公共危机管理中的府际协作：目标、驱动力与模式

人们习惯于将公共危机管理中的政府视为一个整体,但对危机管理中的府际协作问题却重视不够。政府职能、危机的扩散性和资源有限性要求各级政府必须以协作的方式应对危机,并树立维护安全、提高效益等共同目标。在府际协作达成中既有公共利益等正向驱动力因素,也有地方主义等负向驱动力因素,多种因素在同一场域下进行博弈从而产生主动协作型、命令协作型等协作模式。     

Intergovernmental Relations: Ensuring Informed Cooperation in Strategic Policy Development

COAG was formed out of a concern by commonwealth, state and territory governments to improve intergovernmental cooperation. In particular, COAG allowed leaders and central agencies to discuss and coordinate policy frameworks from a whole-of-government perspective. It also has increased the prospects of further reform to Australia's political system in the areas of financial arrangements, international treaties and constitutional reform.     

Managing Intergovernmental Relations in Australia: The Case of Agricultural Policy Cooperation

In June 2004, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) announced changes to the guidelines and protocols of some 40 ministerial councils and intergovernmental fora which comprise the web of intergovernmental consultative arrangements. This article examines the impact of the guidelines on the operation of the oldest of the sectoral ministerial councils, those relating to agriculture. The COAG guidelines aim to increase the strategic focus of the councils. However, in the case of agricultural policy there appears to have been a centralising of policy control, both within state governments and towards the Commonwealth, which undermines that objective and leaves the ministerial councils focusing on the more technical issues which they are more effective at addressing.     

Informal Accountability, Socially Embedded Officials, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China: The Role of Lineage Groups

In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.     

Public School Music: Notes on the Public Provision of a Quasi-Private Good

This paper uses a version of theBergstrom/Goodman median voter model toexamine whether there are aspects ofpublicness to public school music. It alsoexamines whether the provision of publicschool music is an example of the abilityof small groups to seek benefits forthemselves at the expense of larger groups. School music programs provide a uniquesetting in which it is possible to separatethe demand for school music programs by theconsumers of school music (the privatebeneficiaries) from the demand for schoolmusic programs by those who do not directlyconsume the product. If those who are notdirect consumers of music programs appearto value school music programs as a publicgood, their valuation cannot be confusedwith a jointly consumed private good, orconsumption of a private good with scaleeconomies, because they are not themselvesconsuming it as a private good. Using datafrom the 1987 Schools and Staffing Survey,the results from a logarithmic, normative,demand model show that (parents of)nonmusic students appear to value musicprograms as a public good. Once it isprovided for music students, additionalproportions of nonmusic students do notdemand additional music classes. In thatmodel, music students appear to value musicclasses as a private good. In thepositive, additive, demand model, moremusic students mean that more music classeswill be provided. Further, since music isvalued as a non-subtractable public goodwhose costs can easily be spread,increasing numbers of non-music studentsalso result in (slightly) more musicclasses. The method can be used to estimate thepublicness of publicly provided goodswhenever it is possible to separate thedirect beneficiaries of the good from thosewho could only value its externalities. The model seems particularly applicable tostudying the extent to which defense isvalued as a quasi-private good by theconcentrated defense industry; and whetherit is also valued as a public good bycitizen/voters with no connection to thedefense industry. It may also be usefulfor investigating still unsettled questionsregarding the publicness of publiclyprovided education.     

建构信任合作的府际关系：总体性治理根基

我国自上而下的政策执行模式导致政府间缺乏理解、信任、对话、互动。多元行政主体受制于科层制窠臼而难以建构合作机制,行政层级的位势差导致了中央及部委、地方政府及地方部门之间信任度较低。总体性治理尊重行政主体的个体独立性,破除信任危机和营造诚信原则方法,建构起多元县市、省市及作为行政主体的政府部门之间平等信任的伙伴关系;对府际关系的历史发展趋向予以引导,在共同的语境下将共识转换成多元主体皆可接受的符号,建构符合发展规律的自生自发秩序;立基于公义建构宪政秩序和法律规则,主动协调多元政府和社团间关系,破除行政层级的束缚,全方位实现政府层面的跨界相互依赖和社团层面的多元共治。     

Blowback: Investor–State Dispute Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gave unprecedented rights to private investors. These provisions quickly became entrenched in policy and practice, appearing in most multilateral and bilateral trade agreements in the 1990s as American investors began to bring Canada and Mexico to arbitration. However, the Australia–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) of 2004 contained no such provisions. The purpose of this article is to explain why enthusiasm for NAFTA‐style protections waned so dramatically after a decade of entrenched practice. We argue that the reason lies in the “blowback,” the unintended and negative consequences created by NAFTA’s Chapter 11, and conclude that the abandonment of NAFTA‐style protections in the AUSFTA sets important precedents for the future of international free trade agreements.     

Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods

This paper treats interest groups – peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers – asthe unit of account for representativevoting. Each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand, at the margin, the effort-benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits.

Under reasonable assumptions, a uniqueequilibrium is assured and itscharacteristics are quite intuitive. Inparticular, the marginal political benefit(from consumers) of the last unit of outputmust equal the marginal political cost(from taxpayers). Alternatively, the rateat which the politician can transformtaxpayer income into consumer surplus mustequal the ratio of their political prices. The result will be optimal only on the rareoccasion when the effort-benefit ratios ofthe two groups are equal.

Since political goals are themselves ``public goods'' for thetwo interest groups,they face all the normal free riderproblems. Moreover, even small differencesin the effort-benefit ratios of the twogroups lead to large welfare losses.

How bad can things get? Each group has anincentive to try to overcome free-riderproblems and divert resources from privatesector activities to politics. And anyincrease in political effort is alwaysrewarded. However, (1) the marginal returnis always higher for the group with thesmaller effort-benefit ratio; (2) thedifferential return between the two groupsgrows the further we stray from optimality;and (3) both groups face diminishingreturns. These incentives may act asnatural checks on political outcomes –placing some limit on the amount of wasteand inefficiency democracy is likely toproduce.

The influence of a producer (of the publicgood) group that collects a rent increasesthe likelihood that public goods will beoverproduced. In fact, it is conceivableto have a good with no value to consumersproduced, solely because of the influenceof producers. Comparative static analysisreveal that the political system willrespond to changes in market conditions ina way similar to economic markets. Themagnitude of these shifts differs fromeconomic markets, however. For goods thatare being overproduced, the politicalmarketplace overresponds to changes indemand and underresponds to changes incosts. The converse is true for goods thatare being underproduced.

     

Costs of Cooperation Rather than Competition in the Provision of Justice?

The civil law reforms starting in the USA and exemplified by Lord Woolf's reform package(1995; 1996) in the U.K. are considered in the context of diminishing legal aid and pressure on judges to become case managers responsible for the economic performance of their courts. The reforms are being sold in a package that promises a fairer system for all, greater access, cheaper and quicker justice, less stress and greater party control. This move from the welfare state to a civil society is analysed using Habermas's critical theory in an effort to uncover and debate its assumptions. Specific recent changes in civil procedure in Queensland are referred to in this context.     

公共物品私人提供的博弈分析

公共物品的自愿提供是公共经济学研究的一个基础问题,已有研究者从博弈论与实证等角度对该问题进行了研究,但较少有学者考虑效用函数对公共物品提供问题的影响.基于对效用函数的回顾,建立了考虑社会效益这一因素的效用函数.在此基础上对公共物品私人提供进行了博弈分析,得出结论:引入社会效益这一非物质性因素使得可以通过行为主体的自愿提供使公共物品的提供量达到帕累托最优;随着行为主体的数目的增多,要实现通过自愿供给的方式提供公共物品则要求降低物质性因素对行为主体效用所产生的贡献水平;当参与提供公共物品的行为主体为很多时,要实现合作,通过自愿的方式来提供公共物品则要求社会效益这一因素成为行为主体进行决策的一个重要的因素.     

Public Sector Reform, Intergovernmental Relations and the Future of Australian Federalism

Recent developments in the reform of intergovernmental relations have been influenced by contemporary models of public sector reform. Their systematic application to intergovernmental administration, in particular the manner in which jointly funded and managed programs are organised, may have profound and unanticipated effects on the federal system. When viewed in the context of a recent history of collaborative policymaking between political executives, the possibility that new forms of intergovernmental joint policy-making and program management might become the norm poses serious challenges to federal traditions of dual government. Arm's length and collaborative forms of joint decision making are contrasted as ideal types, and then used to analyse two case studies in collaborative intergovernmental decision-making — National Competition Policy and the National Training Agreement. It is concluded that the system-wide implications are profound if they are part of a broader trend, but caution is expressed about the powers of inertia and resistance in traditional forms of federal politics.     

External Actors and the Provision of Public Health Services in Somalia

Concentrating on the health sector, this article argues that the provision of collective goods through external actors depends on the level of state capacity and the complexity of the service that external actors intend to provide. It shows that external actors can contribute most effectively to collective good provision when the service is simple, and that simple services can even be provided under conditions of failed statehood. Effectively delivering complex services requires greater levels of state capacity. The article also indicates that legitimacy is a key factor to explain variance in health service delivery. To demonstrate this, the article assesses health projects in Somalia. It shows that simple services—malaria prevention and tuberculosis control—are provided effectively in all three Somali regions, including the war‐torn South‐Central region. In contrast, the HIV/AIDS project only achieved substantial results in Somaliland, the only region with a comparatively higher level of state capacity, and failed in the South‐Central region and Puntland.     

Exploring the Role of Nonprofits in Public Service Provision: Moving from Coproduction to Cogovernance

This article investigates the determinants of nonprofits' involvement in cogovernance, or the planning and design of public services, using a unique data set of park‐supporting nonprofit organizations in large U.S. cities. The results indicate that nonprofits are more likely to get involved in cogovernance when they are younger, larger, and operate in communities that are more resourceful and stable. In addition, the likelihood of nonprofits' involvement in cogovernance is negatively associated with the level of social capital and government capacity to provide corresponding public services. The article points to an emerging mode of government‐nonprofit collaboration that goes beyond the production and delivery of public services. As public managers face extensive challenges in sustaining the desired level of public services, these findings have important policy implications for efforts to promote citizen participation and cross‐sector solutions to complex social problems.     

公共安全：公共管理不可忽视的社会问题

公共安全是公共部门必须重视的公共管理中的一个社会问题。现代社会存在多种威胁公共安全的因素。公共部门要和社会公众共同合作,制定保障公共安全的法律和制度,有效地处理危机,更好地实现社会公共利益。     

The Evolution of Public Service Provision by the Third Sector in France

Public services have been externalised, in part, to the non‐profit sector in France and in the United Kingdom. This article begins by reviewing relations between the public and non‐profit sector in France before 2008, and its evolution since. This has been characterised by the slow reduction of public funding, the adaptation of non‐profit associations and organisations, and their clearer positioning within a wider ‘social and solidarity economy’, which was consolidated by a framework Law in 2014. The article then examines the current sharing of responsibilities between the public and non‐profit sectors in education, health and social services, pointing to the diverse historical and political conditions which have led to this shared organisation.     

政府在农村公共物品供给中的理念创新

农村公共物品的有效供给是确保社会主义新农村建设进程和质量的决定性因素,政府作为推动新农村建设的主导力量,在农村公共物品供给中应该打破固有的观念束缚,用先进的理念来指导农村公共物品的有效供给,通过树立公共性理念、服务多元化理念、社会公正理念、民主正义理念、法治理念和追求效能理念,把政府对农村公共物品的供给提高到体现政府责任、实现社会公正和凸现价值正义上来。     

农村公共品供给效率实证研究

运用公共服务满意度理论对农村公共品供给效率进行评价研究。研究认为,效率既是主体行为结果的投入产生的比较效果,又是一个对于主体行为而言的相对概念。农村公共品供给效果,既包括物质性效果,也包括精神效果,即公共品受众的感觉效果。在农村公共品供给效率评价中,从农民主体而言,只有农民认为有用的公共品,才是有效率的。相反,即使政府反复认定有用并强制去供给的公共品,当农民认为没有用时,农民依然感觉它是无效率的。利用126个乡(镇)农户对农村公共品供给效率"满意度"评价(CSI)抽样调查数据,运用CSI-Probit回归模型对农户的农村公共品供给效率"满意度"及其影响因素进行了实证分析,得出:当CSI值处于同一类型的市(州)时,其影响因素表现出明显的共性特征。总体而言,CSI的主要影响来自农民受教育年限、医疗可及性、农民收入水平、农户有效灌溉面积率、农户距乡镇政府的距离、农林技术站服务次数以及被调查者年龄等因素。     

Public Opinion on U.S. Federal and Intergovernmental Issues in 2006: Continuity and Change

A 2006 trend survey found that Americans most often select localgovernment as giving them the most for their money, followedby the federal and state governments. African Americans aremost supportive of the federal government as giving them themost for their money; Hispanics are most supportive of localgovernment. As in many previous years, the local property taxwas viewed as the worst tax, followed by the federal incometax, state sales tax, and state income tax. Americans displayedreduced trust and confidence in the federal government; however,trust in all three spheres of government—federal, state,and local—dropped between 2004 and 2006, possibly reflectiveof the poor response of all governments to Hurricane Katrina.Analysis of surveys since 1972 reveals that there has been along-term decline in the public's support for the federal governmentand a corresponding increase in support of state and especiallylocal governments.     

An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods

How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. However, we also observe outcomes in which a minimum winning coalition exploits the contributions of the remaining players. A second experiment demonstrates that when electoral delegation must be endogenously implemented, individuals voluntarily cede authority to an elected agent only when preplay communication is permitted. Our combined results demonstrate that democratic delegation helps groups overcome the free‐rider problem and generally leads to outcomes that are often both efficient and equitable.