Iron Houses in the Tropical Heat: Decentralization Reforms in Africa and their Consequences

Abstract

Decentralization reforms introduced to Africa have not always delivered the intended outcomes. Through interaction with the broader historical, political, social and economic context, reforms seem to have engendered political consequences beyond decentralization itself. Most of the literature on decentralization and development emphasizes questions of institutional design and policy, but here we expand the focus of analysis and incorporate the harder-to-pin-down political patterns marking the workings of decentralization in Africa. Through the case-studies of Ghana, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ethiopia and Uganda we seek to connect the debates on development with the scholarly literatures on comparative federalism, comparative decentralization and local democracy. The conclusion that emerges is that no magic formula which can turn countries into peaceful, stable and prosperous democracies overnight exists. And, importing formal institutions without regard to the local historical, political, social and economic context risks leaving us with elegant but dysfunctional iron houses in the tropical heat.     

Federalism in Africa: Origins,Operation and (In)Significance

Abstract

Recent years have seen major advances in the comparative study of federalism and a growing literature on decentralization in Africa, but there has been surprisingly little systematic comparison of African federalism. This article explains several commonalities in the origins and operation of Africa's three main federal states: Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Each country used ‘holding-together’ federalism in order to accommodate ethnic pluralism. Each country—especially Ethiopia and South Africa—also experienced several key centripetal forces: dominant governing parties, top-down state administration and high degrees of fiscal centralism. Federalism mattered in offering accommodative decentralization, but in its operation subnational governments have limited autonomy because of these interlocking centralizing features. This African variant of federalism can have certain salutary features, even as it precludes the possibility of many of the theorized advantages of federalism that are predicated on real subnational autonomy.     

Decentralization in Cambodia: New Wine in Old Bottles

The usual arguments for decentralization by its advocates are that it can achieve accountability, transparency, participation and democracy. In reaching these goals, however, proponents of decentralization reform have articulated concerns about whether government officials have sufficient capacity to implement decentralization policies, particularly at local level. This article asserts that in Cambodia, where decentralization has unfolded gradually since its adoption some 15 years ago, lack of capacity is not the main problem. Decentralization is designed and implemented as part of the ruling political party's strategy to strengthen its grip at the sub‐national level rather than as an exercise for improving accountability and democracy. Although decentralization is unlikely to lead to democratic gains, it does provide an opportunity for the rejuvenation of a patronage‐based party in ways that could increase state capacity and improve development outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Abstract

Decentralization in South Africa was entrenched in the new democratic constitution of 1996 and charged local government with bringing basic and other services to the population. Our in-depth empirical study of 38 municipalities across South Africa indicates that the experiment with decentralization has largely failed to achieve its main aims—democratizing local government and delivering adequate basic services to all communities. In order to provide some answers to the question as to why this failure occurred, we focus attention on the legislative over-burdening of local government and its concurrent lack of institutional capacity to actually turn legal obligation and decentralization principles into practice as two of the main and related causes for this failure. While the South African constitution gave clear mandates to local government, the issue of adequate institutional capacity for municipal government was largely overlooked or ignored altogether.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Autonomy and Performance: Decentralization Reforms in Zhejiang Province,China

Decentralization reforms rarely live up to the high hopes and expectations of the reformers for a variety of reasons rooted in actions and omissions of the governments pursuing it or in the context in which it is undertaken. The paper examines the experience of Zhejiang Province where decentralization was successful in achieving and indeed exceeding initial expectations. The remarkable feature of its reforms was ‘performance‐based’ decentralization wherein localities showing superior performance were awarded additional autonomy at a faster speed while the rest were given additional support to build their capacity for assuming more responsibility in the future. To understand the effects of this unique pattern of decentralization, the paper compares the performance of participating and non‐participating counties under five waves of reforms between 1992 and 2008, based on indicators such as gross domestic product, industrial output and local government revenue. It finds that performance‐based decentralization not only helped overcome the problem of capacity deficits but also fostered capacity in weaker counties to assume more autonomy in the future. The paper confirms that speed and sequence of transfer of autonomy and responsibilities to local governments are as important as the content of decentralization. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public sector transparency and sustainable development: A focus on Sub-Saharan Africa

This study empirically addresses the relevance of public transparency in promoting sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the generalized method of moments techniques in order to account for concerns of endogeneity and simultaneity, the study utilizes a panel of forty-eight (48) countries in Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2000-2019. We then establish the subsequent findings. Public transparency maintains overall positive net effects on both the human development index (i.e., social sustainability); adjusted net national income growth (i.e., economic sustainability), and renewal energy consumption (i.e., environmental sustainability). Overall, we establish that public transparency enhances sustainable development. This study recommends that policymakers should ensure that public transparency processes are enhanced in order to achieve the post-2015 agenda.     

Decentralization in Africa and the Resilience of Traditional Authorities: Evaluating Zimbabwe's Track Record

Abstract

This paper looks at one of the most important endogenous factors influencing the workings of decentralization in Zimbabwe. Successive waves of formal institutional change that took place during Zimbabwe's colonial and post-colonial history have been unable able to uproot the influence of traditional leaders. Due to their home-grown legitimacy, various traditional authorities continue to play an ever-present role in the lives of people in rural areas. But, as it is the case throughout most of Africa, the powers of traditional leaders have mostly been uncodified under modern law and these power relations tend to be rather informal and culturally inaccessible to most outsiders. Consequently, the scholarly literature has not been able to systematically acknowledge their pervasive influence. The article concludes with a reflection on how the influence of traditional authorities can be translated into the democratic and progressive empowerment of rural populations in the developing world.     

Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases of Italy and Nepal

Federalism has been discussed as a potential system of governance in many countries, but in some it has failed to take shape. This has been the case in Nepal and, to a certain extent, in Italy. In fact, in Italy the federal option was rejected at the time of Risorgimento, and constitutional reforms in the 2000s never transformed the country into a federation as desired by political actors such as the Northern League despite some decentralization. In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution specified that the country would be federal, but the first Constituent Assembly elected to write a new constitution was unable to produce a federal map acceptable to the major political parties and the second is wrestling with the same issue. In both cases, federal structuring was attacked by political actors who argued that it could promote disunity, undermine solidarity, and possibly lead to disintegration. This article argues that the idea of federalism held by prominent political actors as promoting division and conflict played strongly against its implementation.     

Between Deadlock and Decentralization: Bargaining Dynamics in Federal States

A classic way to meet regionally diverse interests is to grant partial autonomy to sub-national entities, either by assigning them the right to decide upon policies (federalism), to implement policies (decentralization), or both. This article argues and formally elaborates that central governments may intentionally choose to increase decentralization in an effort to facilitate agreements that otherwise would be deadlocked. In this regard, a central government's decision to promote decentralization depends on its own relative valuation of policy change and congruence. We illustrate the empirical validity of our argument with a case study pertaining to the Swiss New Regional Policy.     

Decentralization in Tanzania: An assessment of local government discretion and accountability

A large part of the decentralization literature is fragmented along political, fiscal, or administrative lines. In this article we employ a diagnostic framework to draw these dimensions together in a coherent manner to focus on analyzing local government discretion and accountability in Tanzania. Tanzania seems to have a deconcentrated local government system with central appointees having large powers at the local level. Centrally‐funded mandates—such as constructing secondary schools—dominate local government plans and budgets. Central control over administrative functions has ensured that administrative decentralization is yet to occur. In the fiscal sphere, progress has been made in transparency and harmonization of transfers in the last 5 years but local governments still have some way to go in raising own revenues, being less reliant on transfers, and ensuring downward accountability. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization in Italy and the Troubles of Federalization

Since the mid-1990s, Italy has made significant steps towards federalism, decentralizing political, fiscal and administrative powers, also by means of a major constitutional reform. Yet, 20 years after the beginning of this process, the country is experiencing problems in finalizing these reforms towards a stable federal architecture. This article examines Italy as a case of failed federalization. Adopting a long-term focus inspired by the ‘gradual institutional change’ approach, we argue that federalization has been trapped between a rather anomalous (and pathological) alliance between a persistent centralism, which prevailed when Italy was born as a state in 1861, and an ever-present strong tradition of localism. This approach allows us to show the very incremental nature of institutional change and to map changes and continuities along the 150 years of the Italian state, identifying both political and cultural factors that help to explain this unfulfilled journey towards federalism.     

Decentralization as a conflict transformation tool: The challenge in Kosovo

Perspectives are divided on whether decentralization can ease ethnic conflict. This article considers whether asymmetric decentralization reforms in Kosovo have reduced tensions between Kosovo Albanians (K‐Albanians) and Serbs (K‐Serbs). We argue that because decentralization has been linked to Kosovo's sovereignty in the years after the NATO bombings, during the final status talks, and after independence, it has not achieved intended outcomes throughout the territory of Kosovo. Instead of assuaging tensions and generating allegiance to the central government, decentralization has re‐inforced ethnic divisions and strengthened K‐Serb ties to Serbia, particularly in northern Kosovo. Concessions to majority Serb municipalities in Kosovo have been seen by K‐Serbs as a bribe to buy acceptance of independence, while K‐Albanians question their leaders' continued policy of asymmetric decentralization. Since independence, there have been some encouraging developments in southern municipalities, where K‐Serbs have participated in municipal elections organized by Pristina. Based on Kosovo's experience, we argue that policy‐makers must consider the impact of decentralization reforms at multiple levels of conflict. Further, although we find that decentralization may engage minorities in political processes if reforms are attempted after the establishment of a central government, we caution that it must be combined with policies to encourage interaction and dialogue between ethnic groups if it is to assuage conflict. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

OVERCOMING A DECADE OF CRISIS: ZIMBABWE'S LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN TRANSITION

The world's attention has focused on Zimbabwe as the country has moved from the turmoil of the 2008 elections to a tentative democratic transition under the current Inclusive Government. The country's newly elected local authorities and an apparent interest in decentralization have been largely ignored in the process, however. This essay thus provides an extensive, survey‐based examination of local governance in Zimbabwe as of 2009. Four areas are discussed. First, with the growth of the political opposition to the ruling regime, local governance has also suffered from the deep polarization among all the country's institutions. The inexperience of the new local councilors vis‐à‐vis local administration officials also holds significant ramifications. Second, although local officials believe that public participation in decision‐making is strong, citizen involvement is actually quite weak. Third, reeling from the country's 2008 economic crisis, local authorities were operating as best as they could on minimal income and barely functioning in many areas. Financial transfers ended long ago; revenue generation remains poor. Finally, this essay captures the poor state of public services. Achievement of a national democratic consensus, decentralization that actually promotes democratic local governance and strengthening once‐strong local institutional capacity will determine the future progress of local governance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization as a strategy of regime maintenance: The case of Yemen

Proponents of decentralization often argue that decentralization makes governments more accountable and responsive to the governed. This is perhaps why the decentralization literature tends to overlook Middle Eastern regimes as these are among the most authoritarian and most centralized regimes in the world. However, many of these regimes have included decentralization in their legal framework. This article shows how a weak regime can use decentralization as a regime maintenance strategy when formal decentralization reforms strengthens external and internal legitimacy. The articles main argument builds on the literature on decentralization and elite capture to show how weak regimes can use formal decentralization reform to undermine local autonomy. The article uses the case of Yemen to make this argument. Yemen has a long tradition for local bottom-up initiatives and there is widespread internal support for decentralization. Simultaneously, donors have seen decentralization as a way of strengthening the Yemeni state, leading to international support to the formulation of the Local Authority Law of 2000, Law 4/2000, an extensive legal decentralization framework.     

Fiscal Decentralization Policies in the EU: A Comparative Analysis through a Club Convergence Analysis

Abstract

We study the degree of convergence or divergence in fiscal decentralization in the European Union over the period 1995–2015 using a club convergence approach. First, we analyze non-central expenditure and revenue as percentages of GDP, of total expenditure and of total revenue. The results for the EU-15 countries indicate some clustering, with three clubs formed when using GDP and four to five when using total revenue or expenditure. Second, we study the gap between expenditure and revenue as a proxy of fiscal responsibility. This results in three and two clubs respectively, with Denmark as the divergent country with the highest gap. Finally, we analyze potential unions of clubs and transitions. We also interpret our results taking into account variables found in the literature as determinants of fiscal decentralization. These results show how European countries are quite heterogeneous in terms of fiscal federalism and decentralization, with greater convergence in fiscal responsibility than in the other magnitudes.     

Decentralization and Development in Contemporary Uganda

Abstract

There has long been an emphasis on the importance of decentralization in providing better quality public services in the developing world. In order to assess the effectiveness of decentralization I examine here the case study of Uganda, which has seen major decentralization of power over the last quarter-century. In particular the current government has introduced a five-tiered local government structure, decentralized both fiscal and political power to local governments and introduced regular local government elections. However, initial excitement about Uganda's decentralization programme has tapered off in recent years due to a number of problems outlined here. In particular, I show that decentralization in Uganda has suffered from a lack of independence from central government control, which has led to a lack of effectiveness in the provision of high quality public goods.     

Decentralization of road administration: case studies in Africa and Asia

A study of decentralization of road administration in developing countries has been undertaken, including a literature review, and field studies in Nepal, Uganda and Zambia. The findings are reported under the headings of: constitutions and governance; policy and planning; financial and fiscal aspects; institutions, management and human resources; operations; and contribution to poverty alleviation. Decentralization of road administration has potential for improving the delivery of rural transport infrastructure services. But the evidence from this study suggests that it is proving difficult to realize fully the expected benefits. Problems include: lack of local government powers to exercise political influence; insufficient financial resources; lack of management capability; and a lack of accountability mechanisms. Limited data also suggest that there is little evidence of existing decentralized systems being particularly responsive to addressing the needs of the rural poor. There is a need for the poor to be involved more actively in the planning, financing and implementation process. Different models for administrative decentralization are described and recommendations are made for approaches likely to be the most appropriate for rural transport infrastructure administration and management. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization as a Post‐Conflict Stabilization Tool: The Case of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone's experience with decentralization as a post‐conflict stabilization tool highlights both the value of making and keeping a promise to empower citizens through local government and the importance of fully implementing that promise over a longer time horizon. The emergence of the country from civil conflict into peace and stability is one of the greatest success stories of post‐conflict stabilization. Although the nation has enjoyed over a decade of peace (and peaceful transitions from party to party), many of the conditions that laid the groundwork for conflict remain, especially in rural areas, due to the partial implementation of the decentralization framework. Based on a post‐conflict perspective, we review the re‐emergence of local governments in Sierra Leone following the civil war, the institutional and legal framework within which they exist, and some of the remaining challenges the nation faces. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.