An economic model of guerrilla warfare∗

This paper draws on the guerrilla warfare literature so as to synthesize and to describe the dynamics of the initial stages of a guerrilla war against an established government. It combines two classical economic models, the Solow growth model and the Ricardian model of economic rents, with two classic studies of guerrilla warfare by T. E. Lawrence and by Mao Tse‐tung. The transitional stages of the guerrilla warfare are modeled as conflict over control of the real line. Four different Ricardian distribution functions describe the country: the resources the guerrillas can extract from territory under their control; the porosity of the country, indicating the guerrilla's ability to obtain weapons; the government's ability to tax; and the mobility the guerrillas. Depending on initial conditions, the course of the guerrilla war could take one of several paths. One is a direct movement to a stable equilibrium independent of the initial conditions. Another is a situation in which for the guerrillas to make a successful transition to the second stage via the dynamics of the process they have to reach a certain critical level of capability. Finally, the third path involves cyclical motion, with alternating positions of the guerrillas and the government in the evolution of the war. This model, while simple, appears to be consistent with the historical pattern of guerrilla wars, a key parameter in the model being porosity.     

Why States No Longer Declare War

Why have states stopped issuing declarations of war? Declaring war was a norm of international politics for millennia, but now appears to have exited states’ behavioral repertoires. I argue that the proliferation of codified jus in bello, the law of war governing belligerent conduct, has created disincentives for states to issue formal declarations of war. The increasing number of codified international laws that govern belligerent conduct during warfare has made complying with the laws of war extremely costly. One way for states to limit these costs is to avoid admitting they are in a formal state of war by refraining from declaring war. I test this claim, as well as others, using an original data set. I also discuss several cases of nineteenth and twentieth century wars that illustrate the logic of this argument.     

Democracy through War?

This article brings together three strands of democracy research which have thus far seldom been informed by one another: the empirical research associated with the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, the juridical-normative questions of legality, and moral-philosophical reasoning about just war. Linking the statistical analysis of the democratic peace to the findings of comparative research on democratization and to the normative debates occurring in law and philosophy on just and legitimized wars, there is an inescapable conclusion that: jus ad bellum and jus post bellum criteria must be closely tied. The protection of people threatened by mass murder and brutal violations of human rights requires not only a short-term military intervention, but also the intensive support to establish sustainable rule of law and democracy. External actors intervening for humanitarian reasons equally have a duty to contribute to long-term sustainable state- and democracy-building. Forced regime change and an international trusteeship protectorate can become legitimate and necessary means to guarantee justice after war and to reconcile jus ad bellum principles with duties post bellum. A premature withdrawal of intervening forces, for example in Afghanistan or in Iraq, would amount to a flagrant violation of external actors' post-war duties.     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

Chinese warfare and politics in the ancient East Asian international system,CA. 2700 B.C. to 722 B.C.

Ancient East Asia is the second oldest “protobellic area” and pristine state system of international relations within the global international system, after West Asia (ancient Near East). In a previous study Cioffi‐Revilla and Lai (1995) reported the first findings on the origins and evolution of war and politics in ancient China (Legendary, Xia [Hsia], Shang, and Western Zhou [Chou] periods), ca. 2700 B.C to 722 B.C In this paper we make public an expanded data set (N = 104 cases, 12 variables; version 2.0), explaining our sources, measurements, and data quality control procedures. The new data set will permit investigators to test hypotheses about warfare distributions, ethnic and protracted conflicts, time series, periodicity, system dynamics, and structural relationships (e.g., war‐polarity theories). This new long‐range data set should also promote a new stage in comparative analyses of the universal and particular properties of warfare and international systems, both cross‐polity and longitudinally.     

The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi–Tech and Infrastructural Violence

This article examines how humanitarian laws of war have been recast in light of a new generation of hi–tech weapons and innovations in strategic theory. Far from falling into disuse, humanitarian law is invoked more frequently than ever to confer legitimacy on military action. New legal interpretations, diminished ad bellum rules, and an expansive view of military necessity are coalescing in a regime of legal warfare that licenses hi–tech states to launch wars as long as their conduct is deemed just. The ascendance of technical legalism has undercut customary restraints on the use of armed force and has opened a legal chasm between technological haves and have–nots. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of distinctions between soldiers and civilians and to legitimize collateral damage. Hi–tech warfare has dramatically curbed immediate civilian casualties, yet the law sanctions infrastructural campaigns that harm long–term public health and human rights in ways that are now clear.     

The neo‐functionalist explanation of world wars: A critique and an alternative

In this article we criticize explanations ofworldwar at the level of the international system: the hegemony‐stability theory developed by Gilpin and the world leadership model developed by Modelski and Thompson. In our view, (a) their statements are of a definitional nature instead of being empirically refutable propositions, (b) their statement that global war periods are more severe than hegemonic intervals is empirically incorrect, and (c) their conviction that global wars are functional, unjustifiably neglects the possibility that world wars are mere senseless slaughters. As an alternative explanation of the outbreak of world wars we propose a three‐level approach, starting with the war‐instigating effect of power transitions in dyads of major powers. Wars in dyads of contending nations are specifically prone to escalate during periods of capability deconcentration at the systemic level. In addition, the rise of democracy and the trading‐state may signal the abolition of a strategy of ‘conquest’ to attain leadership positions: even in periods of systemic deconcentration, power transitions only escalate to world war if one major power has an authoritarian or totalitarian political system and an autarchic economic policy.     

Maritime security in the United States: Latent threats and latent vulnerabilities

Americans and their government are seemingly unconcerned about the possibility that maritime facilities and personnel might be at risk to armed violence. Not only are current maritime security efforts minimal, they feature a curious dichotomy: one thrust is directed toward occasional acts of terrorism, the other toward coastal defense in wartime. Despite a manifestly more interactive world marked by the ready availability of powerful, mobile weapons, no serious efforts have been directed toward protecting maritime facilities and personnel in the United States against special operations or unconventional warfare. This indifference reflects the prevalence of the Clausewitzian paradigm in America's attitude toward war and the country's historical experience with coastal defense in the wars of this century. The fragmented structure of civil and military protection available to protect ports and other facilities suggests that protection could not be quickly upgraded in the face of a rapidly‐developing threat.     

‘Non-lethal’ weapons and the occupation of Iraq: technology,ethics and law

The occupation of Iraq is a challenging task for the United States (US) military, which is considering resort to options other than lethal force as a possible just response. From the outset, the notion that a weapon can be deemed ‘non-lethal’ is problematic. Some weapons intended to leave their target alive often have lethal consequences and other weapons intended to have lethal effects often do not kill their target. This article explores ethical and legal challenges that arise from the potential use by US forces in Iraq of two classes of so-called ‘non-lethal’ weapons: incapacitating chemical agents and dazzling laser devices. Such challenges are highly relevant to questions about the role of Just War theory in the context of modern warfare. In particular, they beg the question whether the use of non-lethal weapons supports or subverts the jus in bello requirement that war be waged in a discriminate and proportionate fashion.     

Prevention,knowledge, justice: Robert Nozick and counterterrorism

ABSTRACT

This article explores questions of justice and moral permissibility of state action in counterterrorism through Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Using the case of the Berlin attack in December of 2016 and the ensuing political debate over whether potential terrorists could be put into preventive custody as an illustrative example, it engages Nozick’s argument on prevention, knowledge and justice. In Nozick’s fierce defence of individual rights, the state comes into being as an aggregate of individuals and their inviolable rights, and thus possesses no moral legitimacy of its own. Individual rights must therefore not be violated for the sake of common goods. In conjunction with his emphasis on free will and the ensuing unpredictability of human decision-making, the article highlights the Nozickian position as a powerful account against the justification of preventive custody, thereby providing a moral “fail-safe” in counterterrorism discourses that build on just war theory and utilitarianism.     

War, ‘strategic communication’ and the violence of non-recognition

Contemporary Western war-fighting is animated by the fictitious imagination of a war free from antagonism. In this logic, winning wars is about winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations, about persuasion rather than confrontation. In recent years, the concept of ‘strategic communication’ (SC) has been elevated to the top echelons of strategic thinking in United States military circles, focusing attention on how to communicate ‘effectively’ with local populations. Via an analysis of the concept of SC, this article examines the ethico-political dimensions of contemporary Western-led ‘population-centric’ war. Through a reading inspired by Judith Butler's recent work in Precarious life (London: Verso 2006) and Frames of war (London: Verso 2009), and an analysis that turns on the link between ethics and ontology, I reflect on the significance of the ‘communications turn’ in warfare for our study of war in ontological terms.     

Democratising Transitional Justice: Transitional Trade-offs and Constituting the Demos

I argue that transitional justice should be democratised and to realise this goal I propose a method by which people can be enfranchised to make such choices. By showing that transitional justice options often involve trade-offs, I lay the groundwork for my democratic account of transitional justice. This article balances three democratic principles, including collective self-determination, the all affected interests principle and the protection of individual rights that are necessary to vote, to argue that victims and potential victims should constitute the transitional justice demos. I propose a new institution that would balance international and local control of transitional justice decision making, and choose the demos. This article does not attempt to construct a theory of how to resolve tensions in transitional justice decisions. Conversely, exactly because these tensions are often present, I develop a theory of who should be empowered to make transitional justice decisions and how their powers should be constrained.     

Restorative justice in the aftermath of politically-motivated violence: the Basque experience

ABSTRACT

An emerging body of literature discusses how restorative justice can contribute to the response to terrorism. This paper expresses concerns about the uncritical acceptance of many orthodox assumptions about terrorism inherent in the search for a “restorative response” to terrorism. When restorative justice embraces the label “terrorism” in what appears to be a politically neutral sense, rather than opening up a critical discussion of realities of political violence and the factors that had propelled it, it may form part of the efforts designed to inculcate “truths” that help control political dissent. With its key aspiration being to restore a presumed healthy order disrupted by terrorist offences, restorative justice may be enlisted to help entrench social relations that led to the violence in the first place. The paper illustrates this danger by examining attempts to use restorative justice techniques by Spanish authorities in the aftermath of ETA or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and Freedom”) violence. It is argued that rather than searching for a “restorative response” to terrorism, a more adequate framework for restorative justice in the aftermath of politically motivated violence may be found within broader projects of reparation for historical injustices, remembering and political reconciliation.     

Poverty of riches: contesting an economic interpretation of civil war and insurrection

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler contend that greed is the motivation behind an insurgency, a conclusion arrived at via the application of rational-choice theory to situations of conflict. To gauge the likelihood of internal conflict, they constructed a series of quantitative variables that allowed them to test a data set of over 50 countries with a legacy of warfare. Based on this data set and the proxies employed, such as primary commodity exports, Collier and Hoeffler claim that the greed-based narrative provides greater explanation of intrastate violence than the grievance model, since, statistically, similarities exist between countries that have experienced violent conflict. While their work offers a new means of examining internal conflict, the faults inherent in the analysis prevent it from achieving its objective of establishing a predictive theory of civil war. The problem with this is not overall theory, but the authors’ interpretations: the proxies that they adopt mean that important factors in conflict initiation are ignored. In order to illuminate such concerns, this article examines them through the narrower lens of the Northern Ireland conflict.     

跨越东西差异,践行多边主义

今年中方的出席具有特殊意义,因为我和我的同事是从前线而来。中国政府正在习近平主席坚强领导下,全力抗击一场突如其来的新型疫情,14亿中国人民团结一心,投身到这场没有硝烟的战争之中。我们决心守护武汉,守护湖北,守护与病毒抗争的每一位骨肉同胞,坚决打赢这场疫情阻击战。     

Transitional justice in settled democracies: Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in comparative perspective

This article explores the concept of transitional justice in democratic states dealing with political violence. Although transitional justice was designed for paradigmatic transitions (from war to peace and from dictatorship to democracy), conflicted democracies such as Northern Ireland and the Basque Country could also benefit from this framework which brings a comprehensive human rights approach to the past and promotes the principles of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. The article compares the transition from conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. It explores some of the specific features which characterise processes of transitional justice within settled democracies, such as the blurred break with the past, the fragmentation of initiatives aimed at dealing with violence and the mixture of ordinary and transitional justice. As well as contributing to the conceptualisation of the field of transitional justice, the study proposes that the conflict vs. terrorism divide and the clash of narratives associated with it are the key to understanding these types of transitions.     

Eugene: A conceptual manual

The study of international relations using quantitative analysis relies, in part, on the availability of comprehensive and easily manipulable data sets. To execute large‐n statistical tests of hypotheses, data must be available on the variables of interest, and those data must be manipulated into a suitable format to allow the inclusion of appropriate control variables as well as variables of central theoretical interest This paper introduces software designed to eliminate many of the difficulties commonly involved in constructing large international relations data sets, and with the unavailability of data on expected utility theories of war.

In order to solve these two problems, we developed EUGene (the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program). EUGene is a stand‐alone Microsoft Windows based program for the construction of annual data sets for use in quantitative studies of international relations. It generates data for variables necessary to incorporate key variables from implementations of the so‐called “expected utility theory of war” into broader analyses of international conflict EUGene is also designed to make building international relations data sets simple. It accomplishes this by automating a variety of tasks necessary to integrate several data building blocks commonly used in tests of international relations theories.     

Maat and human communication: Supporting identity,culture and history without global domination

Abstract

This article discusses the ancient Egyptian ideal of maat, or moral order, and its implications for human communication. It is argued that the communicator must always be in search of harmony, balance, order, justice, truth, righteousness and reciprocity. Maat opens up possibilities that go beyond tolerance for the Other, towards profound respect.     

The Fog of Negotiation: What Negotiators Can Learn from Military Doctrine

On the surface, warfare and negotiation may seem to be polar opposites. The objective in war is to defeat the enemy. In negotiation, the goal is to find a solution that satisfies all the parties. Not surprisingly, little cross‐learning and exchange has occurred across the two domains. In spite of important differences, however, the dynamics of war and negotiation have much in common. Specifically, both involve the interaction of motivated agents with distinct interests, perceptions, and values (especially in high‐stakes contexts). As a result, robust strategy, creativity, and nimble tactics are essential both on the battlefield and at the bargaining table. Just as negotiation theory could be enriched by principles of maneuver warfare, military doctrine offers officers and soldiers a potentially useful foundation to better understand and manage the negotiation process, especially in complex, cross‐cultural contexts.     

Responsibility to Protect in the Age of Global Terror: A Methodological Reassessment

Abstract

Ten years after its formal adoption, the R2P doctrine remains an incomplete project in a world of continuing conflicts now aggravated by the existential threat of global terrorism. The debate on the permissibility of military action to stop mass atrocities when authorisation to use force is not forthcoming from the Security Council has produced only a plurality of conflicting theories but hardly any progress at the normative level. A two-pronged approach could be used to consolidate R2P as a doctrine fully integrated into the corpus of international law. The first prong requires the revamping of the largely neglected Article 48 of the ILC Draft on State Responsibility; the second involves using R2P as a platform to initiate a reform of customary international law to make it more consistent with elementary principles of justice and universal human rights.