Credible Comparisons Using Interpersonally Incomparable Data: Nonparametric Scales with Anchoring Vignettes

Comparisons of individuals based on their selections from an ordinal scale traditionally assume that all respondents interpret subjective scale categories in exactly the same way. Anchoring vignettes have been proposed as a method to replace this homogeneity assumption with individual‐specific data about how each respondent uses the ordinal scale. However, improving interpersonal comparisons with anchoring vignettes also requires a new set of assumptions. In this article, I derive the assumptions needed to make credible nonparametric comparisons using anchoring vignettes, and propose a new nonparametric scale that does not assume homogeneity among respondents. I also provide methods for evaluating empirically whether a set of anchoring objects can produce credible nonparametric interpersonal comparisons. Two empirical studies illustrate the importance of accounting for differences in the use of ordinal scales by showing how our inferences about interpersonal comparisons may change as a function of the assumptions we accept.     

Constraint in European party activists' sympathy scores for interest groups

Abstract. This paper presents an analysis, country by country, of sympathy scores given by European party activists from 58 political parties in 11 countries of the European Community to more than 100 different national interest groups. In all countries but one, the left-right dimension is the predominant criterion for interpreting the sympathy scores given. In Belgium, the exception, a regional (Flemish-Walloon) cleavage line is most important. The analyses were performed with a new adapted version of the unidimensional Coombsian unfolding model. Bad fit to the unidimensional model is not remedied by postulating additional common dimensions, but by identifying and removing stimuli (interest groups) that do not conform to the unidimensional unfolding model. The nonrepresentability of these stimuli can be attributed to lack of agreement among activists about the location of these stimuli on the left-right dimension. More specifically, certain relatively popular stimuli are perceived by most respondents as close to their own location on the left-right scale, and, conversely, certain relatively unpopular stimuli are perceived by most respondents as distant from their own location.     

Polarization and ideological congruence between parties and supporters in Europe

The relationship between parties and their supporters is central to democracy and ideological representation is among the most important of these linkages. We conduct an investigation of party-supporter congruence in Europe with emphasis on the measurement of ideology and focusing on the role of party system polarization, both as a direct factor in explaining congruence and in modifying the effects of voter sophistication. Understanding this relationship depends in part on how the ideology of parties and supporters is measured. We use Poole’s Blackbox scaling to derive a measure of latent ideology from voter and expert responses to issue scale questions and compare this to a measure based on left–right perceptions. We then examine how variation in the proximity between parties ideological positions and those of their supporters is affected by the polarization of the party system and how this relationship interacts with political sophistication. With the latent ideology measure, we find that polarization decreases party-supporter congruence but increases the effects of respondent education level on congruence. However, we do not find these relationships using the left–right perceptual measure. Our findings underscore important differences between perceptions of left–right labels and the ideological constraint underlying issue positions.     

Does Political Information Matter? An Experimental Test Relating to Party Positions on Europe

This article focuses on whether the provision of 'objectively' correct information to voters about where parties stand on an issue affects their placement of the parties, and ultimately their own position, on that issue. Classic theories of how mass publics make voting decisions assume that voters are able relatively accurately to place themselves and the parties on various issue dimensions. While these assumptions have been challenged, it is generally assumed that the provision of new information makes voters' placements more informed. We explicitly test this idea using a survey experiment focusing on one political issue – European integration. In the experiment, all respondents were twice asked to place the three main British parties and themselves on a bipolar scale of European integration. This was done towards the beginning, and then at the end of the survey. Most respondents were also given information on the 'informed' positions of the parties, derived from expert survey placement. Our analyses indicate that individuals' placements did change, and the tendency was related to both political sophistication and the inherent difficulty of placing the party. Only less sophisticated voters updated their placements, and these changes are concentrated on the placement of the Labour party, where the elite stance on Europe has been more conflicted. For all respondents we do not detect any corresponding changes in self-placement that would be congruent with 'cueing' effects.     

The Benefits of Human Resource Centralization: Insights from a Survey of Human Resource Directors in a Decentralized State

Texas is unique among American state governments in its approach to human resources because it has no central human resource (HR) or personnel office and no comprehensive set of centrally prescribed HR policies and procedures. Given contemporary calls for HR decentralization, Texas is an excellent case study of the practical implications of a decentralized approach to HR. This article examines findings from a survey of state agency HR directors. The results suggest that respondents do not see the putative benefits of a centralized HR model. However, respondents from small state agencies, those who perceive they do not have requisite HR expertise, and those with lower levels of educational attainment hold significantly different opinions about the benefits of centralized HR.     

Who is "62 enough"? Identifying respondents eligible for Social Security early retirement benefits in the Health and Retirement Study

Workers are not instantly eligible for Social Security retirement benefits on their 62nd birthdays, nor can they receive benefits in the month they turn 62. This note discusses how well researchers can do using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to identify respondents old enough to receive and report early Social Security retirement benefits. It shows that only some workers aged 62 at the time of an HRS interview will be "62 enough" to have received a Social Security benefit and reported it in the survey. In general, workers become eligible for a retirement benefit the month after they turn 62, and they may receive their first payment the month after that. Until recently, payments were received very early in the month, but in mid-1997 and later, the Social Security Administration (SSA) staggered benefit payments over the course of a month. Therefore, many beneficiaries will not be able to report the receipt of their first benefit payment until the third month after their birthday in more recent HRS interviews. This note describes the best approach for approximating the pool of HRS respondents who are old enough to have reported the receipt of their first retirement benefit. It then applies the procedure to an analysis by Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips, who used the 1994 HRS data to distinguish between those who took early retirement benefits upon turning 62 and those who postponed the receipt of benefits. Because these authors did not provide for respondents who were not "62 enough" to receive a benefit at the time of the interview, they understated the proportion of respondents who took retirement benefits at age 62.     

THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF DEFICIT REDUCTION POLICY

This article identifies those members of Congress who have most often supported deficit reduction on floor roll‐call votes since 1980. An examination of the reciprocal relationship between fiscal policy preference and the more holistic concept of ideology reveals that at an abstract level conservatives and Republicans continue to support fiscal restraint. When we examine specific issues, however, we find that more moderate legislators are generally the most supportive of deficit reduction in the contemporary policy process. This, in turn, suggests a bifurcation of fiscal policy as it relates to ideology. It seems that even though legislators do sometimes think of fiscal policy along the traditional lines of budgetary balance or deficits, the issue is now more often recognized as consisting of the two distinct and separate sub‐issues of government expenditures and revenue policy.     

U.S. workers weigh‐in on the issue of portable benefits

As the sharing economy continues to grow and diversify, various institutes and members of government are contemplating the need for new employment regulations, including those related to portable benefits. However, there has been no known inquiry into this issue with those U.S. workers in the sharing economy. This paper presents exploratory research on the subject of portable benefits for workers engaged in the sharing economy and is intended to inform the development of future research questions and to determine the best research design and data collection method for a more extensive study. Arguably, rideshare drivers represent a large constituency of sharing economy workers in the United States and were utilized as the study population. Through authorized access to closed social media sites, this study explored the desire among rideshare drivers for portable benefits, how these benefits should be funded, and how such programs would be administered. The findings indicate that the majority of respondents were interested in the availability of portable benefits, although the preference for specific benefits varied widely among respondents. More than half believe companies, along with workers, should fund these benefits, and slightly less than half believe private sector third parties like insurance companies should administer these programs. However, given the transient nature of this workforce, administering such programs could prove to be quite challenging for organizations and plan administrators alike.     

The World Wide Web and the U.S. Political News Market

We propose a framework for understanding how the Internet has affected the U.S. political news market. The framework is driven by the lower cost of production for online news and consumers' tendency to seek out media that conform to their own beliefs. The framework predicts that consumers of Internet news sources should hold more extreme political views and be interested in more diverse political issues than those who solely consume mainstream television news. We test these predictions using two large datasets with questions about news exposure and political views. Generally speaking, we find that consumers of generally left‐of‐center (right‐of‐center) cable news sources who combine their cable news viewing with online sources are more liberal (conservative) than those who do not. We also find that those who use online news content are more likely than those who consume only television news content to be interested in niche political issues.     

Validation of voter recall: Time of electoral decision making

Accuracy of respondent recall has long been a concern in political science research. Earlier analyses of voter behavior discovered errors which included 10 to 25 percent of the sample. The present work examines an important attitudinal question which appears in each national election study: the time at which the respondent recalls making a final presidential vote choice. Data from the four-wave 1980 National Election Panel Study are used to validate the recall variable for that election campaign. A new variable — candidate preference patterns — is created which reflects consistency in individual voter preference. Only forty percent of the sample reflect consistent responses on the two measures. Furthermore, partisan strength and political involvement are found to be positively related to inconsistent behavior. Cognitive dissonance and the bandwagon effect are offered as explanations for these results.     

Beyond roll-off: individual-level abstention on ballot measure voting

Why do individuals who have turned out to vote abstain from voting on certain ballot measures? Previous work examines abstention at the aggregate level by observing ballot roll-off, and focuses on the readability of the ballot summary for a measure as the primary determinant of whether individuals will abstain. In contrast, I hypothesize that three individual-level factors interact with the accessibility (i.e. ease or difficulty) of a ballot measure’s issue content to influence one’s propensity to abstain. Individuals with low issue information, who are risk averse, and who attach low importance to the issue should be more likely to abstain from voting than those with high knowledge, who are risk-acceptant, and who attach high importance to the issue. Furthermore, the impact of each of these individual-level traits strengthens as the issue raised in the measure becomes increasingly complex. I find strong empirical evidence for these hypotheses using an experimental design.     

Migrants' remittances and economic voting in the Mexican countryside

This study advances and tests hypotheses about the effects of migrants' remittances on political behavior. Analyzing new survey data from Mexico, I find that despite being very poor, respondents who receive remittances tend to view their income as more stable than neighbors who do not receive this money. As a result, remittance recipients have relatively fewer economic grievances and tend to feel more optimistic about economic matters than neighbors who do not receive remittances. According to the economic voter thesis, citizens who are more satisfied with the economy are also less likely to pressure and oppose politicians, particularly incumbents. Analyses indicate that respondents in this sample who receive remittances are indeed less likely to lobby local officials for economic assistance. They were also less likely to mobilize against and punish the incumbent party in the 2006 Mexican presidential election.     

Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate: The role of dominant-issue voters

This paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.     

Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?

In campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, concealing the policy preferences that would guide them if elected. This paper describes a novel explanation for ambiguity in political campaigns. It develops a model of candidate competition in which policy-motivated candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters. It applies Eyster and Rabin’s (Econometrica 73(5):1623–1672, 2005) concept of cursed equilibrium, which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type (policy preference) and strategy (whether to announce). If voters updated according to Bayes’ rule, they would understand that candidates who do not announce positions are strategically concealing an unpopular policy preference. In equilibrium, only the most extreme candidates, those located furthest from the median voter’s position, would choose to take no position. However, if voters do not sufficiently appreciate the informational content of a non-announcement, unraveling will not occur and both extremists and more moderate candidates will not announce positions.     

Voter‐weighted environmental preferences

This article examines the political economy of preferences with respect to the environment using a new stated preference survey that presents the first benefit values for national water quality levels. The mean valuation greatly exceeds the median value, as the distribution of valuations is highly skewed. The study couples the survey valuations with unique and extensive information on respondent voting patterns. Preferences of registered voters are similar to the preferences of the population at large, but median voters value water quality more than nonvoters. The strongest contrast related to voter‐weighted preferences is among voters for different candidates, as those who voted for Gore in the 2000 presidential election have the highest environmental values. © 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

If I'll win it,I want it: The role of instrumental considerations in explaining public support for referendums

Across established democracies, citizens express high levels of support for decision making via referendums. What drives these preferences remains yet unclear. In this article it is argued that, first, process preferences are less stable than previously assumed but vary substantially across policy proposals. Second, it is suggested that instrumental considerations play an important role in shaping citizens’ preferences for referendums. Specifically, citizens who favour the policy proposal or believe that they hold a majority opinion are expected to express more support for the use of referendums. An original survey was designed and conducted in the Netherlands (N = 1,289) that contains both between and within respondent variation across a range of policy proposals. The findings support these arguments: Both the desire for a specific policy change and the perception of being in the majority with one's policy preference relate to support for the use of referendums across policy proposals, levels of governance, and between and within respondents. This study contributes to a better understanding of process preferences by showing that these preferences have a non-stable component and that instrumental considerations play an important role in citizens’ support for referendums.     

Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Voluntary Retirement from Danish Local Government

Why do politicians choose to retire voluntarily from a position they have been working hard to get? It is argued in this article that the institutional setting of the elected assemblies influences the direct, as well as the alternative costs and benefits of having a political career and hence the patterns of voluntary retirement. Drawing on previous research from the United States Congress, this is explored in a new empirical setting: local government in Denmark. The results show that positions at the labour market matter as private‐sector employees are more likely to retire than public‐sector employees. Furthermore, internal institutional factors matter. Holding an institutional position such as chairing a committee makes retirement less likely. Furthermore, seniority makes the councillors more likely to retire when age is controlled for – a result not found in national studies. However, councillors who reach a high‐ranking position at an early stage are not more likely to quit with seniority than those who do not reach such a position. A high personal share of votes decreases voluntary retirement. In contrast to previous findings, the ideological distance from the ruling party does not play a role. This may be due to norms of consensus in the local councils.     

Retirement and wealth

The decision to retire is related to the decision to save and to a number of other decisions, including decisions of when to claim Social Security benefits and what share of assets to hold as pensions, Social Security, and in other forms. This article explores the relationships among these various decisions and then explains why it is important to take them into account when attempting to understand the effects of changing Social Security and related policies on retirement outcomes. To understand how Social Security benefits affect retirement behavior, and the implications of changing such features as the Social Security early retirement age, the Social Security Administration and others have begun to estimate and use single-equation models of retirement. We explain why the kind of simple model they use is likely to provide a misleading guide for policy. Even if one's primary interest is in the relationship between Social Security policy and the decision to retire, it is important to incorporate other key decisions into the analysis. These simple models relate the probability of retiring to measures of changes in the value of Social Security benefits when retirement is postponed. The basic problem is that because the omitted factors are related systematically both to retirement outcomes and to the measured reward to postponing retirement, a simple retirement equation credits the effects of the omitted factors to the included measures of changes in Social Security benefits. New policies will change the relationship between retirement and the increase in the value of Social Security benefits with postponed retirement, resulting in incorrect predictions of the effects of new policies. When we fit single-equation retirement models, we find a variety of evidence that important behaviors have been omitted. These models include variables measuring the age of the respondent. These age variables suggest there is a sharp increase in the probability of retirement at age 62. This is a sign that even though the equations include measures of the increase in the value of Social Security with delayed retirement, the cause of the increased retirement behavior at age 62 has not been included in the model. In addition, the estimated effect of a variable measuring the future value of Social Security and pensions on retirement suggests that if the Social Security early retirement age were to be abolished, more people would retire earlier rather than later--a counter-intuitive prediction. There is even more direct evidence of the need for a more comprehensive model of behavior. We show that if individuals' preferences for leisure time were unrelated to their preferences for saving, then a simple retirement equation would yield an unbiased estimate of the effects of Social Security on retirement. An implication of such a model is that those who retire earlier for particular reasons would also save more for those same reasons. But when we estimate an equation with wealth accumulated through 1992 as a dependent variable, together with the simple retirement equation, we do not observe that the factors associated with earlier retirement are also associated with higher saving. These and related findings suggest that those who wish to retire earlier also have a weaker preference for saving, a relationship that is ignored in the simple model and can only be measured in a more complex model. Still other evidence also warns of internal inconsistencies in the simple retirement equations that are being estimated. Social Security incentives are often measured by the increment in the value of benefits associated with deferred retirement, but the incremental value depends on when benefits are claimed. Our findings show that those who retire completely are claiming their benefits too early to be maximizing the expected value of the benefits. Yet the measures of Social Security benefit accrual used in these retirement models often include the increase in the value of benefits from deferred claiming in their measure of the gain to deferring retirement. On the one hand, early retirees are seen not to defer benefit acceptance despite the actuarial advantage. On the other hand, later retirees are said to defer their retirement in order to gain the advantage of deferring benefit acceptance. Our empirical analysis is based on data from the first four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of 12,652 respondents from 7,607 households with at least one respondent who was born from 1931 to 1941. Our analysis also uses linked pension and Social Security data together with respondents' records from the HRS. We also evaluate a number of specific features of retirement models and suggest improvements. We develop a measure of the future value of pensions and Social Security--the premium value--that is not subject to a problem plaguing other measures in that it handles the accrual of benefits under defined contribution plans very well. We also introduce a new definition of retirement status that blends information on objective hours worked with subjective self-reports of retirement status. Our findings also explore the effects of Social Security incentives on partial retirement and consider the importance of incorporating partial retirement in any study of the relation of Social Security to retirement behavior.     

Changing Issue Ownership through Policy Communication

Issue ownership has been an important concept in the analysis of party competition for several decades. Traditionally, issue ownership has been regarded as a stable phenomenon where parties are advantaged by different political issues. However, several recent studies have reported change in voters’ perceptions of parties’ issue ownership. To investigate the changeability of issue ownership and how it can be altered, this article investigates the impact of parties’ communication attempts through a web-based survey in Sweden. Two major political issues are in focus: employment and healthcare. The results show that parties can indeed improve their ownership by communicating on an issue. Indications were also found that the effects decrease as other parties simultaneously communicate on the same issue, and when those who receive the messages are ideologically distant from the party. However, in several cases results are weak. Many important conditionalities therefore remain to be explored in future studies.     

Considering Mixed Mode Surveys for Questions in Political Behavior: Using the Internet and Mail to Get Quality Data at Reasonable Costs

Telephone surveys have been a principle means of learning about the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and voters. The single mode telephone survey, however, is increasingly threatened by rising costs, the declining use of landline telephones, and declining participation rates. One solution to these problems has been the introduction of mixed-mode surveys. However, such designs are relatively new and questions about their representativeness and the intricacies of the methodology remain. We report on the representativeness of a post election mixed-mode (Internet and mail) survey design of 2006 general election voters. We compare sample respondent means to sample frame means on key demographic characteristics and examine how mail and Internet respondents differed in terms of attitudes, behaviors and demographics. We find that overall the Internet respondents were representative of the population and that respondent choice of mode did not influence item response. We conclude that mixed-mode designs may allow researchers to ask important questions about political behavior from their desktops.