed an absolute measure for community in the form of the ‘skeletal principle’ of the doctrine of tenure. The paper argues that a conception of the political that affirms the One sovereign source of community and law instead of the original dis-position of law, nation and community repeats the original violence, and will, at best, run aground on the righteous (mis)recognition of the ‘appropriate savage’. It concludes with an indicative rethinking of community through the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.