Let’s not jump (over) the guns: response to Christina Hellmich

This reply explains several decisions I made as author of “Terrorwars: Boston, Iraq.” Among points raised is the central comparison of the Boston counterterrorist operation in 2013, which I call a one-day war, with techniques of the early Iraq war. Relatedly, I use war knowledge presented in a “novel” by an American veteran of the Iraq war to make that comparison, plus my own experiences with the Boston lockdown, all of which raise questions about who or what is a legitimate source of information on war. I close with events of August 2013 in Ferguson Missouri that confirm the idea that the USA is bringing tools and techniques from contemporary wars into urban policing, and doing so in ways that many ordinary people on the ground are identifying as war.     

Reply to Christine Sylvester, “Terrorwars: Boston,Iraq”: an examination of differences between counter-terrorism and war as seen through the Iraqi experience of occupation

This response examines what is overlooked in Sylvester’s analysis of similarities between the US police security response to the Boston marathon bombings (2013) and Kevin Powers’ fictionalised account of the US war operations in Al Tafar, Iraq (2004) and evaluates the consequences for our understanding of contemporary war. This is done by highlighting differences between the experience of residents in Boston and the (real) town of Tal Afar, key among them the insecurity, fear and calamity that result from the distinct political realities in these locations. The experience of war from the perspective of the victims adds an important dimension to the debate over the changing nature of war. At a time that is marked by an unprecedented level of technologisation and visual mediation, it brings into focus the fragmentary and often one-sided evidence on which our knowledge of contemporary war is based. It reminds us to ask not only what we know about war, but how we know it.     

Indonesian state responses to September 11, the Bali bombings and the war in Iraq: Sowing the seeds for an accommodationist Islamic framework?

This paper takes as its starting point the commonalities and differences in Indonesian Muslim responses to September 11, the Bali bombings and the war in Iraq. Empirical evidence suggests that Muslim leaders from all Islamic groups, whether 'moderate' or 'radical', in varying tones condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11. Likewise, a majority of Muslims from mass organizations and political parties condemned the US and coalition attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, so it is now impossible for Indonesian Muslims to conceptualize September 11 in isolation from events in the Islamic world. This paper first attempts to consider Indonesian Muslim perceptions of terrorism and second suggests that since September 11 enhanced solidarity among Muslims is changing the contours of Indonesian nationalism, and third suggests that the ideological basis of the post-independence Indonesian state is beginning to lose its credibility in the eyes of many Muslims and may in time be replaced by an accommodationist format more acceptable to its santri adherents. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Donald E. Weatherbee, section co-editor Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen and the journal's anonymous reviewers, who provided sound advice (which I was not always wise enough to follow).     

Absolute and limited war: The possibility of foreign‐imposed regime change

This paper examines the relationship between foreign imposed regime change and war participation. The oppertunity and willingness of an opponent to impose a new regime on a war participant affects the likelihood that such a change will occur. Results from a logistic regression model suggest that (1) winning or losing the war, (2) the amount of war costs the participant endures, (3) the power of the participant relative to its opponent, (4) the amount of war costs the opponent endures, (5) the occurrence of a domestic regime change during the war, and (6) the difference between the authority structures of the war participant and its opponent all have a significant and sizable impact on the probability that a war participant endures a foreign imposed regime change. The first three variables measure the opponent's opportunity to force a regime change, while the last three measure its willingness. I suggest that these results increase our ability to evaluate the likely consequences of a war, and may have important implications for our understanding of the decision to enter and terminate a war.     

De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011): A New Data Set

Sovereign states remain the primary units of analysis in conflict research. Yet, the empirical record suggests that the international system includes a wider range of actors whose behavior is relevant for conflict outcomes. This article introduces De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011), a new data set dedicated to understanding the behavior of de facto states—separatist statelike entities such as Abkhazia. I begin by explaining why de facto states deserve attention. Further, I provide a definition of the de facto state that separates it from cognate phenomena. Thereafter, I offer an overview of the data set and illustrate its utility by demonstrating how it contributes to the literatures on war and state making, civil war, and rebel governance.     

Crisis ideology and the articulation of fascism in interwar Japan: the 1938 Thought-War Symposium

In early 1938, the newly formed Cabinet Information Division (Naikaku jōhōbu) held a closed-door Thought-War Symposium (Shisōsen kōshūkai) in Tokyo with over 100 bureaucrats, military officers, media executives and academics in attendance. While the ostensible purpose of the symposium was to discuss propaganda following Japan's full-scale invasion of China in July of 1937, the presentations had very little to do with the practical coordination of information. Rather, the symposium participants brought their specific areas of expertise to bear on elaborating the curious term ‘thought war’ (shisōsen), a term that had only recently been used with any regularity but which had become invested with critical urgency following the invasion of China.

In the conventional literature, the term ‘thought war’ is understood as marking a new modality of state propaganda as Japan moved towards a total war system. However, this reading overlooks the ideological investments in thought war discourse, as well as how ‘thought war’ inherited a multivalent sense of crisis that had crystallized around thought and culture earlier in the 1930s. In this article, I explore how the 1938 symposium reveals a combined sense of historical crisis and an urgent call for the total overhaul of Japanese state and society, a combination which, I argue, underwrote the development of fascism in Japan. I trace how three earlier discourses of crisis – the ‘Manchurian Problem’, the ‘thought problem’ and the ‘movement to clarify the kokutai’ – converged within thought war discourse, thus investing it with fascist urgency.     

(Non)-lethality and war: tear gas as a weapon of governmental intervention

This article attempts to think through the relationship between lethality and war through the object of tear gas from its invention to contemporary uses. First, I examine the way in which tear gas migrates from a zone of lethal/non-lethal conceptual indistinction, to one where the same rationalities operate but the intent of their use is opposed in relation to life and death. Second, from this biopolitical distinction, I trace its use in the governing of colonial populations and populations under occupation, and its recent weaponisation in “domestic” spaces. These contemporary uses of tear gas, I argue, can be seen as what Sloterdijk would call “atmosterror” which contribute to blurring the lines between war and peace.     

Passenger or Driver? A Cross-National Examination of Media Coverage and Civil War Interventions

Existing research on civil war interventions provides contradicting evidence about the role that the media plays in affecting the likelihood of intervention. To date, studies often focus on specific cases (frequently by the United States) leaving it unclear whether the media's influence extends more broadly. In this article we examine this question cross-nationally and argue that we need to account for the possibility that interventions also lead to increases in media coverage. We test our hypotheses using cross-national data on civil war interventions and media coverage. These data include a new measure of media coverage of 73 countries experiencing civil wars between 1982 and 1999. These data allow us to determine whether media coverage is more likely to drive leaders’ decisions or follow them. Toward this end we employ a two-stage conditional maximum likelihood model to control for potential endogeneity between media attention and interventions. The results suggest a reciprocal positive relationship between media attention and civil conflict interventions. Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in media coverage raises the probability of intervention 68%.     

The realism debate and the politics of modern art in early postwar Japan

This article examines the realism debate (riarizumu ronsō) that took place between 1946 and 1950 as a forum in which ideas on artistic form, the role of the artist in society, and the social relevance of art come into focus in a way that allows us to see how questions such as Japan's modernity, the recent experience of fascism, and the challenges of rebuilding culture during the early cold war were taken up by leading cultural figures in the field of the visual arts. Occurring alongside discussions of how the art world could be reformed to avoid the failures of fascism, the debate served as an occasion to re-examine the history of modern art in Europe and Japan and to consider the question of artistic representation in a way that opened the most fundamental question of art's relationship to the world and promised to begin the process of envisioning it anew. The debate involved three camps which I label social realism (represented by Hayashi Fumio and Nagai Kiyoshi), modernist realism (Hijikata Tei’ichi), and avant-garde realism (Uemura Takachiyo, Okamoto Tarō, and Hanada Kiyoteru). While assessing their points of agreement and disagreement, I argue that the debate set the stage for debates in the 1950s and beyond.     

Flesh and steel: antithetical figures in the war on terrorism

The ongoing conflict in the war on terrorism puts two emblematic modes of violence into sharp relief: the drone, as an ostensibly rational, clinical and measured weapon of war, and suicide bombings, frequently portrayed as the horrid deeds of fanatics. In this article, I seek to challenge this juxtaposition and instead suggest that both modalities of killing are part of the same technologically-mediated ecology of violence. To do this, I examine the material-semiotic assemblage of the drone and of the suicide bomber, paying attention to the technological production of each mode of violence, as well as the narratives that render each figure intelligible in the war on terrorism. I argue that the strongly divergent narratives found in Western discourse serve as a politically expedient sense–making device, whereby suicide bombing is pathologised, thereby justifying ever more intrusive violent acts with seemingly rational technologies like the drone. Rather than “solving” the problem of terrorism, this creates counter-productive, or iatrogenic, effects, in which technological mediation escalates rather than diminishes cycles of violence. By way of response, I suggest that a better understanding of the relational nature of violence in the war on terrorism might be gained by reading the two not as antithetical figures, but instead as operating in the same technological key.     

Wars of Succession

I analyze a model of bargaining, war, and endogenous leadership turnover in which (1) leader attributes affect war outcomes and (2) war can insulate settlements from renegotiation. Shifts in bargaining power caused by leadership turnover are endogenous and discontinuous, but sufficiently decisive war outcomes can solve the associated commitment problem. In contrast to other models where the shadow cast by a hawkish successor encourages moderation toward a dovish incumbent, the foreign state attacks instead—despite a dovish incumbent’s known preference for peace—using war to lock in a settlement that would otherwise be lost to future leadership turnover. I discuss the theory’s implications for widening the empirical scope of the commitment problem explanation for war to limited wars over relatively lower stakes and for integrating the politics of leadership turnover with the study of strategic rivalries.     

Sam Fisher and the “war on terror”: an analysis of Splinter Cell in a post-9/11 context

This article examines the values and attitudes present within the 2002 video game Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell, and the methods employed to convey them. It compares the game’s message with the rhetoric contained in the Bush administration’s post-9/11 “war on terror” narrative. A qualitative content analysis of a Splinter Cell “game movie” and gameplay sessions is undertaken to examine the messages communicated through elements of simulation and representation. This article finds that Splinter Cell and the “war on terror” narrative express similar perspectives of terrorism and counterterrorism. First, both exaggerate the physical and normative threat of terrorism, and portray it as overwhelmingly powerful. Second, both sources justify violent counterterrorism action through claims of necessity, urgency and self-defence. Third, violence is consistently portrayed as effective for achieving the desired objective. Finally, violence and military action are represented as simple solutions that ultimately lead to victory over terrorism. The parallels between the messages within Splinter Cell and the “war on terror” rhetoric indicate that the game was shaped by the post-9/11 culture in which it was developed. More significantly, however, Splinter Cell perpetuates and legitimises the “war on terror” narrative by conveying its message through an immersive interactive environment.     

The US discourse on political Islam: is Obama's a truly post-‘war on terror’ administration?

In this article, I examine the legacy of the discourse on political Islam in the context of George W. Bush's ‘war on terror’, reflecting on the role this discourse has performed in constructing and affirming the United States' self-identity as a beacon of ‘democracy’, ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’, in contradistinction to an Islamist ‘other’. It will evaluate the three most prominent manifestations of the modern rationalist paradigm in relation to the ‘war on terror’ discourse: the tendency to ‘ideologise terror’; the tendency to conflate Islamist movements and view them solely within a security/counterterrorism framework; and the tendency to employ double standards when distinguishing between what is regarded as legitimate and illegitimate uses of political violence. This article will then consider to what extent it is appropriate to label the period since the Obama election as a truly ‘post-war on terror’ politics.     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

Inclusive institutions and stability of transition toward democracy in post-civil war states

This article attempts to bring together research on democratization and democratic consolidation with research on civil war termination. The post-civil war environment is contentious and the transition toward democracy achieved after a civil war is susceptible to failure. The side that wins the democratic elections in a post-war state may use its democratically won power to dismantle the institutions of democracy and repress the opposition. The fear of constant marginalization in the political processes as well as the fear of being repressed might create incentives for the defeated party to return to civil war. By utilizing the expected utility framework, this article suggests that former rivals would support democratic transition if they were confident that inclusive institutions ensured that they could achieve their political interests through the democratic processes. After analysing the data on post-civil war transitions toward democracy (TTD) from 1946–2005, I found that the proportional representation system and the parliamentary system are the most important institutions that help sustain the post-civil war TTD.     

Resource Curse in Reverse: How Civil Wars Influence Natural Resource Production

Conflict scholars have argued that natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and gemstones, may increase the chances for civil wars because rebels can sustain their organizations by looting resources and because certain types of resources, such as oil, create weaker state governments that are less capable of putting down insurgencies. Natural resources like oil also raise the value of capturing the state through war. However, empirical studies typically treat natural resources as exogenous variables, failing to consider the possibility that war alters the production levels of various natural resources. This endogenous relationship may help to explain the inconsistent empirical results linking natural resources and civil war onset. This article examines the two-way relationship between natural resources and civil war, focusing on oil, diamonds, and fisheries. The empirical findings suggest that most of the relationships run in the direction from war to resources, with no significant effects of resources on the onset of civil war. States with civil wars experience lower oil and diamond production, while marine fisheries production recovers in civil war–torn states.     

Why States No Longer Declare War

Why have states stopped issuing declarations of war? Declaring war was a norm of international politics for millennia, but now appears to have exited states’ behavioral repertoires. I argue that the proliferation of codified jus in bello, the law of war governing belligerent conduct, has created disincentives for states to issue formal declarations of war. The increasing number of codified international laws that govern belligerent conduct during warfare has made complying with the laws of war extremely costly. One way for states to limit these costs is to avoid admitting they are in a formal state of war by refraining from declaring war. I test this claim, as well as others, using an original data set. I also discuss several cases of nineteenth and twentieth century wars that illustrate the logic of this argument.     

Democracy and civil war: A note on the democratic peace proposition

Democracies may not fight each other, but do they fight themselves? Despite the need to better understand internal wars, empirical investigations of the democratic peace have focused on international war between democracies. We test the effect of regime type on civil wars, a class of events that is widely overlooked in the study of conflict. We find that regime type strongly affects civil war participation.     

Lincoln's Gamble: Fear of Intervention and the Onset of the American Civil War

Few studies consider how civil war onset can be influenced by third parties and by the belligerents’ perceptions of third party actions. I show that the American Civil War, a war largely ignored by civil war scholars, sheds insights into how anticipation of third party intervention influences the decision-making process within the target state and how the possibility of third party intervention can influence the onset and escalation of civil war. The American Civil War is an especially interesting case for exploring the role of third parties in civil war initiation since, unlike most cases considered by the existing civil war literature, the American Civil War is an instance of nonintervention: the third parties (the European powers in this case) mattered despite staying out of the conflict. Specifically, I argue that fear of foreign recognition (particularly by the British) played an underappreciated (if not the decisive) role in the earliest stages of the American Civil War by influencing Lincoln's decision to authorize the first major battle of the war at Manassas Junction, Virginia.