“CRACK,” STREET GANGS,AND VIOLENCE*

This investigation considers the connections among street gangs, “crack” cocaine, and violence associated with crack distribution during the initial years of crack proliferation. Data were extracted from the narcotics investigation files and homicide fires of five Los Angeles Police Department and Sheriff's Department areas where both crack and gangs were prominent. The aims were to compare for 1983–1985, when crack first emerged as a significant problem, hypotheses about (1) gang involvement in crack distribution and (2) concomitants of gang involvement, particularly violence. The analyses confirm a dramatic growth in crack sales, an accompanying increase in gang members involved, but a declining rate of involvement, and inconsistent evidence on the impact of gang involvement on sales events. We infer that crack distribution, while including many individual gang members, was not primarily a street gang phenomenon.     

“Great Men,” Law,and the Social Construction of Technology

Is Alexander Graham Bell's fame owed to law and lawyers? Two recent histories argue that some popular tales of invention originated with lawyers and judges as part of patent litigation battles (Stathis Arapostathis and Graeme Gooday , Patently Contestable: Electrical Technologies and Inventor Identities on Trial in Britain [2013]; Christopher Beauchamp , Invented by Law: Alexander Graham Bell and the Patent That Changed America [2015]). Bringing law into the historical project of understanding the social construction of technology, the authors unsettle “great man” narratives of invention. A tale of a recent patent war is a case study in the persistence of such narratives, highlighting the uses of legal storytelling (Ronald K. Fierstein , A Triumph of Genius: Edwin Land, Polaroid, and the Kodak Patent War [2015]). Together, these works invite consideration of the cultural power possessed by invention origin stories, the role of narratives in law and history, and the judicial performance of truth finding in Anglo‐American law .     

On Two Distinct and Opposing Versions of Natural Law: “Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”

Abstract. This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural‐law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural‐law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural‐law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies moral rules and specifies their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude. *

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