Towards a positive theory of political rhetoric: Why do politicians lie?

This paper presents a model in which politicians can increase the probability of election by making exaggerated claims about the benefits of their own platform — referred to as positive campaigning — and by exaggerating the undesirable characteristics of their rival — i.e., negative campaigning. Such lies may be detected at some point in the future and thus result in a costly loss in reputation. Thus the politician must tradeoff immediate benefits against potential future costs. Of course this problem is similar to any commercial endeavor — a car maker, for example, is tempted to claim that his car is better and the competition's is worse than it is. But it is shown that the lack of transferable property rights to political office makes lying more likely in political markets. It is also shown that there is a natural tendency for politicians to engage in more negative campaigning.     

Assessments of group influence,subjective political competence,and interest group membership

This research examines the relationship between citizens' assessments of how much influence the group they identify with is able to exercise in American politics and their subjective political competence and political participation. Appraisals of group influence have a powerful effect on subjective political competence, fulfilling theoretical expectations outlined by Leon Festinger many years ago. Moreover, assessments of group influence affect individuals' decision concerning membership in an interest group that promotes the interest of one's reference group. The work reported here is an improvement over past efforts in that it explicitly defines and assesses the causal importance of a concept that has been featured in prior research.     

The political monetary business cycle: Political reality and economic theory

This paper addresses the issue of expectations incorporated into political business cycle models. Rational agents anticipate Democratic efforts to stimulate the economy via monetary policy, discounting money supply from the calculations for determining output variance, so that output under Democrats is wholly unaffected by changes in the money supply. Rational agents appear to be naive about Republicans, incorporating money supply into the calculations for determining output variance, so that output under Republicans is significantly related to money supply.     

试论国家说服力--关于国家功能的一种政治经济学视角

本文认为 ,国家说服力是分析发展问题的锁钥 ,且假定国家说服力是由国家权力来源的合法性、国家制度安排的合理性以及国家意识形态的有效性三种要素构成。国家若要发展 ,就必须不断地增强这种说服力 ,即不断地增强国家权力来源的合法性、国家制度安排的合理性以及国家意识形态的有效性 ,以及三要素之间良性互动的“纵向一体化”关系。只有这样 ,国家才能降低发展成本 ,才能得到公民最大程度上的认可和信服 ,才能最终具有说服力     

The political economy of food pricing: An extended empirical test of the interest group approach

Several recent studies have documented the magnitude and impact of distortions in food pricing. However, little attention has been paid to the nature of the political agendas that determine the levels of direct and indirect protection granted to producers and consumers. This paper offers evidence that, regardless of the degree of economic development, the level of political pressure wielded by interest groups in food markets, and hence the level of protection they receive, is an inverse function of the relative size of their constituencies. The results recommend the application of collective action concepts to the understanding of agricultural policies in countries which are at different stages of development.     

On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective

It is a widely held belief that interest groups respond competitively to political challenges from other groups. This view is found not only in the traditional theory of interest groups, but also in the literature on policy typologies. Though it is not necessarily supposed that groups form in response to opposition, it is believed that when groups exist, they compete. If an interest group is thought of as a multipurpose organization, whose leaders might spend organizational funds on nonpolitical programs which directly serve the members, the supposition of competition can be subjected to rigorous examination. Political competition causes the cost of political success to rise. Since group leaders must allocate scarce revenue among projects, it seems that nonpolitical projects might become more attractive when the political environment becomes competitive. Political scientists have usually been disposed to take the opposite view, believing that demand for political activity rises as the cost of political success increases. The nature of political action as an organizational investment is discussed from the allocative perspective in this essay. It is shown that competition cannot be safely assumed unless other strong hypotheses are invoked. A Slutsky-type theorem is deduced for political reaction.     

论中国利益群体参与公共政策制定存在的问题

处于社会转型期的中国,如何处理利益群体参政问题关乎改革开放的历史进程和社会稳定。中国的渐进式改革路径在保持社会稳定方面发挥了重要的作用,但是这种渐进式改革更多地表现在经济领域,而政治领域的改革,特别是公民参政权的落实则略显迟滞和不够。由此引起的矛盾和问题使人们产生了诸多不满和怨恨,因此探讨中国利益群体在参与公共政策制定上存在的问题,对于进一步完善中国利益群体参政的路径、提高政府的执政能力和管理创新能力,其理论价值和现实意义不言而喻。     

Ideological constraint, political interest and gender: a Swedish-American comparison

Abstract. American and Swedish university and gymnasia students were examined in order to discover whether or not evidence could be found for higher levels of: a) ideological coherence, b) political interest, c) ideological variance, and d) strength of interface between political party preference and political self-concept on the one hand and socio-political attitudes on the other for Swedish citizens as compared to American citizens. The results confirmed the hypotheses in almost all cases and the results are discussed in terms of differences between the nations' political party environments.     

The political economy of environmental regulation: Towards a unifying framework

There are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy. Building on insights from this theoretical work, and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance, this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation. There are two primary contributions of this research. The first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy. For example, there is, as yet, no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive-based mechanisms, such as marketable permits and effluent fees. The second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy. This framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Gordon Hester for helpful comments. Responsibility for the final product rests solely with the author.     

经济体制与政治稳定形态的关系探析

马克思主义认为,经济基础决定上层建筑,有什么样的经济基础,就会出现什么样的维护这一经济基础的上层建筑.计划经济产生静态的政治稳定,市场经济要求动态的政治稳定.静态政治稳定南于其封闭性和停滞性,与当前中国丰十会发展的方向和目标相背离.动态的政治稳定是新时期中国惟一可以选择的政治稳定形态.     

Targeting inflation targeting: the influence of interest groups

Public Choice - We examine whether sectional interest groups influence monetary policy goals in a manner consistent with their interests as distributive coalitions. In particular, we explore...     

Co-operation in institutional economics and the political economy of trust

The aim of this paper is to analyze the institutional economics of co-operation and the political economy of trust. It is reviewed the transactions costs, the principal-agent theory, market power, increasing-returns theory and value creation, strategic management, competitive forces, resource-based theory, organizational knowledge and learning, strategic choice theory and the collective efficiency theory. Finally, it is sustained the political economy of trust.     

Towards a contextual theory of innovation

A contextual theoretical strategy should be pursued to overcome past deficiencies in the study of organizational innovation. The strategy is likely to lead to greater success in efforts to promote innovation. The heart of this strategy is to define the types of innovation processes at work and the contexts in which they operate. There are at least three innovation processes at work which operate in contexts defined by organizational and environmental characteristics and by the type of innovation under consideration.