Notes on contributors

Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse consequences. In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those responsible for the offending policies. This article discusses the merits of UN sanctions in the context of the membership and practice of the Security Council and looks closely at flaws in sanctions programmes and in their administration. Experience suggests careful review of alternative means of pressure as well as reform of existing procedures.     

UN sanctions burden sharing: Article 50 of the UN charter and assistance to third states

This article proposes the establishment by the UN Security Council of a system of mutual support for third states whose economies have been adversely affected as a result of UN non-military sanctions. This system consists of several components: (1) creating new markets for the sale of goods and services of third states; (2) crafting of a logical UN sanctions costs methodology; (3) bringing into UN Security Council for a those bilateral and regional efforts involving cases of UN sanctions compensation; (4) devising norms and procedures for acquiring and pooling of the requisite funds out of which states' claims for damages attributable to UN sanctions might be satisfied; and (5) establishing a mechanism for the adjudication of such claims. While many obstacles admittedly exist to creating such a system of mutual support, the article argues that effective UN sanctions burden sharing is nevertheless important to international relations theory and practice, since UN sanctions appear to be increasing in frequency as they undergird many of the Security Council's contemporary enforcement actions.     

UN sanctions burden sharing: Article 50 of the UN charter and assistance to third states

abstract

This article proposes the establishment by the UN Security Council of a system of mutual support for third states whose economies have been adversely affected as a result of UN non‐military sanctions. This system consists of several components: (1) creating new markets for the sale of goods and services of third states; (2) crafting of a logical UN sanctions costs methodology; (3) bringing into UN Security Council for a those bilateral and regional efforts involving cases of UN sanctions compensation; (4) devising norms and procedures for acquiring and pooling of the requisite funds out of which states’ claims for damages attributable to UN sanctions might be satisfied; and (5) establishing a mechanism for the adjudication of such claims. While many obstacles admittedly exist to creating such a system of mutual support, the article argues that effective UN sanctions burden sharing is nevertheless important to international relations theory and practice, since UN sanctions appear to be increasing in frequency as they undergird many of the Security Council's contemporary enforcement actions.     

Do Sanctions Always Stigmatize? The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Foreign Aid

A prevalent view among both scholars and policymakers is that economic sanctions stigmatize and isolate their targets. According to this perspective, the stigma associated with economic sanctions should signal to foreign aid donors that they should be more cautious and restrained in providing assistance to sanctioned states. We test this signaling-based theory via a large-n analysis of the impact that sanctions imposed by the United States and those supported by the United Nations (UN) had on the aid flows of 133 recipient states from 1960–2000. Contrary to expectations, our results indicate that being subject to sanctions supported by the UN does not have a negative effect on target states’ aid flows, and being sanctioned by the United States actually has a positive effect on them. We explore two potential explanations for our puzzling findings based upon donor self-interest and donor altruism via a scoping analysis of eight sanctions cases in which target states received greater than expected aid flows. Our findings suggest that theories based upon donor self-interest represent the most promising explanation for why individual donors may increase their aid to sanctioned states.     

Counter-terrorism and communities: an interview with Robert Lambert

The targeted sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council against individuals and entities suspected of association with terrorism are managed through procedures that infringe fundamental human rights, and there are no mechanisms for actual accountability. With the exception of the ECJ in Kadi, municipal and regional courts tend to consider the UN Security Council's resolutions and domestic measures implementing them outside the scope of judicial review. This article argues that the Security Council is bound to observe human rights even in the context of international security action, and that States are not exonerated from international responsibility for violations committed under the umbrella of Chapter VII resolutions.     

Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy

This article seeks to analyze the impact that sanctions have on democracy. We argue that economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, we argue that economic sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties, to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Using time-series cross-national data (1972–2000), the findings show that both the immediate and longer‐term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. The findings also demonstrate that comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited sanctions. These findings suggest that sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state.     

The Zimbabwe Issue in Sino-U.S. Ties

The United States has criticized the domestic and foreign policies of the Mugabe regime, and has attempted to raise the Zimbabwe issue in the UN Security Council, thus creating a point of potential conflict in Sino-U.S. relations.China differs from the United States on this issue not because of the measures taken by the Western countries such as economic sanctions and political pressure, but,more significantly, because of the Western conception of democracy and human rights, and the difference between the U.S. and Chinese strategies in Africa. The policies of China and the United States on the Zimbabwe issue can be interpreted as a struggle between two powers in Africa. In the short term, however, it is the Middle East that will continue to preoccupy U.S. foreign policy, and Zimbabwe will not become a major flash point in Sino-U.S. relations.     

欧美科技制裁协作的动力与分歧：基于欧盟的视角

科技制裁在持续的军事冲突中发挥着关键作用,在和平时期的地缘政治中也从未消失。欧盟与美国是最大的制裁实施者,双方的制裁协作在多个地区和领域产生了重要影响。虽然欧美科技制裁协作较为频繁,但欧盟和美国在制裁政策上仍存在诸多分歧。文章从欧美价值观、安全威胁和二级制裁这三个维度出发,剖析欧盟与美国进行科技制裁协作的动因与诱发分歧的因素,并选择俄罗斯、伊朗和中国这三个具有代表性和差异性的案例进行比较。欧盟与美国对俄罗斯的制裁协作水平最高;在伊朗案例中,二级制裁因素带来的欧美分歧较为突出;在中国案例中,欧美尚未达成明显的制裁共识。共同价值观、安全威胁的紧迫性、二级制裁压力等要素是促使欧盟参与美国科技制裁的重要动因。然而,不同的外交政策理念、安全认知的错位和二级制裁的反作用力也使欧美分歧难以弥合,大大削减了制裁效率。     

Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes

The crisis bargaining literature sees demands as endogenous to crises. However, despite the parallels between military and economic coercion, sanctions researchers have preferred to analyze economic coercion after demands have been issued, and have not explored sufficiently the possibility that when senders formulate their policy objectives, they consider the international constraints imposed by the capabilities and interests of target states. I complement the sanctions literature by deriving the implications of strategic goal formulation in a game theoretic model of economic coercion that assumes endogenous demands. The model explains the inconsistent empirical relationship between sanctions costs and outcomes as well as the paradoxical tendency of senders to select into difficult disputes. I find that threats are not always more effective than sanctions and suggest what an optimal sanctions policy might look like.     

Pioneers of peace research — Lewis Fry Richardson: Apostle of math

Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may be examples of two‐level games in which the domestic game within both parties affects the international game and vice‐versa. Here, we take a first cut of applying this approach to the analysis of sanctions effectiveness. We extend the spatial model to focus on how sanctions affect the internal political bargaining within the target state. From this, we determine how state policy should change (or not) as a result of the sanctions. We use the basic model to identify general hypotheses regarding the nature of sanctions and their effectiveness and we evaluate some of these hypotheses using cases in which the United States imposed sanctions on Latin American countries for human rights violations.     

A Review of: “Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, (eds.). Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.”

Because of its dynamic nature, those confronting the al-Qaeda threat must follow its evolution very closely. As demonstrated here, this task is particularly challenging when counterterrorism is carried out under the aegis of international organizations. This article explores the threat identification function of the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee (also known as the 1267 Committee) charged with supervising the UN sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and its associates. Examination of the role of threat identification in the committee's work, and of the content of the threat analysis presented in the periodic reports of its subsidiary monitoring team, suggests the marginality of strategic threat assessment and underscores the constraints created by bureaucratic and political factors. The article also demonstrates the failure of the Committee and the monitoring team to thoroughly engage in central questions regarding al-Qaeda's nature, objectives, and organizational strategy.     

Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective

Multilateral economic sanctions can be expected to impose greaterterms-of-trade effects on a target nation than unilateral sanctions. Yet despite their potential for greater economic damage, multilateral sanctions often are less effective in bringing about desired political results in the target. An interest-group model of endogenous policy suggests that multilateral sanctions can undermine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the targetcountry, or strengthen those groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime. Such perverse effects are due in part to the inability of multilateral coalitions to enforce cooperation among members, and to the appropriation of sanctions rents in the target country. Unilateral sanctions, however, imposed by a country with close ties to the target, are ofteneffective in achieving their intended political objectives.     

Economic Sanctions and the Politics of IMF Lending

What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes.     

The beginning of a new cold war?

The proactive policies of the United States in expanding NATO, its bombing of Iraq in December 1998, NATO's air war on Yugoslavia in 1999 in which the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed, and the United States’ new perspectives on the use of force in the global arena have led to increasing resentment and tensions on the part of Russia and the PRC. As Washington is seeking new rationales for the unilateral use of force worldwide, or circumventing the use of sanctions, of the UN Security Council before taking military actions, Russia and China are becoming increasingly convinced that the United States is bent upon establishing its global hegemony. Obviously, neither Russia nor China will let this increasing proactivism go unchallenged.     

Economic Sanctions,Poverty, and International Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis

This study examines the impact of economic sanctions on international terrorism. It is argued that sanctions intensify economic hardships on the poor within countries and this increases their level of grievance and makes them more likely to support or engage in international terrorism. Further, economic sanctions are conceptualized as creating an opportunity for rogue leaders to manipulate aggrieved poor people to terrorize foreign entities who are demonized as engaging in a foreign encroachment on the sanctioned nation's sovereignty. A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 152 countries for the past three decades provides evidence that ceteris paribus, economic sanctions are positively associated with international terrorism. This finding suggests that, although the main purpose of economic sanctions is to coerce rogue countries to conform to international norms and laws, they can unintentionally produce a negative ramification and become a cause of international terrorism.     

Democratic sanctions meet black knight support: revisiting the Belarusian case

Democracy promotion through economic sanctions has become commonplace. Previous studies argue that an important challenge to the effectiveness of democratic sanctions is the contravening support of black knights. However, these studies underestimate conflicting interests between the target and its black knight. In this paper, I propose a bargaining model for understanding how targets obtain support from black knights. The target’s main source of bargaining power is its threat to defect from the black knight and obtain support from an international rival. However, the credibility of this threat decreases with democratic sanctions because they hinder cooperation with a likely source of support, namely the sender. Therefore, targets take steps towards democracy to improve their bargaining position relative to the black knight. To probe my argument, I conduct a deep single case study of EU sanctions against Belarus between 2004 and 2016 with Russia as a black knight. Sanctions should have no effect in this paradigmatic case of black knight support. Yet, there is substantial evidence that democratic sanctions have increased the cost of electoral fraud and state repression in Belarus. This indicates that the conflicting interests of targets and their black knights provide windows of opportunity for democracy promotion.     

Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy

The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. Remarkably little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, I develop an analytical framework identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanctions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply and evaluate this framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case, the analysis is briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans (Croatia and Iraq). The article suggests that sanctions can unintentionally contribute to the criminalization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders, organized crime, and transnational smuggling networks. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist beyond the lifting of sanctions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the rule of law. The article is one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanctions and transnational crime, and suggests that the criminalized collateral damage from sanctions and its post-sanctions legacy should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions.     

How the indigenous got seats at the UN table

Indigenous peoples are the only distinct segment of national populations having voting membership in UN bodies devoted to defining their rights and advancing their concerns. This unusual result was the result of the confluence of three factors familiar to students of transnational social movement politics: a) presence within UN offices and bodies of supporters opening forums and agendas to indigenous concerns, b) deference to the growing network of indigenous activists by anthropologists—the professional community best placed to serve as advocates speaking on behalf of indigenous communities, and c) indigenous activists' success in developing and projecting a globally-valid indigenous identity as “peoples” simultaneously uniting the various indigenous communities and providing a rationale for establishing voting rights that enough other actors could be persuaded to accept. Comparison with UN treatment of other groups indicates that indigenous voting rights are more likely to remain an isolated success rather than a harbinger of similar practices in other UN bodies.     

Constructing sanctions: rallying around the target in Zimbabwe*

Targeted’ sanctions seek to circumvent a target state’s citizens in general from the adverse economic impact of coercion. Arguably, this would remedy some of the population’s incentives to engage in the well-known “rallying-around-the-flag”. Yet occasionally, targeted sanctions still seem to produce such an effect. This paper explores sanctions conflicts as social constructs. It purports that rally-around-the-flag is all but one part of the discursive dimension of sanctions conflicts. Sanctions are intricately connected with the conflict setting they occur in. The study suggests a dialectical relation between how opponents perceive conflicts and the meaning of sanctions therein. This nexus of different constructions of sanctions moreover extends to “targeted” sanctions as well: As restrictive measures against Zimbabwe demonstrate, they are not the kind of minimally-invasive operations with clinical precision as such reasoning would suggest. Whether sanctions are really “targeted”, sparing the economy and concentrating on the culprits, is as much a question of discourse in the target state.     

UN Troop Deployment and Preventing Violence Against Civilians in Darfur

ABSTRACT

Does the presence of UN peacekeeping force lower civilian fatalities at the local level? If it does, is it because of their coercive military capacity or for other reasons such as their roles in monitoring and reporting violent atrocities? To explore these questions, I study the deployment of peacekeeping units in Darfur and its impact on violence against civilians. Using original geocoded data of UN deployments before and after the intervention, I examine what aspects of such deployments impact one-sided civilian killings by government and rebel groups. Results indicate that deploying UN peacekeepers in an area restrains belligerent from targeting civilians. However, the military capacity of peacekeepers is not a significant predictor of violence against civilians. While their ability to defend themselves is extremely important for peacekeepers, these findings caution against the militarization trend in UN peacekeeping and seek to reshift focus on other substantive aspects of peacekeeping.