Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes1

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Yet what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed is poorly understood. We argue that the quality of multinational military coalitions—in terms of the coalition’s skill, coordination, and legitimacy—can provide better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing conflict aims. Empirical testing reveals that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success: a history of success, both alone and with the same coalition partners, predicts military success. Moreover, increasing a coalition’s legitimacy via more diverse members has a weak effect, indicating that diversity comes at the expense of coordination and cooperation challenges. Last, we find that elements of coalition quality affect initiating and defending coalitions differently.     

Security,profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the security strategies of microstates

Which factors determine the security strategies of microstates? Many microstates are either secluded island states or have very close political, economic and cultural ties to a larger neighbouring ‘protector state’. They have had, therefore, little use for more traditional alliance arrangements. However, the patterns of security cooperation between states have shifted as the significance of flexible ad-hoc coalition-building as a means to coordinate international interventions has increased. Consequently, the strategic security challenges and opportunities for microstates have been transformed. Focusing on the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, this article explores some of these challenges and opportunities. Three hypotheses regarding the decisions made by the respective microstates to join international ad-hoc coalitions are studied: (1) participation provides increased security, (2) participation provides economic gains, and (3) participation reflects the lessons of past security challenges. The explanatory powers of each hypothesis are examined using a comparative case study of 11 Pacific microstates.     

Why do states join US-led military coalitions?: The compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy

Why do states join US-led military coalitions? The war/dispute-diffusionliterature suggests that opportunity and willingness are crucialdeterminants of coalition participation (Siverson and Starr, 1990,1991). A state joins a coalition if it has a strong interestin war and enough capability to send armed forces abroad. Alliancestudies connect coalition participation problems with the reliabilityof allied countries (Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).These studies seem to provide a fairly good picture on the question;however, they are not free of problems. In particular, theystudy only coalitions for interstate war and militarized disputesbut ignore coalitions for other purposes. Coalitions can beformed for military operations other than war (Kober, 2002).There are coalitions for humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,and even for the evacuation of noncombatants. This article showshow difference in operation-types and collective legitimacyaffect the decision of a state to participate in US-led coalitions.A coalition with United Nations' authorization may appear tobe a legitimate international ‘police’ act and attractmore partner states. A coalition for intervention into domesticaffairs may be less attractive to possible participants becauseof the violation of the noninterference norm of internationallaw. Statistical analysis on United States coalition partnersfrom 1950 to 1999 suggests that how and for what purposes coalitionsare formed cannot be overlooked. Coalition participation isnot fully explained by the existing perspectives found in war/dispute-diffusionliterature and alliance studies, and there is a need to invoke‘the compulsion of the coalition's missions and legitimacy’. Received for publication November 16, 2005. Accepted for publication April 20, 2006.     

Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation: The European Community’s first enlargement

This paper introduces a new theoretical framework of international unions qua coalitions of countries adopting a common policy and common supranational institutions. I make use of a three-country spatial bargaining game of coalition formation, in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if the latter is assumed to be weakly efficient? I propose asymmetric information about the benefits of integration as a mechanism that can generate gradual union formation in equilibrium. As it turns out, it may well be in the ‘core’ countries’ interest to delay the accession of a third, ‘peripheral’ country in order to (1) stack the institutional make-up of the initial union in their favor and (2) signal their high resolve to wait out the expansion of their bilateral subunion. A related case from the European experience provides an interesting illustration.     

Rethinking the ‘presidentialism debate’: conceptualizing coalitional politics in cross-regional perspective

The democratization literature has increased our understanding of the role of institutional variables in the study of democratic sustainability. Debates about the dangers of presidentialism have been central to this body of research. In more recent times the presidentialism literature has focused on the capacity of presidents to overcome the conflict-inducing nature of the separation of powers through successful coalition formation. This review article moves this research agenda forward by examining how presidents build legislative coalitions in different regional contexts. Based on the extant analysis of presidential systems in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union, the article develops the idea that presidents use a toolbox of five key tools when constructing legislative coalitions: agenda power, budgetary authority, cabinet management, partisan powers, and informal institutions. We find that presidents typically utilize more than one tool when they act; that the combinations of tools they employ affects the usage and strength of other parts of the presidential toolkit; and that the choice of tools can create negative consequences for the wider political system. Our findings reveal the limitations of the univariate bias of much of the early presidentialism literature and the need for greater cross-regional research into the effects of presidential rule.     

联合阵线与美国军事干涉

作为国际体系中的唯一超级大国,美国是冷战后海外用兵最为频繁、进行军事干涉行动次数最多的国家。研究者们通常认为,美国的军事干涉在决策和实施上具有很强的单边主义色彩,其突出特征是动辄使用或威胁使用武力,在决定使用武力时一意孤行,时常将自身意志凌驾于联合国和国际法之上。通过考察冷战后美国在伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争、利比亚战争等重大军事干涉行动中的选择可以发现,尽管美国在使用武力的决策上较少受到国际社会的有效约束,但它在军事干涉行动中既不是纯粹依靠自身力量单干,也不是依靠其缔造的多边或双边军事同盟,而是经常性地采取联合阵线的方式执行军事打击和战后维稳行动。联合阵线的目标确定性及手段灵活性为美国主导军事干涉行动提供了便利,而规避集体行动的困境、让伙伴承担军事行动的负担、为干涉行动寻找合法性以及减少美国的投入和损失等考量,也使得美国具有招募多国参与其军事行动的强烈动机。由于当前国际体系结构的制约,不少国家倾向于加入美国的军事干涉联合阵线,以便在美国主导的等级体系中获取安全保障和经济利益。     

Confrontation by default and confrontation by design: strategic and institutional responses to Poland's populist coalition government

For a short and controversial period in 2006–2007, Poland was governed by a three-party “populist coalition” which attempted to break with the liberal-democratic model of post-communist transition and implement a far-reaching set of reforms. In this article, I analyse the ways in which domestic and external actors responded to the challenges posed by this coalition. I argue that Poland's Constitutional Court and the temporarily united opposition parties were key to repelling the populist challenge. However, the anti-populist response was driven less by a deliberate strategy than by the confrontational logic of populism itself, and the institutional design of Poland's liberal-democratic system. I conclude with a discussion of several lessons the Polish case holds for further analyses of anti-populist reaction.     

联盟的起源：理性主义研究新进展

联盟作为具有战略意义的一种国家间关系,对其研究在国际关系理论中占据了一个十分重要的位置,也有助于学者们将具有普遍意义的国际关系理论运用于具体的国际关系研究。围绕着联盟的起源这一主题,理性主义国际关系理论提出了许多重要的见解。在最近的十多年来,这一主题的研究又与单极体系内的联盟现实相结合,提出和分析了如下方面的核心问题：联盟需要什么样的共同利益基础;制衡性的联盟为何没有出现;国际结构如何塑造大国的联盟选择;地理因素如何影响联盟的形成以及联盟起源的其他根源有哪些。理性主义国际关系理论的这些研究都具有一定的启发意义,但总的来看,现实主义范式的研究占据了主流地位,系统性的理论创新不够,并没有提出解释联盟起源的新的核心概念,即如果把联盟界定为一种明确、稳定的战略关系,而非仅仅是针对安全威胁的军事同盟的话,仅有结构现实主义和威胁平衡理论是不够的;联盟起源的理论研究仍然具有较为广阔的空间。建构一种更加普遍的、有强大解释力的利益关系概念,在此基础上推导出国家的联盟选择战略,将会有助于更加具体深入地了解联盟的起源。     

How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context

We investigate the role of international reputation in alliance politics by developing a signaling theory linking past alliance violations with the formation of future alliance commitments. In our theory, past violations Are useful signals of future alliance reliability conditional on whether they effectively separate reliable from unreliable alliance partners. It follows that states evaluating potential alliance partners will interpret past violations in their context when deciding to enter a new alliance, attaching less weight to violations in “harder times,” when many states are defaulting on their alliance commitments together, and more weight to violations in “easier times,” when fewer states are defaulting on their alliances. We test our theory and find that states are empirically more likely to form new alliances with states that violated in harder times compared to states that violated in easier times. The results have important implications for how scholars understand and estimate the impact of international reputation.     

Regionalism in Asia: Past and Future

In order to predict the future of East Asia in the wake of the 1997-98 financial crisis, Kenneth B. Pyle looks to the region's past for lessons. He assesses East Asia's 'old new orders' and deduces six major lessons from their history that can be applied to the current post-Cold-War interregnum. The region is gaining an unprecedented power to shape its own system and to influence the international order, but its current institutions are built on extremely fragile foundations. The risk is that we are in an age of rising nationalism within the region and the emergence of strategic rivalries, arms races, and competition for limited resources. Finally, in looking at Japan, Pyle predicts that the currently awkward US-Japan alliance will determine the region's stability, despite the fact that Japan will most likely continue to shy away from a proactive role in the area. These lessons lead to the argument that events will drive the region's international relations in the future and that the region must seize this opportunity to create new stabilising institutions.     

The changing character of EUFOR Althea: power politics or learning?

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU’s longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.     

联盟困境、理性选择与澳美同盟的有限升级

任何联盟内部都存在联盟困境(即"被抛弃"与"被牵连")。在"美主澳从"的澳美同盟中,澳大利亚也面临着联盟困境:如果强调战略自主性则担心"被抛弃";如果强化澳美同盟则担心"被牵连"。在中国快速崛起、美国战略收缩和中美战略竞争不断加剧的背景下,澳大利亚认为有限升级澳美同盟——对美国欲"距"还迎——是其缓解联盟困境的理性选择。首先,有限升级澳美同盟不仅可以大大降低"被抛弃"的风险,而且有望提升地区影响力,同时有助于提升澳在中美战略布局中的重要性。其次,由于中美两国仍将长期维持"斗而不破"的状态,澳大利亚"被牵连"至中美军事冲突中的可能性很小,而当下澳美同盟的有限强化对成熟稳定的中澳关系冲击总体有限。澳大利亚为了缓解联盟困境、提升外交地位,有限升级澳美同盟,不仅使澳大利亚收益颇丰、成本可控,收益大于成本,而且中澳关系保持有限紧张是符合澳大利亚国家利益的理性选择。     

The Imia/Kardak affair, 1995–96: A case of inadvertent conflict

On Christmas Day 1995, a Turkish freighter ran aground on a rocky islet in the northern Dodecanese islands, setting off a chain of events that would lead Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Senior officials in Washington later admitted that the countries were literally hours from conflict over an issue of which decision makers in America and Europe were completely unaware prior to military forces being deployed. The Imia/Kardak affair raised significant questions on all sides about how relations between two NATO countries with well‐known, ongoing tensions could have deteriorated so rapidly without drawing international attention till the last moment. The conflict highlighted problems in both Athens and Ankara related to the exchange of information between civilian and military leadership. It also revealed that strategic warning in emerging conflicts might not appear when the cause of the incident remains unknown until after the commitment of forces or when the pace of conflict moves too quickly. In such a situation, decision‐making architecture within a coalition or alliance may prove too cumbersome to react to unexpected problems.     

西方“技术联盟”组建的战略背景、目标与困境

美国因战略背景变化不断进行战略工具调试,其主导的西方"技术联盟"作为关键的战略遏制工具,曾经成功地限制了战略竞争对手的经济与技术进步。面对新历史环境下的战略博弈,美国再次谋求联合西方盟友组建新的排他性"技术联盟",并加大与战略对手在新技术维度的战略竞争与博弈力度。目前的全球技术结构特征、全球价值链的结构制约、欧美技术治理结构等多重矛盾因素,给"技术联盟"的建立及其战略有效性带来了新困境,但"技术联盟"作为一种战略工具,依旧可能是未来美国政府在"战略安全"语境下的优先战略选项。"技术联盟"扩散的"战略安全"逻辑阻碍了全球技术进步,并将催生全球技术格局的"隔离"状态,同时其外溢效应还可能包括瓦解全球价值链的潜在风险。     

European small states' military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies

This article looks at the evolution of European small states' military policies after the Cold War. Traditionally, small states faced a security dilemma between favouring influence and guaranteeing sovereignty. These security options were embodied by the strategy of alliance and the policy of neutrality. This article argues that in today's unipolar world small states' security policy must be cooperative either in the form of joining a security institution or an ad hoc coalition. This has two consequences for small states' military policies. These can either favour niche or lead/framework nation strategies. This in turn, depends on the strategic ambitions of the small states, which are ultimately mediated by their strategic culture. This article concludes by looking at the military policies of Cold War neutral states after the Cold War.     

Reflections on the Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Our foreign policy elites, the press, our elected representatives and the general public internalize “lessons” from each war, although the lessons may be wrong or misapplied. How we arrive at such consensus lessons is a mystery. It is too early to predict what lessons from Iraq will guide future U.S. decision-making. But on the situation as it now stands, it is possible to make some broad generalizations concerning what went right in Iraq and what went wrong.     

To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics

Wedge strategy, a policy of preventing or dividing an adversary coalition, has been attracting increasing scholarly attention. In particular, Timothy Crawford has articulated the concept and claims that reward-based strategies are more effective than coercive strategies that actually strengthen the ties between enemies. Although this sounds logical, history provides sufficient cases that contradict the claim. Why? To answer the question, I develop a theory of wedge strategy by utilizing the concept of reward power. I then argue that although countries seeking to divide adversary coalitions usually prefer reward-based strategies, they turn to coercive measures when a divider state perceives grave threats as a result of a target state's strong alignment with its primary enemy but does not have sufficient reward power to split the adversaries. I examine this theory through two case studies of us wedge strategies toward the Sino-Soviet alliance during the early Cold War period. This article addresses the specific puzzle of choices between reward and coercive wedge strategies and offers broader theoretical implications regarding the utility of the concept of reward power in international and alliance politics.     

Alliance Forging or Partnership Building? China’s Policy in the Asia-Pacific under the Xi Administration

ABSTRACT

Should China forge a military alliance? Some scholars believe it should, others believe it should adhere to a policy of non-alignment. For China many risks are associated with military alliances. On the one hand, China would likely be involved in unwanted conflicts and confrontations created by potential allies. On the other hand, China would be bound to compete with the existing hegemon, the United States, which has already established a huge alliance system, to win more allies. China just cannot afford this. The intensified strategic competition between China and the United States may also lead to a new antagonism in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, China’s ‘non-alliance’ policy does not mean China has to abandon the development of strategic cooperation with other countries or renounce the right to build a cooperative partnership network. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Chinese government has continuously expanded its strategic partnership network in the region. This policy could avoid US-China competition over military allies and enhance strategic trust between China and its neighbouring countries, creating conditions for China’s peaceful development and global strategic stability.     

Show them the flag: status ambitions and recognition in small state coalition warfare

ABSTRACT

Why do small states actively contribute to US- and NATO-led military operations? The small state literature has recently developed a novel explanation, referring to their dependency upon the alliance hegemon. The logic is that the small states aim to improve their status and reputation in order to remain relevant and to receive protection. This article contributes to this literature by moving away from this fear of abandonment motivation towards more positive status incitements. It shows how such status motives actually guide and shape small states’ military contributions in US- or NATO-led operations. It does so by using recent innovations in process-tracing methodology to create a status-seeking mechanism. Using the case of Belgium’s participation in the military coalition against ISIL, this article goes beyond the usual Scandinavian suspects in the small state literature and demonstrates that status motivations have relevance for a wider group of small states.     

日本民主党对华政策走向探析

日本民主党主政后为实现长期执政的目标,在强化对华关系的同时,也会赋予对华外交更多战略性的色彩.然民主党既和自民党同为保守政党,也坚持把对华关系定位为以日美同盟为基轴的对外关系整体的一个局部,加上日本国内外诸要素和自身条件的制约,其对华政策的转换不仅空间有限,且也存在着不确定性.