Partisanship as information

Intuitively, we associate different political parties with different types of policy. In contrast, this paper shows that in the absence of differential costs of membership among parties (that is, if party membership ischeap talk), party labels cannot perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates. However, under certain conditions parties can signal candidate types imperfectly. The paper therefore also provides an example of how costless communication can be effective in games of partial conflict.     

Structural and functional information

Fernandes and Simon propose to examine decision making in complex and ambiguous situations by inviting various professionals (architects, doctors, engineers, and lawyers) to contemplate a paradoxical case, but the thoughts which this exercise generates are then summarized in terms of categories proposed a priori (structural information). A functional approach, by way of contrast, endeavors to examine a phenomenon as closely as possible in terms of its intrinsic character. An alternative is presented using Q methodology and factor analysis as a way to reveal functional responses to the same decision making scenario employed by Fernandes and Simon.     

Lobbying and asymmetric information

Informational lobbying — the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies — is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the ‘right direction’. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. qu]Much of the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form of freely provided “objective” studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks). qu]The analysis here is vague. What is needed is an equilibrium model in which lobbying activities have influence. Incomplete information ought to be the key to building such a model that would explain why lobbying occurs (information, collusion with decision makers, and so on) and whether lobbying expenses are socially wasteful. (Tirole, 1989: Ch. 1.3, p. 77, Rentseeking behavior).     

Handling and communicating intelligence information: a conceptual,historical and information design analysis

Effective communication of information is essential to intelligence work. This paper identifies the main obstacles to good communication: policy-related challenges; cognitive impediments; resource limitations; cultural and structural issues within intelligence communities; and technical information. To illustrate, it examines four cases when poor communication contributed to intelligence shortcomings. Via questionnaire and document survey, the study identifies the current state of practice in UK intelligence communities. The survey of visualization documents currently in use revealed errors against established principles of Information Design. Thus, to ensure better handling and dissemination of intelligence, there is a distinct need to apply Information Design principles.     

Privatization,information and incentives

In this paper the choice between public and private provision of goods and services is considered. In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference between the two modes concerns the transactions costs faced by the government when attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention under public ownership can have its advantages; but the fact that a promise not to intervene is more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects. The fundamental privatization theorem (analogous to the fundamental theorem of welfare economics) is presented, providing conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production. The restrictiveness of these conditions is evaluated.     

Revealing information in electoral competition

Electoral competition between two expert candidates may lead to inefficient platform choices. The present paper studies electoral competition between two experts and a third uninformed candidate. The latter behaves populistically. This seemingly useless candidate restores efficiency. The paper then endogenizes information acquisition. If the information acquisition costs are low, then equilibria with (i) three expert candidates or (ii) two experts and one uninformed candidate may arise. There are costs such that the latter equilibrium is the only pure strategy equilibrium in which information is transmitted.     

Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information

We consider rent-seeking contests with two players who each have private information about their own cost of effort. We consider both discrete and continuous distributions of costs and give results for each case, focusing on existence of equilibrium.     

Organizing research in an information society

His publications include Guidelines to the Decentralization of Government Furnctions; Utilization of RANN Research Results: A Survey of the Research Applied to National Needs Program of the National Science Foundation;and A Strategy for Improving Education in Science and Mathematics.     

Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

Standard majority-voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean-to-median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed. This paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean-to-median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard framework with imperfect information. In such a model, it is important to consider the source of rising mean-to-median ratios. Income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich, which tends to reduce the support for redistribution. An empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first Reagan tax cut.