Republican liberty and border controls

This article examines the normative status of border controls from a neo-republican perspective, grounded in the value of freedom as non-domination. It makes use of Philip Pettit’s account of this kind of freedom and discusses Pettit’s own remarks on the status of border controls. Against Pettit, it argues that the domination generated by border controls is ineliminable given existing political institutions, because such controls cannot avoid subjecting non-citizens to coercion in ways that are not forced to track their interests. The article also argues for an alternative neo-republican account of border controls that does not deny their coerciveness but allows for certain border control policies in non-ideal circumstances.     

Accepting the Bargain? An Experimental Study of Political Rights, Economic Development and Support for Government in Rural China

All governments are dependent upon a degree of political support and legitimacy. Some authoritarian countries, like Singapore and China, have staked this legitimacy on an “authoritarian bargain” in which residents exchange their political rights for economic growth and development. However, this bargain is complicated in the Chinese countryside, where rural residents have been granted a key political right – the right to participate in the election of their local leadership. In this paper, we ask whether rural residents have accepted the authoritarian bargain, and base their political support solely on economic development, or whether rural residents also consider their political rights when evaluating government. Based on an experimental study conducted in rural China, we find that rural residents place equal importance on their political rights and economic development when assessing their support for government.     

Defending a cosmopolitanism without illusions. Reply to my critics

This essay engages with several critiques of my project a ‘cosmopolitanism without illusions.’ Who is the subject of rights? What are the objects of rights? Is there a distinction between human and moral rights? Furthermore, what is prior in this cosmopolitan account: democracy or human rights? Do democratic iterations exhaust the meaning of principles of rights? Finally, does the ‘scarf affair’ really signify the return of ‘political theology’ or have not such disputes always accompanied secularization and modernity? I argue that moral rights comprise more than human rights and that non-human beings such as animals can have moral rights claims against us. Democratic iterations and rights complement one another; neither is prior and that although debates about religion and secularization have been endemic to modernity, the return of references to Carl Schmitt’s ‘political theology’ is rather new.     

Occupancy rights: dynamic as well as located

ABSTRACT

Anna Stilz’s Territorial Sovereignty (2019) aims to be a revisionist account of territorial rights that puts the value of individual autonomy first, without giving up the value of collective self-determination. In what follows I examine Stilz’s definition of occupancy rights and her emphasis on the moral relevance of what she calls ‘located’ life plans. I suggest that, if it aims at being truly revisionist, her theory should work with a broader definition of occupancy. So long as it doesn’t, these rights will be mainly the preserve of groups of settlers and peoples with predictable patterns of movement. Moreover, insofar as occupancy rights ground collective rights to self-determination, they actually have the potential to trump individual rights to what I call ‘dynamic’ or non-located occupancy. This is worrying, I claim, for at least two reasons. First, rights to dynamic occupancy are arguably as central for respecting individual autonomy as rights to located occupancy. And second, rights to dynamic ocupancy should be seen as key in helping to form the kind of political allegiances required to overcome the most pressing collective action problems that humanity faces.     

Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the Subject of Rights

The antidemocratic tendencies of rights appear to be numerous. As trumps, rights are denounced for shutting down political debate and undermining the common good. As disciplinary, rights are attacked for reinforcing a politics of exclusion. I argue that an appreciation of the democratic potential of rights requires conceiving of them as political claims, as claims that represent a perspective that we seek to persuade others to adopt and through which we can create and contest community and identity. I cull a political conception of rights from the work of John Stuart Mill by rethinking the meaning of and connection between his ontological commitments and his politics. Paying careful attention to his notion of "character" and its cultivation, I argue that Mill embraces a conception of the socially constituted subject who is both disciplined and enabled by rights.     

Human Rights Without Political Participation?

John Rawls claims that “benevolent absolutisms” honor human rights without honoring political participation rights. Critics argue that he is mistaken. One objection appeals to the instrumental value of political participation rights. This objection holds that without political participation rights, individuals cannot secure the content of their rights against encroachment. Given this, individuals without political participation rights cannot be said to have rights at all. Here, I evaluate this instrumental objection. I identify three ways of relating political participation rights to human rights and show that one makes sense of Rawls’s claim. I then defend this view from instrumental objections. This has implications beyond the realm of Rawls scholarship. Many societies are not democratic and are not democratizing. We must determine whether any of these societies can secure at least the content of human rights and, if so, what shape their social and political institutions must take to do so.     

Conceiving human rights without ontology

Conclusion In his book, World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge sets out to articulate an approach to basic justice that is inversal and cosmopolitan. This notion of justice is to be articulated through the language of human rights. Pogge’s arguments about justice, moral universalism and cosmopolitanism are impressive and reward serious study. It is to be hoped. indeed, that many aspects of his argument might be adopted by the elite ruling classes of world politics; they have much to offer in the project of creating a world that is humane for all. The issues that I have raised in the foregoing argument however are central to the integrity of Pogge’s project. I have argued, in sum that it is not possible to advance a program for the expansion of justice and the implementation of human rights in world politics without making an appeal to a specific account of the nature of justice and of human rights. The account that informs Pogge’s argument is that of political liberalism, and this is an account that has much in its favor as a preferred vehicle for justice in world politics. However, this account makes itself vulnerable when it argues for universal principles without acknowledging their partisan and normative base. My argument has been that this issue is at the center of Pogge’s attempt to isolate the conception of human rights he explicates, which he wants to serve as the language for his global ethical universalism, from the ontological affirmations which make that conception of human rights possible, and which of necessity tie human rights to a specific conception of the nature of the good for human persons and groups. The attempt to establish a single, universal criterion of justice, and to express it in the language of human rights, is undermined from within for as long as it fails to engage with ontological concerns.     

Arguments for Naturalisation

This article investigates what moral principles should inform states' decisions to grant resident migrants the rights of full citizenship. Some work on this question has focused on the beliefs and attitudes it is thought desirable for migrants to have. This article takes a different approach. Beginning from the assumption that a high rate of naturalisation is desirable, the article investigates four arguments in its favour. The contribution argument says that residents merit citizenship by virtue of their productive contribution to their new society. The coercion argument says it is wrong to impose on resident migrants laws they had no say in making. The membership argument says that migrants merit citizenship because they are already members of society. The respect argument says that long-term alienage is a failure of respect. I argue that the respect account escapes the difficulties of the other arguments, and best matches our intuitions about naturalisation. Further, the respect which states and citizens owe migrants, if manifest in the right political climate, is likely to lead to migrants respecting their new society too, and hence having the right kinds of attitude towards it.     

Development law: Squaring the circle, advancing human rights in Africa

Development law is an ethos-driven law reform paradigm that examines conditions from within the country and provides a frame of reference in which to evaluate the legal regime in the political, economic, social and cultural context. Moreover, development law provides a fresh approach to assessing existing national laws effectiveness generally; it assesses whether modifications are required to promote economic, political, and social progress, including protecting the rights of minority ethnic groups and disenfranchised peoples. By protecting rights, law can be an instrument of social development and will not be alien to large segments of the population. Development law as a paradigm is the result of decision making within the country after careful examination by trained professionals whose sole interest is political, economical, social, cultural and national development. The enactment of laws and integration of customary norms that are embraced by the ruling authority, political elites, and other stake holders will best advance human rights. I thank Professor Mary Wright for reviewing and providing helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.     

Control,consent and political legitimacy

In this essay, I evaluate Philip Pettit’s theory of republican political legitimacy and maintain that it fails to provide a more satisfactory account of legitimacy than consent-based theories. I advance two interrelated theses. First, I argue that in so far as Pettit successfully narrows the scope that his theory of political legitimacy has to address, his arguments could be adapted to support consent-based theories. Second, I argue that Pettit’s theory fails to satisfy the high standards it sets for itself and is thus unsuccessful. My critique focuses on Pettit’s notions of historical, political and normative necessity, before evaluating whether his requirement of equally individualised popular control of government should be endorsed.     

Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation

In recent years a number of theorists have maintained that the obligation to obey the law is best conceived and justified as an associational obligation. Not consent or utility or fair play but membership is the source of political obligation. These theorists are wrong, I argue, but they are wrong in interesting and illuminating ways. For an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of the membership account of political obligation underscores the merits of a rival account of obligation grounded in the principle of fair play.     

Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space

This article engages with current debates on the sociology of camps and camp-like institutions in contemporary society. Drawing on ethnographic material collected in Italy in ‘nomad camps’ where forcibly displaced Roma from former Yugoslavia were sheltered in the 1990s and 2000s, it argues that Agamben's conceptualisation of the camp as a space of exception, by constructing the camp as other to an idealised notion of citizenship and the rule of law, offers limited purchase for a sociological investigation of the complexity and ambivalence of social relations in and around camps as well as residents' everyday practices and experiences of political membership. Focusing on the resources, entitlements and ‘rights’ of camp residents and their interactions with state, regional and local authorities and non-governmental actors, this article invites to de-exceptionalise the camp and the experiences of its residents, and proposes the concept of ‘campzenship’ to capture the specific and situated form of political membership produced in and by the camp. Getting closer to the camp and its inhabitants through the adoption of an ethnographic gaze reveals the camp space as paradigmatic of the stratification and diversification of political membership in contemporary society, a social and political terrain where rights, entitlements and obligations are reshaped, bended, adjusted, neglected and activated by and through everyday interactions.     

The logic of multiculturalism and Korean democracy

In this article, I attempt to construct a normative framework of Korean multiculturalism in the Confucian public-societal context of Korean democracy by focusing on the political implications of the claim to cultural rights (so-called ‘logic’ of multiculturalism) and cultural pluralism that it is likely to entail for Korean democracy. After examining the logic of multiculturalism that often puts multiculturalism in tension with liberal democracy, I turn to Will Kymlicka's account of immigrant multiculturalism that resolves the potential tension between multiculturalism and liberal democracy in a liberal way. Then, I construct a normative framework of Korean multiculturalism in a way that a decent multicultural society can be established on the same public-cultural ground on which Korean democracy has matured in the past two decades.     

What comes first,democracy or human rights?

Minimalists about human rights hold that a state can have political legitimacy if it protects a basic list of rights and democratic rights do not have to be on that list. In this paper, I consider two arguments from Benhabib against the minimalist view. The first is that a political community cannot be said to have self-determination, which minimalists take to be the value at the heart of legitimacy, without democracy. The second is that even the human rights protections minimalists take to legitimize institutions cannot be had without democracy. These rights can only be adequately interpreted and specified for any social context if the interpretations and specifications result from democratic processes. Here, I bring out some important problems with these arguments and so conclude that they do not represent a robust case for rejecting minimalism.     

Review Article: The environmental turn in territorial rights

Recent theories of territorial rights could be characterized by their growing attention to environmental concerns and resource rights (understood as the rights of jurisdiction and/or ownership over natural resources). Here I examine two: Avery Kolers’s theory of ethnogeographical plenitude, and Cara Nine’s theory of legitimate political authority over people and resources. While Kolers is a pioneer in demanding ecological sustainability as a minimum requirement for any viable theory of territorial rights – building a bridge between environmental and political philosophy – Nine highlights a crucial distinction when looking at territorial rights from a global justice perspective, namely that between jurisdictional powers and ownership rights over resources. Daring and innovative at first glance, I claim that both theories present, however, deep ambiguities and retreat from their radical implications which, if taken seriously, would lead to a massive redrawing of current territorial borders.     

Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico

In this article I test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy posit that elected governments are responsive to public demands because citizens are able to sanction bad politicians and select good ones. Participatory theories attribute responsiveness to a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two approaches, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators for Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, from 1989 to 2000. The data show that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government performance. But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonelectoral participation causes improved performance. Thus, I suggest that the quality of municipal government in Mexico depends on an engaged citizenry and cooperation between political leaders and their constituents, rather than the threat of electoral punishment. I recommend that scholars broaden the study of government responsiveness to account for participatory strategies of political influence and critically assess the claims of those who would promote elections as a cure-all for poor democratic performance.     

Foucault,Critique and Rights

Abstract

This paper outlines Foucault's genealogical conception of critique and argues that it is not inconsistent with his appeals to concepts of right so long as these are under stood in terms of his historical and naturalistic approach to rights. This approach is explained by reference to Nietzsche's account of the origins of rights and duties and the example of Aboriginal rights is used to exemplify the historical character of rights understood as internal to power relations. Drawing upon the contemporary ‘externalist’ approach to rights, it is argued that the normative force of rights can only come from within historically available moral and political discourses. Reading Foucault's 1978-1979 lectures on liberal governmentality in this manner suggests that his call for new forms of right in order to criticise disciplinary power should be answered by reference to concepts drawn from the liberal tradition of governmental reason.     

Tocqueville, Jansenism, and the Psychology of Freedom

In American political discourse, freedom is often spoken of in terms of its inherent rationality or divine origins and is conceptualized as nothing more than a set of concrete institutions coupled with individual rights. By way of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, I will attempt to broaden our political vocabulary by constructing a psychology of freedom. According to Tocqueville, the American consciousness is largely a product of two conflicting tendencies: Cartesian rationality and Pascalian existential angst. Out of the tensions created by the interplay of these two elements Tocqueville demonstrates that the motivations to sustain freedom, as well as the institutions and practices crucial for the maintenance of it, result from a complex psychological mixture of self-interest, vanity, and a desire for solitude.     

Self-determination,group identity and the common will

ABSTRACT

Anna Stilz defends a political autonomy account of self-determination that, she argues, best explains our intuitions about why colonization, annexation and foreign occupation are wrong. These are wrong, on Stilz’s view, because they unilaterally coerce individuals living under those systems of government. I argue that Stilz does not show that her account of self-determination explains our intuitions about autonomy in these kinds of cases, because she does not have a separate argument for the value of belonging to particular political groups.