State Tax and Expenditure Limitations: There is No Story

Out of the troubled economic atmosphere of the late 1970's grew a discontent with government in general and taxation in particular. The tax revolt took hold at the local level and placed limits on the growth of the property tax through celebrated citizen initiatives like Proposition 13 in California. At the national level, uneasiness with the role of government and a sense that taxation was too high culminated in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan. The electorate embraced promises of less government and lower taxes. For states, the tax revolt resulted in a number of state tax and expenditures limitations (TELS). Most had several things in common: they were adopted before 1983, they addressed state appropriations, and they were largely a western phenomenon spreading from California. The overall condition of state economies and structure of state tax systems, in combination with the sensitivity of policymakers to anti-tax sentiment, have done more to limit state spending than have imposed restrictions.     

Tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments

This paper uses comprehensive data on state and local tax and spending limitations for forty-nine states between 1976 and 1990 to estimate the effects of these limits on the fiscal relationships between state and local government. Results indicate that tax and spending limits on local governments are only partially effective in reducing revenues because political agents bypass limitations by transferring revenue reliance to unconstrained revenue sources, or because unconstrained levels of government take on additional revenue responsibilities. In particular, the empirical analysis demonstrates that binding local government fiscal constraints are associated with reductions in local revenues and increases in state aid to local governments. In contrast, state government limitations are related to reductions in both state and local own source revenues.     

The Changing Property Tax and State-Local Relations

The substantial transfer of fiscal power to state government,undermining local government autonomy, characterizes the courseof state-local relations in the last quarter of the twentiethcentury in the United States. Central to this shift is diminishedlocal control of the property tax, a result of the tax limitationsadopted in most states since the 1970s. This article arguesthat control of the property tax is critical to the workingsof local representative democracy, affecting both the discretionof elected officials and participation of citizens. It presentsboth quantitative and qualitative evidence of the centralizationtrend, including changes in property-tax flows and state financesaffecting local governments, an analysis of the comparativeseverity of property-tax limitations, changes in K-12 educationfinancing, and local consequences of the tax limitations.     

Turning Up the Heat: The Impact of Electric Utility Competition on K–12 Education Funding in Ohio

Ohio, like many states, is currently-considering deregulation of the retail electric power industry. This issue is made more complex in Ohio because structural change in the delivery of electric power is also likely to have a negative effect on state and local government revenues. This effect occurs because of three main forces: the elimination of differential property tax treatment of utilities relative to general businesses, the likely decrease in state electricity excise tax revenues as a result of falling power prices and administrative difficulty in taxing out of state providers, and the potential for stranded costs to diminish the taxable value of electric generating equipment. This article provides an overview of these issues and a brief analysis of the extent to which these problems will be shared by other states. The article then demonstrates the impact of deregulation-induced tax changes on both state and local school district revenues in Ohio and concludes with a discussion of how the state's ability to insulate local governments from these adverse fiscal effects is made both more imperative and more difficult by a recent Supreme Court Ruling on school funding Finally, the issues discussed in the article are placed in a more general context of the challenges of adjusting tax policy to changing circumstances     

New Hampshire's tax-base limits: An example of the Leviathan model

This study views the lack of an income tax on wages and salaries and a general sales tax in New Hampshire as tax-base limits. I use the Leviathan model to analyze the differences between the fiscal system in New Hampshire and the fiscal systems in Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts. Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts do not have the tax-base limits that New Hampshire has. From 1957 to 1989, New Hampshire had lower state and local government tax and expenditure levels than the other three states, more rapid population growth, lower welfare expenditures but comparable levels of expenditures for several of the major public services, and a more competitive structure of state and local government.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.     

The Rise of Competitive Federalism

This article challenges the prevailing view of increasing political and fiscal centralization in the federal government. Since 1978, the authors argue, the nation has entered a new era of "Competitive Federalism" with federal, state and local governments locked in a competitive struggle for taxpayer resources and support. The new era has emerged largely because of the loss of the tremendous fiscal advantage held by the federal government during its centralization period, 1929 to 1978. Although "deregulated" and free to move into any area of domestic policy, the federal government is constrained by necessary budget pressures and a "reformed" income tax structure. Competitive Federalism has emerged as a new balancing force between Washington, D.C. and the fifty state-local governments and will govern the federal system for the foreseeable future.     

Bitter Harvest: Intergovernmental Dimensions of the Farm Crisis

The recent and deep recession in American agriculture seriouslyaffected state and local government finances and services in1986. Sharp declines in farm land values began to erode thelocal property tax base in many rural communities, while rapidlyrising property tax delinquencies created more immediate cashflow problems. Many farm states experienced serious budgetaryshortfalls as revenue receipts from state income and sales taxesdeclined or failed to grow at expected rates. Both state andlocal fiscal problems were exacerbated by federal aid reductions,regional economic conditions, and rising service demands. Suchproblems made agricultural policy a major issue in the 1986elections and prompted a proliferation of new policy initiatives,especially by state governments. Some of the policy approachesadopted or being considered raise fundamental questions aboutintergovernmental relations and methods of public service provisionin a rapidly changing policy environment.     

The convergence of fiscal regimes and the decline of the Tiebout effect

A measure of waste from the competitive rent-seeking activity of special interest groups in federal, state and local budgets was calculated over the period 1900–88. This period in U.S. fiscal history is characterized by constitutional changes that have made for more transparency in governmental fiscal activities and for greater diffusion of taxes. The XVI Amendment to the Constitution created the progressive individual income tax (the corporate income tax was judged to be an excise tax in 1909 and passed the test of constitutionality). High marginal tax rates are a justification for a high average level of taxation. The Full Employment Act of 1946 insitutionalized government deficits as a means of meeting a political objective. As a result, opportunities for rent-seeking through budgetary reallocations rose in the United States. In the first two decades of the 20th century, waste at all levels of government represented about 10 percent of incremental national output. Today, waste is three times that amount.The transparency and diffusion of taxes are highest at the federal level and least at the local level. Rent-seeking through budgetary reallocation has followed the public purse. One explanation for the observed centralization of government in the 20th century may be that opportunities to concentrate benefits and diffuse taxes are highest at the federal level.     

On the political and fiscal determinants of income redistribution under federalism and democracy: evidence from Germany

Several recent studies suggest that transfers from central to regional governments are motivated by political considerations. In this paper we examine if this is also the case for transfers from regional to central governments in the context of the German fiscal equalization system. We examine the factors that contribute to differences in tax revenues across German states. The evidence indicates that both fiscal incentives and political factors can explain these differences, although in Germany the former are more important. Moreover, accounting for fiscal institutions has important consequences for the empirical assessment of political influences on taxation. Overall we find that the political affiliation of the state governor is an important factor in explaining differences in state tax revenues. Thus, the right-wing party (CDU/CSU) is effective in relaxing the tax burden at the state level. In contrast, partisan alignment between the state government and the federal government loses its importance once fiscal conditions enter the empirical model.     

The cartelization of local governments

Intergovernmental competition can enhance efficiency. Centralization of government expenditures inhibits intergovernmental competition because it makes governments more homogeneous, and so cartelizes local governments. Cartelization reduces Tiebout competition, and limits benchmark competition in which one government??s performance can be compared with neighboring governments. Measuring fiscal centralization as the ratio of local to state and local government expenditures within the state, the evidence shows that more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher levels of state per capita income. Cartelization of local governments negatively impacts income.     

An Evaluation of Alternative Tax and Expenditure Limitation Policies on Kansas Local Governments

Cross-sectional time series data in a partial adjustment model are used to examine county government fiscal behavior under a "hard" tax and expenditure limitation policy, an aggregate property tax levy limit, versus a "soft" limit under Truth in Taxation in Kansas. Results indicate that under the aggregate levy limit, per capita property taxes, own-source revenues and own-source expenditures were significantly higher than under the Truth in Taxation policy where local officials face many fewer restrictions on their ability to raise the levy.     

Diversifying Local Government Revenue in Bosnia-Herzegovina Through an Area-Based Property Tax

After a bitter and devastating war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is making slow but steady progress rebuilding its economy and government structure. As normalcy returns, the demand for government services invariably will continue to increase, especially at the sub-entity levels of government. Unfortunately, the current fiscal structure severely restricts the resources available to local governments. This article suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina consider adopting a property tax as a means to provide much- needed revenue. After describing the current governmental and fiscal system that has evolved since the signing of the Dayton Accords, the authors discuss why an area-based property tax, rather than a more traditional property tax based on capital value or market prices, makes sense for this country in transition.     

Effects of the Form of Government and Property Tax Limits on Local Finance in the Context of Revenue and Expenditure Simultaneity

This paper examines the impact of the form of government and state‐imposed property tax limits on municipal finance. We suggest that municipal revenues and expenditures are determined concurrently and estimate revenue and expenditure functions as simultaneous equations. We use the instrumental variable approach and fixed effects to address revenue and expenditure endogeneity. By testing the model on a cross‐section of rich municipal data for fiscal year 2002, we find evidence that revenues and expenditures are simultaneously determined, that potentially binding state‐imposed property tax limits effectively restrict local revenues and that the form of government is a significant predictor of local expenditures.     

The effect of school district and municipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes: evidence from fiscal stress labels in Ohio

A key informational asymmetry in local public finance is the lack of information available to local residents regarding the financial status of the school districts and local governments in which they reside. Given that voters in many states must approve property and income tax increases for these local entities, the lack of full information on the financial status of these local entities may lead to sub-optimal voting decisions. State financial intervention systems have begun to make financial problems more salient to residents, potentially alleviating these informational asymmetries. This paper examines the effect of the Ohio fiscal stress labeling program on voting outcomes and the tax-setting behavior of local officials for school district and municipal government tax referendums. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine data from over 3000 school district and 2300 municipality property tax elections from 2004 to 2012. While we find minimal evidence that the yes vote share changed for school district referendums following fiscal stress label receipt, we find very large increases (15 to 23 percentage points) in the likelihood of referendum passage for school districts following label receipt. We do not find much evidence of changes in the likelihood of passage or the yes vote share following label receipt for municipalities, but we do find that these voting outcomes rise following label removal. We also find that local officials do not appreciably change their tax-setting behavior in response to these labels, as the size and likelihood of property tax proposal are largely unchanged following label receipt or removal.     

Effects of Federal Tax Reform on Local Finances

The federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 promised to be fair, simple,and revenue neutral to the federal treasury. Tax reform, however,was not revenue neutral with respect to all state and localtreasuries. Indeed, tax reform entailed a restructuring of thebalance of power in federal-state-local relations. In particular,new restrictions on the tax-exempt bond authority of state andlocal governments are requiring significant shifts in traditionallocal debt policy. Furthermore, the Supreme Courts recent decision,South Carolina v. Baker, raises additional concerns about thestatus of state and local tax-exempt bond issues. The natureof future relations between the federal government and localgovernments is likely to be molded more by the federal tax codeand by erosion in state authority over fiscal matters than byfederal grant-in-aid programs of the kind that have characterizedthe past quarter century of intergovernmental relations.     

Simulating Massachusetts Municipalities' Recession Readiness: Early Warning of a Perfect Storm?

We simulate effects of two recessions on Massachusetts municipalities in light of their relative dependence on state aid, capacity to increase property taxes under Proposition 2½ constraints, growth, and nondiscretionary costs. We also explore the efficacy of local government stabilization funds in light of current literature on stabilization funds, slack resources in general, and the state–local fiscal relationship. We found substantial variance in Massachusetts municipalities' recession readiness. Fifty‐five (16 percent) municipalities have insufficient resources to weather a severe recession scenario without significant sacrifice due to reliance on state grants‐in‐aid, low property tax revenue growth, erosion of property tax revenue increments by increases in nondiscretionary expenditures, and inadequate stabilization funds.     

State Fiscal Strategies for the 1990s: Balancing Budgets in a Recession

The fiscal crunch facing many states in FY 1991 has its rootsin the recession, federal mandates, election-year politics,and rapid growth in spending for Medicaid and corrections. Southernand midwestern states that made drastic cuts in response tothe 1981–1982 recession have fared relatively well, butstates in the Northeast have faced tax increases, layoffs, cutsin services, and prolonged conflict over state budgets. Althoughthe tax revolt has not led to appreciably lower taxes, it hasmade raising taxes more difficult, and has heralded a shiftto "boutique government," which may create further fiscal problemsin the long run. State tax increases and spending cutbacks mayalso delay recovery from the recession.     

The fiscal effects of statehood: New Mexico and Arizona, 1903–1919

The residents of US territories often vote against statehood for fear government will use its greater sovereignty to impose a heavier tax burden. On the other hand, public choice theory predicts that fiscal decentralization limits government’s size. The financial reports of New Mexico and Arizona were examined before and after statehood in 1912. Graphical and regression analyses of the ratios of receipts and expenditures to property values and US GNP suggest that the relative price of government rose far more in the two new states than in a control state, Nevada, thus supporting the claims of statehood’s opponents.