Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland

This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland – as measured by the vote in the two referendums – between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997, when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two referendums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However, implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main cause of the variation the 'democratic deficit' created by Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoretical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit comparison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a 'democratic deficit') appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two referendums.     

Towards a right-to-development governance in Africa

In this article, I provide the rationale for conceptualizing a rights-based development model for Africa, necessitated by the conviction to seek African solutions to African problems. For the first time since independence, Africa has formulated a consolidated roadmap for development named “Agenda 2063,” which looks promising and attainable but leaves unanswered questions relating to the right to development enshrined in the African Charter and ancillary treaty instruments. In retrospect, I illustrate how the right to development originated and has evolved in Africa, potentially setting the pace for development and human rights protection but has not yet recorded significant impact. I contend that Africa's development future is attainable only through a self-reliant consciousness, not by letting the development agenda be shaped by imported paradigms. I justify why and how this is achievable by advancing arguments in favor of right-to-development governance as a homegrown model for development in Africa.     

Economic performance of 'weak' governments and their interaction with central banks and labour: Deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation, 1961–1998

Abstract.   Comparative political economists have conventionally claimed that the strength and stability of governments affect policy making and performance, and that what they call 'weak governments'– multiparty, minority and short-lived governments – show poorer economic performance. This article tests this and related hypotheses on deficits, economic growth, unemployment and inflation by examining data from 17 OECD countries. I find that there is generally little evidence to indicate that so-called 'weak governments', when considered independently, produce poorer performance than strong ones. However, the effects of different government types are partly contingent on central bank independence and labour organization. When central banks are independent, coalition governments exhibit better inflation and economic growth performance than one-party governments, but the opposite happens when central banks are dependent. I attempt an explanation for these relationships. I also find that independent central banks, under certain conditions, lead to lower growth and higher inflation. Thus, some of the benefits of central bank independence are context-specific, depending on other political-economic factors.     

What Makes an Agency Independent?

The responsiveness of government agencies to elected officials is a central question in democratic governance. A key source of variation in responsiveness is agency structure. Yet scholars often view agencies as falling into broad structural categories (e.g., cabinet departments or independent commissions) or fixate on some features of design (e.g., “for cause” protections). I develop new estimates of structural independence based on new data on 50 different structural features of 321 federal agencies in the federal executive establishment. Using a Bayesian latent variable model, I estimate independence on two dimensions: limits on the appointment of key agency decision makers and limits on political review of agency policy. I illustrate the value of this new measure by using it to examine how structure affects political influence and how agency independence can vary over time.     

On the Overreport Bias of the National Election Study Turnout Rate

Consumers of the National Election Study (NES) should be concernedif the survey has a bias that is increasing with time. A recentarticle by Barry Burden claims that for presidential elections,there is an increasing overreport bias, or turnout gap, betweenthe NES turnout rate and the observed turnout rate caused bydeclining NES response rates. I show that the increasing turnoutgap is an artifact of the universes these two turnout ratesare based on. Reconciling the two universes shows no systematicincrease of the reconciled turnout gap in presidential electionsfrom 1948 to 2000, and furthermore demonstrates that the post-1976rise in NES response rates (until 2000) is rewarded in a lowerturnout gap. In addition, I offer another theory to explainthe turnout gap. If respondents have an equal propensity tomisreport that they voted when they did not, as turnout declines,the number of nonvoter respondents increases and so does theturnout gap. I show that in multivariate analysis this theoryoutperforms Burden's response rate driven theory, though neithertheory reaches statistical significance.     

Decentralization and district development planning in Zimbabwe

One of the most important dimensions of rural development policy in Zimbabwe since independence has been rural local government reform, in particular decentralization policy. Evidence from a number of recent studies is used to present a comprehensive review of Zimbabwe's experience of local government decentralization during the first eight years of independence, 1980 to 1988. Section 2 presents a brief outline of some basic concepts on decentralization which have guided the discussion. Section 3 contains a short account of the local government system inherited from the colonial era. Section 4 outlines the major post-independence reforms, that is: the 1980 District Councils Act; the 1984-85 Prime Minister's Directive on Decentralization; the 1985 Provincial Councils and Administration Act; and the 1988 Rural District Councils Act. Section 5 presents an assessment of these reforms, paying particular attention to organizational, financial and planning issues. While some important improvements have been achieved in rural Communal Areas-in particular the extension of services and increases in local revenues and popular participation-the system of local government and administration remains a dual one. Other problems include the gap between the planning and budgeting processes, continued financial dependence of district councils on central government, and a lack of serious effort by central government to make use of provincial and district development plans.     

The Immediate Challenge Regarding COAG Reform

Federalism presented an attractive model for young Australia. Preserving the autonomy of colonies through the retention of state governments and the establishment of a bicameral Commonwealth parliament with a 'states' house' helped to counter the suspicion of central government. But as a system of government, federalism requires coordination and cooperation between the layers of government. In the history of Australia's federation there are examples that show times of strong cooperation and coordination between the states and the Commonwealth. However more and more, our federation does not enjoy cooperation or coordination on issues of vital importance to all Australians. I believe it is time to look at the way our system of federalism works. We require a mechanism to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the layers of government.     

Sticking to fiscal plans: the role of institutions

The rules-based fiscal framework of the EMU relies heavily on the development of medium-term fiscal plans by the EU governments. In this paper, I present an empirical analysis of the deviations from the plans presented in the annual Stability and Convergence Programs. I focus on projections for real GDP growth and general government balances, revenues and spending at different time horizons. I show that deviations from the projections presented in these Programs since 1999 can be explained by institutional factors, i.e., the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules.     

Political economy of agricultural policy

The present paper uses a paneldata estimation technique to combine the time series for individual countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). We postulated the response of central banks in these countries to inflation, economic growth and current account surplus given the constraints to be the same among the sample countries. Differences between central bank independence come forward in a different structural pressure to lower or raise money market rates in these countries. The empirical results in this study coincide remarkably well with the legal indices of central bank independence.     

Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements

Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research.     

Minor parties and strategic voting in recent U.S. presidential elections

I measure and explain strategic voting in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 U.S. presidential elections. Aggregate polling and election data from the 50 states and District of Columbia indicate whether a minor party candidate's support rose or fell between the final poll and Election Day. A negative vote-poll gap is evidence of classic strategic voting while a positive vote-poll gap is evidence of expressive strategic voting. Expressive voting was widespread in 1992 and 1996, but instrumental voting was dominant in 2000. In 2000 Ralph Nader lost support in most states, particularly those where the major party contest was competitive. In contrast, Ross Perot gained in most states due to expressive strategic voting facilitated by the noncompetitive national race. I also show that the vote-poll gap is a product of changes in voter turnout and, to a lesser extent, elite mobilization.     

Credibility,Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies

The delegation of policy-making tasks to EU agencies and their remarkable growth in number over the past two decades mark a striking new development in the EU's institutional make-up. While most of the nascent literature on the EU's ‘agencification’ addresses the conditions for agency creation and the implications of agency governance from the perspective of democratic accountability, there is a lack of empirical research systematically scrutinising the institutional structure and degree of formal-institutional independence of these agencies. This article offers a comprehensive empirical assessment and measure of the variation in institutional independence displayed by the entire set of 29 EU agencies operating under the EU's three pillars and tests hypotheses explaining variation in formal independence among agencies.     

The dimensionality of partisan strength and political independence

This study explores the dimensionality of partisan strength and independence by analyzing the relationships between the traditional four-point partisan strength scale, a strength of independence scale, and other relevant variables in the 1980 and 1984 NES/CPS election studies. In particular, the investigation centers on the possible different explanations for independence. The findings tend to support explanations for independence that concern party attachment and civic responsibility. The data show that partisan strength and independence are separate components of party identification. Previous findings based on the use of the traditional partisan strength scale may therefore need to be reconsidered.     

Colonial experience and postcolonial underdevelopment in Africa

In this paper, we analyze the connection between the history of colonial rule and postcolonial development in Africa. We focus on the fact that many African colonies were governed by indirect rule. Under indirect rule, indigenous people are divided into two groups: a privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled group. Our model assumes that the ruled group cannot observe how the resources appropriated from them are divided between the colonial ruler and the ruling group. In this economy, excessive exploitation by the colonial ruler creates distrust among indigenous groups and a negative effect on postcolonial economic and political development.     

政治发展过程中民主与效能冲突的内在根源

在广大后发国家的政治发展过程中，民主与效能往往鱼和熊掌不可兼得。实行民主，就有可能损害政府的效能；提高政府的效能，又可能需要压制民主。这种冲突根源干发展中国家在其政治发展过程所不可避免的三大矛盾：合法性与有效性的冲突、理想与现实的落差及政治与经济的失衡。     

Understanding the education gap in immigration preferences across countries over time: A decomposition approach

The structure and dynamics of the education gap in immigration preferences are not well understood. Does the gap increase when the economy contracts? To what extent does the gap reflect labour market conflicts versus value polarization? Does the structure of the gap change with labour market and refugee shocks? I use European Social Survey data to decompose the gap into parts reflecting labour market position, social background, and value orientation, and explore how their importance in accounting for the gap change over time. I find no uniform trends in preferences or in the size of the gap, but the gap varies with the unemployment rate and the strength of trade unions. Moreover, positions in the labour market are more important for the gap in times of high unemployment, at the expense of the importance of value orientations. The results show the enduring importance of labour market conflicts for the gap.     

Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies

Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions, and, ultimately, to policy outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of chief executives of these agencies is used to create a proxy for the actual independence of agencies from politics. The analysis demonstrates that formal independence is an important determinant of actual independence, but the rule of law and the number of veto players matter as well.     

Confidence in the Judiciary: Comparing the Independence and Legitimacy of Judicial Systems

This contribution investigates the determinants of judicial confidence. It argues that this is the decisive source of legitimacy for the third branch. Fairness and impartiality, i.e. the independence of the judiciary, are paramount in fostering citizens' confidence in the justice system. Through several multilevel analyses, the study tests whether judicial independence promotes the development of an individual's confidence in the justice system. The results show that judicial independence has a positive impact on the development of individual trust. However, public beliefs about the trustworthiness of judicial institutions do not seem to originate from constitutional rules (de jure independence) but from actual events and real life experiences (de facto independence).     

城市减贫的权利再现

城市贫困的发生与城市化进程有关,也与城市权利的实现有关。在全球范围内,城市化多伴随着贫困的治理,收入的差距最终将摧毁城市健康成长的物质与权利结构。中国的城市贫困隐藏在城市化的宏大叙事之中,体现为城市公共生活的个体争取;在城市化已经完成的西方国家,城市贫困则体现为公共生活的机会丧失。从现象上看,城市贫困呈现出空间与职业的分布特征,但是劳动才是城市生活的权利起点,因此劳动权的保障应该成为城市政府的政策起点。在中国的城市化进程中,城乡之间、区域之间的权利差距势必驱动人口流入沿海发达城市,从而形成单向度的权利选择,给一些城市增加了治理难度。因此,中国的城市治理还要立足区域协同发展,确保无差别的城市权利的全过程保障。