'A Single Truth': Mill on Harm, Paternalism and Good Samaritanism

On Liberty provides the classic defence of what has come to be known as Mill's harm principle and yet that principle is commonly believed to be at odds with Mill's equally famous discussions of paternalism and good samaritanism. Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies are often said to expose the inadequacies not only of Mill's anti-paternalism and good samaritanism but his harm principle as well. This paper offers a re-interpretation of these three aspects of On Liberty . It attempts to show both the unity of Mill's thought and how the contemporary relevance of his ideas has been misunderstood.     

Mill, Liberty and the Facts of Life

This paper examines John Stuart Mill's discussion of economic liberty and individual liberty, and his view of the relationship between the two. It explores how, and how effectively, Mill developed his arguments about the two liberties; reveals the lineages of thought from which they derived; and considers how his arguments were altered by political economists not long after his death. It is argued that the distinction Mill drew between the two liberties provided him with a framework of concepts which legitimized significant government intervention in economic matters without restricting individual liberty.     

Labor, Democracy, Utility, and Mill's Critique of Private Property

Scholars have long debated whether John Stuart Mill became a socialist, as he claimed in his Autobiography . This article strengthens the case that he did, ironically, by examining Mill's longstanding adherence to a labor-based justification for private property in means of production. Even while he developed sharp criticisms of capitalist property relations based on democratic principles of individuality and freedom, Mill held on to this labor justification, which partly offset his growing socialist sympathies. But relatively late in life, Mill reconsidered and discarded the labor justification and began to argue for a more explicit utilitarian analysis of the relevant questions, thus bolstering the importance of his democratic critiques of the system of private property. A recognition of the slow gestation of Mill's views on the labor justification enriches our understanding of his thought on socialism versus capitalism and provides an insight into how he applied utilitarianism in a practical context.     

On a Contradiction in Mill's Argument for Liberty

Mill took very seriously the warning example from China that even a civilised country could stagnate and become a backwater of world development. Although certain sections of Mill's On Liberty have been scrutinised, evaluated and debated with intense care, this, his most fundamental warning to his own society – that it was systematically undermining its own pre-eminence – has stimulated relatively little investigation. This article notes Mill's concern with social stagnation and suggests that, even in terms of his own presentation of the balance of social forces, his proposed countermeasures of 'eccentricity' and 'refusal to bend the knee' are futile gestures quite insufficient to combat the tendencies he outlined.     

Millian Radical Democracy: Education for Freedom and Dilemmas of Liberal Equality

This paper returns to J. S. Mill to draw out democratic conceptions of education and equality that challenge still-current conceptions of intractable human inequalities. Mill acknowledges that individuals differ in abilities. Nonetheless, he develops a broad conception of 'education for freedom' and insists that only 'wretched social arrangements' prevent virtually all people from exercising capacities for self-government in citizenship, marriage, and industry. In the same breath, he qualifies his democratic egalitarianism with reference to a sub-class of working people whose 'low moral qualities' leave them unfit for such self-government. Modern liberal states largely dismiss Mill's more radical democratic impulse. Meanwhile, they reiterate and refine his exclusionary one through new practices for constructing and managing inequalities – for example, IQ tests, educational 'tracking', and social science categories like the 'underclass'. I reconsider this divided legacy of Mill's egalitarianism as a basis for rethinking the limits of today's 'meritocratic' egalitarianism.     

THE THESIS OF THE TWO MILLS

Abstract. How successful was J. S. Mill in reconciling the various elements in his thought which, on his own account, he tried to weave together in the period after he ceased to be a dogmatic Benthamite? This much discussed issue is raised afresh by some recent studies, especially Gertrude Himmelfarb's On Liberty and Liberalism and Paul Feyerabend's Against Method . The former argues that there is a conflict between the Mill of On Liberty and the conception of liberty to be found in his other writings, whilst the latter claims that On Liberty is not only a corrective to Mill's Logic but to all attempts to lay down rules for the conduct of scientific enquiry. Can these versions of the'two Mills thesis'be sustained?     

John Stuart Mill's Theory of Bureaucracy within Representative Government: Balancing Competence and Participation

The relationship between bureaucracy and representative government has been a subject of concern to public administration since its inception. John Stuart Mill addressed this question in an 1861 essay, in which he explained his theory of government. Mill suggests a role for public administration that is not only legitimate, but also necessary for good government. His writings contain remarkable references to the concerns addressed in current theories of public administration. Mill worked to balance the spirit of popular government with governance by the most educated, skilled, and experienced of the nation, whether they were citizens, elected representatives, or administrative officials. This article examines Mill's theory and the contribution it makes to current public administration discussion.     

Intervention and Empire: John Stuart Mill and International Relations

It is surprising that John Stuart Mill's international thought, which focuses on intervention and empire, has not attracted the attention it warrants. It is particularly surprising that Mill has been largely overlooked by the English School, whose members acutely appreciate the contributions of classical political philosophers to international discourse. Galvanised by his introspection on his life, especially the impact of interference in his psychological and intellectual development, to his analysis of the impact of Britain on India's princely states and intervention in civil wars, Mill identified timeless problems intrinsic to international relations whilst profoundly appreciating the tensions they generated in the form of perverse effects, unintended consequences and moral hazard. Contemporary international relations are replete with examples of the unforeseen and unforeseeable developments that attend intervention and interference. If a concern of the English School is the tormenting decisions that fall to statesmen, Mill provides an understanding of the considerations that vastly complicate such decisions.     

Mill and the Value of Moral Distress

People are sometimes distressed by the bare knowledge that lifestyles are being practised or opinions held which they take to be immoral. Is this distress to be regarded as harm for the purposes of Mill's Harm Principle? I argue, first, that this is an issue that is to be resolved not by analysis of the concept of harm but by reference to the arguments in On Liberty with which the Harm Principle is supported. Secondly, I argue that reference to those arguments makes it clear beyond doubt that, since Mill valued moral confrontation and the shattering of moral complacency as means to social progress, he must have regarded moral distress as a positive good rather than as a harm that society ought to intervene to prevent. Thirdly, I relate this interpretation to Mill's points about temperance, decency and good manners. I argue, finally, that my interpretation is inconsistent with Mill's underlying utilitarianism only if the latter is understood in a crudely hedonistic way.     

The Liberal Justification for Local Government: Values and Administrative Expediency

There are several important justifications for autonomous units of local government, derived from the writings of J. S. Mill and later theories concerning the value of pluralism. These arguments fail to show that local government is a morally necessary, as opposed to expedient, adjunct to liberal-democratic government. The paper develops from J. S. Mill's ideas on liberty a more substantive justification for local government based on the principle that local government can be a means for ensuring that the determination of collective decisions are made solely by those people affected by the decision.     

Liberal Justifications for Local Government in Britain: The Triumph of Expediency over Ethics

It is shown in this article how theories justifying local government in Britain are largely based on the expedience of providing administrative efficiency or stable democracy for the central state rather than ethical grounds that justify local government as an independent entity in its own right. The article critically reviews the development of theories justifying local government within Britain and argues that it is possible on the basis of Mill's arguments within On Liberty to establish a strong ethical justification for local government. It is shown how Mill did not develop this line of thought but established substantive arguments concerning the value of local government for securing a stable liberal democracy and how successive mainstream theorists have modified but not substantially departed from this approach.     

John Stuart Mill and Unassimilated Subjects

Mill's harm principle declares that one's liberty of action may be interfered with by the state only if one has caused harm to others. Cases of culture clash involve unassimilated subjects, be they citizens, aliens, immigrants or national minorities, who violate the law while engaging in a practice that is a prevalent and legitimate part of their native culture or religion and which they do not regard as harmful. A Millian approach to the punishment of unassimilated subjects is explored by examining Mill's views on whether there is an objective standard of harm and Mill's discussions of free will, moral responsibility and the respect due to native cultures.     

Liberal Feminism: Individuality and Oppositions in Wollstonecraft and Mill

The essay explores liberal feminism by matching Wollstonecraft's and J. S. Mill's works against radical feminist criticism. Though censured by radicals for perceiving society in binary terms modeled on the male-female distinction, liberal feminists subscribe to a worldview that is variegated and dynamic. Liberal feminism does not oppose nature to culture or individuality to society, but rather sees the ability to achieve autonomous personhood as dependent on social conditions. This insight underpins liberal feminism's attitude to the status of women: to form as rational agents, humans have to be provided with social safeguards such as education and the vote. Far from being starkly individualistic, this agenda is based on liberal feminism's perception of individual rationality as a social product.     

Rousseau's Critique of Representative Sovereignty: Principled or Pragmatic?

In the Social Contract, Jean‐Jacques Rousseau advanced an impassioned critique of representative sovereignty, yet it is often thought that his objections were merely pragmatic and that he did not consider the question of representation to be a matter of basic political right. This article maintains, to the contrary, that Rousseau did have a principled argument against representative sovereignty and elucidates the nature and bearing of that argument by situating it in response to Hobbesian accounts of representation. Rousseau's argument is shown to have far‐reaching implications, as it entails that the existence of representative sovereignty contravenes two principles central to the legitimacy of modern democratic states: the sovereignty of the people and the moral equality of the citizens.     

Carr, Mannheim, and a Post–positivist Science of International Relations

Recent work on Carr has looked beyond The Twenty Years' Crisis to the seeming anomaly of a political realist advocating regional integration in Western Europe, a welfare state at home, and a free hand for the USSR in Eastern Europe. Some have seen this anomaly, and Carr's successive appeasements of Germany and the USSR, as mere opportunism, but this paper finds a coherence in Carr's work deriving substantially from Mannheim. It was from Mannheim that Carr took not only the structure of The Twenty Years' Crisis , but also his characteristic post-positivist and interdisciplinary methodology, his belief in the policy role of the intellectual, his strong sense of the connectedness of foreign and domestic policy, his insistence on forms of international society that heavily discounted the sovereignty of small nations, and the besetting weaknesses of inadequately acknowledged historicism and elitism.     

THE LOGIC OF J. S. MILL ON FREEDOM

Abstract Mill's aim in Chapter 2 of Book 6 of the System of Logic, to reconcile human freedom with universal causality whilst at the same time answering the challenge of Owenite 'social fatalism', pushes him into attempting an ambitious reconstruction of the traditional Compatibilist conception of freedom as absence of constraint. An examination of the convolutions through which the argument goes before culminating in the conclusion that genuine freedom is the same as complete virtue reveals over half-a-dozen distinct varieties of freedom and a remarkably chaotic mixture of insight and confusion, much of which bears directly upon an understanding of the kind of freedom Mill was out to protect in On Liberty.     

TOWARDS RESOURCEFUL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A MANAGEMENT POLEMIC

Abstract: Doctrines of public administration are in ferment. Proponents of the newer public management challenge defenders of the traditional public service. Academic commentators frequently oppose both the newer managerialism and the traditional apolitical professionalism. The net effect is to distort the call for better public management. One useful step out of the mess is backwards—toward a recovery of the fundamentals of democratic political theory, of that original sense of the governing partnership between public servant and politician. In the 1950s, Fritz Morstein Marx called it resourceful public administration. By reviving this older sense of public resources, we tap a fundamental but frequently ignored vein of public administration theory. Through "the other Marx" we rediscover his mentor, John Stuart Mill, from whom we still have much to learn about our greatest administrative resource—our people, both politicians and public servants. Both Marx and Mill give us salutary examples on how to ask the basic questions of principle, which we tend to bypass in our pursuit of pragmatic arrangements.     

Locke, Sincerity and the Rationality of Persecution

According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the Letter . Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the sincerity argument . He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the Letter is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational.     

Utilitarianism and rational choice

Abstract. Rational choice theory springs from the utilitarian premises that what is best for society is nothing but the sum of what is best for each individual and what is best for the individual is best understood by the individual himself. Modern research, however, has often found both these premises to be invalid. Sometimes rational individual action leads to collectively irrational decisions. Occasionally, individual preferences emerge out of irrational motives. Other theories of the relation between man and society such as the doctrines of paternalism and the general will are therefore analyzed. The conclusion is that the present difficulties of rational choice theory can be attributed to its reluctance to integrate our empirical knowledge of the decision making of parties and organizations. There is room for a new theory that makes the rulers more independent of their voters than they are in rational choice theory, but more bound than they are in practice.     

Montesquieu on Federalism and Anglo-Gothic Constitutionalism

The common perception that Montesquieu is not a major theoristof federalism is due both to the peripheral nature of his accountof confederate republics and his praise of the unitary BritishConstitution in the Spirit of the Laws. This study challengesthis view by arguing that, despite his endorsement of the separationof powers, Montesquieu had serious reservations about England'shighly centralized system of parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover,his most significant reflections on federalism were not containedin his brief treatment of confederate republics, but ratherin his lengthy consideration of Gothic constitutionalism. Iconclude that Montesquieu's complex constitutional theory involvestwo distinct dimensions including both the separation of powersexemplified in England and the federal principles in the decentralizedGothic system of medieval France.