Why Interpret?

Abstract. My article is about legal interpretation, but not about the question: how to interpret the law. Rather its aim is to make us consider seriously the question: Why is interpretation central to legal practices? After all not all normative practices assign interpretation such a central role. In this regard the law contrasts with morality. The reason for the contrast has to do with the status of sources in the law. There are no “moral sources” while legal sources are central to the law. Legal interpretation is primarily—I will suggest—the interpretation not of the law, but of its sources. To understand why interpretation is central to legal practices requires understanding the role of sources in the law: the reasons for having them, and hence also the ways in which they should be treated. I will show how reflections about these topics connect with some traditional jurisprudential puzzles, such as the relations between law and morality. Are there gaps in the law? Is the law or its interpretation objective or subjective?     

非常时期涉疫情犯罪教义学的争议问题

此次涉新冠疫情犯罪,对刑法教义学提出了新挑战,使涉疫情犯罪教义学成为可能,同时带来非常时期刑事政策、刑法理念与规范等方面的争议。依法从严从重涉疫情犯罪之战"疫"刑事政策,并不只是量刑意义的,也涉及从严解释在罪与非罪、此罪与彼罪区分中的实现,涉疫情犯罪的不法性在非常时间尚需进行个别化判断,并需要立足于义务冲突理论化解不法性等争议问题。《关于依法惩治妨害新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控违法犯罪的意见》在以危险方法危害公共安全罪、妨害传染病防治罪的界限上,没有区分法条竞合与想象竞合,这会导致从严解释的政策意图落空。区分涉疫情犯罪之法条竞合与想象竞合的标准,除传统的法理标准外,还需强化政策标准,并发展与实践"明确优先于不明确"的法理标准。     

Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law

This article is based on the assumption that there is a continuum running from non‐legal positions to legally binding and judicially controlled commitments with, in between these two opposite types of norms, commitments that can be described as soft law. It aims at defining soft law in international relations in order to provide a mapping of EU law on the basis of the soft law/hard law divide. It helps categorise EU competences and public policies, and sees how they fit with the distinction between two kinds of processes: legalisation (transformation of non‐legal norms into soft or hard law) and delegalisation (transformation of hard law norms into soft law and evolution from hard to soft law).     

论法律形式与法律渊源的界分

法律形式与法律渊源的关系比较复杂,但是我国学者一般将之作为等同的概念使用。这种观点导致了某些学术上的混乱,也导致法律形式和法律渊源各自的作用没能够充分发挥。正确界定法律渊源和法律形式,是实现二者区分的逻辑起点。法律形式是法律文本的表现方式;法律渊源是裁判规范的集合体,法官从中发现裁决案件所需要的裁判依据和裁判理由。由此可以得出二者之区分:从实践来看,法律渊源之法是指司法之法,法律形式之法是指立法之法;从内容来看,法律渊源之法是具有一定开放性的规则体系,而法律形式则是具有一定封闭性的规则体系;从路径来看,法律渊源之法是在司法适用过程发现和寻找的,法律形式之法是立法中形成的。司法适用之法完全局限于制定法之时,二者会出现种属统一,但是其概念内涵依然有着重大区别。     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

The Weak Natural Law Thesis and the Common Good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.     

司法过程中的法律发现及其方法论析

司法过程中的法律发现有二层含义:其一指法官从现行法体系中找出那些能够适用于当下案件的法规范或解释性命题的活动;其二是指在没有明确法规范或解释性命题可以适用的情况下进行漏洞填补或自由造法的一系列活动。法律发现方法主要有法律识别、法律解释和漏洞填补几种。在适用法律中,法官关于法律的认识、法渊理论、诉讼参与人等因素都会影响法官的法律发现。     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

分析法学对行为概念的重建

民法学、刑法学及行政法学领域对行为概念的研究 ,为整个法学对行为概念体系的原理性构建提出了要求。分析法学 ,尤其是霍菲尔德的权利概念元形式的分析框架 ,提供了在法理学层面上构建行为概念体系的一种思路。按这一思路 ,行为概念有四种元形式 :事实行为、法律行为、合法行为和违法行为。它们与霍菲尔德提出的四种权利概念元形式一起构成八个法律基本元素 ,共同体现了法律的逻辑推理结构     

Social Values and the Multiple Sources of European Social Law

Abstract: The paper aims at describing the current status of European social law, by examining different sources. These include the most recent directives; the Protocol attached to the Maastricht Treaty; the Commission's latest White papers on social policies and on economic growth and unemployment; and the case law of the European Court of Justice. In such a variegated legal landscape, a significant role could be played by non-binding measures; the notion of soft law is slowly acquiring its own dignity in European social law and is emerging for open interpretation. Yet, European labour law houses a fragile body of norms. The spreading of social values would become a tangible prospect if the potential of the multiple sources here examined were better exploited by all actors. Although a coherent legal structure is still to come, a legal culture is being created which should be strengthened through action by all Community institutions.     

论作为第三种规范的法律正义

将法、正义、法律正义视为同一事物的意念 ,是一个需待澄清的误解性意念。法、正义、法律正义不仅有重合会通的一面 ,更有各自的界限。法是一种常见的制度规范 ,正义是一种高层次伦理规范 ,而法律正义则是融合了法和正义两种要素的第三种规范。法律正义也是一种正义 ,是正义中的基本正义、有形正义和正义中的强者。法律正义也是一种法律规范 ,是高层次法律规范 ,是区别于恶法劣法的良规良法 ,是理想和现实相结合的法律规范。明辨三者的界限 ,方能洞知法有良恶优劣的分别 ,完整地认知法的面貌 ,倾力于建设以良法美制为基础的现代法治国家     

Are There Methods of Reasoning on ‘Meta‐Legislation’? The Interpretation of Legislative Competence Norms within the Methodology of European Constitutional Law

Legislative competence norms are paradigmatic elements of European constitutional law and the supranational, post‐federal era. The article aims to address legislative competence norms from the viewpoint of methodology by considering significant features of reasoning on European legislative competence norms. The discussion will be based on understanding legislative competences as ‘meta‐legislation’. That concept encompasses a substantive rather than formalistic, and a politically informed rather than strictly positivist account of legislative competences and their methodology. Against that background, the interpretation of competence norms is assessed. Subsequently, the process of interpretation is discussed according to judicial practice, constitutional theory and general legal methodology. A consideration of the significance of the—usually vast—wording of competence norms completes that discussion. Finally, consequences about the political inclusiveness of interpreting competence norms and the issue of ‘clarity’ are drawn. A conclusion summarises the results.     

Some Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System

Abstract
In this paper, the authors discuss some problems related to the existence and identity of legal norms and legal systems. Firstly, two criteria for identification of legal norms are analyzed: linguistic criteria and non-linguistic criteria. Secondly, the dynamics of legal systems and the distinction between legal system and legal order are examined (close to Raz's distinction between momentary legal system and legal system). Based on the logical relations of membership and inclusion, two ways of analysing the change of legal systems are suggested. Thirdly, a criterion for identification of legal orders (from Bulygin) is discussed and it is shown that this criterion does not explain adequately, on the one hand, the existence of some norms, i.e., customary norms; and, on the other, the existence of invalid norms; i.e., unconstitutional norms. The main conclusions of this paper are: (a) the concepts of legal system and legal order could not explain the existence of law in a given society; (b) the concepts of legal system and legal order could be considered models of rational normative systems.     

《刑法修正案（九）》第120条前置化规制的法理探析

《刑法修正案（九）》第120条的前置化规制是保护重大法益的必要手段,对其正当性的讨论为当前立法和司法突破和扩张的态势提供了法理依据。敌视社会基本规范和恐怖犯罪的预备或预备的预备行为已呈现出侵害重大法益的抽象危险,具备了前置化规制预备行为的前提要素;在识别敌人刑法争议的根源并加以理性辨别的基础上,从立法目的都是社会要保护自身免受该违法者的侵犯之角度,前置化规制的依据与某些敌人刑法的理念存在有限的内在暗合,但不可否认,尚未成熟的敌人刑法亦与前置化规制存在疏离之处;而敌视基本法规范且具有抽象危险的实质预备犯满足了前置化规制现实依据的要求。其处罚边界亦需遵循,应根据行为方式和特征进行司法定量限制及限缩解释。     

The Dynamics of Legal Positivism. Some Remarks on Shiner's Norm and Nature

In a recently published book, Roger Shiner shows that understanding the fundamental discrepancies between different legal theories is important for a better understanding of law itself. He argues that one of the most important tasks of legal philosophers is to take into account the dynamics or conceptual movements generated by positivism and antipositivism. Our paper intends to show that Shiner's analysis can be developed and modified when other relevant elements are introduced into the universe of discourse. We emphasize the importance of a positivistic conception of legal science. According to Shiner, an adequate theory of law must reproduce the way in which legal norms work in the lives of the participants who accept the law. After analyzing the distinction between norms and norm propositions and the relationship between legal science and the external point of view, we show that legal positivism is not committed to reproducing the internal point of view to law.     

Sanction and Obligation in Hart's Theory of Law

Abstract. The paper begins by challenging Hart's argument aimed to show that sanctions are not part of the concept of law. It shows that in the “minimal” legal system as understood by Hart, sanctions may be required for keeping the legal system efficacious. I then draw a methodological conclusion from this argument, which challenges the view of Hart (and his followers) that legal philosophy should aim at discovering some general, politically neutral, conceptual truths about law. Instead, the aim should be to discover the values because of which certain things in the world are classified as law and others as non‐law. Focusing on those would give us a more insight to the roles law plays in society, as well as more illuminating answers to traditional jurisprudential questions like the status of law in evil regimes.     

传统法律思想研究的近现代嬗变

在中国法律思想史学科一百多年的发展历程中，以人物为中心的研究体例为学科发展和法律思想的传承奠定了良好的基础，后来逐渐转向以问题研究为中心、以法理阐释为目的的研究方式，并衍生出法律思想史的国学、法哲学、部门法和法文化等研究维度。作为本民族文化传统的一部分，继往开来的传统法律思想研究应该在构建“中国”语境下的现代法学图景过程中产生更大的价值。     

法律与文化:法学研究的双向视角

把法律认识置于法律与文化之间,不仅为法学研究开辟了一片新天地,还使法学研究增添了一种新方法。对法律的文化解释有一个从单一迈向双向的视角转变,这种让法律与文化在对话中相互提升自己的转变呈现出一种包容和多元的方法态势。同时,文化方法的法学运用还表现出它在沟通异质法文化与变革传统法文化方面的方法论意义。     

法律解释方法位序表的元规则

法律解释方法的排序由于缺乏一个元规则而颇受非议。对这些异议的回应迫使我们检讨影响法律解释方法位序的种种因素,并进而探寻隐藏在解释方法位序表背后的元规则。研究表明,可接受性的元规则可以作为法律解释方法排序的始基,并在法律解释中担当起类似法学研究逻辑起点的各项功能。