Separate or equal? The emergence of an all‐female group in Norway's rightist underground

This article discusses the importance of separate women's organizations in militant groups of the far right. The analysis suggests that the existence of a separate women's group has not only enhanced the respect the members feel for themselves and each other, but has been successful in eliciting greater respect from their male counterparts, resulting in the women receiving greater responsibility in the organization. The article is based on participant observations and on interviews with activists in the militant far‐right underground in Norway. It assumes that the need for separate women's organizations in the rightist underground reflects a pre‐existing dissatisfaction with conditions and opportunities for females in a highly male‐dominated environment.     

Good radicals? Trajectories of pro-Kurdish political and militant mobilisation to the wars in Syria,Turkey and Iraq

ABSTRACT

This article explores the interrelation of volunteering, violence and ideology by studying the pro-Kurdish political and militant mobilisation to the wars in Syria, Turkey and Iraq. Focusing especially on the trajectories, motives and reflections of foreign volunteers in different Kurdish militant groups, I argue that ideology is neither a precondition nor a necessary reason for mobilisation to an armed group. In many cases, it is the other way around, as mobilisation to violence is often the source of ideological conviction.     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

Rebel's dilemma: The changing relationship between the IRA,Sinn Féin and paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland

The 40‐month period which has followed the introduction of the IRA's 1994 cease‐fire has witnessed the most intensive vigilante campaign ever carried out by the movement. A commitment to vigilantism has profoundly affected the evolution of both the policy and structure of Sinn Féin and the IRA. However, vigilantism bears costs for the two organizations and several serious attempts have been made by senior figures to end the practice. This article sets out to understand and describe the dynamics of militant republicanism's fluctuating commitment to vigilante violence, and in particular to understand the complex issues vigilantism has raised within Sinn Féin and the IRA in the past three decades. The article concludes that the two organizations are now irretrievably committed to vigilantism, and short of major RUC reform, they will be unable to end what has become a politically‐damaging policy.     

Obama and Afghanistan: a constructivist approach to shifting policy narrative and practices

Abstract

This article adopts a constructivist approach to explain how and why the Obama administration shifted its policy narrative and practices towards Afghanistan from 2011 onwards. It recognizes that the ‘Global War on Terror’ narrative helped pave the way for a set of institutionalized militarized practices and collectively held beliefs that have structured the post-9/11 world. At the same time, the article argues that the Obama administration’s ‘selling’ of its Afghan policy provided the space for an evolving approach. This policy narrative involved the ‘existential threat’ of transnational militant actors operating out of an Afghanistan–Pakistan ungoverned space being downgraded to a ‘containable’ one. Three key factors prompted this change: the administration’s discursive decoupling of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; the changing perception that the threat posed by ‘al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ was a decentralized one; and the United States’ changed conception of Afghanistan as a ‘safe haven’ for transnational terrorists.     

Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organizations

ABSTRACT

Why do Indonesian Muslims join Islamist extremist groups? This article explores four pathways to entry into Indonesian militant groups: study sessions, local conflict, kinship, and schools. It argues that within all four of these pathways, social bonds and relationships are the common thread in encouraging entry as well as in fostering commitment. Specifically, these relationships contribute to the formation and eventual consolidation of one’s identity as a member of the jihadi group through regular participation in activities, attending meetings, narrowing the circle of friends to those within the group, and participating in increasingly risky and possibly violent activities together. Drawing on original fieldwork including 49 interviews with current and former members of Jemaah Islamiyah, Mujahidin KOMPAK, Darul Islam, Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh, Indonesia’s pro-ISIS network, and other jihadist groups as well as 57 depositions and court documents, this article explores the development and evolution of these pathways and how relational ties play a role in each.     

Bangladeshi Militants: What Do We Know?

ABSTRACT

Although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s, the country catapulted to international media attention on July 1, 2016, after an attack on a café in the upscale neighborhood of the capital Dhaka. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack which killed 29 people, mostly foreigners. The attack came in the wake of a series of attacks on religious and ethnic minorities, foreigners, liberal activists, authors, and publishers by both an AQIS affiliate and ISIS. The government denied the existence of militant groups tied to international terrorist organizations. Despite these developments and instances of Bangladeshis joining the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, there has been very little in-depth discussion about who these militants are and what is driving Bangladeshis to militancy. This article addresses this lacuna. This paper examines the common traits of alleged Bangladeshi militants and explores the factors of radicalization. Drawing on media reports of the profiles of the alleged militants, between July 2014 and June 2015, and between July 2016 and August 2017, the article finds that most of the Bangladeshi militants are young, educated males increasingly coming from well-off families. We have also found evidence that four factors—social relationships, use of the Internet, personal crises, and external relations—appear most frequently in the narratives of Bangladeshi militants.     

Do 90 Percent of Terrorist Groups Last Less than a Year? Updating the Conventional Wisdom

ABSTRACT

Prominent scholars criticize terrorism research for lacking sufficient empirical testing of arguments. Interestingly, one of the most widely cited estimates in terrorism studies has not been evaluated using the many data sources now available. Rapoport’s 1992 claim, that perhaps 90 percent of terrorist groups last less than one year, has been described as part of the conventional wisdom. This estimate is frequently used to justify studies of terrorist group longevity, a substantial line of research in recent years. Is the estimate accurate? Scholars increasingly publish data sets of terrorist organizations, but no one has analyzed them collectively to see if the 90 percent claim holds up. This article examines the eight largest global data sets of terrorist group longevity, covering 1968–2013. The samples vary considerably, but the percentage of groups that do not survive beyond their first year in these relevant data sets is between 25–74 percent. Across all data sets, on average about 50 percent of terrorist organizations do not make it past their first year. There is some variation depending on group motivations, consistent with Rapoport’s “wave” theory. However, overall, terrorist organizations appear to be more durable than the conventional wisdom suggests.     

Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan

ABSTRACT

While there have been many scholarly inquiries about the sources of support for terrorism among Muslim publics, to date, scholars have generally not asked whether or not gender predicts support for Islamist militancy. Instead, most scholars and officials assume that “men of military age” are the most important segment of interest. Instead, gender is usually treated as a “control variable” rather than a “study variable,” reflecting the paucity of interest in this subject. This is likely an important scholarly and policy-analytic oversight. Many terrorist groups have women’s wings and women-oriented publications and other outreach programs because they understand the important role that mothers, wives, and sisters play in a male family member’s decision to take up arms with a terrorist group. In some conflicts, women also join as combatants. In this paper, we seek to address these scholarly lacunae by examining gender-wise support for two militant groups based in and operating from Pakistan: the Afghan Taliban, which has no female outreach program, and the sectarian Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, which does. We leverage a dataset drawn from a relatively large national survey of Pakistanis collected in 2011 to model support for these groups using gender as an independent variable along with other demographic and control variables. We find that females are significantly more likely to support the sectarian group with a women’s outreach-wing. In contrast, there is no significant gender effect on support for the Afghan Taliban. We argue, from these results, that gender deserves more attention in understanding who supports and participates in Islamist militancy.     

Under the shade of AK47s: a multimodal approach to violent extremist recruitment strategies for foreign fighters

Two notable features of the current conflict in Syria and Iraq are the number of foreign fighters from western countries fighting for Sunni militant organisations, and the use of the Internet and social media by some extremist groups to disseminate propaganda material. This article explores how the group which refers to itself as Islamic State and an affiliated British group, Rayat al Tawheed, deploy combinations of images and text which serve as bonding icons to rally supporters. The data consists of the English language edition of ISIS’s online magazine Dabiq and online materials produced by Rayat al Tawheed. The results suggest that ISIS and Rayat al Tawheed adopt similar but different iconisation strategies. While ISIS adopts a global strategy to present a unified world view utilising a range of ISIS values in its iconisation, Rayat al Tawheed foregrounds jihad using strategies specifically targeting young, English-speaking men of Islamic/Arab backgrounds.     

Making women terrorists into “Jihadi brides”: an analysis of media narratives on women joining ISIS

ABSTRACT

Although the involvement of women in terrorist activities is not new, it is still considered to be an exceptional phenomenon. The figure of a woman militant contradicts the main gender constructions and thus produces a certain shock and disconcertment in societies. In the case of “Jihadism”, women who willingly join a terrorist organisation also challenge the Western Neo-Orientalist perspective on Muslim women in the West. Starting from these theoretical standpoints, this article focuses on a group of terrorists who have recently received a great deal of attention: ISIS women jihadis. Based on a critical discourse analysis of three main UK broadsheets, this article presents, deconstructs and problematises the main depictions that were used to describe these subjects. Furthermore, it discusses how the frames described reconcile these women’s actions with the gender and Neo-Orientalist constructions that circulate in Western societies, safeguarding the deriving hegemonic narratives. In other words, the article focuses on how women terrorists are made into “Jihadi Brides”.     

Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics

Targeted killings have become a central component of counterterrorism strategy. In response to the unprecedented prevalence of this strategy around the world, numerous empirical studies have recently examined whether “decapitating” militant groups with targeted killings is strategically effective. This study builds on that research program by examining the impact of targeted killings on militant group tactical decision-making. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in the attack patterns of militant groups conditional on whether a government’s targeted killing attempt succeeded against them operationally. In both the Afghanistan-Pakistan and Israel-West Bank-Gaza Strip theaters, targeted killings significantly alter the nature of militant group violence. When their leaderships are degraded with a successful strike, militant groups become far less discriminate in their target selection by redirecting their violence from military to civilian targets. We then analyze several potential causal mechanisms to account for these results and find strongest evidence that targeted killings tend to promote indiscriminate organizational violence by empowering lower level members with weaker civilian restraint.     

Universal soldiers or parochial actors: Understanding jihadists as products of their environments

ABSTRACT

Why did the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)—two groups that shared similar ideological preferences and were both initially part of the Al Qaeda network—take different paths in the Syrian conflict? Part of the answer lies in the fact that JN is primarily a Syrian organization, whereas Iraqis lead ISIS. A jihadist group’s relationship to its country of origin and domicile (the two are not always the same) helps to explain that organization’s ideological preferences and alliance behavior. Yet no method of categorization based on jihadist-state relations exists. I fill this gap by theorizing an explanatory typology based on a jihadist group’s relationship with its country of origin and/or domicile. This typology consists of two tiers. The first classifies jihadist organizations based on whether they are nationally homogeneous or heterogeneous, and whether they are based in their country of origin, exile, or multiple locations. The second tier categorizes groups based on the nature of their engagement—collaborative, belligerent, or neutral—with a state. This new typology enables the generation of multiple hypotheses and has practical implications given that most U.S. counterterrorism efforts require cooperation from partner nations.     

Too central to fail? Terror networks and leadership decapitation

ABSTRACT

Leadership decapitation, as a means of hindering the operations and hastening the demise of terrorist organizations, has been the subject of a growing body of research. However, these studies have not examined how an organization’s position in a broader network impacts its ability to weather decapitation. We argue that highly networked organizations possess characteristics that make decapitation less effective. To test this argument, we combine data on leadership decapitation with network data on terrorist organizations and find that well-networked organizations are resilience to leadership decapitation. Our study has implications for our understanding of how terrorist organizations respond to counterterrorism efforts.     

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion,politics and governance

ABSTRACT

After winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections and subsequently taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, the Palestinian Hamas – a hybrid political, social and military actor – undertook a complex process to ascertain authority and control over Gaza. The article focuses on understanding Hamas’s performance as a political party and a “rebel government” as well as the impact of this newly acquired role on the group’s strategy. Relying on primary sources, field-work and interviews with members of the Hamas government and its security sector, the study looks at Hamas’s role as a security provider and analyses the complex relationship between the institutionalized security sector and the group’s insurgent armed wing. Examining Hamas’s logic as a security provider and exploring the inherent tensions between political and insurgent logics allows for a better understanding of both the rebel group’s role as a political actor and the broader challenges behind the successful rebel-to-political transformations of non-state armed organizations. In doing so it contributes to the emerging literature on non-state actors’ shifts between ballots and bullets and on their potential role as alternative governance providers.     

Rights vs. Effectiveness? The Autonomy Thesis in EU Internal Security Cooperation1

Abstract

In the EU's internal security policy-making, parliamentary power remains—de jure and de facto—patchy. This situation has been (unofficially) justified by reference to the idea that the liberal constraints on executive power typically introduced by parliaments mark an irresponsible challenge to the effectiveness of policy. This essay tests this apologia, examining three cases where the retention of liberal values would actually be conducive to effectiveness: the EU-US ‘Passenger Name Register Agreement’, the elaboration of common data protection standards and the ‘Returns Directive’ on the expulsion of illegal immigrants. It suggests that the posited ‘rights/effectiveness’ incompatibility in fact masks a search for autonomy by executive participants.     

Rapid response or evasive action? Regional organization responses to peace operation demands

Abstract

Scholars have largely overlooked a critical influence on the effectiveness of organizations in their conduct of peace operations: response duration. The consequences of prolonging the time between the demand and supply of a peace operation often include a rise in the death toll on the ground and a fall in the operation's legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This paper aims to present and explain surprising variation among regional organizations' response rates – a critical influence on operations' prospects for success. The evidence that I have collected shows that despite its relative superior capacity, the European Union responds more slowly than the African Union and other less affluent regional organizations conducting similar peace operations. Applying theories of international organization pathologies, the paper argues that institutional design problems of bureaucratic dysfunction hinder organizations' abilities to rapidly respond.     

The Renewed ‘Struggle for Syria’: From the War ‘in’ Syria to the War ‘over’ Syria

ABSTRACT

Syria is generally considered a case of non-intervention. One of the dominant (since the 1990s) kinds of intervention, namely multilateral humanitarian intervention, failed, as did other attempts by a select group of countries to implement a ‘red line’ concerning the use of chemical weapons. However, in this case, there is no sharp dichotomy between intervention and non-intervention. In lieu of an intervention that would tilt the balance and coordinate help to halt massacres, various rival and uncoordinated international and regional interventions overlapped over time, fuelling a market for violence. ‘Weakened interventionism’, as opposed to principled and hierarchical intervention, has manifested itself in Syria in a model recalling “the struggle for Syria” of the 1960s in a new, contemporary setting.     

Egypt's struggle against the militant Islamic groups

This study deals with the militant Islamic challenge to the Egyptian regime during the early 1990s. The article analyzes the militant Islamic groups’ modes of operation and the regime's counter‐measures. This analysis leads to the conclusion that although the Islamic groups are a major source of instability in Egypt, their ability to overthrow the government and to establish an Islamic order is doubtful. The militant Islamic groups would be able to pose a viable alternative to the regime only if they could overcome the disputes among themselves, broaden their socioeconomic infrastructure, penetrate the army and find a charismatic leader capable of attracting and leading the masses.