The stock market and U.S. presidential approval

Since the 1970s research has demonstrated a strong relationship between national economic performance and presidential approval. Traditionally, these popularity models rely on macroeconomic conditions; however, other economic performance measures may more fully capture the direction of the economy. One such measure, the stock market index, captures elements of national and household economic well-being. Therefore, market performance should impact presidential ratings. Our presidential approval model, based on quarterly data covering 1960–2011, demonstrates that approval is highly sensitive to the stock market's acceleration or deceleration, even with strong controls in the model for the other economic and political determinants of popularity. A rapid fall in the stock market index reduces president approval, while a sharp acceleration in the index growth boosts U.S. presidential approval.     

Economic performance and presidential trait evaluations: A longitudinal analysis

Presidential traits (i.e. morality, intelligence, leadership) have generally been assumed to be idiosyncratic personal characteristics of the individual and are treated as exogenous from other political and economic factors. Prior literature has shown that presidential characteristics and economic performance are important elements of vote choice and approval. Using ANES data from 1984 to 2008, we demonstrate an important link between these factors, showing that objective and subjective indicators of economic performance are significant predictors of trait evaluations. Specifically, evaluations of the incumbent president at election time are directly related to changes in economic performance earlier in the year. The effects of economic performance are not isolated to retrospective policy evaluations, but also influence the overall evaluation of the president as a person.     

Personalization in attributing responsibility for national problems to the president

The studies reported test two hypotheses concerning the conditions under which citizens will attribute more of the responsibility for political events to the president. The first hypothesis, derived from Heider's theory of defensive attribution, is that citizens who feel more threatened by national political problems will judge the president to be more responsible for those problems. The second hypothesis is that those who lack knowledge about political events will attribute more of the responsibility for such events to the president as a cognitive simplifying strategy. These hypotheses were tested in three studies—two surveys on inflation and unemployment and an experiment on nuclear war. The results of all three studies support Heider's defensive attribution hypothesis. Each suggests that those more threatened by a national political problem will hold the president more responsible for that problem. The survey results also suggest that such attributions of responsibility have an influence upon voting behavior, with those who hold the incumbent responsible for national economic problems more likely to vote for the other presidential candidates. The results of the three studies are equally clear in the case of knowledge effects. In none of the studies do those who lack political knowledge attribute increased responsibility for national problems to the president. In addition, there is no evidence of an interaction between threat and knowledge. Instead, threat-induced increases in attributions of responsibility to the president are found to occur to an equal degree at all levels of political knowledge.     

Presidential prototypes

The American public expresses considerable consensus on those qualities of character and performance indispensable to a modern president. Contrary to expectations, however, such conceptions of an ideal president (or presidential prototypes) generally failed to provide standards by which actual presidential candidates were evaluated. Across five complementary tests, qualities that citizens thought important for an ideal president counted no more heavily in their evaluations of presidential hopefuls than did qualities thought less important—with one consistent and striking exception. Conceptions of an ideal president did set the standards by which the incumbent president was evaluated, and quite powerfully so. In the final section of the paper, we provide several interpretations of these results, suggest how public conceptions of an ideal president are acquired, and speculate about processes of presidential appraisal.     

State Visits and Leader Survival

Why do political leaders travel abroad? In this article, we propose an informational mechanism linking in‐person diplomacy to leader survival. A foreign power visits an incumbent in order to reap a future policy concession; the visit is only worth the effort if the incumbent remains in power long enough to deliver on the deal. A diplomatic visit thus provides a visible and credible signal of the visitor's high confidence in the incumbent's stability in office. Domestic opponents, facing incomplete information as to the incumbent's strength, observe the signal and are deterred from mounting a challenge. Using data on U.S. diplomatic visits from 1960 to 2013, we find strong empirical support for our predictions: A visit with the U.S. president substantially reduces the risk of a leader's removal from office.     

Economic voting and welfare programmes: Evidence from the American states

While scholars have hypothesised that a strong welfare state should reduce voters' incentives to base their votes on economic outcomes, evidence for this proposition remains mixed. This article tests whether differences in welfare protections across American states affect the relationship between economic performance and support for the president's party in 430 state legislative elections from 1970 to 1989. Analysing the results of over 42,000 contests in which an incumbent was running for re‐election, it finds that while unemployment insurance programmes do not affect the importance of economic performance, the electoral fortunes of presidential co‐partisans are less strongly tied to the national economy in states with generous anti‐poverty programmes. Thus by reducing vulnerability to poverty, economic safety‐nets lower the salience of the economy and provide electoral cover for politicians during economic slowdowns.     

A turning point in Argentine politics: demands for change and territorial cleavages in the 2015 presidential election

The 2015 national, subnational, executive and legislative elections marked a turning point for Argentina's democratic history. For the first time, a non-Peronist centre-right coalition won the presidency. These elections also inaugurated the first non-Peronist governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in almost 30 years. This article tries to make sense of these elections, which represent a significant shift in the country's political direction. We argue that the incumbent left-party (Peronist Frente para la Victoria) faced a combination of electoral fatigue and mounting economic challenges. Sluggish economic growth and unabated inflation created an anti-incumbent demand for change, alienated the middle class and deepened territorial cleavages between the agricultural central region and the peripheral provinces. Against this backdrop, the combination of a unified opposition and a fragmented Peronism led to Mauricio Macri's victory. We also explore the challenges that the newly elected president faces, including minority in Congress and among governors.     

Do Campaigns Drive Partisan Turnout?

Although campaign strategy often, and perhaps increasingly, emphasizes the mobilization of core supporters, we know little about whether campaigns affect the partisan complexion of the electorate. We examine whether the balance of Democratic and Republican voters depends on the balance of campaign activity, the popularity of the incumbent president, and the state of the economy. Drawing on time-series cross-sectional data from state exit polls, we demonstrate that the partisan composition of voters depends on campaign activity more than on the political and economic fundamentals.     

Territorial Polarization in Brazil's 2014 Presidential Elections

The 2014 presidential elections showed a growing political polarization based on regional differences in Brazil. Against this backdrop, President Dilma Rousseff was re-elected by the slimmest margin ever obtained by a Brazilian president. Rousseff's Workers’ Party (PT) has held the presidency for the past 12 years, gaining widespread support for reducing social inequality and maintaining macroeconomic stability in the country. However, as the latest presidential elections show, this support for the PT and its presidential candidate has eroded. This article argues that as a result of fiercer competition for votes, a more politically polarized discourse was used in the presidential campaign to mobilize voters around Brazil's regional divide between the richer south and the poorer north. In the analysis, the article attempts to elucidate possible causes of territorial patterns of voting in Brazil's 2014 presidential elections.     

Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin

In liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders have been shown to track citizens’ perceptions of the state of the economy. By contrast, in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, leaders are often thought to boost their popularity by exploiting nationalism, exaggerating external threats, and manipulating the media. Using time‐series data, I examine the determinants of presidential approval in Russia since 1991, a period in which leaders’ ratings swung between extremes. I find that Yeltsin's and Putin's ratings were, in fact, closely linked to public perceptions of economic performance, which, in turn, reflected objective economic indicators. Although media manipulation, wars, terrorist attacks, and other events also mattered, Putin's unprecedented popularity and the decline in Yeltsin's are well explained by the contrasting economic circumstances over which each presided.     

The 1988 Presidential Election in Finland

The article aims to describe and analyse the 1988 presidential election in Finland. The parties and candidates in the election are presented and the electoral system is discussed. For the first time a double-vote system was used in which there are two ballots, one for the direct election of the president and one for the elector of the president. If a candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote, then that candidate is elected. If, however, no candidate receives 50 percent or more of the vote, then the electoral college elects the president. Although it was fairly certain that the incumbent president Mauno Koivisto would be re-elected, the campaign was a heated one, with the electorate very politically engaged. It is concluded that despite the fact regional differences between north and south Finland were aggravated—the candidate for the opposition, Paavo Väyrynen, received considerable support especially in northern Finland-the presidential election showed that the Finnish political system functions relatively smoothly and that its overall effect is highly legitimizing.     

Presidential image and economic performance: A dynamic analysis

How do people form and revise their images of the president's personal characteristics? While analysts have made considerable progress in uncovering the content, structure, and political impact of images of political figures—especially presidential candidates—we know very little about how these beliefs develop and change over time. This study of change and stability in presidential images is based on two contrasting theoretical perspectives. Research by several rational choice theorists suggests that individuals base their images of the president's personal characteristics on observations of presidential performance and these images remain open to revision, based on new performance evaluations. Research on social cognition, however, suggests that early impressions tend to maintain themselves by biasing performance evaluations. These perspectives guide an examination of five-wave panel data in an effort to determine the extent to which people's evaluations of the president's handling of economic problems influence, and are influenced by, general images of the president's competence.     

Economics,politics, and the cycle of presidential popularity

Does the economy hold the key to the ups and downs of the popularity of American presidents? This study, which is based on quarterly data from 1961 to 1980, employs stochastic models for time series (Box-Jenkins). For inflation, though not for unemployment, the findings confirm a significant effect at a lag of one quarter. The worries of political leaders about the inflation side of macroeconomic performance appear to be justified. Nevertheless, the influence of noneconomic factors such as international events, the Vietnam War, and Watergate proves even more potent. Moreover, presidential popularity is subject to a cycle whereby each president begins his service with an unearned popularity bonus that subsequently erodes. Economic performance is not found to be responsible for this inauguration-erosion cycle, but neither are rallies, wars, or scandal.     

Presidential coattails in Taiwan: An analysis of voter- and candidate-specific data

Considerable empirical evidence demonstrates presidential coattail effects in elections held in the US. Employing hybrid logit and mixed logit models that analyze data collected from voters and candidates in Taiwan, this study examines coattail effects in a non-American setting. The findings show that presidential coattails exert powerful influences on Taiwanese citizens' vote choices and take the form of conversion. Contrary to American experiences, the mediating role of incumbency is quite minimal. Presidential coattails thus provide the president with an important source of influence in the legislative body. The linkage between presidential and legislative politics through coattails can help the operation of Taiwan's democratic institutions. Future research on voting behavior needs to consider voter characteristics as well as candidate attributes.     

Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism

This article develops a theory of presidential unilateralism in which both ideological divergence with Congress and legislative capacity influence the president's use of executive orders. We argue that when Congress is less capable of constraining the executive, the president will issue more executive orders during periods of divided government. Conversely, in periods of high legislative capacity, the president is less likely to issue executive orders when faced with an opposed Congress. Based on an examination of institutional changes, we identify years prior to the mid‐1940s as characterized by low congressional capacity and the subsequent period as characterized by high capacity. Testing the theory between 1905 and 2013, we find strong support for these predictions and demonstrate that legislative capacity conditions the role of ideological disagreement in shaping presidential action. Overall, this article deepens our current understanding of the dynamics of separation‐of‐powers politics and the limits of executive power.     

“God of vengeance and of reward?”: The economy and presidential popularity

The relationship between the economy and the political fate of incumbents is reexamined empirically by proposing seven multivariate statistical models representing major approaches found in the literature. These models are tested empirically to determine the influence of aggregate economic conditions on presidential popularity as measured by Gallup Poll data from 1950 to 1974. Analysis suggests (1) that inflation and military expenditures constitute consistently significant influences on popularity and (2) that this influence is best detected in an Almon distributed-lag model which allows for an initial political response that increases cumulatively and remains strong for several months before diminishing.The title quotation comes from V. O. Key, Jr.,Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (5th ed), New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964, p. 568. I am indebted to Edward R. Tufte for calling it to my attention.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meetings of the Public Choice Society in New Orleans, March 1977.     

The winning of the 1995 French presidential election

The article analyses the processes which conditioned the outcome of the 1995 presidential election in France. By a fresh evaluation of four frequently made propositions, namely (1) the presidential contest is above party politics, (2) presidential candidacy is pre‐eminently about individual leadership, (3) the confrontation is between the incumbent (or his surrogates) and one or more ‘challengers’, and (4) this confrontation reinforces political polarisation, the unique configuration of the current French polity is delineated. In conclusion, the interaction between social and political fractures is shown to have been crucial to Chirac's victory.     

Business cycle and political election outcomes: Evidence from the Chilean democracy

This paper explores the influence of economic variables in Chilean presidential elections. We use a panel where the dependent variable corresponds to the share of the vote obtained by the incumbent at a municipal level in the presidential elections of 1989, 1993 and 1999. We focus on the unemployment rate and the output gap and find that both have a significant influence on the vote. We also find that if the mayor is from the same coalition as the incumbent, people will further punish the incumbent when regional unemployment is above national unemployment.     

Examining Relationships Between Legislative and Presidential Influences and Organizational Probity: Evidence from South Korean Central Government Agencies

In public management, few empirical studies have been conducted on the effects of the most influential political authorities—the legislature and the president—on government organizations, despite the theoretical and practical significance of these effects. This study tests the relationships between legislative and presidential influences and organizational probity in South Korean central government agencies, on the basis of political transaction-cost and principal–agent theories. We use three measures of legislative influence—inspectional influence (total annual days of legislative inspection), statutory influence (rules-to-laws ratio), and budgetary influence (ratio of reprogramming budget to total budget), and one measure of presidential influence (annual number of substantive meetings with the president). Then, these independent variables are linked to the organizational probity measure from audited archival data. The two-time-point panel data analysis reveals a positive link between legislative inspectional influence and probity but a negative relationship between the presidential influence measure and probity; the results support theoretical arguments for control over administrative agencies. Thus, the evidence suggests that governments should be cautious of implementing reforms that increase organizational or managerial autonomy.     

Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea: the Case of the Kim Young Sam Administration, 1993–1998

This article examines the nature of political and institutional reform initiatives that have been carried out under former president Kim Young Sam. How effective have they been in consolidating democracy in Korea? Specifically, we examine why the Kim Young Sam government's political reform campaigns have been limited, and explore the impact of this limitation on his institutional reform initiatives and the process of consolidation of democracy in Korea. We argue that Kim Young Sam's initial political reform campaigns have contributed to creating a favorable environment for his institutional reform efforts. However, limitations of these initial political reform campaigns such as political funding and bribery scandals have hampered institutional reforms. We also argue that these difficulties were intensified by public dissatisfaction with Korea's poor economic performance and International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial assistance. As a result, Kim Young Sam's moral legitimacy as a civilian and reform-oriented leader toward the public has totally evaporated. Therefore, experiences under the Kim Young Sam administration are just trials and errors of democratization that show another failure in presidential leadership in Korea. These experiences will negatively affect the consolidation process of democracy in Korea by increasing the public's distrust of government as a whole. As a result, democratic consolidation in Korea is being delayed.