Why Counter-terrorism Breeds Yet More Terrorism

The global campaign against terror has achieved considerable success over the past five years since the events of9/11. The Taliban forces in Afghanistan have been destroyed and Al-Qeda has received a devastating blow. In Russia, Chechen secessionist terro…     

Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?

ABSTRACT

Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens’ fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens’ fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.     

Culture and Terrorism: The Role of Cultural Factors in Worldwide Terrorism (1970–2013)

The relationship between terrorism and culture was systematically examined using three high-quality global databases. Contrary to prior research, terrorism—collapsed across form and era—was not related to any of Hofstede's cultural dimensions. Yet, particular forms of terrorism—incidents involving substantial casualties and damage, suicide bombings, and the proportion of incidents involving fatalities—all showed relationships with cultural dimensions. Tolerance of terrorism and relative tolerance of the 9/11 attack were related to cultural dimensions and terrorist events. Finally, populations that were relatively voiceless, disengaged from their communities, suffering, angry, and hopeless showed more tolerance of terrorism and incidents of terrorism.     

What's Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?

This study analyzes the interaction between the motivations of individual attackers and terrorist group strategies. To do so, I combine a quantitative analysis of all known suicide terrorist attacks between 1981 and July 2008 with a strategic account of why terrorist organizations employ female suicide terrorism (fst) and case studies of individual female attackers. I advance five central claims. First, I reveal the superior effectiveness of fst from the perspective of the groups that employ women. Second, I explain that terrorist groups increasingly enlist women as suicide attackers because of their higher effectiveness. Third, I demonstrate that terrorist groups adapt their discourse, catering to the specific individual motives of potential female suicide attackers in order to recruit them. Fourth, I show that female attackers are driven by the same general motives and circumstances that drive men. Furthermore, and in contrast to the existing literature, women attackers uphold, rather than eschew, their societies' norms for gender behavior. Attempts to transform these societies into gender-neutral polities are therefore destined to increase fst. Finally, I conclude that, unless target states adapt their defensive strategies, we should expect an increase in fst.     

Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis

Does terrorism help perpetrators to achieve their demands? Few research questions about terrorism generate as much controversy. This study contributes to the debate in two main ways. First, we identify major limitations within the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of terrorism. Specifically, we highlight the main methodological problems vexing empirical assessments of whether terrorism promotes government concessions. Second, we present a research design that circumvents those recurrent methodological shortcomings. In short, we find no empirical evidence to suggest that terrorism pays. In fact, multiple variants of the tactic in hostage standoffs impede the perpetrators from coercing government compliance. The negative effect of terrorism on the odds of compliance is significant and substantial across logistic and multilevel logistic model specifications, particularly when civilians are killed or wounded in the coercive incident. These findings have important implications for both scholars and practitioners of counterterrorism.     

The United Kingdom's “War Against Terrorism”

This article examines the United Kingdom's current response to international terrorism and argues that the response has been driven by heightened concerns of major terrorist attacks. From the enactment of emergency legislation to major structural changes within the intelligence community, the article surveys a range of measures that have been introduced since 11 September in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to a major terrorist attack. It conclueds with the observation that although, to date, the UK has avoided terrorist attacks at home, it is unrealistic to expect total security.     

Characteristics of ＂East Turkistan＂ Terrorism and Future Prospects

The continuing threat of terrorism around the world has intensified interest in the perpetrators＇ characteristics to see whether a profile or type can be drawn from individual majority of today＇s terrorists features. Research has shown that a are young-to-middle-aged, male, psychological immature, insufficiently educated, and have a family of origin in which a religious atmosphere prevails. If motivations are studied, the studies find that individuals who commit extremist or violent terrorist acts are dissatisfied with the current situation but also convinced it can be successfully altered through their personal capability. Besides these factors of age, gender, education, and religion, a mastery of computers and the internet has been found to be a basic feature common to modern terrorists.1 The ＂East Turkistan＂ terrorists who instigated terrorist activities in recent years in Xinjiang and inland China closely resemble those of their international contemporaries. With access to the three sets of reports from the Ministry of Public Security of China and information from cases tried by national courts in 2013, this article analyzes the relationship between common individual features and terrorist activities, and estimates developments of ＂East Turkistan＂ terrorism.     

Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism—A Comment

In this comment, I offer an alternative model for describing and explaining suicide terrorism. The model offers three stage: a) decision making among elites of terrorist organizations, b) individual motivations of the perpetrators and c) the organisational process of recruitment, socialization, and launching of the terrorist.     

Honour and expulsion: Terrorism in nineteenth‐century Japan

Case studies of terrorist groups from before 1900 are rare and only a handful have been fully detailed in the terrorism literature. This article describes one such group, the shishi, a radical samurai movement which waged a terrorist campaign in Japan just prior to the Meiji Restoration. Placed in context, the origin, structure and methods of this group are described. Also examined is the profound impact the movement had on Japanese society. It is argued that the study of older terrorist groups warrants greater interest and that a scientific understanding of terrorism depends on the incorporation of such early examples.     

Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism

This article evaluates state-sponsored terrorism as a principal-agent issue. More often applied to the study of licit national or international institutions as a way to improve their governance, we argue that applying principal-agent analysis to illicit relationships such as those between states and terrorist agents is an equally fruitful application, though one with different objectives. Rather than being used as a tool to improve governance, applying principal-agent analysis to illicit relationships such as state-sponsored terrorism may point to areas of susceptibility and thus inform more effective counterterrorism strategies. In this article, we explain why states delegate to terrorist groups, how they seek to control their agents, and the tensions in the relationship, both generally and through specific reference to Iran's sponsorship of Hizballah, Syria of various Palestinian groups, and the Taliban of al-Qa'ida. This analysis yields propositions about the conditions under which states are likely to delegate to terrorist groups and specific recommendations on how principal-agent problems of these illicit relationships may be used in practice to combat terrorism.     

Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavours in Scotland?

It has been suggested that a nexus between terrorist groups and those involved in organised crime exists. This study explores the co-operative possibilities that exist between these phenomena, focusing specifically on the level of assistance participants in organised criminal activity might provide to those engaged in terrorism, the “initial nexus.” This was achieved initially through interviews with subject matter experts with knowledge of the organised crime and counter terrorism situation in Scotland. Thereafter, law enforcement personnel who investigate serious and organised crime were interviewed, and their opinions sought in respect of the likely actions of those they investigate. The data gathered is subject to analysis and comment are provided as to what level of co-operation between those involved in organised crime and terrorism can be expected; what motivational factors may have a bearing on the level of co-operation provided; and discussion of “tipping points,” ethical or otherwise, where the withdrawal of co-operation could occur, providing opportunities for increasingly successful law enforcement intervention.     

Nuclear Terrorism: What Can We Learn from Los Alamos?

ABSTRACT

The international security community is increasingly concerned about the nexus between indiscriminate terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. Many nuclear terrorism threat assessments focus primarily on terrorist motivations to employ an atomic bomb, the availability of nuclear know-how and technology, and the opportunity for clandestine organisations to acquire fissile material. Scholars and experts, however, often neglect to elaborate on the challenges for terrorist organisations in organising and implementing the construction and detonation of a crude atomic bomb. This will most likely be a complex project. This article will therefore explore the organisation of such an endeavour. To be precise, we will highlight the impact of the organisational design of the terrorist group. The organisational design determines the division of tasks and how coordination is achieved among these tasks. It therefore has a strong impact on the functioning of any organisation, especially an innovative and complex terrorism project. Building on a case study of Los Alamos, we inductively infer that terrorist organisations face an inherent effectiveness-efficiency trade-off in designing a nuclear armament project.     

Terrorism, ‘pure justice’ and pure ‘ethics’

The argument in this article is that ‘terrorism’ is not necessarily unethical. It begins with the argument that terrorism should not be denned as immoral. It is also argued that terrorism should not be condemned categorically. Finer judgments are needed. By analogies to other forms of political violence, especially in war, some of the criteria appropriate to assessing the ethics of terrorism are suggested.     

Terrorism and fear: do terrorists really want to scare?

There is a widespread tendency among academics, state institutions and international organisations to regard intention to cause fear and intimidation as a key definitional characteristic of terrorism. This article argues that such a conceptualisation of terrorism is unfounded. A survey of mainstream terrorist doctrines (propaganda by the deed, foco theory–urban guerrilla warfare and armed propaganda, and jihadist doctrines) and writings of several pre-eminent terrorist ideologues provides little evidence to suggest that the main tactical goal of terrorism is to spread fear and intimidation. Rather, regardless of their ideological orientation and the historical period in which they operated, terrorists seem to be preoccupied with similar goals: mobilising what they regard to be their constituency, avenging their fallen comrades, extracting retribution for their allegedly wronged constituency, or, simply, with the physical destruction of their perceived enemies. This survey is complemented with a number of “crucial case studies”, where “most-likely cases” of terrorist justification of indiscriminate attacks and a detailed analysis of terrorist literature, which explicitly deals with the question of “fear”, are used to test the validity of the claim that terrorists aim to cause fear and intimidation. In both type of cases the hypothesis is invalidated. In cases of justification of indiscriminate attacks, there is no evidence to suggest that the aim of the terrorists is to spread fear and intimidation. Moreover, in the case of one particular terrorist ideologue who explicitly addresses the question of fear, the analysis of the texts indicates that fear among a population is not seen as an aim to be achieved but as an obstacle for mass mobilisation: an obstacle, which can only be overcome by the terrorist tactics. Thus, in this particular “most-likely case” the aim of terrorist tactics turns out to be encouraging masses for insurrection rather than intimidating them.     

A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States

ABSTRACT

Drawing on Rapoport’s four waves thesis, this study asks whether the emergence of terrorist semi-states (TSS) in the 21st-century MENA region and Pakistan mean that we are seeing the beginning of a new (fifth) wave. We define a TSS as a rebel group that a) has control over portions of a weak state’s territory, maintaining governance there; b) but still launches terrorist attacks against third-party states. To be considered a fifth wave, the new terrorism phenomenon at hand must both fit Rapoport’s criteria of a wave (be global, have the same driving force) and also be significantly different from the prior wave. Clearly, the TSSs are different from the religious terror groups of the fourth wave in key respects: they prioritize territorial control, they engage in a much wider array of governance activities (not just social services), most of their victims have been members of the same religion—namely, Muslims (which suggests that they are driven more by the pursuit of power than by Jihad); and finally, their behavior (though not their statements) shows they have a local rather than a universal agenda. The main counter-argument is that TSSs are all Islamic and have so far not been exported globally.     

The Trouble with Terror: The Apologetics of Terrorism—a Refutation

This essay warns against a recent philosophical confusion concerning the definition of “terrorism,” which has dominated the post 9/11 literature. Terrorism, it is suggested, is nothing but the intentional random murder of defenseless non-combatants, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends. Furthermore, this essay argues that regardless of its “root cause,” terrorism is diametrically opposed to the requirements of liberal morality and can only be defended at the expense of relinquishing the most basic of liberal commitments.     

Terrorism as treated by the Christian science monitor, 1977–1987

Standing uniquely apart from journalistic sensationalism in its reportage of terrorism, the Christian Science Monitor (CSM/“The Monitor”) has taken a stance of trying to keep perspective on what individual events mean in terms of a wider framework.

It is perhaps critical to state at the outset that this researcher is not of the Christian Science faith, but has been a faithful reader of the Monitor for 15 years. When approached several years ago by The Terrorism and the News Media Research Project to contribute to that scholarship, an immediate response was that her primary newspaper would be inadequate to the task. A preliminary check into the Christian Science Monitor Index confirmed that fact: there were no entries under the heading of “terrorism” for 1975, 1976, 1977, and for 1978 it directed the researcher to see “violence”.

But then some dramatic changes took place in the mid‐1980s. The newspaper was undergoing major transitions internally, and terrorism was becoming an increasingly hot topic internationally.

This paper discusses terrorism as treated by the Christian Science Monitor, 1977–1987 both quantitatively and qualitatively. The approach is to delineate some of the underpinning philosophy of the newspaper, to discuss its chronological treatment of terrorism, and then to draw some implications from the study.