European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?

The European Union has, since 1999, moved deliberately, if slowly, to develop the capability to undertake autonomously a range of demanding political military operations beyond Europe's borders. This effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (esdp), is a puzzle insofar as post-Cold War Europe is very secure, and most European nations are members of an established alliance, the u.s.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. esdp is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an imminent threat from the United States, they are balancing u.s. power. The concentration of global power in the United States, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the abandonment that u.s. freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global political environment the United States could create.     

“The Most Sophisticated Intervention We Have Seen”: The Carter Administration and the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978–1979

In May 1977, in a public forum, President Jimmy Carter laid out the foundations of a distinctive foreign policy programme for the United States. He offered a striking shift away from the Cold War realpolitik of previous American administrations. Human rights, he declared, would be a central component of United States foreign policy. The growing instability in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, during Carter's term of office provided a major test of his Administration's new programme. And its ultimate response to Nicaraguan instability thus provides key insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the thirty-ninth President's attempt to move beyond traditional, hard-line Cold War diplomacy.     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。     

Playing at peace: Western politics,diplomacy and the stabilization of Macedonia

On 27 July 2001 negotiators of the ethnic Slav and ethnic Albanian political parties from the self‐proclaimed unity government of the Federal Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) met at Ohrid, a lakeside resort in the southwestern corner of the war‐torn country. The negotiators had fled Skopje, the country's starved, gray capital, because the pressures from the spreading war between ethnic Albanian insurgents and the dominantly ethnic Slav security forces had made constructive political dialogue nearly impossible. Ohrid, on the other hand, was a community that embraced many of the region's historical contradictions. The town had seen Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Ottomans, Serbs, Greeks and Albanians all come and go. Saint Clement of Ohrid (d. 916) had once lived and worshipped in the city, and much of the architecture, with its winding streets and numerous churches and monasteries, still bore the marks of its medieval and diverse past. All parties arrived in this contemplative setting under intense diplomatic pressure from the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to find a constitutional and political solution to the crisis, and find one soon. As all parties sat down to thrash out a compromise, a senior EU mediator was heard to remark: ‘This country doesn't need mediators, it needs a psychoanalyst.”     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

Russian policies on central and eastern Europe: An overview

After the collapse of both the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in 1990—91 Russia has lost highly effective instruments of (repressive) control of the East European countries and has been left without any significant influence on the economic, political and military developments in the region ever since. This can partly be explained by the deep distrust and emotional reserve vis‐à‐vis Russia on behalf of the new ruling elites in the region. A very important additional factor, however, has been the lack of a clear and coherent Russian strategy on the region in the early years of independent Russian statehood. After the initial loss of importance the region has regained prominence only indirectly as a crucial variable in Russian relations with Western countries and institutions such as NATO, the WEU, and the EU. Though deeper economic and trade relations between Russia and the region seem mutually advantageous, a major rapprochement seems to be blocked by political reservations and considerations.     

美国军事介入钓鱼岛将面临两难困境

2010年9月"钓鱼岛海域撞船事件"导致中日关系严重恶化,一度紧张.美国一面表示希望中日通过对话解决撞船事件;一面向日方承诺钓鱼岛适用于<美日安全条约>,在军事上加强美日合作.2010年末,日本制定新的防卫计划大纲,把防卫重点转向包括钓鱼岛的西南诸岛,并企图进一步借助美国牵制中国.综合各方因素看,未来如果美国在军事上卷入钓鱼岛争议,必将使美国面临两难的战略选择.     

United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense

Liberal theory asserts that the need for cost-effective, technologically advanced weapons requires the United States to acquiesce to increasing defense globalization even as this restrains U.S. power. Realist logic dictates that the United States should resist defense liberalization to retain its self-sufficiency. This is a false choice; the United States encourages defense globalization in order to extend its international political influence. This paper proposes an alternate theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance. Modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies, and the value chain for the production of these monopolistic goods is dominated by the systems integration techniques of prime contracting firms. In turn these prime contractors remain largely enthralled by U.S. market power. The United States gains international influence by controlling the distribution of these weapons. Put simply, technology with international political effects is likely to have international political origins.     

‘Unfortunate Arabia’: The United States,Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63

As it emerged from a long, self‐imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo‐American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil,Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23

There has been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923, in particular British attempts to retain Mosul as part of Iraq. However, as this article explores, the conference also had important implications for the composition of the British-registered Turkish Petroleum Company, which was expected to win the Iraqi oil concession. In the first phase of the conference, the United States observer delegation's stance persuaded the British Government to put pressure upon the British companies involved in the TPC to admit American companies upon the latter's terms. Despite this, in the second phase, the Americans supported the Turkish delegation in its opposition to clauses in the proposed Treaty, which would have guaranteed the rights of the TPC, and forced a British compromise on the issue. The Lausanne Conference played a significant role in the Anglo–American “oil war” of the inter-war period.     

Communication,Politics, and the Notions of Martin Spencer

This essay calls attention to the work of sociologist Martin Spencer, who once offered an uncommon understanding of political communications in the United States. According to Spencer, public discourse not only propels action but constitutes action in and of itself on occasion. This means that political rhetoric can have both an injunctive effect on political actors and can also stand as a kind of completed “action” in its own right. The importance of these principles is examined here, and some of their implications are delineated.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

Cause,effect, and consistency: A response to Kenneth Waltz

In The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, we argued that the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is due largely to the influence of a domestic interest group—comprised of Jews as well as non-Jews—and that this unusual situation is harmful to both the United States and Israel. Jerome Slater's thoughtful review endorses many of our central arguments, but it also highlights several points of disagreement. He argues that we overlooked important alternative sources, defined the lobby too broadly, and exaggerated its influence on Congress and especially the Executive Branch. Although Slater is even more critical of U.S. Middle East policy than we are, he argues that the special relationship is due to strong cultural and religious affinities and broad public support in American society, and not to the influence of the lobby. In fact, the alternative sources cited by Slater do not undermine our basic claims; a broad conception of the lobby makes more sense than his narrower definition; and there is little disagreement between us about the lobby's influence on Capitol Hill or in the White House. Most importantly, public opinion in the United States does not explain why the United States gives Israel such extensive and nearly unconditional backing. Although most Americans have a favorable image of Israel, surveys show that they also favor a more even-handed Middle East policy and a more normal relationship with Israel. Thus, the special relationship is due primarily to the lobby's influence, and not to the American people's enduring identification with the Jewish state.     

Notes on recent dissertations

The growing popularity and use of news Web sites around the world provides new possibilities for studying the position of the United States in the world system charted by digital news items. In this article, we look at 35 popular news sites in 10 different languages over a 2-year period, in order to assess the position of the United States in world news as well as to identify possible explanations for it. Our findings show that the United States is by far the most prominent country in the news sites that we studied from around the world, except for the French and Arabic ones. The network structure of news links clearly exhibits its key position as the centerpiece of a global system. Economic factors better explain America's news prominence than political, social, and geographical factors. Yet, none of the many variables we examined could explain the large gap between the news prominence of the United States and that of the rest of the world. We discuss possible reasons for these findings and suggest directions for further studies in the field.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Political Communication for the following free supplemental resource: network data.]     

Terrorism and Human Rights: A Defence Lawyer's Perspective

ABSTRACT

The author of this article is one of the attorneys appointed to represent Zacarias Moussaoui in the United States. Mr. Moussaoui is the only person facing criminal charges for alleged involvement in the September 11 plot. The author describes the system of government in the United States with a specific emphasis on several terrorism cases pending in the United States. He seeks to assure the readers that the rule of law is paramount in the United States. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court—in the Hamdi and Guantanamo cases—that confirm the constitutional rights of even the most dedicated enemies of the United States, which decisions post-date this submission, only affirm the writer's theme.     

America's freedom to act in the Caspian Area

After the break up of the Soviet Union the conflict over energy resources in the Caspian area has flared up again. The United States has entered the stage, but the only remaining superpower finds it hard to forward its security policy interests and interests in the economic sphere in the area. The creation of a US‐dominated hegemony in the area would be beneficial for the United States, but the policy of containment of Iran and Russia, and US policy towards Azerbaijan seriously limits this possibility. Thus it is not possible to secure American influence in the Caspian area. In the long term this leaves the area open to Russia and Iran, or new actors such as China and the EU, unless the United States is willing to soften its policy vis‐à‐vis Iran and/or Azerbaijan in order to create the needed hegemony, and in this way achieve economic and political influence in the former Soviet republics.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.