Japan's emerging role as a 'global ordinary power'

In this article we argue that since 1945 Japanese foreign policyhas evolved through five phases, which will culminate in Japan'sre-emergence as a global ordinary power. We then discuss threepotential models of ordinary power that are ideal-typical innature, but which share some qualities with the respective politicalcircumstances of France, Germany, and Britain. We also considerthe legitimacy and capacity deficits that Japan possesses, andthe way in which recent electoral developments may contributeto the addressing of these deficits. We argue that Japan isusing the British model as a foundation for the acquisitionof ordinary power status. In doing so it is increasingly bindingitself to the United States. But such a move can also providea platform from which to develop the possibilities that liebeyond bilateralism (plus), in the realm of the German model,and wider regional cooperation.     

Identity,Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War

Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? This question has long puzzled scholars of international security, who consider German naval ambition to be an instance of suboptimal arming—a decision that decreased Germany's overall security and risked the survival of the German state. This article argues that the social desire to be recognized as a world power guided Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony. From the beginning of its naval planning, Germany had one clear aim: a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea would alter the political relationship with Britain in such a way that it could no longer ignore Germany's claim to world power status. Reconceptualizing Germany's naval ambition as a struggle for recognition elucidates the contradictions at the center of German naval strategy, explaining how the doomed policy could proceed despite its certain failure. The article concludes that the power-maximizing practices of great powers should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of contemporary security practice.     

A Problem Postponed: Britain and the Future of Austria-Hungary, 1914-18

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

German policy in a strategic triangle: Berlin,Paris, Washington … and what about London?

The article presents the German view on the current stand and future perspectives of the transatlantic relationship. It points to the caesuras that have defined the US–German relationship since the end of the Cold War. It also details the German role in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and highlights the German discussion on its involvement in those wars. The historical strategic triangle of the US, Germany and France might develop into a Euro‐American ellipse to confront current global challenges, but, as of today, many hurdles remain, particularly the lack of a common vision and policy regarding the future political order of Europe. The article finally calls on the German government to continue its policy as a ‘civilian power’ and to repair its relations with the US after the Iraq war. International cooperation in multilateral institutions remains the main pillar of German foreign policy.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907–20

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

Civilian power and ‘history‐making’ decisions: German agenda‐setting on Europe

This article examines ‘history‐making’ decisions on Europe by the German government, drawing on the concept of civilian power, which has been refined by international relations theorists, subjecting it to a political science critique. Three case studies ‐ of economic and monetary union (EMU), dual enlargement and European defence and security policy ‐ are discussed and compared with the aim of assessing the value of civilian power for the analysis and explanation of key German decisions. The focus is on agenda‐setting in relation to key ‘history‐making’ decisions. It is argued that German European policy behaviour is better explained by civilian power than realism or neo‐liberal institutionalism. However, civilian power does not adequately capture the complex attitudes and values at work in Germany, the interests brought to bear in a fragmented, sectoralised policy process, the resource limitations on pursuing this approach, and the external conditions for sustaining such a role.     

Domestic politics,news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya

The European Union member states split over the military intervention in Libya with France, Germany and the UK voting differently in the United Nations Security Council. This article compares news media in France and Germany to better understand the foreign policy decisions of these key actors. Using a newspaper analysis of 334 articles, it shows that the German domestic debate started very late and was much less stable than the French debate. This supports arguments that Germany's decision-making was erratic. The analysis, however, also shows that the German debate was comprehensive and included an extensive discussion of the legitimacy of intervention. This fits in well with the traditional reluctance of German foreign policy elites to support military action.     

“价值观外交”:德国新政府的外交基轴?

德国新政府提出的“价值观外交”是对默克尔政府开启的“价值观外交”的延续和继承,是作为后现代和后民族国家的德国成功转化身份的必然结果。德国国内政治生态、国际秩序变革和默克尔时期“价值观外交”实践的正向激励,都会促进德国新政府加速推进德式“价值观外交”。但德国的“价值观外交”不完全等同于“意识形态外交”,它给中德关系发展带来的既有机遇也有挑战。未来针对德国新政府对华政策中的“价值观外交”,中国应在坚持“红线”的基础上,注重从积极面入手,明确双方在多边主义规则和制度方面的共同点,争取相互合作以塑造更具包容性的国际秩序。     

German crisis management and leadership—from ignorance to procrastination to action

The financial crisis of 2008 and even more so the crisis of the Eurozone drastically increased the demand for decisive leadership and public crisis management. Due to the size of its economy and its position in the global as well as in the European economy, Germany should take the lead in this crisis management. Germany’s management of the two crises differs but also shows strong similarities. A “center-left Grand Coalition” managed the global financial crisis; a global crisis in which Germany was one among several relevant global players. A center-right government under the leadership of the same chancellor then during the sovereign debt crisis manages the Eurozone crisis. This is a regional crisis but with global implications. German government was slow in responding to both crises but acted eventually after some procrastination. Both cases, however, differ with regards to Germany’s actual role in crisis management. During the global financial crisis, other global actors pushed Germany to the forefront. The Eurozone crisis, a regional crisis, demands a leading role of Germany, the largest economy and member state of the EU. The paper, however, argued that the German crisis management with regards to the Eurozone is very much driven by ideas that preserve German norms but do not live up to the challenges of the crisis. Germany’s insistence in its own interests and norms hinders the delivery of a comprehensive crisis management of the Eurozone crisis within the European Union.     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

The Berlin Republic,Iraq, and the Use of Force

This article holds that German security policy and attitudes towards the use of force remain framed by the distinct strategic culture that emerged during West Germany’s rearmament and international rehabilitation in the 1950’s. This strategic culture, characterised by strong anti-military sentiment and a commitment to multilateral diplomacy and international law, determined Germany’s position over Iraq and its ongoing opposition to the US-led invasion of the country. However, the strength and highly vociferous nature of Germany’s opposition to US policy also indicated that German strategic culture is itself evolving, as both elites and society reconsider aspects of German national history and the role of collective memory. Much of this new discourse relates to the notion of the ‘Berlin Republic’, which in foreign and security policy terms is synonymous with the emergence of greater self confidence, the introduction of more ‘national’ vocabulary into foregin policy statements and a less reflexive attitude to transatlantic security.     

Postwar (West) German–Romanian Relations: Expanding Brubaker's Analytic Triad

This article revisits Rogers Brubaker's well-known triadic nexus, consisting of national minority, nationalizing state, and kin-state, and interrogates its applicability to the study of German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe since the second half of the 20th century. It does that by looking at German–Romanian relations after the Second World War, arguing that the migration of Romanian Germans to (West) Germany led to the transformation of Brubaker's triadic nexus into a quadratic nexus. More precisely, the field of Romanian Germans in (West) Germany has to be added to the three already existing fields. Furthermore, the extension of Brubaker's model allows in effect for a more comprehensive analysis of postwar West German–Eastern European relationships.     

试析德国对卢旺达的发展援助

发展援助是德国外交政策的一极,既是推动和实现德国对非洲外交目标的重要工具,也强烈地塑造了德国的对非洲政策。作为世界最不发达国家之一,卢旺达在德国对非洲发展援助中占据了特殊的位置。20世纪60年代以来,德国对卢旺达发展援助主要经历了4个发展阶段,目前呈现出快速发展的势头。德国主要通过财政援助和技术援助促进卢旺达在医疗卫生、种族和解、政治发展以及经济改革等领域的建设。德国对卢旺达的援助,既有其显著的特点和优势,也存在明显的缺陷。中、德两国对卢旺达的援助存在很大差异。     

De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum

Since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union (EU) has undergone significant changes. Once a model "Europeanist," Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Neither an instance of a planned strategic change nor a result of an inevitable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level, these changes in German foreign policy, incremental yet significant as they are, evade both deterministic and voluntaristic accounts of foreign policy change. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory, the article develops an innovative framework for analysis that is applied to Germany's European asylum and refugee policy as well as its security and defense policy. The origins of both policy fields at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany. However, as the 1990s progressed Germany increasingly obstructed further institutionalization. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam summit marks a clear turning point in Germany's position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defense proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field more broadly. An unanticipated consequence of earlier initiatives, in both cases Germany has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations it has helped to raise.     

Germany’s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy’s First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem

Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval policy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence policy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a security problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.     

Explaining institutional Europeanisation in security and defence: the German administration under Schröder and Merkel

Abstract

Participating in EU crisis management operations has affected institutional actors on various levels. As the main deliverers of civilian and military resources to EU operations, national ministries and agencies have been particularly confronted with the need for administrative adaptation. A big member state like Germany is expected to make substantial contributions, but it also faces a rigid administration. This article uses a combined hypothesis of historical institutionalism and organisational learning to explain administrative Europeanisation in German government institutions involved in civilian and military crisis management deployments. The empirical data on the German administrative trajectories under Schröder and Merkel show an explanatory link between political learning and overcoming institutional path dependency.     

European debates during the Libya crisis of 2011: shared identity,divergent action

The war in Libya of 2011 is generally portrayed as yet more evidence of the European Union (EU)'s inability to formulate a coordinated foreign policy. While the crisis took place in the EU's backyard, joint foreign policy action was hindered by member states' disagreements on whether or not to establish a no-fly zone in Libya. While this is true of political decision-makers, this paper investigates whether governmental decisions were reflected in similar divisions in national news media or whether references to European identity and criticism of European disunity transcended national media boundaries. Comparing a total of 6746 newspaper articles from Germany, France, the UK, Austria and the USA, the findings show that intergovernmental differences did not lead to similarly divided public spheres. Public debates in France, Germany and Austria constantly referred to a European foreign policy identity, though EU identity references were largely absent from UK newspapers.     

Collective memory in Germany and the great foreign policy debate: the case of the European refugee crisis

Abstract

Embedded within the wider normalization–continuity debate about the nature of Germany’s actorness, this article assesses the impact of collective memory on German foreign policy during the European refugee crisis. The Federal Republic’s open-door policy in autumn 2015 bewildered many observers who saw it as a self-harming act of charity. Based on a three-stage empirical framework, the article argues that Germany’s initial behaviour cannot be understood without accounting for the influence that collective memory still exerts in Germany today. The open-door policy was irreconcilable with Germany’s immediate material interests, but instead shaped by collective memory-inspired humanitarian and European principles. This conclusion challenges the growing consensus among students of German foreign policy that Germany is becoming a normal actor which has freed itself from the constraints of the past and behaves in congruence with its material interests. This article seeks to make a timely contribution to the knowledge about collective memory in international relations, Germany’s foreign policy in the specific as well as wider context, and the dynamics of the European refugee crisis.     

Doom in East Germany,Dawn in the New East European Member States of the European Union? Elements of a Comparative Analysis

The economic, and in part political, transition failures in East Germany, based on institutional path dependencies and politicians begging for the median voter, form the background of this analysis. Although there are plentiful data to compare developments in East Germany and West Germany after unification in 1990, East German developments are rarely explicitly contrasted with those in the eight new East European member states of the European Union. Such comparisons are vital in highlighting the long-term drawbacks and catastrophic failures committed in the East German case. Acknowledging that much more empirically guided theoretical research lies ahead, this article aims at being more than a mere “think piece”.