Good for some,bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) trigger investment through their commitment to a liberal market economy. Increasingly however, PTAs go far beyond liberalizing trade and investment flows. Especially controversial features included in most modern PTAs are environmental and labor standards. Do these standards affect business activity? If so, how do investors react to such non-trade issues in trade deals? The literature provides inconclusive findings about the impact of standards on foreign direct investment (FDI). Some contributors argue that strict standards decrease FDI, whilst others claim that environmental and labor protection increases productivity and, in consequence, inward investment. In all likelihood, the usage of aggregated FDI data, as is the case for most studies, causes confusion. I expect standards to influence investors’ decisions – but heterogeneously across sectors. Environmental and labor standards should reduce FDI in polluting and low-skilled labor endowed industries, but increase investment in environmentally clean and high-skilled labor abundant sectors. Based on an original dataset of environmental and social standards in trade agreements and at the sector-level disaggregated US-FDI data, I find robust support for my argument. The paper provides a more nuanced picture on the standards and investment nexus: Standards have no uniform effect on multinationals. Instead, they are good for some, but bad for other industries.     

Economic Policy,Political Constraints,and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries

As foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly important in the world economy, a large body of literature has emerged regarding the determinants of FDI flows. Some scholars argue that democracy attracts FDI through the mechanism of political constraints, which reduce the risk of negative policy changes. However, the value of policy stability should be conditional on the attractiveness of contemporary FDI-relevant policies. I therefore propose a theoretically more comprehensive argument: political constraints are attractive to investors when the host country policy environment is FDI-friendly, because these political constraints reduce the probability of negative policy changes in the future. When the policy environment is hostile to FDI, on the other hand, political constraints will have little positive effect, and, to the extent they indicate that FDI-relevant policies are unlikely to improve, may even deter FDI. This argument helps explain why the positive relationship between democracy and FDI seems to emerge after a global shift toward FDI-friendly polices. I find robust empirical support for the argument in tests covering more than 100 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, indicating significant effects using a variety of policy and political constraint measures.     

Labor Market Institutions and Outward Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries

ABSTRACT

Concern among voters in the United States and elsewhere about jobs moving overseas has spurred significant research into outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), which can depress employment and economic growth. Recent research shows that labor market institutions play a prominent role in influencing inward foreign direct investment in developed economies, but little is known about how such institutions influence OFDI. We argue that increasing labor union density or centralized wage bargaining threatens firms’ profitability and thus leads to higher OFDI flows. Yet union density and coordination of wage setting moderate each other’s effect on OFDI since firms can expect wage moderation, fewer strikes, and labor skill protection that offset labor costs. Our tests using data on 27 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries between 1971 and 2013 suggest this is the case. The findings indicate that a highly stable and institutionalized labor market can lead firms to stay and to return if they have left.     

Coercive Assets? Foreign Direct Investment and the Use of Economic Sanctions

How does foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the use of economic coercion? This article argues that while FDI matters, the effect depends on the entry mode of the FDI. The economic interdependence created by FDI does not have a monotonic effect on economic statecraft because the relative costs incurred by economic disruption differ depending on the forms of foreign investment. In particular, the FDI that creates wholly-owned subsidiaries (for example, cross-border mergers and aquisitions) imposes greater costs to the sender's firms than cross-border joint ventures with local partners, while FDI through joint ventures incurs greater costs for the host than the home country and its firms. By utilizing US sanction episodes from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, the empirical analysis supports the argument. The results show that economic sanctions are less likely to occur as the share of FDI through cross-border mergers and acquisitions increases.     

Credibility,preferences, and bilateral investment treaties

When is a commitment mechanism employed as a solution to a time-inconsistency problem? This article provides a nuanced answer to this question by studying bilateral investment treaties (BITs). We develop a game theoretic model of BIT signing in which the government of a capital-importing country and an investor from a capital-exporting country strategically interact. The model predicts that, on the one hand, when host states highly value foreign direct investment (FDI), the likelihood of BITs increases as their judicial institutions lack credibility. On the other hand, when their preferences for FDI are only modest, the likelihood of BITs increases as their judicial institutions become more credible. We employ Cox proportional hazard models to test our hypotheses, and the results largely support our theory. Our findings have broad implications for the large literature on credible commitment, which has paid insufficient attention to the interplay between preferences and credibility.     

Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Accountability

The literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has paid an increasing interest to international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but whether BITs help attract FDI is an unsettled question. Building on the existing literature, this article argues that BITs can change investors’ perceptions and the corresponding investment they make because signing BITs signals the involvement of another powerful country that is able to compel the host government to comply. This implies that the effect of BITs is not constant across signatory countries: BITs are more effective when they are signed with rich and influential countries. Using monadic and dyadic FDI data, this article finds that BITs signed with powerful countries (defined as the top six largest economies) lead to an increase in FDI inflows (both from these signatory countries and from other countries). BITs signed with other countries, despite in a larger quantity, have little influence on FDI inflows.     

Campaigning for Capital: Fair Elections and Foreign Investment in Comparative Perspective

This article makes several contributions to the literature on political risk and the determinants of capital inflows. First, I clarify the relationship between capital flows and democracy’s constituent parts in a way that takes arguments beyond aggregate democracy indicators and static political institutional structures. Specifically, I argue that fair elections signal government respect for democracy and the rule of law in a highly visible manner investors can access. I show how investors therefore use the fairness of elections as a way to assess political risk and to inform their investment strategies. However, the type of investment and the kinds of evidence of electoral misbehavior condition elections’ influence on capital flows. I also disaggregate capital flows into foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. I argue that the logic of investing is different in the short term (portfolio) versus the long term (FDI). When it comes to political risk, I provide evidence that portfolio investment is much more sensitive to risk factors than FDI because of the relative ease with which portfolio investors can extricate themselves from an increasingly risky market and seek safer returns elsewhere compared to direct investors.     

Political institutions and FDI inflows in autocratic countries*

ABSTRACT

Why do some autocratic countries attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) than others? Surprisingly, few studies have explored the considerable variation in FDI inflows to non-democratic countries. In this article, I argue that non-democratic countries with seemingly democratic political institutions, such as elected legislatures, attract more FDI inflow than others. This is because these institutions can (1) reduce the transaction costs of investment activities due to the relative transparency of the policy-making process, and (2) act as veto players, making the existing market-friendly policy changes difficult, and thus, promising a more stable investment environment. My empirical results support the main expectation that autocratic countries with legislatures attract more FDI than other autocratic countries, and the institutions’ effects are conditionally modified by the quality of market protecting institutions.     

越南外商直接投资的特点及其对经济增长的影响

从20世纪80年代后期开始,越南开始推行经济体制改革,鼓励外商投资者到越南投资.由于越南丰富的劳动力资源和良好的社会环境,越南经济增长很快,良好的经济基本面吸引了大量外商直接投资,而外商直接投资在越南经济增长中也发挥了重要作用.     

Sovereignty,Bargaining, and the International Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment

While developing countries have undergone a remarkable transformation in their attitudes toward foreign direct investment (FDI) during the past decade, they still resist the establishment of a multilateral regime governing FDI. This is puzzling, first, because these states are liberalising their policies anyway, and second, because a multilateral regime offers several advantages over the patchwork of unilateral and bilateral arrangements that currently exist (for instance, by contributing to increasing FDI flows). What explains this paradoxical attitude? This paper critically examines a number of potential explanations. Concerns about losing sovereignty, lack of knowledge about the costs of FDI restrictions, or lingering suspicions of multinational corporations may play some role, but cannot account for unilateral and bilateral liberalisation. Another approach highlights the role of domestic groups in supporting or opposing a multilateral agreement. Yet the pattern of variation among the attitudes of developing countries casts doubt on this explanation as well. Finally, the paper puts forth an argument that focuses on how bargaining power affects the trade-off between economic gains and the loss of sovereignty. The host state's perceived attractiveness to multinational investors conditions whether or not the government resolves this trade-off in favour of supporting a multilateral regime.     

The Political Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Firm-Level Analysis

Many large-N cross-national studies claim to show that political institutions and phenomena determine where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In this article, I argue that these studies tend to overemphasize statistical significance and often neglect to assess the explanatory or predictive power of their theories. To illustrate the problem, I estimate variations of a statistical model published in an influential article on “Political Risk, Institutions, and FDI.” I find that none of the political variables that the authors consider accounts for much of the variation in aggregate FDI inflows. To ensure that this underwhelming result is not driven by misspecification or measurement error, I leverage a large firm-level data set on the investment location decisions of thousands of multinational firms. Using nonparametric machine-learning techniques and out-of-sample tests, I show that gravity variables can help us develop very accurate expectations about firm behavior but that none of the 31 “political determinants” of FDI that I consider can do much to improve our expectations. These findings have important implications because they suggest that governments retain some room to move in the face of economic globalization.     

Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment

The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Protecting labor rights in preferential trade agreements: The role of trade unions,left governments,and skilled labor

This paper investigates variation in the design of labor provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) by focusing on the power of trade unions, the role of government partisanship, and the relative strength of skilled labor. We expect strong trade unions and left-leaning governments to be associated with more, and more far-reaching labor provisions in PTAs. We also expect the strength of skilled workers relative to the strength of unskilled workers to negatively correlate with the depth of labor provisions in PTAs. In addition, the effect of trade unions should be conditional on both the presence of left government and democracy. We test these hypotheses relying on an original dataset of labor provisions included in 483 PTAs signed between 1990 and 2016. This dataset covers 140 different labor provisions that relate to six overarching dimensions. The quantitative analysis finds support for the expectations concerning the influence of trade unions and the role of a country’s skill profile.     

试论印度利用FDI的经济效应及启示

外国直接投资（FDI）对东道国经济作用是多维度的,本文从多个视角透析FDI对印度资本形成、技术溢出、产业演进以及贸易结构的作用,从而揭示FDI对印度所产生的经济效应,并提出对中国利用FDI的启示,这对我们进一步认识和把握印度经济发展动态具有重要的战略意义。     

Chinese investment and European labor: should and do workers fear Chinese FDI?

The rapid increase in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into Europe raises important questions about the implications of such for workers and organized labor in Europe: (1) does Chinese FDI flow more or less to regulated labor markets than do other investment sources?; (2) what are the strategies of works councilors and union representatives in dealing with real or expected investment from China?; and (3) how do individual workers view the propriety of Chinese FDI given China’s low-wage, labor-unfriendly profile in the global economy? Quantitative and qualitative data on Chinese FDI, individual opinions about China and globalization, and on strategies of labor representatives provide some leverage to preliminarily answer these questions. First, Chinese FDI does not seem to be more (or less) focused on investing in the least regulated labor markets than other sources of FDI. Second, interviews with works councilors and union representatives in Germany, France and the Netherlands affirm a cautiously optimistic view of Chinese investors as no more or less threatening to organized labor than other investors. Third, analysis of attitudes about Chinese and European interests in managing globalization suggest that less-skilled, more vulnerable, pro-labor-union workers in Europe tend to be more rather than less enthusiastic about Chinese management than their fellow citizens. These patterns suggest a surprising, if tentative, embrace by workers and their representatives in Europe of that investment.     

Political Investment Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies

Extant research has shown considerable interest in whether host countries’ political uncertainty impedes foreign direct investment (FDI). Building upon the scholarly consensus on the adverse impact of political uncertainty on FDI, this article demonstrates that the extent to which investment climates are unpredictable varies cyclically, on the basis of election timing in democracies and leadership turnover in autocracies. The empirical results show that in presidential democracies, FDI tends to slowly increase after an executive election and then decline as the next executive election nears. However, I find that an electoral investment cycle is not found in parliamentary democracies where election timing is irregular, less predictable, and endogenous to domestic economic conditions. I also find that a similar political investment cycle exists in autocracies not through electoral cycle but through leadership tenure cycle. The level of FDI inflows tends to be relatively low early in autocrats’ tenure when political uncertainty is high and rise as autocratic leadership tenure increases over time but eventually wane again as autocratic leadership is destabilized in the late period of power transition. The findings indicate the existence of heterogeneous political investment cycles, depending on regime type.     

Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997–2011

This article examines the differentisal effects of specific provisions included in China’s bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in inducing foreign direct investment (FDI). Empirical analysis yields some evidence suggesting that while the signing of a BIT does not necessarily boost FDI, the entry into force of a BIT does exert a strong effect on investment flows. More importantly, we find substantial evidence that BITs with stronger investment protection provisions such as absolute and relative standards of treatment and dispute settlement procedures are more likely to induce greater FDI flows. These results suggest that the variation in the institutional design of bilateral investment treaties strongly influences FDI flows by shaping foreign investors’ expectations of their asset security and the overall stability of the host country investment environment.     

Foreign direct investment and the risk of regime transition in autocracies

Economic globalization and, in particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been considered to be catalysts for economic reform and political liberalization. It is argued that openness to foreign investment spurs democratization by empowering pro-liberalization actors and undermining elite cohesion. This article explores and tests three alternative hypotheses linking FDI and autocratic regime survival. The liberalization hypothesis claims that FDI promotes democratization. The state-capture hypothesis suggests that FDI, by increasing the value of power, may raise the risk of an autocratic transition. Lastly, the stabilization hypothesis, contrary to the first two, claims that FDI can enhance dictatorships’ stability by opening new opportunities for distributing benefits to regime elites. The empirical analysis, covering about 100 countries for the time period 1970–2008, uses data on autocratic breakdowns and transition types to test the above hypotheses. The reported evidence does not support the liberalization or the state-capture hypothesis. FDI is found to reduce the likelihood of democratic transitions.     

Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI

Under what conditions can governments use international commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Although numerous studies have attempted to answer this question, none considers how investment treaties may have heterogeneous affects across industry. I argue BIT effect is strongest when the obsolescing bargaining problem between firms and governments is most protracted, namely, when FDI relies on strong contracts between firms and states. Using a time series cross-sectional data set of 114 developing countries from 1985 to 2011, I find BITs are associated with increases in infrastructure investment, an industry particularly reliant on the sanctity of government contracts, but not with total FDI inflows. Moreover, BITs with strong arbitration provisions display the strongest statistical effect on infrastructure investment, while BITs that do not provide investors with such protections are not associated with increased investment. My results have implications for both scholarship on the relationship between governments and multinational firms as well as for the study of international institutions more broadly. To properly ascertain the effects of international treaties and institutions, scholars should consider not just whether institutions constrain or inform—or matter at all—but also the extent to which the targets of institutions have heterogeneous responses to them.