Determinants and Evaluation of Local Energy‐Efficiency Initiatives from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

This article examines variation in local‐level energy‐efficiency grants and corresponding initiatives from the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in the United States. The analysis is based upon a hurdle model of counts of energy‐efficiency grants received by 348 local governments that received these grants from 2009 to 2013, as well as 348 matched local governments that did not receive such funds. City‐level characteristics including amount of federal financial support, per capita income, signaling of preferences for sustainability policies, manufacturing, and political influences are shown to be empirically important determinants of variation in local energy‐efficiency initiatives. The evidence suggests that all else held equal, the $21.8 billion in ARRA funds expended with the intent of increasing local energy‐efficiency programs and policies successfully led to this end.     

Budget Slack,Institutions, and Transparency

Economic theory suggests that it is optimal for governments to use precautionary saving as a countercyclical tool. However, the availability of surplus funds often triggers political pressure for tax cuts and spending increases. Mechanisms for alleviating that pressure include limiting the transparency of slack resources and limiting politicians’ discretion to use slack resources for purposes other than stabilization. This article investigates the extent to which these two mechanisms are substitutes. In particular, the authors examine whether the widespread adoption of budget stabilization funds (BSFs) in the U.S. states over the past several decades has been accompanied by a decline in conservative revenue forecast bias. Using panel data from 47 states over a 22‐year period, they find that the adoption of a BSF reduces revenue underestimation by approximately two‐thirds; however, the size of the effect depends in part on how much a state saves in the BSF and the rules governing BSF deposits and withdrawals. The results suggest that BSFs have the unintended effect of increasing fiscal transparency.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Virginia

相似文献   

Recovery and Reinvestment Act spending at the state level: Keynesian stimulus or distributive politics?

We examine the US state-level pattern of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) spending. We relate spending to (1) Keynesian determinants of countercyclical policy, (2) congressional power and dominance, and (3) presidential electoral vote importance. We find that the ARRA is, in practice, poorly designed countercyclical stimulus. After controlling for political variables, coefficients on Keynesian variables are often statistically insignificant. When they are statistically significant they are often the “incorrect” sign. On the other hand, statistically significant effects are associated with majority party House of Representative appropriations subcommittee and authorization committee membership. One striking result is that the elasticity of ARRA spending with respect to the pre-ARRA ratio of federal grants and payments to federal taxes paid is estimated to be greater than unity in most specifications. States previously capturing large amounts of federal funds continue to do so under the ARRA stimulus.     

Putting the Brakes on the Rush to Spend Down End‐of‐Year Balances: Carryover Money in Oklahoma State Agencies

End‐of‐the‐year spending sprees by government agencies are viewed generally as an example of government wastefulness. Agency personnel, however, rationalize the practice as a means for protecting their budgets from inexpedient cuts. In Oklahoma, a policy has been adopted that allows agencies to carry over and reprogram year‐end surpluses as long as the reprogrammed funds are spent within 16.5 months of the end of the fiscal year. Using agency theory as a theoretical lens, we show that this policy restructures the contract between the principal (legislature) and its agents (state agencies) so that their interests are better aligned, regarding end‐of‐the‐year surpluses.     

SUB‐NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL SPENDING IN INDONESIA: LEVEL,STRUCTURE, AND FINANCING

Sub‐national government capital spending is important for both public service delivery and economic development. Currently, Indonesian sub‐national public capital spending appears barely sufficient to cover the annual depreciation of its fixed assets. A substantial proportion of local government investment spending goes to create relatively unproductive assets, such as administrative office buildings. Sub‐national governments finance their capital acquisitions out of gross operating budgets and have thus far not used, to any great extent, either borrowed funds or their significant cash reserves for such purposes. Indonesian sub‐nationals need to spend more on capital than they do now and also need to focus that spending on more useful types of infrastructure. The major constraints to increasing capital spending at the sub‐national level are not related to a dearth of finance, but regulatory rigidities in budget preparation and implementation and, most importantly, a lack of capacity to plan, design and implement investment projects. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the Size and Allocation of U.S. State Spending

This article demonstrates the impact of public officials’ corruption on the size and allocation of U.S. state spending. Extending two theories of “excessive” government expansion, the authors argue that public officials’ corruption should cause state spending to be artificially elevated. Corruption increased state spending over the period 1997–2008. During that time, the 10 most corrupt states could have reduced their total annual expenditure by an average of $1,308 per capita—5.2 percent of the mean per capita state expenditure—if corruption had been at the average level of the states. Moreover, at the expense of social sectors, corruption is likely to distort states’ public resource allocations in favor of higher‐potential “bribe‐generating” spending and items directly beneficial to public officials, such as capital, construction, highways, borrowing, and total salaries and wages. The authors use an objective, concrete, and consistent measurement of corruption, the number of convictions.     

Does more federal environmental funding increase or decrease states' efforts?

We examine the flow of federal grants‐in‐aid from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the states. We simultaneously model two dependent variables (the flow of EPA funds, and state environmental and natural resource budgets) to identify the independent roles of state political institutions, political preferences, economic and demographic characteristics, and the task environment. Our central focus, though, is on the relationship between grants and state spending after taking into account those direct effects. We examine the evidence for positive association (a flypaper effect) and negative association (crowding out). We show the different roles for political institutions, political preferences, demographic and economic characteristics, and the task environment in each spending context. Most importantly, we find evidence for a flypaper effect between federal funds and state spending: Federal spending and state spending are positively correlated after accounting for the contribution of the unique factors. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico, 1999–2004

This article examines the determinants of primary education spending among 29 Mexican states from 1999 to 2004. There is wide variation in spending despite expectations of policy convergence due to market forces associated with globalization, and in spite of the unique potential of education spending to complement economic strategies in achieving equitable growth. This study exploits significant advantages of subnational analysis in exploring political and economic variables that have been useful in explaining spending levels cross-nationally. Consistent with these studies, this article shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending. In contrast to other work, however, this study finds that exposure to the global economy has distinctly mixed effects on education spending. These findings thus further highlight the positive returns to higher "quality" democracy, while underscoring the need to examine the effects of many different aspects of globalization representing a wide variety of strategies employed by governments in engaging the international economy.     

Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Much work on the apparent ineffectiveness on incumbent spending in congressional elections has hypothesized that the productivity of incumbent spending is low because incumbents operate on the “flat part” of their election returns function. Differences in campaign spending associated with state campaign finance laws allows for a test of this hypothesis because restrictions on campaign contributions tend to reduce campaign spending. Exploiting cross-state variation in campaign finance laws, this study tests whether campaign expenditures by state House candidates are more productive when candidates are subject to contribution limits. The results show that campaign expenditures by incumbents and challengers are more productive when candidates run in states with campaign contribution limits, as opposed to in states without limits. In states with contribution limits, incumbent spending and challenger spending are equally productive, and spending by both candidates is quantitatively important in increasing their vote shares.     

The Georgia Lottery and State Appropriations for Education: Substitution or Additional Funding?

This article examines the use of lottery proceeds for funding public education in Georgia, with specific focus on the state's effort to guard against fungibility of lottery proceeds. The Georgia lottery earmarks proceeds for education and Georgia is among the states requiring a high level of transparency at each stage of the budget and appropriations process. Based upon comparisons of spending before and after the lottery was put in place, we conclude that lottery spending has not been completely offset by substitution. Lottery funds appear to have stimulated additional spending in the target areas. Budget fungibility has been constrained by the transparency of the budget and appropriations process, gubernatorial commitment to supplement not supplant, the policy architecture of the lottery–for–education program, and a relatively strong state economy that renders substitution unnecessary.     

Simulation of a Constitutional Spending Limit for a Conservative State: With Dynamic Adjustment and Sensitivity Analysis

Longstanding concern about the rate of state and local government spending growth, strengthened by “Great Recession” economic and fiscal conditions, sustains advocacy of constitutional amendments to cap the growth of state and local taxes or spending. For some states, interest recently changed to necessity, and current constitutional limits—most notably the California experience with the Gann Spending limit (1979–1990) and the Colorado experience with its Taxpayer Bill of Rights (1992‐present)—contain numerous valuable lessons for fiscal restraint proponents. We use those lessons, and others, to develop a constitutional spending limit (CSL) for Utah, and describe a CSL simulation for the state for 1990–2009. In contrast to what an “Institutional Irrelevance Perspective” suggests for a politically conservative state such as Utah, we find that Utah would have seen large and robust CSL impacts from setting the spending growth rate at school‐age population plus inflation for K‐12 education funding, and at population plus inflation for remaining nonexempt state spending.¹ Those impacts include a reduced tax burden, sizable reserves to cope with emergencies, elimination of fiscal crises, and expanded personal income. Extensive sensitivity analysis identifies the key underlying factors and demonstrates the robustness of those findings. We compare the Utah results to a 1990–2009 CSL simulation for California, and a 1995–2009 CSL simulation for Ohio.     

Road to Ruin? A Spatial Analysis of State Highway Spending

Do states engage in infrastructure expenditure competition to attract new economic activity? Economic theory is inconclusive on the matter. States might respond to increased infrastructure spending in competitor states by increasing their own infrastructure spending. Conversely, states may decrease spending in the presence of positive spillovers from competitor states' infrastructure investment. Using spatial econometric techniques and focusing specifically on highway spending, we demonstrate that states expend less on highways when spending in neighboring states increases. We explore this possibility further by modeling state personal income growth as a function of own‐state and neighbor‐state highway spending. Our findings suggest positive spillovers influence interstate relationships for highway spending rather than race‐to‐the‐top competition for economic activity.     

Interstate Spillovers,Fiscal Decentralization,and Public Spending on Medicaid Home‐ and Community‐Based Services

This article examines the interstate spillover effect of Medicaid expenditures for home‐ and community‐based services (HCBS) and tests the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public spending. Based on the theory of interstate strategic interaction, an empirical model is specified that explicitly accounts for interdependence in states’ spending decisions. The model is estimated by applying spatial econometric methods to panel data for the 50 U.S. states for 2000–2010. Findings show a positive interdependence in state HCBS expenditures that is contingent on similarity in citizen ideology between states. Fiscal decentralization, measured by transfer dependence and revenue autonomy, is positively related to Medicaid HCBS spending.     

Has the Shift to Managed Care Reduced Medicaid Expenditures? Evidence from State and Local‐Level Mandates

From 1991 to 2009, the fraction of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMOs and other forms of Medicaid managed care (MMC) increased from 11 percent to 71 percent. This increase was largely driven by state and local mandates that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in an MMC plan. Theoretically, it is ambiguous whether the shift from fee‐for‐service into managed care would lead to an increase or a reduction in Medicaid spending. This paper investigates this effect using a data set on state‐ and local‐level MMC mandates and detailed data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on state Medicaid expenditures. The findings suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from fee‐for‐service into MMC did not on average reduce Medicaid spending. If anything, our results suggest that the shift to MMC increased Medicaid spending and that this effect was especially present for risk‐based HMOs. However, the effects of the shift to MMC on Medicaid spending varied significantly across states as a function of the generosity of the state's baseline Medicaid provider reimbursement rates.     

Terrorism and pork-barrel spending

The horrifying, tragic events of 9/11 made Americans aware of their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and triggered the creation of the Department of Homeland Security along with a substantial increase in federal spending to both thwart terrorist attacks and to increase our ability to respond to such emergencies. Much of this large increase in spending was in the form of direct transfers to states and cities through several grant programs. Homeland Security grants may be used for protection against terrorist activities, thereby enhancing public interests, or as wealth transfers to state and local governments, enhancing the reelection efforts of incumbents, and thus, private interests. Using 2004 per capita Homeland Security grant funding to states and their cities, we find that the funding formula used for some of the grant programs, which allocates almost 40% of the funds in some grant programs through a minimum percent to each state with the rest allocated based on population, means that per capita funding is related to electoral votes per capita, i.e., to the politics of Presidential re-election. However, the funding in other grant programs is also related to some of the dangers and vulnerabilities faced by states and their cities. Some of the variation in per capita grant allocations is also explained by the amount of airport traffic in the state and the state's population density, which are variables closely linked to the state's vulnerability to attack. Per capita Homeland Security grant allocations, however, do not seem to be related to the closeness of the 2000 presidential race.     

New Federalism Modified: Jobs and Highways in New York

The Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 (JTPA) and the SurfaceTransportation Assistance Act of 1983 (STAA) were intended inpart to stimulate the American economy out of recession. Eachlaw embodied a different approach to that goal and, hence, poseddifferent implementation challenges to the states. JTPA wasintended to decentralize decisionmakingand administration tothe states, and to in volve the private sector in state andlocal decisionmaking processes. Moreover,the level of federalaid was reduced below that available under its predecessor,the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). STAA wasintended to inject increased federal funds for rebuilding roadsand highways. Its stipulation that states bring their standardsfor truck dimensions and routes into line with new nationalstandards was a centralizing feature of the legislation. Inexamining responses of the states in 1983 to these laws, particularlyNew York, decentralization appeared to be on track in the earlyimplementation of JTPA. The level of involvement of governorsand, to a lesser extent, legislatures was higher than underCETA. The implementation of STAA revealed both decentralizingand centralizing features at work. Participation of the NewYork legislature in deciding how the increased highway fundswere to be spent was much higher than before STAA, but conflictsbetween the national and state governments over the new nationalstandards were resolved in favor of the national government.     

All spending is not equal: European Union public spending,policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU

While public support is central to the problem‐solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.     

Comment on Jill Khadduri's “should the housing voucher program become a state‐administered block grant?”

Abstract

The stated goal of the Housing Act of 1949 is “a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.” It is time that we delivered on that commitment. Contrary to popular opinion, this does not require spending more money on housing assistance. It can be achieved without additional funds by shifting all funds from less cost‐effective methods for delivering housing assistance to choice‐based vouchers as soon as current contractual commitments permit and by gradually reducing the large subsidies to current voucher recipients. The proposal to replace the Housing Choice Voucher Program with a block grant to states can contribute to this goal by precluding the use of the block grant funds for project‐based assistance, increasing the targeting of assistance to the poorest families, and including the fraction of recipients with extremely low incomes in the formula for determining the performance rating of state programs.     

State health reform: Effects on labor markets and economic activity

Individual states are actively weighing health care reform proposals and their potential impacts on many levels, including states' own economies. This article considers the effects on state economies of two instruments of health reform: employer mandates and cost containment. The literature suggests that an employer mandate will reduce employees' wages in the long run. In the short run, however, to compensate for the costs associated with mandated health care insurance for their employees, firms may raise their prices to consumers, reduce the number of employees or allow a drop in profit margins. By increasing health care spending and the number of insured persons, mandates would also increase states' levels of economic activity. Though cost containment may dampen the stimulative effects of expanded coverage, resources not spent on health care as a result of effective cost containment might be redistributed to other sectors in a state's economy.