Principles, Values, and Rules in Legal Decision-Making and the Dimensions of Legal Rationality

Abstract. The author singles out various conceptions of rationality used in practical legal discourse: formal and substantive rationality, instrumental goal- and means-rationality, communicative rationality. Practical rationality is expressed in decisions justified by epistemic and axiological premises according to the rules of justificatory reasoning. Five levels of analysis of this justification are identified. Rules, principles and evaluations are used as justifying arguments and their characteristics determine the dimensions of rationality of decision depending on the features of rules, various conceptions of principles, and kinds of relativisation of evaluations. The dimensions of legal rationality depend mainly on three singled out conceptions of rationality, i.e., formal rationality dealing with the deep structure of justification, instrumentally oriented rationality as content of justifiability, and communicative rationality linked with the pragmatics of human interaction. Legitimacy, according to the presented analysis, appears as a subclass of external justification dealing with axiological premisses in terms of instrumental rationality and/or communicative rationality.     

Synthesizing Related Rules from Statutes and Cases for Legal Expert Systems

Abstract. Different legal expert systems may be incompatible with each other: A user in characterizing the same situation by answering the questions presented in a consultation can be led to contradictory inferences. Such systems can be "synthesized" to help users avoid such contradictions by alerting them that other relevant systems are available to be consulted as they are responding to questions. An example of potentially incompatible, related legal expert systems is presented here - ones for the New Jersey murder statute and the celebrated Quinlan case, along with one way of synthesizing them to avoid such incompatibility.     

Ought-Sentences and the Juristic Description of Rules

Abstract .
According to the normative theory of legal science, juristic ought-sentences describe rules, since legal science just deals with rules, and rules cannot be described but by means of ought-sentences. The author challenges this view. Two different constructions of "describing rules" are proposed: Namely, either interpreting or stating the validity of rules. "Interpreting rules," in its turn, can be understood in three different senses: listing all the possible meanings of rule-formulations, reporting the different interpretations a rule-formulation has in fact received by courts, or ascribing meaning to rule-formulations. However, the author argues that ought-sentences are not the proper tools to accomplish such tasks. At the same time, juristic ought-sentences cannot be understood as validity statements, since they neither mention any rule whatsoever, nor include the term "valid." Further, if validity-statements were ought-sentences, their logical behaviour would reflect the logic of rules themselves. However, as the late Kelsen argued, things do not run this way, since two inconsistent ought-sentences, if understood as validity statements, can paradoxically both be true, as well as both false. Hence, validity-statements cannot be reduced to ought-sentences iterating the rules which they (are supposed to) refer to.     

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.     

法律认知和法律原则：情感、效率与公平

情感、效率、公平是人们认知活动中惯常的三个进程。对应这三个进程,人们对法律的认知有一些基本的原则。这些认知互动既可能形成社会自发秩序,也可能为法学提供一个基于认知背景的分析框架,有助于法学应对实践问题。“公平主导”的一个简单回答是,面对不同场合,情感、效率、公平三种进程被激活的程度不同。大体上,家庭场合激活情感,工程场合激活效率,市场和法律则更激活公平。在实践中,公平主导的法律原则由于比较接近主流社会认知,所以法律规范在社会中往往可能“自执行”,无需全靠外界监督或者激励。公平原则也有其自身的局限。虽然规范和原则很重要,是社会秩序的母体。但是,公平原则并不能解决所有问题。缺乏制度上的法治,光靠情理法是不足的。所以现代社会形成了规则化解决纠纷的机制,这就是二阶意义上的法律。     

法律救济的规则选择:财产规则、责任规则与卡梅框架的法律经济学重构

法律经济学上的"卡-梅框架",是从法益保护的效果模式出发,对法律规则做出的一个类型划分。其原初结构是以法益的转移自由和定价意愿为标准划分的"财产规则"、"责任规则"和"禁易规则"。通过引入法益的初始归属和限价方式两个新的划分标准,可以增添"管制规则"和"无为规则"两个新的类型,扩展和重构"卡-梅框架"的救济分类和规则结构。这五类规则构成了法律经济学上可供选择的一个"规则菜单"。一个社会在特定领域的规则选择,对应着国家权力干涉社会生活的不同程度,体现了法律背后的观念变化和权力博弈。对于法律救济规则分类与效率比较的理论研究,有助于深化对中国现行法律的学术理解和制度完善。     

西方两大法系行政法基本原则之比较

行政法基本原则作为行政法的基本问题之一 ,历来为中外学者所关注。但对什么是行政法的基本原则及行政法的基本原则有哪些 ,西方各国的情况不尽相同 ,各学者也往往有不同的概括。在西方各国中 ,以法、德为代表的大陆法系和以英、美为代表的普通法系 ,被公认为是对世界影响最大的两大法系。这两大法系各具特点 ,对行政法基本原则的认识也有各自鲜明的特色。所以 ,这里主要以西方两大法系作为比较对象。通过对西方两大法系行政法基本原则的深入比较 ,我们可以从中探寻其所遵循的普遍性规律 ,以为我国行政法基本原则的确立提供有益的启示。一　…     

庭审直播的根据与规则

庭审直播有一个历史发展的过程.从各国对庭审录音录像和电视直播的法律规定来看,大多数国家对电视直播持开放的态度.我国法律没有对庭审直播问题作明确规定.审判应当以适应时代发展需要的形式对外公开.对公开审理的案件,可以进行庭审直播和录音录像才是常态,而不允许如此才是一种例外.在进行直播时,一要坚持设备使用的"三无"规则:无声音、无特殊光亮、无大幅度的动作;二要根据法庭的决定来确定使用何种形式的设备;三要禁止对法庭上某些特殊的人进行拍摄.另外,是否庭审直播的决定应当由法官作出.     

两大法系非法证据排除规则比较研究

排除非法证据是保障被告人人权,维护司法公正的一项重要原则。由于法律文化传统的不同以及特定时期控制犯罪与保护人权的需要,不同法系之间以及同一法系不同国家之间有关这一问题的诉讼理论和具体对策往往存在着许多差异。对两大法系非法证据排除规则的发展历史及有关法律规定进行了比较和研究,目的在于为确立我国的非法证据排除规则提供借鉴。     

On the Structure of Legal Principles

The author offers a sketch of his thesis that legal principles are optimization commands. He presents this thesis as an effort to capture the structure of weighing or balancing and to provide a basis for the principle of proportionality as it is applied in constitutional law. With this much in place, he then takes up some of the problems that have come to be associated with the optimization thesis. First, he examines the objection that there are no such things as principles, but only different modes of the application of norms. Second, he discusses problems concerning the concept of an optimization command and the character of the “ought” contained in principles. He concludes that the distinction between commands to optimize and commands to be optimized is the best method for capturing the nature of principles.     

论法律原则及其司法价值

法律原则是法律规则的起源,贯穿于法律文本、法律部门直至法律整体的始终。法律原则是法律规则精神的集中体现,同时法律原则本身也是一种特殊的行为规则,其价值不仅表现在立法领域,在司法领域也发挥着重要作用。     

测谎原理、冲突与法律思考

测谎是科学技术发展的产物,测谎证据也是自然科学与法律科学交叉共生的结果。通过鉴定结论,可以利用科学技术,给案件的侦破、公诉以及审判带来一些国家层面上的便利,但是,测谎证据同时也会引起国家利益与个人权利、科学与否的冲突。这里,问题的关键是如何给测谎证据以正确的定位。     

文化法的定位、原则与体系

文化法属于社会法的范畴,旨在保障公民文化权益的实现和满足人民群众精神生活需要。建立公民文化权利与政府责任之间的关联性,确立和维护产业文化与事业文化形态,促进文化体制改革、社会核心价值体系建设和文化繁荣发展,需要加强文化法治建设。文化法治建设应当遵循文化权利保障、政府主导与公众参与结合、市场化与政府规制协调以及综合效益原则,构建由宪法文化权利与宪法文化政策两块坚实基石、文化事业法制与文化产业法制两个基本侧面、中央文化立法与地方文化立法两个对应层面、文化政策与文化法律两个互动方面有机构成的文化法制体系。     

民间金融的法律评判及规制路径

民间金融的存在和发展具有其应然合法性和实然合法性。倘若脱离民间金融所生存和发展的具体语境,单纯从国家法一元化视角出发去讨论民间金融的合法或者非法,都是有失偏颇的。从国家法与民间法二元结构体系看,那些在国家法层面被认定为非法的民间金融活动,在民间法层面并不当然丧失其合法性。因此,对民间金融必须立足于国家法与民间法二元结构的分析视角来加以考察,并通过适当的制度选择实现对其发展的规制和引导,而不是不加区别地一律予以打压和限制。     

法律翻译的特殊原则

法律语言翻译研究是翻译学研究的一个分支学科,是对翻译学体系的重要补充。法律翻译在遵守翻译普遍原则的同时,也有属于自身专业特点的特殊原则。法律翻译的特殊原则主要体现在专业性、严谨性、准确性和等效性四个方面。法律翻译特殊原则的提出,有利于提高法律翻译质量,亦有助于促进立法机关对法律翻译立法的关注。     

法律原则的规范性研究

规范性主要是对合法权威与守法主体之间相互关系的一种认识。对理解规范性问题来说,规范性强度是一个重要的概念。法律原则的规范性追问这样两个问题：原则何以成为法律？为何具有指引、约束司法裁判的规范效力？法律原则的规范性包括形式渊源、价值理据、规范特征三个方面的意涵。对法律原则规范性的追问,考问着国家司法权威的公信力。法律原则构成了人之为人的主体性根基。晚近学界对分类式法概念的批判不能替代也不应阻断对法律原则的定性,即对法律原则规范性的追问。     

私法原则、规则的二元结构与法益的侵权法保护

私法是由原则与规则组成的。侵权法对法益的保护途径有如下两种 :1.通过规则实现法益保护即以保护权利之名保护法益 ;2 .通过原则实现法益保护即以一般的立法条文制裁故意违反公序良俗行为。我们应该分析两种途径的利弊 ,确定我国侵权法对法益的保护方法。     

独立审计准则的法律地位研究

审计准则是行业协会制订的内部自律性规则,其制度价值在于保障审计质量并作为对其成员的审计失败是否追究纪律责任的依据,不能调整注册会计师与财务信息使用人之间的民事关系。审计准则规定的注意义务范围与注册会计师应尽的注意义务范围之间存在一定的差距,因而在该义务差距范围内出具的虚假证明文件注册会计师是有过错的,注册会计师对此应承担民事责任,同时以履行审计准则规定的义务作为抗辩其审计失败的民事责任缺乏法律根据,也不为国外司法实践承认。我国的审计准则与公众期望之间存在一定差距,该差距的存在进一步表明我国的审计准则不能作为注册会计师注意义务的法定标准。     

Following Legal Rules: Visibility and Feasibility

This paper reflects on the idea of ‘visualization’ of legal rules as part of an account of rule following in action. Presenting an alternative to Van Schooten’s (Jurisprudence and communication. Deborah Charles, Liverpool, 2012) account of interpretation, I first distinguish between two modes of interpretation: rehearsing and discursive. I argue that the former is the more basic one, relating to our respecting sources, rather than noticing signs, in action. In other (Wittgensteinian) words, we have to understand how we take guidance from rules. This account can profit from an analysis of what ‘seeing’ amounts to. Taking my cue from Merleau-Ponty, I point to the intertwinement between agent and world in seeing, in rule-following, and eventually in legal rule-following. The proof of the pudding is an alternative account of the time-honoured paradigm of legal interpretation: Hart’s ‘no vehicles in the park’. I show how this example is predicated on detecting ‘depth-clues’ in a rule, which allow an agent to correlate his vantage point to a vanishing point of a rule. The example illustrates a key-feature of rule following: reflexivity. I cannot follow a rule unless I project myself into its picture.