Sanctioning Liberal Democracies

This article examines when economic sanctions should be imposed on liberal democracies that violate democratic norms. The argument is made from the social-liberal standpoint, which recognises the moral status of political communities. While social liberals rarely refer to the use of economic sanctions as a pressure tool, by examining why they restrict military intervention and economic aid to cases of massive human rights violations or acute humanitarian need, the article is able to show why they are likely to impose strong restrictions on the use of economic sanctions as well. After reconstructing the social-liberal case against economic sanctions, the article develops the argument that liberal democracies have reasons to support sanctions on other liberal democracies, even when they perpetrate injustices on a smaller scale. Liberal democracies share especially strong ideological, cultural and institutional bonds, and these peer group relations open them to mutual influence. When one liberal democracy commits serious injustices while still proclaiming allegiance to the democratic ethos, it can adversely affect the vitality of the democratic culture in those other liberal democracies with which it maintains close relations. Other liberal democracies therefore have the right and the obligation to condemn this behaviour, in order to preserve their allegiance to their values. The article defends the use of economic sanctions in light of some recent critiques, and concludes by providing an overall assessment of the factors which liberal democracies ought to take into account when they consider imposing economic sanctions on other liberal democracies.     

Welfare reforms,family resources,and child maltreatment

This paper examines the impact of welfare reforms on several measures of child maltreatment. The authors use state‐level data from 1990 to 1998 to examine whether recent welfare reforms have increased or reduced the incidence of reported and substantiated cases of maltreatment, the incidence of specific types of substantiated maltreatment—physical abuse and neglect—and the number of children living in out‐of‐home care. The welfare reforms considered are the imposition of: family caps, lifetime limits, work requirements, sanctions for non‐compliance, and the restriction of welfare benefits to immigrants. How welfare benefit levels and changes in state Earned Income Tax Credit programs affect reports and substantiated cases of maltreatment are also considered. Evidence strongly indicates that reductions in states' welfare benefit levels increase the number of children in out‐of‐home care, and some evidence indicates that strict lifetime welfare limits and tougher sanctions for noncompliance are related to higher levels of substantiated maltreatment. The evidence on family caps is mixed: family caps appear to be associated with fewer instances of substantiated maltreatment, but more children in out‐of‐home care. Because most of the welfare reforms examined have been in effect for only a short time, these results should be considered preliminary. Overall, however, they provide some evidence that the recent welfare reforms in the United States may have increased child maltreatment. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy and Analysis and Management.     

Improving compliance with state environmental regulations

This article reports on empirical tests of two theories for improving compliance with state environmental regulations. One theory argues for centralization of enforcement responsibilities with state agencies, while the other focuses on enforcement strategies, arguing for an approach that emphasizes capacity building and the social and moral bases of compliance in addition to deterrence and the threatened application of sanctions. Using evidence from North Carolina, we show that centralization does not necessarily enhance compliance, but cooperative enforcement strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulations that seek to attain performance standards. Compliance with simpler specification standards, however, can be attained just as well with easier to administer deterrent enforcement strategies based on frequent inspections and adequate sanctions.     

The Influence of EU Membership on Methods and Processes of Budgeting in Britain and France, 1970–1995

This article explores the impact European Union (EU) integration has had on methods and processes of budgeting in France and Britain from 1970 to 1995. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by an hybridization effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made compulsory by membership in the EU. Hybridization emphasizes that national and EU budgetary processes are increasingly interwoven and indivisible. Public budgeting is no longer purely national because part of the decision-making on national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in financial and policy terms. Based on an institutional analysis, combined with elite interviewing, the article suggests that hybridization is a significant factor contributing to a convergence of budgetary practices in Britain and France. Underlying the argument is the fact that an increasingly important function of departmental actors involves negotiating with their EU counterparts at the EU level, in addition to the conventional budgetary game at the domestic level. Regarding compliance, there is an influence as testified by significant formal institutional convergence. However, compliance seems a less effective factor in influencing convergence than hybridization because it conveys a "negative" approach to convergence, based on enforcement and sanctions. The article suggests that the convergence of administrative systems is promoted by the growing similarity of administrative practices more than by the harmonization of rules.     

Naming without shaming: The publication of sanctions in the Dutch financial market

Enforcement agencies increasingly disclose or “name and shame” corporate offenders. This article uses responsive regulation as a framework for an empirical study of the impact of non‐anonymous publication of sanctions in the Dutch financial market. These publications are characterized as “naming without shaming”, because they are used for technical guidance rather than with the intention to shame. The findings show that naming offenders functions as a general deterrent in the market for financial intermediaries, but considerably less so in the capital market. In both markets, the publication of sanctions weakened the impact of enforcement. In the capital market, the publications neutralized the seriousness of offenses and contributed to the image of the regulator as powerless. In the market for financial intermediaries, naming offenders was perceived as stigmatizing shaming and led to defiance, rather than compliance. The case study suggests, however, that the publication of sanctions may provide an opportunity for guidance, provided they contain a moral message, rather than technical instruction.     

Conflict and Compliance in Swedish Health Care Governance: Soft Law in the ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’

Soft law, or non‐legislative modes of policy making, is becoming increasingly common today. The Nordic countries have a long tradition soft law, not least in central–local relations, where non‐binding agreements are frequently used to coordinate policies. A key question springing from soft law theory is that of compliance. Why do independent actors comply if they are not formally obliged to do so, and what happens if they do not comply? This article addresses the question of how compliance can be achieved during policy conflict between actors at different governing levels by investigating a case of health care reform in Sweden. An important finding in the study is that compliance was reached ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. The central government resorted to the threat of regular legislation to force the county councils to comply. This finding points to the fact that sanctions and the presence of a hierarchical order may play an important role even in soft law governance. The study also shows that an additional important reason that the voluntary agreement between the county councils and central government was honoured in the end by both parties can be attributed to the efforts of a mediating actor: the organization representing the county councils in their negotiations with the government. Finally, the study also illustrates how various forms of informal social pressures such as shaming, peer pressure and moral responsibility can help enforce local compliance in a case of open policy conflict. Arguably, all these compliance mechanisms also have relevance outside the Nordic setting.     

Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?

Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross‐country time‐series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle.     

The war on cartels and the social meaning of deterrence

The global war on cartels has had much success in introducing tough sanctions for cartel conduct, such as price fixing and market sharing. The policy rhetoric justifying criminalization assumes that compliance can be induced through deterrence. This, in turn, assumes that business people know about the law, believe that they are likely to be caught and face enforcement action and jail if they break the law, and calculate that they should comply. This paper problematizes these policy assumptions using evidence from a survey of a random sample of Australian business people and in‐depth interviews with 25 cartelists. This paper argues that business people's knowledge about the law is less important than their relationship with (or distance from) the law. Corporate elites see themselves as intimate with the law and, therefore, able to strategically “play” the law; while small business people and managers lower down the corporate hierarchy see themselves as “innocent” of any knowledge of the law. The impact of a policy of increased sanctions for misconduct cannot be understood solely in terms of marginal difference in aggregate levels of deterrence. It must also be understood in terms of how it interacts with people's experience of the law to create and maintain or contest and destabilize social segmentation and inequality.     

Regulation by Reputation: Monitoring and Sanctioning in Nonprofit Accountability Clubs

Nonprofits seek to enhance their reputation for responsible management by joining voluntary regulation mechanisms such as accountability clubs. Because external stakeholders cannot fully observe nonprofits’ compliance with club obligations, clubs incorporate mechanisms to monitor compliance and impose sanctions. Yet including monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms increases the cost of club membership for nonprofits. What factors account for the variation in the strength of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms in voluntary accountability clubs? An analysis of 224 clubs suggests that stringent monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are more likely in fund‐raising‐focused clubs, clubs that offer certification (as opposed to only outlining a code of conduct), and clubs with greater longevity. The macro context in which clubs function also shapes their institutional design: clubs in OECD countries and clubs with global membership are less likely to incorporate monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms than clubs in non‐OECD countries and single‐country clubs, respectively.     

Information, Interests, and Environmental Regulation

This study contributes to the understanding of informational approaches to bringing about compliance with environmental regulations with particular attention to differences in the influence of information provided by different information sources. Based on theorizing from a combination of information processing and interest group literatures, we develop hypotheses about regulatees' reliance upon and the influence of different sources of information. We test these hypotheses for Danish farmers' compliance with agro-environmental rules. Our findings show that information plays a role in bringing about regulatory compliance, but its influence is not as strong and is less direct than might be thought to be the case. In addition, we show that not all information sources have the same influence. The findings demonstrate that interest groups have important roles in information provision and legitimization of policies that have often been assumed in the literature but have rarely been empirically examined.     

Criminal Deterrence: Evidence from an Individual-Level Analysis of 24/7 Sobriety

Decisionmakers continue to search for new ways to deter criminal behavior that do not rely on increasing the severity of punishment. This paper evaluates South Dakota's 24/7 Sobriety Program—a novel, large-scale intervention requiring those arrested for or convicted of an alcohol-related offense to abstain from alcohol and submit to alcohol tests multiple times daily. Those testing positive or missing a test receive a swift,certain, and moderate sanction; typically, a night or two in jail. To estimate the causal effect of the 24/7 program on the probability of rearrest or probation revocation for those arrested for a second or third driving under the influence (DUI) offense, we instrument an individual's 24/7 participation with program availability in the county of arrest. We estimate that the individual-level probability of rearrest or probation revocation is 13.7 percentage points (49 percent; p = 0.002) lower for 24/7 participants than non-participants 12 months after their DUI arrest. We detect substantive decreases at 24 and 36 months, but the precision of those estimates depends on model specification. These findings provide empricial support for applying “swift-certain-fair” sanctions to deter noncompliance in community supervision settings. This paper also provides policymakers with evidence for a new approach to reduce criminal activity among those whose alcohol use leads them to repeatedly threaten public health and safety.     

Counting on codes: An examination of transnational codes as a regulatory governance mechanism for nanotechnologies

This article examines the rise of nanotechnology‐specific codes of conduct (nano‐codes) as a private governance mechanism to manage potential risks and promote the technology. It examines their effectiveness as well as their legitimacy as regulatory instruments in the public domain. The study first maps the rise of voluntary nano‐codes and the roles played by different actors. Focusing on five specific nano‐codes, the article then discusses their adequacy in terms of scientific uncertainty, gaps in existing regulatory regimes, and broader societal concerns. It concludes that these voluntary nano‐codes have weaknesses including a lack of explicit standards on which to base independent monitoring, as well as no sanctions for poor compliance. At the same time it also highlights the potential power of these governance mechanisms under conditions of uncertainty and co‐regulation with government. It is likely that nano‐codes will become the “first cut” of a new governance regime for nanotechnologies.     

Budgetary Collective Action Problems: Convergence and Compliance under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union

Budgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in which the problem a hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders. The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions. This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all budgetary agreements and treaties.     

Global Governance through Private Organizations

Governance at international and global levels is not only provided through states and markets but also through a variety of private organizations. The business world is well represented through this kind of organization and contributes to global governance through self-regulation across a number of industries. This article examines these efforts in the encompassing organization of global commerce, in the pharmaceutical industry and among dye stuffs producers. Smaller organizations are generally better suited to monitor compliance and impose sanctions on members violating the codes and norms behind self-regulation. Even small organizations, however, are confronted with problems and there is also evidence of large and very complex organizations having established effective mechanisms as alternatives to public regulation. These experiences can be built into theories on self-regulation as a form of global governance.     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

Economic sanctions as the propositional satisfiability problem

In this paper we are trying to answer the question of when economic sanctions have the best chance to succeed. Almost three hundred scholars from around the world participated in a survey designed to define which pre-conditions and actions by the sender are desirable in order for economic sanctions to succeed. The resolution algorithm is employed to find out whether there is a consensus among the scholars about the factors leading to the success of economic sanctions. The results provide evidence that when scholars were grouped by region the consensus could be reached that sanctions will succeed if: (1) modest policy change is sought, (2) sanctions are comprehensive, i.e., both trade and financial sanctions are imposed, (3) the target does not receive significant support from a third party, (4) the sender has much greater economy than the target, (5) there is international co-operation in the imposition of sanctions, and (6) the target is economically and politically weak and unstable. When scholars were grouped based on the level of economic development of their countries of origin, a consensus on all but one issue (senders welfare or economic interest are threatened by targets action) was reached between scholars from economically developed nations and scholars from less developed nations. Surprisingly, experts from economically developed nations, i.e., the United States versus EU nations, could not reach a consensus on several issues.     

Innovation in Welfare Policy: Evaluating State Efforts to Encourage Work among Low‐Income Families1

This article examines what states are doing to help Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) recipients move into the workforce and become self‐supporting. We first present documentation regarding many different state TANF policies aimed at encouraging work, including benefit structures, time limits, work requirements, sanctions, and work supports. We then discuss how effective these policies are at helping welfare recipients get jobs and increase their income, by reviewing research on each of these elements. We conclude that the TANF program has been effective in increasing employment and decreasing welfare caseloads and expenses, but that this has not resulted in overall income gains for welfare recipients in the long run. We also conclude that the most promising state programs have a strong employment focus combined with focused training and educational opportunities. In addition, we also find that sanctions appear to be harming those most in need of assistance, and therefore that such policies should be reevaluated and refocused.     

Big Five Personality Traits and Responses to Persuasive Appeals: Results from Voter Turnout Experiments

We examine whether Big Five personality traits are associated with heterogeneous responses to commonly used Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) appeals in both a survey and a field experiment. The results suggest that Big Five personality traits affect how people respond to the costs and benefits of voting highlighted in GOTV appeals. Our evidence also suggests that one trait—Openness—is associated with broad persuasibility, while others shape responses to particular types of messages. In some cases the conditioning effects of Big Five traits are substantial. For example, in the one-voter households (HHs) included in our field experiment, we find that a mailer that raised the specter of social sanctions increased the likelihood of voting by a statistically greater amount among those scoring high on Openness. The findings constitute an important step forward in understanding how core personality traits shape responses to various aspects of the act of voting.     

Insuring legislative wealth transfers: theory and evidence

Authorities rely on reports from private citizens to detect and enforce more than a trivial portion of effective law-breaking. The present article is the first to study the cultural aspect of peer reporting experimentally. By collecting data in a post-Soviet country (Moldova), we focus in particular on how the Soviet legacy of using citizens as private informants may have a long-lasting effect on their willingness to cooperate with state authorities. We then contrast those effects with peer reporting behavior in France, a Western society. Our results suggest that participants in Moldova view cooperation with authorities as less socially acceptable than their counterparts in France. Our results also suggest that participants in Moldova engage less frequently in peer reporting than individuals in France. However, we also find that less peer reporting does not necessarily imply less tax compliance. Participants in both countries exhibit very similar tax compliance rates. We explain the effect of peer reporting on tax compliance in Moldova using the country's past experience during the Soviet era, when being reported to authorities was common and carried grave consequences.