Is There a Modern Legal Culture?

Abstract . This essay argues that there are certain traits which, taken together, characterize modern legal systems, and are reflexes of modern legal culture. Modern law is rapidly changing; it is dense and ubiquitous; the basis of its legitimacy is instrumental; it stresses fundamental human rights and is strongly individualistic; lastly, the globalization of law leads to a process of convergence among legal systems. These traits also produce structural changes in legal systems, for example, an increase in the power and activism of courts.     

使用盗版软件要不要负责?

也许很多人还记得"微软诉亚都使用盗版计算机软件"一案.那个案例很让软件用户紧张了一阵子."软件用户"是相对于软件经营者的概念,他们是处于软件贸易的末端群体,只是使用软件,并不向公众提供(发行)或者展示软件复制件,因此软件用户的责任应当与软件经营者的责任有所不同.     

Is There a Duty to Legislate for Linguistic Minorities?

In April 2005, the Scottish Parliament passed the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005, requiring certain public bodies in Scotland to provide some services through the medium of Gaelic. This Act was modelled to a certain degree on similar legislation for Welsh, the Welsh Language Act 1993. Both Welsh and Gaelic, and to a lesser extent Irish in Northern Ireland, benefit from a range of other measures of legislative support. Many other languages are, however, spoken in the United Kingdom, and their speakers have needs and expectations. In this article, the extent to which a state is obliged to legislate for these is assessed. Fundamental principles such as the right to freedom from discrimination, equal protection of the law, substantive equality, and the protection and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity may argue for legislative intervention and support, and the provision of such support to linguistic minorities must itself be non-discriminatory.     

效果标准与目的标准之争:间接征收认定的新发展

近年来,间接征收问题日益引起许多政府及国际法学者的广泛关注。认定间接征收实际上就是如何判断特定政府措施的“效果”与“目的”以及如何处理二者之间的关系。从法律学说、法律规范及投资仲裁三个层面可以发现间接征收认定标准的若干新发展。在认定间接征收过程中引入比例原则有其积极作用,但潜在风险也不客忽视。     

Historical Entitlement and the Practice of Bequest: Is There a Moral Right of Bequest?

Entitlement theorists claim that bequest is a moral right. The aim of this essay is to determine whether entitlement theorists can, on their own grounds, consistently defend that claim. I argue that even if there is a moral right to self-appropriated property and to engage in inter vivos transfers, it is a mistake to contend that there exists an equivalent moral right to make a bequest. Taxing or regulating bequest does not violate an individual’s moral rights because, regardless of whether bequest safeguards certain interests, those interests are not the interests of a living, morally inviolable being. Instead, they are the interests of a deceased entity that has lost the ability to track what it values and pursue projects in accord with those values – a quality that by entitlement theorists’ own arguments renders persons morally significant and deserving of rights in the first place.