Arms transfer and recipient cooperation with supplier policy references: The case of the Middle East

The principal hypothesis of this paper is that the utility of arms transfers as an instrument of supplier influence is highly dependent upon two sets of variables over which the supplier has little control. This is partly because the recipeints’ demand for arms rests largely on forces outside the major power suppliers’ control. The relative impact of arms transfers is evaluated in conjunction with 1) the arms transfers to the recipients's principal local adversary; 2) the intensity of the recipient's conflict involvement; 3) the amount of political support it receives from its major power supplier/patron; and 4) the identity of the supplier country itself. Recipient countries are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Supplier countries are France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States for the years 1947–1973.

Combat aircraft weighted by their performance characteristics and treated as the dominant weapon system are used as the “arms transfers” variable. Conflict, cooperation and political support variables include both verbal and non‐verbal actions weighted for their relative intensity by a 13 point interval scale.

Multiple regression using standardized (beta) coefficients is used in a time series analysis to determine the relative impact of arms transfers and other salient influences on the intensity of recipient cooperation to its principal major power supplier.

The findings in general support the main hypothesis. They suggest that arms transfers may be one useful instrument for extracting additional increments of cooperation from Egypt and Israel, (particularly in the context of Egyptian‐Israeli peace negotiations) but not for any of the other recipients in the study. However, this inference is valid only so long as those two countries continue to be engaged in an arms race with each other, heavily involved in conflict with their neighbors, and economically dependent upon outside powers. Cooperation of the Arab states with their respective major power suppliers is more strongly affected by the quantity of arms transferred to their respective regional adversaries and the intensity of political support from their suppliers than by their own arms transfers. Given the differential impact that the identity of the supplier had on cooperation intensity one conclusion is that the major power suppliers may not be equally successful in using arms as an instrument of political influence. Another is that the development of a “special relationship” between supplier and recipient in conjunction with supplier support for the recipient is probably a prerequisite for effectively using arms transfers as an instrument of supplier influence or coercion.     

Limits to cooperation: Iterated graduated games and the arms race

The arms race is often modeled as mutual defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma game and arms control as reciprocal cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, while Chicken and other games are used to represent different aspects of superpower rivalry. This paper develops a model of the macro‐structure of superpower rivalry in which each of these games occur at different levels of military expenditures or other measures of military effort. In this iterated graduated game model the two rival states repeatedly select from an ordered sequence of policy options, and each state experiences tradeoffs among the desire to gain an advantage over the rival, the dangers of escalation, and the intrinsic benefits and opportunity costs of military expenditures. Analysis of numerical examples demonstrates that equilibrium in this model corresponds to the intermediate levels of cooperation and conflict characteristic of superpower rivalry. A concluding discussion indicates that this model is also consistent with the existence of policy competition among domestic groups with conflicting interests.     

US–Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Forward and Retro after 2008?

Abstract

The arrival of a new US administration in 2009 is a swinging door with respect to opportunities for Russian–American cooperation in strategic nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation. Both US presidential candidates in 2008 supported nuclear abolition as a theoretically desirable goal, and the Obama administration will certainly pursue nuclear arms reductions consistent with already agreed, or lower, levels. Missile defenses complicate US–Russian relations on this issue, but they pose negotiable, not insurmountable, barriers to further arms reductions and strategic stability.     

Deterrence,uncertainty and cooperative behavior

The paper analyzes deterrence relationships in situations when the relevant forms of behavior are subject to lags such as in the case of foreign interventions and technological arms races. Mutual deterrence is a way of inducing cooperative behavior. Successful deterrence, in the cases considered, can be considered as ways of inducing cooperative behaviors in Prisoners’ Dilemma Supergames, the model used in this paper. It is argued that, in general, deterrence is more likely to be successful and hence cooperative behavior more prevalent in systems where the actors can move between strategies quickly (i.e., are flexible) and which are characterized by low uncertainty. The paper also analyzes the concept of discounting and time preference in the discussion of political phenomena where the concept has no market interpretation. It is analyzed as a rational response to uncertainty.     

Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism

Abstract

Despite the obvious differences over the Syrian crisis and Iran, the GCC countries do not seem to be distancing themselves from Russia politically. To a large extent that is due to Russia’s growing military role (in Syria) and military cooperation (with Iran), as well as the diminishing role of the United States under Obama. Having accepted the situation in Syria (after the fall of Aleppo) as a fait accompli, the GCC’s elites seem to be looking at Russia as a powerful player able to reduce the scope of Iran’s expansion in the region. Their approach involves a carefully established mechanism of economic interaction exploiting Russia’s need for GCC finances and arms acquisitions.     

Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it     

The impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race

This paper examines the impact of election frequency and crises upon the arms race via the computer simulation introduced in Dacey and Pendegraft (1988). We answer two basic questions. First, in an arms race are there advantages to holding elections frequently (i.e., on a short interval) as opposed to infrequently (i.e., on a long interval)? Second, do crises have an influence on the outcome of arms races, and if so, how?

The answers to these questions are straightforward. For the first question, we find that in round‐robin tournament play (i.e., traditional Axelrod‐type play) the advantage rests with the short election interval players, and in inter‐group play it rests with the long election interval players. For the second question we find that crises have a pronounced effect, and the size of the effect depends on the relationship between election frequency and the frequency with which losing players are removed from the tournament. [Key Words: Election frequency, Crises, Arms Race]     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

Strategic defense without star wars: The case for a defense‐emphasis arms control regime 1

This paper challenges two prevalent assumptions of the mainstream U.S. arms control community: first, that strategic nuclear disarmament? should be regarded as beyond the scope of serious superpower dialogue; second, that strategic defense (especially population defense) is inherently incompatible with the goals of arms control. It does so first by analyzing the events surrounding the Reykjavik summit—the occasion of the first direct negotiations on disarmament between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Next, while identifying grave flaws in the current design of the Strategic Defense Initiative, it will be argued that a defense‐emphasis arms control regime can provide the best long‐term means for addressing the problem of security in the nuclear age.     

On the study of legal order in future world systems

The disarmament of rival nations can only take place when all countries involved are made better off and a feasibility criterion is also satisfied. Disarmament is more probable when nations face a similar trade off in the acquisition of weapons, when developments in military capabilities can be speedily and accurately verified, and when the existing weapon systems are easily reproducible. A successful disarmament also requires that the speed of the disposition of arms be neither too fast nor too slow.     

Pakistan: the political economy of militarism

Ahmad Faruqui is an economist, who serves as a fellow with the American Institute of International Studies. He is the author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan. Julian Schofield is an assistant professor in political science at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. His research examines the effects of arms races, particularly in relation to South Asia.     

Disaggregating the Incentives of Conflict Management: An Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to develop a formal model of the arms export process that incorporates the complementary ideas of a fuzzy decision‐making goal and a fuzzy decision‐making constraint. The model is formulated as a control problem: The decision‐making actor—in this case, a hegemonic exporter—will attempt to control the evolution of its political relationship with a prospective importer by choosing, over time, a sequence of arms transfer strategies. The exporter's strategic choices will be influenced by its fuzzy goal (a fuzzy set of political relations outcomes between the two states that the exporter seeks to maximize) and its fuzzy constraint (a fuzzy set of arms options that the exporter is constrained to choose by virtue of the preferences of the importer's neighbors). The solution to the control problem is the exporter's optimal policy sequence, and this is uncovered via the dynamic programming optimization technique. The model is illustrated by the multistage decision‐making of the U.S. for Egypt in the years 1968–1971 and 1974–1977.     

International cooperation in exchange‐rate management: Coordination of U.S. and Japanese intervention, 1977–1990

What are the determinants of international cooperation in exchange‐rate management? To answer this question, coordination of foreign exchange intervention by the United States and Japan from 1977 to 1990 is analyzed. An examination of the data raises two empirical puzzles: (1) Why do the periods of active intervention and high cooperation coincide?; (2) Why does Japan intervene unilaterally more often than the United States? Some hypotheses drawn from various theories of cooperation are tested, but none of them receive strong support. Instead, intervention volume and learning by U.S. administrations account for the variance in coordination. These findings resolve the two puzzles: (1) The periods of active intervention are the time of high need for cooperation; (2) Japan is obliged to intervene unilaterally while the United States is learning to cooperate.     

Personality and policy preference: Attitudes in the arms control and disarmament agency and the state department

This is a report of the results of a small project intended to determine what relationships there are between the personality trait of authoritarianism and variations in arms control‐related policy preferences held by bureaucrats in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department. Several moderately strong correlations are found. A major implication of this finding is that as international relations scholarship assumes a greater “policy analysis” focus, it will be advisable to remember that policymaking is embedded in a psycho‐cultural milieu and that therefore the potential substantive and methodological contributions of psychology to policy studies should not be overlooked.     

Negotiating democracy with authoritarian regimes. EU democracy promotion in North Africa

ABSTRACT

In order to better understand the dynamics of international cooperation on democracy promotion with authoritarian regimes, this article looks into the processes and results of negotiations on democracy (promotion) between the European Union (EU) and two of its North African neighbours (Morocco, Tunisia) in the decade leading up to the Arab uprisings. Asking if, how, and to what effect the EU and its Mediterranean partners have negotiated issues related to democracy promotion, it analyses official documents issued on the occasion of their respective association council meetings in 2000-2010. It shows that partners have indeed addressed these issues since the early 2000s, however, without engaging in substantive exchanges. Most of the time, conflicts have been neither directly addressed nor resolved. Where there are traces of actual negotiations leading to an agreement, these are clearly based on a logic of bargaining rather than arguing. These findings challenge the picture of harmony and cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Furthermore, they point to the low quality of these exchanges which reinforces the dilemma of international democracy promotion in cooperation with authoritarian regimes.     

The arms race noninteraction puzzle: The effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race

The continuing failure to find interaction in the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race remains a puzzle. In this analysis the effects of concept choice and measurement error on the estimation of a Richardson‐type model of the U.S.‐U.S.S.R. arms race is examined. Employing a multiple indictor model, it is demonstrated that significant random and systematic measurement error exists. The use of military expenditures as an indicator of economic burden is shown to generate severe statistical problems. Lastly, it is demonstrated that the lack of fit of typical single indicator models is more a measurement error problem than a model specification problem.     

Intergovernmental policy makes transnational politics? The unusually transnational politics of TTIP

Abstract

When the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations were underway, its politics were distinctively transnational. Numerous alliances between European and American industry associations advocated an ambitious agreement to mitigate the effects of conflicting rules. Some civic interest groups also closely cooperated to shape the agreement, while a broad, loose transatlantic coalition of civic interest groups opposed it. The extent of transnationalism in TTIP was greater than what had come before in the transatlantic relationship and what is evident in contemporaneous analogous trade negotiations. This article argues that while the salience of a trade negotiation affects whether societal actors mobilize, it is not sufficient to prompt transnational cooperation. Rather transnational cooperation stems primarily from what the actors are seeking to achieve and whether they have a motive and opportunity to work together. By clarifying the conditions under which transnational cooperation is more likely, this article informs the emerging literature on the new politics of trade. By making the case that the motives to mobilize and cooperate require distinct analysis, it contributes to the literature on transnationalism.     

The PLO and Israel in Central America: The geopolitical dimension

Recently, attention has been drawn to the close relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ruling Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The support, training, and arms furnished by the PLO to the Sandinistas and like‐minded revolutionary movements in surrounding Central American countries have often been cited as proof that Nicaragua has been transformed into a base for international terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.

This article assesses the relationship between the PLO and the Sandinistas. In particular, it examines the geopolitical dimension of this relationship, that is, the extension or transposition of the conflict between the PLO and Israel in the Middle East to Central America. In this respect, PLO support and assistance to the Sandinistas and other revolutionary movements in surrounding countries has served as a counterbalance to Israeli support and arms sales to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America.     

European security as practice: EU–NATO communities of practice in the making?

ABSTRACT

European security is at a critical juncture and many have called for a more coherent and efficient response, involving both the EU and NATO. However, the primary tool for EU–NATO cooperation, “Berlin Plus”, has been stuck in a political quagmire since the mid-2000s, making a lot of scholars to conclude that this cooperation is obsolete and outdated. This article is challenging this view by analysing a range of informal but regular interaction patterns that have emerged. Using practice theory, it sheds new light on and explores how EU and NATO staff at all levels engage in informal practices on various sites in headquarters in Brussels and in field operations. A study of EU–NATO cooperation as practice focuses on the everyday, patterned production of security as well as what makes action possible, such as (tacit) practical knowledge and shared “background” knowledge (education, training, and experience). The article also discusses the extent to which shared repertoires of practice may evolve into loose communities of practice that cut across organisational and professional boundaries.