War of textbooks: History education in Russia and Ukraine

Many scholars stress that teaching about the shared past plays a major role in the formation of national, ethnic, religious, and regional identities, in addition to influencing intergroup perceptions and relations. Through the analysis of historic narratives in history textbooks this paper shows how the governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine uses state-controlled history education to define their national identity and to present themselves in relations to each other. For example, history education in Ukraine portrays Russia as oppressive and aggressive enemy and emphasizes the idea of own victimhood as a core of national identity. History education in the Russian Federation condemns Ukrainian nationalism and proclaims commonality and unity of history and culture with Russian dominance over “younger brother, Ukraine”. An exploration of the mechanisms that state-controlled history education employs to define social identities in secondary school textbooks can provide an early warning of potential problems being created between the two states.     

Commemorating 1917 in Russia: Ambivalent State History Policy and the Church’s Conquest of the History Market

Abstract

Russia’s historical policy towards the centenary of 1917 was composed of several parallel strategies: diminishing the meaning of the event to avoid the head of state and other government figures having to take a stance; outsourcing commemorative events, with no pre-planned grand design; developing a reconciliatory narrative of the ‘Whites’ and the ‘Reds’; and allowing other actors to promote a plurality of contradictory readings of the events. Yet the space left by the state’s refusal to commemorate 1917 has been taken over by the Church, which, as today’s most active engineer of Russia’s historical policy, promoted a very clear pro-Tsarist narrative best embodied by the multimedia historical park ‘Russia—my history’ (Rossiya—moya istoriya).     

History education and historical remembrance in contemporary Russia: Sources of political attitudes of pro-Kremlin youth

Why during the last decade have many young Russians become politically active well beyond simply voting? Particularly striking among youth activists is their enthusiastic support for Putinism and a resounding rejection of the policies, symbols and political figures of the era of President Boris Yeltsin (1992–2000). The vast majority of youth activists are of college age (18–24), which means they were far too young to be aware of what was happening in the country in the 1990s, the period that while democratic and pro-Western, also represents a failure of the Russian state in their imagery. To what degree do the opinions and world views of politically active pro-Kremlin youth reflect the recently emerged, nearly ubiquitous interpretation of recent history as presented in the high school curriculum? To that end, we undertake a content analysis of 47 high school textbooks in Russian history, followed by open-ended interviews with 37 activists from the three most visible youth organizations, all of whom are pro-Kremlin in their orientation. Although demonstrating a causal relationship is methodologically unfeasible, we find a marked correlation between the views of both the Yeltsin and Putin eras presented in those textbooks and in the political beliefs of the youth groups.     

欧洲现代史中的苏联史

苏联史就是现代史的同义语,只有把苏联包括在内才有可能书写20世纪的世界历史;苏联的存在对20世纪世界历史的事件序列和结构,对国际体系,对文化关系和微观环境(不只局限于苏联),对政治和社会话语,对有关政治、经济、社会理论的形成,都产生了决定性的作用;不能把苏联史错误地理解为苏联疆域内的历史,也不能理解为现代史部门内众多国别史中的一部,因为苏联史同时显示出欧洲和全球的维度,波及西欧和欧洲以外的社会乃至日常生活和生活环境。因此,本文在兼顾欧洲背景的情况下,试图突出苏联史的几个主要线索,如人口损失、暴政、非斯大林化、苏维埃社会国家、合法性基础的改变、社会的转变、帝国的形成等,并探讨了与苏联现代化和工业化有关的理论问题。     

The Internet and Anti-military Activism in Russia

This study investigates the forms and networks of civic activism on the Russian-language segment of the internet through the data of anti-military web pages and weblogs in 2007. The results of the web page analysis are complemented by interviews with Russian activists and discussed in the context of the role of the internet in Russian democratisation. Although the state of anti-military activism on the Russian internet currently seems fragmented, the role of the internet and one particular weblog platform, LiveJournal, are considered to contain important potential for future forms of Russian activism.     

The study of international political economy in Russia

The author argues that international political economy (IPE), however prominent in the West, has not been established in Russia as an academic discipline. In the Russian policy community, the main debate is between liberal institutionalists, who advocate the country’s integration into the global economy, and the so-called dirigists, who promote relative economic autonomy. These two schools, however, only now begin to find their way in academia. Three main problems impede IPE development in Russia—the excessive separation of political science from economics, the deficit of theoretical generalization, and the weakness of educational curricula.     

转型期的俄罗斯外交战略

冷战后的俄罗斯社会处于改革和转型过程中,其对外战略也经历了一个转变过程:由最初的全面倒向西方,逐步演变为全方位、多极化和实用主义的外交取向,最终目标是恢复俄罗斯的大国地位.与西方的关系由热变冷,逐步拉开距离;与东方的关系则由冷变热,逐步修复传统友好关系.普京上台后,俄罗斯的外交战略更加清晰,实用主义色彩更加浓厚,基本确定了未来俄罗斯外交的总体走向.     

俄罗斯"社会安全"问题探析

苏联解体后 ,俄罗斯政局动荡 ,经济滑坡 ,两极分化严重 ,人民生活水平大幅下降 ,社会紧张局势加剧 ,社会治安状况恶化 ,俄罗斯民众的社会安全感急剧下降 ,社会安全问题成为俄罗斯一个重大而迫切的问题。俄罗斯政府的反危机措施不力 ,尤其是车臣分子的恐怖暴力活动使俄罗斯的社会安全问题更加尖锐和复杂。俄罗斯社会安全问题的尖锐是由苏联解体和从计划经济向市场资本主义经济过渡引起的经济和社会全面变化的自然后果。     

Civil Society,Populism and Liberalism

This paper considers the threats that various kinds of populism might be said to pose to the ideal of a civil society that mediates between ‘private’ and family life and the state. Although it is difficult to generalise about populisms, just about all—whether on left or right—share a hostility to ‘intermediate’ powers. Of course civil society is exactly what could be called a forum for intermediate powers. In contrast, populists often tend to emphasise a vision of immediate power in the sense of the possibility of the direct expression of the people’s will in political institutions. Populists, of whatever pitch, often tend to invoke a partisan state that will be on the side of the people (however defined) rather than a putatively neutral ‘liberal’ state that stands over and against civil society. These factors make most populisms more or less generically hostile to liberalism, understood not in ideological terms but more as a doctrine which emphasises the necessity of mediating power through institutions. Very often, populism is a threat to the idea of civil society understood as a concept integral to liberal political theory, as a means of balancing the state and its wider interlocutors. In this paper, various means, largely inspired by the writings of Tocqueville on the one hand and Paul Hirst on the other, are suggested for addressing aspects of this predicament.