State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress

During the last several decades, state officials increasinglyconcluded that their interests are not adequately representedin national policymaking and sought to increase their influencethrough the constitutional amendment process, the federal judiciary,and the political process. This article evaluates the extentto which these institutional mechanisms were effective in advancingstate interests during the 104th Congress. United States Constitutionalamendments were improbable and ineffective devices. Litigationwas slightly more successful, though it provided an uncertainsource of long-term security for state interests. Efforts towork through the political process, either through securingthe passage of legislation that increases congressional responsivenessor by engaging in direct lobbying, were moderately effectiveunder certain conditions.     

The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits

Whether term limits would increase or decrease federal spending depends on the reason for the causal relationship between tenure and spending. We investigate this subject by empirically studying congressional spending and tenure for all United States House and Senate members who entered Congress between the 94th and 102nd Congresses (1975–1992). As our measure of congressional spending we use the National Taxpayers Union's Congressional Spending Scores. Our study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between congressional spending and tenure for some groups of congressmen. We then test three hypotheses relating tenure and spending. No single hypothesis is consistent with all of our empirical results. Nevertheless, the small sizes of the empirical effects estimated in this study suggest that term limits would have an inconsequential impact on the level of federal spending – at least via the “moral hazard” mechanisms described in this paper.     

Does the Federal Government Learn from the States? Medicaid and the Limits of Expertise in the Intergovernmental Lobby

State programmatic expertise is an important asset to federalsystems, but this expertise is not always informative to federaldecision-makers. I argue the degree to which state expertiseis informative to federal decision-makers depends on how wellthe policy interests of state and federal levels are aligned.I illustrate variation in these conditions using case studiesof congressional politics over the Medicaid program. I thenapply a statistical test, which demonstrates that states’programmatic expertise regarding Medicaid is less persuasiveto congressional committee members compared to other witnesseswho are equally knowledgeable. The results suggest a "failureof federalism," where the public good potential of state programmaticexpertise often is not realized in the federal system.     

State Sovereignty in the Federal System: Constitutional Protections Under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that state sovereignty is protectedby principles of common law rather than explicit constitutionalguarantees under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The Courthas also cautioned that congressional actions, even under delegatedpowers, may not threaten the integrity of states as sovereignentities in the federal system. The National League of Citiesdecision in 1976 appeared to reverse this doctrine by implyingthe existence of Tenth Amendment protections of state actionsin traditional functional areas. However, the federal courtsdiscounted the NLC ruling as a compelling precedent in subsequentfederalism cases because of its vagueness and its fundamentalinconsistency with established doctrine. In 1985, the SupremeCourt overturned the ruling in Garcia v. San Antonio, reaffirmingthe common law nature of state sovereignty and arguing thatconstitutional protection of state interests lies primarilyin the representative structure of the federal system ratherthan in specific constitutional guarantees.     

Public Opinion on Federalism in the United States and Canada in 2002: The Aftermath of Terrorism

This research reports on a public-opinion survey on intergovernmentaland border issues in Canada and the United States conductedin mid-April 2002. In the United States, there was an upsurgein public support for the federal government in 2002 over 2001,and a slight decline in public evaluations of state and localgovernments. Increased support for the federal government wasespecially notable among whites, Republicans, and respondentswith post-undergraduate education-groups that previously registeredlow support for the federal government. Canadians reported lesssatisfaction with all governments in their federal system, lowersupport for their federal government, and much more regionaland partisan division over intergovernmental issues. On internationalborder issues, Americans and Canadians generally agreed thata common border-security policy would be a good idea, thoughCanadians were slightly more likely than Americans to preferease of cross-border trade over improved border security.     

The Budget Enforcement Act and Its Survival: Congress Hears from Experts

The unpopularity of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 grew in light of the recession, recent international events, and continuing record budget deficits. This prompted many Congress members and congressional committees to consider the future of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Two hearings, held in October and November of 1991, exemplify the kinds of choices facing the Congress and the type of advice that Congress has been receiving. This article reviews the testimony given at the hearings by experts with established knowledge of federal budgeting.     

The congressional veto: Shifting the balance of administrative control

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies.     

Recovery and Reinvestment Act spending at the state level: Keynesian stimulus or distributive politics?

We examine the US state-level pattern of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) spending. We relate spending to (1) Keynesian determinants of countercyclical policy, (2) congressional power and dominance, and (3) presidential electoral vote importance. We find that the ARRA is, in practice, poorly designed countercyclical stimulus. After controlling for political variables, coefficients on Keynesian variables are often statistically insignificant. When they are statistically significant they are often the “incorrect” sign. On the other hand, statistically significant effects are associated with majority party House of Representative appropriations subcommittee and authorization committee membership. One striking result is that the elasticity of ARRA spending with respect to the pre-ARRA ratio of federal grants and payments to federal taxes paid is estimated to be greater than unity in most specifications. States previously capturing large amounts of federal funds continue to do so under the ARRA stimulus.     

Reinventing Amtrak: The politics of survival

This article argues that Amtrak's design as a “quasi-public, for-profit” corporation was seriously flawed from its beginnings. The corporation was isolated from America's private railroads, and isolated from trust-funding financial mechanisms that supported highways, airports, and mass transit. It depended on powerful Democratic congressional patrons and labor union support for protection from Republican executive budget cuts. But these allies pushed Amtrak into running far more costly service than was good for its bottom line. The corporation was already engaged in an internal reorganization designed to bring it closer to its customers, when the Republican victory in the 1994 congressional election launched an external effort to reorient and restructure Amtrak. There are three possible outcomes of the two-sided reinvention process: status quo and continued slow decline; partnership based on new relationships between Amtrak, federal and state governments, and the private sector; and privatization which might still require substantial public expenditures for some time. Synchronizing the opportunities created by both the internal and the external reinvention efforts is the key to whether Amtrak can emerge as a viable and valuable provider of rail transportation in the 21st century.     

Public Opinion on Federalism in Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 2003

This research reports on public opinion surveys on intergovernmentaland federal issues conducted in Canada, Mexico, and the UnitedStates in March and April 2003. In all three countries, respondentsmost often see their federal government as being the least effective,least efficient, and least trustworthy. Respondents from Canadaappear least supportive of their federal government and mostsupportive of their local governments; those from Mexico appearmost supportive of their state governments; respondents fromthe United States appear more "balanced" in their support ofthe various orders of government. Also, far greater regionaldifferences in opinion exist in Canada than in Mexico or theUnited States. Support for more decentralized federalism isfound to be strong in all these federal countries. This researchalso updates long-term trend data for the United States. Comparedwith respondents from previous years, U.S. respondents in 2003showed a measurable uplick in support for the federal government,compared with state and local governments. This support seemsto be a carryover from the terrorist attacks of 11 September2001.     

Congressional Use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

This paper seeks to advance knowledge about congressional use of the program assessment rating tool (PART) in the 109th Congress. The research suggest that both congressional chambers use PART on a limited basis; affirms that congressional committees are exposed to PART scores through congressional budget justification score inclusion and in federal agency testimony; and that use was primarily driven by non‐congressional actors.     

The influence of the gramm-rudman-hollings act on federal budgetary outcomes, 1986—1989

This article analyzes the impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act on federal budgetary and fiscal outcomes. Rather than portraying it as a two-on federal budgetary and fiscal outcomes. Rather than portraying it as a two-party game between Congress and the president, each with monolithic policy preferences, we view GRH as a multiparty negotiation game among advocates of different programs and agencies. In this game, agencies subject to sequestration and their congressional advocates have an incentive to reach a budget accord, while those exempt from sequestration do not. Consistent with this argument, we find that GRH has restrained outlays for nonexempt programs and that exempt programs have, if anything, experienced more rapid growth. Overall, GRH is estimated to have restrained outlays by $59 billion by fiscal 1989, and to have restrained outlays more effectively after the 1987 modifications in the Act. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act signals another phase in the decade-long struggle between the White House and Congress over public spending priorities. Our final counterfactual analysis suggests that GRH partially returned federal fiscal and budgetary relationships and priorities to those that prevailed before Reagan.     

Federal Preemption and State Regulation of Transportation and Telecommunications

Transportation and telecommunications are two of the most importantinfrastructural industries in the American economy. As theseindustries are so vital and because they exhibit characteristicsthat have frequently rendered them quasi-monopolistic, theirgrowth has been accompanied by state and federal regulation.We document how the imposition of regulation has led to continualconflicts over the extent to which federal regulation shouldtake precedence over state regulation. We illustrate how thejustifications for federal preemption have been applied notonly to the regulation, but also to the recent deregulation,of railroads, trucking, and telecommunications. We contend thatpolitical factors, such as congressional support, precedent-settingcourt rulings, and, most important, political pressure fromaffected interest groups that is related to the revenues stillgenerated within states by these industries, ultimately determinethe form of preemption that emerges from the Congress.     

The Street‐Level Bureaucrats of Elections: Selection Methods for Local Election Officials

The 2000 presidential election and the recount battle in Florida focused attention on local election administration in the United States. The Help America Vote Act , passed by the federal government in 2002, requires wholesale changes in voting equipment and other election procedures. However, the law did not address the selection of individuals who manage elections: both state and local election officials play a great role implementing federal and state election laws. Recently, several election reform advocates have argued for shifting to nonpartisan election administrators in the United States. Others, particularly associations representing election officials, have not endorsed that position. To inform this debate, we provide data on the selection methods and party affiliations for all local election officials in the United States (more than 4,500 individuals or commissions). We find considerable variation in the methods used to select state and local election officials in the United States.     

Introduction: Reflections on Two Decades of Congressional Budgeting

Even casual observers of federal policy making cannot help but notice the increasing preeminence of the Congressional budget process. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which created this process, brought forth profound changes in budgeting practices, both within Congress and between Congress and the president. In addition, the last decade has seen numerous attempts to use the process for deficit control. The goal of this special symposium is how congressional procedures-adapted over time-have affected the federal budgeting process. Each article examines the original purpose of the 1974 statute and analyzes the statute's impact over more than two decades.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.     

Congressional voting on Superfund: Self-interest or ideology?

Many allege that Superfund is a pork-barrel program that serves self-interested federal legislators. An earlier empirical study found that Superfund cleanup priorities and expenditures were not dictated by congressional committee influence, but rather largely by public interest concerns. Despite this apparent denial of classic distributive politics, it is important to recognize that pork also can arise from legislators voting to expand programs when their constituents stand to benefit disproportionately. This study examines important House and Senate votes on Superfund for their correspondence to theories of congressional self-interest and ideology. On the whole, and despite its theoretical appeal as a potentially-classic pork-barrel program, congressional voting on Superfund is found to represent legislator's environmental and liberal ideologies as much as (if not more than) narrowly-defined self-interest. Along with the results of a previous study, this should be taken as evidence that Superfund has not consistently been a typical pork-barrel program, and that its rapid expansion and legislative support must be explained by other factors, including its symbolic environmental appeal.This research was funded in part by a Faculty Research Grant from the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.     

What congressmen knew and when they knew it: Further evidence on the origins of U.S. broadcasting regulation

This paper presents richer contemporaneous evidence of Congress's role in the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, the act which established the basic statutory framework that still governs federal regulation of broadcasting in the United States. Recent analysis finding the court's decision in Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station to have been the cause of Congress's action on the radio bill is shown to rest on an inaccurate chronology of congressional decisionmaking. More closely examining the actions of legislators upon whose votes passage of the radio act depended, this paper contributes new evidence of strategic orchestration surrounding the perceived “chaos of the airwaves” that stimulated broadcasting regulation. Original congressional documents show that, in a political context characterized by costly information, intra-congressional manipulation of information costs was an important factor in the adoption of the Radio Act of 1927. Personal ties between executive branch officials are shown to have spawned a key legal opinion that prompted passage of the radio bill.     

Anticipating future congressional action: Designing a new retirement income system

After federal workers were covered by the social security system for the first time in 1983, the Congressional Research Service began working with congressional committees, particularly the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on the design of a new federal retirement system made necessary by this coverage. Over a two-year period, the CRS prepared a study that became, in effect, the analytical framework used by the majority and minority of both houses of Congress as they enacted a new system. The analytical tools created by the CRS in doing this study were used during congressional deliberations to analyze specific options developed by committees and members, and to assist with assessment of the implications of compromises necessary to pass the bill and have it signed by the President.     

The power not to tax: A search for effective controls

Although the primary purpose of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was to gain greater congressional control over federal spending, the act also represented a small but significant step toward controlling the substantial financial commitments made through the numerous exclusions, deductions, and credits in the federal income tax. In the Budget Act Congress, for the first time, recognized and defined these “tax expenditures” and adopted procedures for reviewing them. But tax expenditure budgeting has not had the beneficial effect that some had hoped, mainly because the 1974 effort failed to take adequate account of the organizational structure of Congress and of the political character of its decision-making. But these weaknesses can be overcome.