Interministerielle Netzwerke: Formale und informelle Koordinationsstrukturen bei der Vorbereitung der deutschen Verhandlungspositionen zur Regierungskonferenz 1996

How do German ministries manage the preparation of national negotiation positions for EU intergovernmental conference? After a survey of the debate on organizational deficits of the interministerial coordination in Germany, we are consulting decision- and organization-theoretic approaches in IR. Drawing on organizational economics we concretise and supplement these older frameworks. We conceive the management of a governmental organization as a specific aggregation of heterogeneous preferences and information. Applying social network analysis we take into account formal as well as informal aspects of coordination channels. The objective of this article is to make visible the complex structures and processes that constitute foreign policy making, and to provide a preliminary assessment of its efficiency.     

To the beat of a different drummer: Ideological nonconformity and issue scales

This study examines and tests assumptions about the dimensionality of issue scales commonly used in attitude research. Researchers assume that a respondent designation of his or her position on an issue represents an ideal point on a single-peaked preference scale. However, in comparing actual respondent preference orderings with the liberal-conservative ordering assumed by the scale, it is found that many respondents do not conform to the assumption. Furthermore, in a sample of relatively well-educated respondents, those who do not conform to the dominant scaling dimension are found to be as interested in politics, as efficacious, and as predictable in their voting as those who do conform. However, nonconformists do appear to be somewhat more internally directed and more dogmatic than conformist respondents.     

Conditions for effective large‐scale anticorruption efforts and the role of external actors: What does the Slovak experience tell us?

The article looks at what policy‐makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, based on an in‐depth examination of effectiveness of actual anticorruption measures in Slovakia. The research presents a synthesis of 12 case studies where measures in the sectors most associated with corruption as well as horizontal measures were analysed. The research shows that corruption can be decreased significantly within several years and external actors can play a substantial role in the process. An overall decrease in corruption can be based on aggregation of individual sectoral changes in areas most suffering from graft. In particular, the Slovak strategy was based on a sector‐by‐sector economic approach to resolve supply–demand imbalances based on either liberalisation/privatisation, limitations on discretion or managing supply and/or demand. Horizontal reforms complemented by sectoral reforms with their strong focus on increasing transparency. Concerning the role of external actors, we conclude that even when there is a domestically driven anticorruption effort, the external actors can still help significantly by serving as sources of inspiration, legitimacy, know‐how and funding for reform design and implementation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate

This study uses the voter-shopping construct to analyze signaling of moderateness in the U.S. Senate. We compare legislator-provided signals (advertising)—such as membership in the U.S. Senate’s Centrist Coalition—with actual voting histories in order to characterize these types of advertising cues as sincere or insincere. Following recent research indicating that moderate legislators receive greater financial support, we test whether or not Political Action Committees (PACs) are willing to support financially those who send false signals of moderateness. Our results show that the mean level of real PAC contributions garnered by non-moderate Democrats who send false signals exceeds that of the non-moderate Democrats who do not do so by $182,078. This figure is about 74% of mean level of real PAC contributions for those non-moderate Democrats who do not send false signals.     

Neither Hayek nor Habermas

The rise of the blogosphere raises important questions about the elicitation and aggregation of information, and about democracy itself. Do blogs allow people to check information and correct errors? Can we understand the blogosphere as operating as a kind of marketplace for information along Hayekian terms? Or is it a vast public meeting of the kind that Jurgen Habermas describes? In this article, I argue that the blogosphere cannot be understood as a Hayekian means for gathering dispersed knowledge because it lacks any equivalent of the price system. I also argue that forces of polarization characterize the blogosphere as they do other social interactions, making it an unlikely venue for Habermasian deliberation, and perhaps leading to the creation of information cocoons. I conclude by briefly canvassing partial responses to the problem of polarization.     

Foreign Policy as Battlefield: A Study of National Interest and Party Motives

In no other policy arena are party unity and national unity considered as critical as in security and foreign policy. Party unity on foreign policy is viewed as a national security strategy of particular importance in times of international crisis and uncertainty, or as an expression of party strategy and ideological considerations. Through an empirical study of programs, congresses, voters and ideology of the Swedish parties 1945–1993, we show that the presence or absence of tension in the international system does not affect the inclination of parties to take issue on matters of foreign policy. We also show that parties argue just as much about issues that are central to Swedish security policy as they do about issues that do not directly affect national interest. The main sources of party disagreement over foreign policy seem to be ideologically motivated.     

On the Fragility of the Western Achievement

The weight of evidence from evolutionary psychology suggests that human behavior is largely self-regarding. This implies that social structure will change as do the prevailing patterns of opportunities to pursue self-interested goals. Throughout the greater part of history the most rewarding opportunities have involved the coercive extraction of surplus production, “takers” living off “makers”. The Western achievement, the huge explosion of production and creativity that marks modernity, is the result of a highly anomalous set of circumstances whereby Western “makers” were able to throw off the “taking” yoke and make theirs the most successful strategy. This, however, created a further set of anomalies which have been progressively undermining the institutions of classical liberalism that the triumphant “makers” put in place. “Taking”, in revamped guises, may be on the way to reasserting its long-time hegemony as a life strategy, thus threatening the Western achievement.     

Multidimensional Welfare Aggregation

Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition ofArrow's (1951/1963) and Sen's (1970/1979)social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of anindividual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a singlescalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensionalgeneralization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representingindividual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfarefunctions, corresponding to multiple `dimensions' of welfare.I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence ofattractive aggregation procedures depends on certaininformational assumptions, specifically about themeasurability of welfare and its comparability not only acrossindividuals but also across dimensions. I state severalimpossibility and possibility results. Under Arrow-typeconditions, insufficient comparability across individualsleads to dictatorship of a single individual, whileinsufficient comparability across dimensions leads todominance of a single dimension. Given sufficientcomparability both across individuals and across dimensions, arange of possibilities emerges. I discuss the substantiveimplications of the results.     

Is Information Enough? The Effect of Information about Education Tax Benefits on Student Outcomes

There is increasing evidence that tax benefits for college do not affect college enrollment. This may be because prospective students do not know about tax benefits for college or because the design of tax benefits is not conducive to affecting educational outcomes. We focus on changing awareness of tax benefits by providing information to students or prospective students. We sent e‐mails and letters to students that described tax benefits for college, and we tracked college outcomes. For all three of our samples—rising high school seniors, already enrolled students, and students who had previously applied to college but were not currently enrolled—information about tax benefits for college did not affect enrollment or reenrollment. We test whether effects vary according to information frames and found that no treatment arms changed student outcomes. We conclude that awareness is not the primary reason that tax benefits for college do not affect enrollment.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

Protest and Decision-making in a Society of Blame

The modern 'globalised' society takes for granted that future and development can be planned and controlled. Economical and political decision-making processes propose goals and intentions; protest movements show how this can be dangerous, but do not have realistic alternatives. Adopting the instruments of systems theory the paper focuses on two topics that are the very social condition of modernity and globalisation. First, decision-making can only affect variables on the level of formal organisations, but not on the level of society as a whole. Second, the results of planning are never those expected by the decision-makers. Society is a result of evolution, not of (good or bad) intentions. Protest in the society against the society is then the reaction of society to itself, once that which is possible to do is a consequence (positive or negative) of a future without shape and the only available resource is uncertainty.     

Do Homeowners Associations Affect Citywide Segregation? Evidence From Florida Municipalities

Homeowners associations (HOAs) have become one of the most popular housing options, offering residents supplemental services, amenities, as well as exclusivity and protection. HOAs are touted for their potential to improve the match between household preferences and local services, but denounced for, among other things, their tendency to facilitate residential segregation. Yet, despite growing claims, these propositions have not been rigorously tested. The expectation is that if households do sort into HOAs based on income or race/ethnicity, then these associations can affect segregation by encouraging exclusive and homogeneous living environments. However, HOAs may actually offer a unique vehicle for racial and/or economic mixing or, at the other extreme, they may not influence segregation if residents do not rely on HOAs to sort along racial or economic lines. Unlike previous studies, the current analysis observes jurisdictions over multiple decades in an attempt to better identify whether the growth in HOAs is driving changes in segregation. Using a unique, longitudinal database of HOAs in Florida and multiple measures of segregation, this article tests the effect of HOAs on jurisdiction racial/ethnic and economic segregation. Results from both ordinary least squares and instrumental variable regressions indicate that an increase in HOA presence exacerbates black–white and Hispanic–white residential segregation. Any segregation, however, is tempered by the concentration of HOA units in larger communities. On the contrary, there is no significant effect on income segregation; this suggests that HOAs do not intensify existing tendencies toward income sorting.     

Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism

One enduring question about terrorism is why individuals choose to join terrorist groups. Past studies have shown that terrorists are not always poor, and they can in fact come from more privileged groups in society. Risk sensitivity and prospect theory are approaches that can help explain some of the anomalies. They suggest that two types of group are likely to supply members for terrorist organizations in disproportionate numbers. One group consists of those who face a loss of status or position due to ongoing changes in society. A second group consists of those who have an opportunity to gain a major advance in status or position. Both groups are thus more likely or more willing to take risks such as joining dissident terrorists – either to maintain their position or to improve it. An analysis of the situation of Palestinian nationalists, nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Tamils in Sri Lanka provides support for the idea that sensitivity to risk can be an important factor in explaining the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups.     

Third party voting and the rational voter model: Empirical evidence from recent presidential elections

This paper attempted to demonstrate that a rational voter model as derived by Barzel and Silberberg (1973) can be used (with modifications) to explain third party voting in presidential elections. The empirical findings strongly suggest that the rational voter model is applicable in explaining third party voting. This conclusion likewise suggests that people who vote for third parties do so under similar motivations as people who vote for the major parties. Thus, people do not appear to regard votes for third parties as wasted votes or engage in the voting process in an irrational fashion. Lastly, votes for third parties represent the transmission of individual preferences by people who believe that their vote is important and that in the aggregate their signal may be interpreted as a signal to alter the direction of current policies as run by the major parties. Therefore, it does not appear from the evidence presented here that we should distinguish between or treat differently voting participation for the major parties versus the minor or third parties in presidential elections.The author expresses appreciation to Charles Campbell, Gary Pecquet, Paul W. Grimes, and James E. McClure for comments and criticisms. The usual caveat applies.     

What would delegates do? When and how the delegate paradox affects estimates of ideological congruence

The consensus that American politicians are more ideologically extreme than voters has been challenged by the observation that issue delegates – who adopt voters’ majority position on each issue – can be more extreme than the median voter. We show that this difference is conditional. Issue delegates are much more extreme than the median voter in left- and right-leaning constituencies, but not in evenly divided or ideologically pure constituencies. This means that these preference aggregation assumptions have a large effect on ideological comparisons between legislators and their party constituents, but little effect on comparisons between legislators and their general election constituents. We demonstrate this finding’s implications by replicating and extending two prominent studies. Although issue delegates representing full states are not much more extreme than the median voter, party issue delegates have moved to the extremes at nearly twice the rate of party median voters and are just as extreme as legislators.     

Austerity or welfare state transformation? Examining the impact of economic crises on social regulation in Europe

This article provides an encompassing analysis of how economic crises affect social regulation. The analysis is based on an innovative dataset that covers policy output changes in 13 European countries over a period of 34 years (1980–2013) in the areas of pensions, unemployment, and child benefits. By performing a negative binomial regression analysis, we show that economic crises do matter for social policymaking. Our main empirical finding is that crises impinge on social regulation by opening a window of opportunity that facilitates the dismantling of social policy standards. Yet crisis‐induced policy dismantling is restricted to adjustments based on existing policy instruments. We do not find significant variation in policymaking patterns across different macroeconomic conditions for the more structural elements of social policy portfolios, such as the envisaged social policy targets or the policy instruments applied. This suggests that economic crises do not lead to a profound transformation of the welfare state but to austerity.     

So who really does the donkey work in ‘multi-speed membership parties’? Comparing the election campaign activity of party members and party supporters

One of the traditional functions of party members is to campaign on behalf of their party at general elections. However, they are not the only people who volunteer for the job. In the context of the growing literature on ‘multi-speed membership’ parties, it is important to ask what non-members do for parties they support. This paper examines how different actors contributed to the electoral campaigns of six parties at the 2015 UK General Election, using survey data covering not only members of the Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, United Kingdom Independence, Scottish Nationalist, and Green parties, but also voters who identified themselves as being close to one of those parties but did not formally belong to them. As well as exploring how much work they do during campaigns, we ask whether the two groups choose different activities and are differently motivated. We find that, at the individual level, party members do more than non-member supporters, and that this is especially true of more intensive forms of activity. We also find that constituency context and political attitudes influence levels of activity in similar ways for members and supporters. However, we find no consistent impact from demographic factors or ideological incongruence. At the aggregate level, we estimate that the campaign work done by supporters may match or even exceed that done by party members.     

Is there a relationship between election outcomes and perceptions of personal economic well-being? A test using post-election economic expectations

Do individuals believe that an election victory by their favored candidate will improve their personal economic well-being? Previous work has either adopted an approach that is not well suited to determining this relationship, or ignored this question to focus on perceptions of macroeconomic conditions. In this paper we adopt a new approach that allows us to determine the relationship individuals perceive between elections and personal economic welfare, examining the relationship between vote choice, the election outcome, and post-election expectations for personal economic well-being. We find that economic individualism plays an important role in shaping the relationship individuals perceive between election outcomes and their personal economic well-being. Individuals who reject economic individualism do perceive a relationship, with those viewing an election outcome as favorable more optimistic in their expectations for personal economic well-being than those who view the election outcome as unfavorable. Conversely, election outcomes do not influence the expectations of economic individualists.     

Effect of aggregations of aphids ( Periphyllus spp.) on their size

In autumn, aphids reared on the opposite side of a sycamore leaf from an aggregation ofPeriphyllus acericola nymphs are heavier than aphids reared on uninfested leaves. Groups ofP. testudinaceus nymphs do not enhance the growth of aphids reared opposite.

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Zusammenfassung H?lt man einzelne Blattl?use (Drepanosiphum platanoidis oderPeriphyllus acericola) auf einem Bergahornblatt, das auf der Gegenseite mit einer Aggregation vonPeriphyllus acericola befallen ist, so werden sie etwa um das doppelte schwerer. Dieser Effekt zeigte sich nicht bei Gruppen vonP. testudinaceus.

     

Is compulsory voting more democratic?

Lijphart (1997) endorses compulsory voting as a means to increase voter turnout. Considering the likely effects of the role of information (including its costs) on the decision to vote and taking an expressive view of voting, however, compels us to investigate two unexamined claims by such advocates: (i) that individuals are transformed by forcing them to vote, and (ii) that a compulsory electoral outcome is a more accurate reflection of community preferences.We argue that compelling those who are not particularly interested in, or informed about, the political process to vote increases the proportion of random votes and we show that under simple majority rule, compulsory voting may violate the Pareto principle; the less popular candidate is more likely to be elected. Our results cast doubt on the ”miracle of aggregation“ argument, which optimistically concludes that as long as uninformed votes are not systematically biased, they will have no effect on voting outcomes. We also briefly consider how information cascades can exacerbate this problem.