Economic Statecraft,Structural Power,and Structural Violence in Sino-Kyrgyz Relations

Abstract

This article employs the concepts of structural power and structural violence to a undertake critical study of China’s use of economic statecraft toward Kyrgyzstan. The article argues that China’s reliance on economic exchange to secure its strategic ends in Kyrgyzstan has resulted in asymmetric economic exchange between the two states. Through this asymmetric exchange, China has gained influence over Kyrgyzstan’s domestic structures. Chinese structural power, in turn, contributes to violence across Kyrgyzstan’s structures of economy, environment, and society and within the country’s state-society relations. Structural violence within Kyrgyzstan also results in periphery instability and domestic insecurity for China. As such, the article argues that China’s use of economic statecraft to achieve its strategic aims in Kyrgyzstan is self-defeating.     

How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

This article discusses Japan's contribution to world peace both in the past and in the future. Japan's domestic, historical, and strategic circumstances shaped its concept of comprehensive security focused on international economic cooperation since the 1970s. Three decades of constructive relations with neighbors, including reconciliation with Southeast Asia built a strong foundation for Japan's new security role, one driven by new domestic and external imperatives. The article also documents the evolution of Japan's security policy and role in international peacekeeping, and concludes by arguing that Japan–ASEAN partnership is a key component of Japan's new security role, including permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In developing this new role, it is critically important that Japan engages its neighbors in ASEAN (and elsewhere) to gain their support for this new role.     

The Development-Insecurity Nexus in China’s Near-Abroad: Rethinking Cross-Border Economic Integration in an Era of State Transformation

Surprisingly, perhaps, China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative expresses a familiar mix of the security–development nexus and liberal interdependence thesis: Chinese leaders expect economic development and integration will stabilise and secure neighbouring states and improve inter-state relations. However, drawing on the record of China’s intensive economic interaction with Myanmar, we argue that the opposite outcome may occur, for two reasons. First, capitalist development is inherently conflict-prone. Second, moreover, China’s cross-border economic relations today are shaped by state transformation – the fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of party-state apparatuses. Accordingly, economic relations often emerge not from coherent national strategies, but from the uncoordinated, even contradictory, activities of various state and non-state agencies at multiple scales, which may exacerbate capitalist development’s conflictual aspects and undermine official policy goals. In the Sino-Myanmar case, the lead Chinese actors creating and managing cross-border economic engagements are sub-national agencies and enterprises based in, or operating through, Yunnan province. The rapacious form of development they have pursued has exacerbated insecurity, helped to reignite ethnic conflict in Myanmar’s borderlands, and plunged bilateral relations into crisis. Consequently, the Chinese government has had to change its policy and intervene in Myanmar’s domestic affairs to promote peace negotiations.     

Shifting Domestic Politics and Security Policy in Japan and Taiwan: The Search for a Balancing Strategy between China and the US

This article examines the impact of the changed domestic political environment in Japan and Taiwan in the second half of the 2000s, namely the arrival of administrations with a more moderate China policy, on their respective relations with Beijing and Washington. It seeks to find out the extent to which Japan under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Taiwan under the Kuomintang (KMT) may have attempted a policy shift towards accommodation of China at the expense of their respective security ties with America. The article also examines how much impact upon security policy can be traced to the changes in domestic politics in the two cases. The discussion suggests that, irrespective of the altered domestic political situation, the concern that China's growing military power may adversely affect national interests has largely trumped the political will for seeking accommodation, more so in the Japanese case than in the Taiwanese case. While both Tokyo and Taipei have avoided deferring to Beijing's interests, each has sought to strike a delicate balance between engaging China and maintaining defense ties with the US.     

Environmental protection in Chinese foreign policy

The environmental aspect of Chinese foreign policy has been neglected in the study of Chinese foreign relations. Yet it has become increasingly important since the late 1980s. Beijing’s increased interest in environmental diplomacy is closely linked with its security, economic, environmental and foreign policy interests. Recognizing the seriousness of its deteriorating domestic environment, the growing international attention on the ecological threats, and the need to improve China’s image and international status, Beijing has begun to pay special attention to environmental diplomacy. Yet China’s priority of economic development, its limited resources, its concerns about sovereign infringement, and trade barriers determine the features of China’s practice in this area.     

制度距离、文化差异与中美贸易摩擦中的权力因素——基于1980~2018年美国对外贸易争端数据的定量研究

中美贸易摩擦是体系压力和美国国内因素共同作用的结果。基于1980~2018年美国对外贸易争端数据的定量研究,文章采用面板负二项模型对中美两国间的制度距离、文化差异和相对实力差距的缩小等结构性变量,以及美国国内政治等单元层次的中介变量、贸易和投资等渠道变量,对中美贸易摩擦的影响进行了实证考察。研究认为,中美间军事、经济和科技实力差距的缩小即相对实力分布的变化会显著强化美国作为守成大国对中国作为崛起大国发起贸易摩擦的可能性;中美两国间的政治、经济制度距离和文化差异或价值观的不同也会显著影响中美两国间发生贸易摩擦的可能性,同时,与美国政治关系良好、在制度和文化上与其接近的国家并不必然意味着与美国贸易摩擦的减少;美国国内不同政治行为体、社会行为体的利益诉求、政策偏好,与贸易的交互效应一起,会进一步增加中美两国因实力差距的缩小、制度和文化(观念)差异等体系因素或结构性变量所引发的贸易摩擦发生的概率;经济因素依然是决定中美贸易摩擦的基础性因素,中美贸易失衡、中国对美直接投资的迅速增加以及中国对美国市场渗透率的提升、美国国内经济绩效的波动、美国国内收入不平等程度的加剧,与贸易的收入分配效应一起,也会显著提升两国间发生贸易摩擦的可能性。     

Hybrid Hegemonic Masculinity of the EU before and after the Arab Spring: A Gender Analysis of Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations

In the academic literature on EU–southern Mediterranean relations, a focal point of neglect has been the gendered dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This article argues that the Euro-Mediterranean space has been formed within the gendered global West/non-West relations with the purpose of promoting the West's security interests. Euro-Mediterranean security relations, thus, embody a gendered power hierarchy between the hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the EU (bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior) and the subordinate (both feminized and hypermasculinized) southern neighbourhood. In addition, it shows that following the Arab Spring the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by reconstructing these gendered power relations. This gender analysis contributes to the literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations through its specific focus on the (re)construction processes of gendered identities within the West/non-West context in tandem with the EU's competing notions of security.     

U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA

This paper seeks to examine U.S.-Vietnam relations under the Trump administration. It will concentrate on the political, economic and security dimensions of the relationship. It will demonstrate that the Trump administration's policy towards Vietnam has many elements of Obama's policy towards Vietnam. Though President Trump has focused on the trade deficit with Vietnam, the Trump administration has worked closely with the Vietnamese government to intensify the partnership with Vietnam. It should be noted that in the context of China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Hanoi and Washington see that it is in their mutual interests to advance their security cooperation. The last two years have witnessed the increasing partnership between Vietnam and the United States.     

Three difficult months in ‘Iraq

Though the build-up of China's blue-water fleet is causing consternation in foreign-policy circles, the country's on-going expansion into Russia and the former Soviet Union has scarcely garnered comment. For the past decade, China has used its foreign reserves to acquire strategic assets (principally infrastructure and natural resources) and tracts of sovereign territory along its existing borders and increasingly further afield. The impact on targeted countries (and, in turn, their own foreign policy) is extreme, with serious implications for security and economics far beyond their borders. This article provides an overview of China's acquisitions and investments in Eurasia, followed by more detailed discussion of recent developments and responses in Central Asia, Ukraine and Mongolia, and Siberia. It then looks at the impact of China's actions on Sino-Russian relations, discusses the importance of Russia and Central Asia as a resource corridor and buffer zone between Europe and China, and suggests how these manoeuvrings might result in long-term benefits for China.     

Are Sri Lanka's Relations with China Deepening? An Analysis of Economic,Military, and Diplomatic Data

Abstract

During the past few years, Sri Lanka appears to have forged closer relations with China. Sri Lanka welcomed Chinese investment in building a port in Hambantota, arms from China for use in its civil war, and “dialogue partner” status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Such high-profile moves have unnerved analysts fearing the rise of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. A first-time, systematic analysis of the trends in Sri Lanka's economic, military, and diplomatic relations with China reveals that ties have indeed been strengthening. However, Sri Lanka is neither bandwagoning with nor balancing China, as structural realism predicts. More attention should be devoted to explaining the security thinking of small states that are not following such predictions in response to the emergence of a regional hegemon.     

China's ‘win-win’ cooperation: Unpacking the impact of infrastructure-for-resources deals in Africa

This paper discusses China's use of infrastructure-for-resources loans in Africa as a win–win economic cooperation tool. This formula, offering generous loans for infrastructure in exchange for resource access, came into being largely as a default cooperation tool, inspired by China's own domestic experience, its competitive advantages and Africa's receptivity to this kind of barter deal. Embodying the principle of mutual benefit, China has consistently combined the extension of financial assistance for infrastructure construction in Africa with the expansion of Chinese business interests and the pursuit of resource security goals. The analysis focuses on whether this instrument is actually promoting African development or fuelling instead China's economic growth at the expense of African economies. The author argues that the impact has been mixed. Although there are some meaningful positive signs, many challenges persist, and as such the long-term developmental impact of this particular tool remains uncertain. The responsibility to ensure a positive outcome rests, however, on the African side as much as on China.     

Malaysia's US Policy Under Najib: Structural and Domestic Sources of a Small State's Strategy

Abstract

This article explains Malaysia's US policy under Prime Minister Najib. It argues that to the extent that there is a “shift” in Malaysia's policy, its substance has been shaped by structural and domestic considerations. Structurally, in the face of a fast rising China, Malaysia is compelled to keep a more balanced relationship with all the major powers. This structural push, reinforced by Obama's “pivot,” has been nonetheless limited by a concern about the risks of entrapment, abandonment, and antagonism. Domestically, there are economic and political motivations to develop closer ties with Washington. These, however, have been counteracted by a calculation of not wanting to align too closely with America. These structural and domestic determinants together explain the smaller state's strategy towards the superpower at a time of systemic change.     

Geopolitics,Ethnic Conflicts along the Border,and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar

Ever since Myanmar reoriented its foreign policy as a result of its transition to democratic rule in 2010, it has significantly improved its relations with the West, particularly the United States. Amid heightened geostrategic competition between the U.S. and China, how can we understand the Chinese government’s changing approaches to Myanmar, where China’s strategic and economic interests face unprecedented pressure? This article examines those changes in the context of the Chinese government’s response to three militarized ethnic conflicts along its border with Myanmar before and after Myanmar’s foreign policy reorientation. Drawing evidence from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and Chinese media coverage of the 2009 and 2015 Kokang conflicts and the 2011-2013 Kachin conflict, the article argues that combined geopolitical changes and domestic nationalist signaling explain the variations of China’s foreign policy approaches to Myanmar. The article thus contributes to ongoing interest in China’s foreign policy approaches to Southeast Asia in the wake of geostrategic competition between China and the United States.     

Taliban 2.0 and China's Counterterrorism Diplomacy in Afghanistan

The US withdrawal that left the Taliban in control of Afghanistan has created a security dilemma for China. Beijing considers its Uyghur population to be a terror threat, and it believes the Taliban are allowing the group to use Afghanistan as a refuge from which to plan attacks and transit into Central Asian neighbors. This article analyzes both the historical record and recent moves by China to explain Beijing's strategy of engaging with the Taliban and developing the Afghan economy. The study indicates that the approach has some potential benefits if, as the Chinese assume, economic growth yields stability, good governance, and a cohesive state that can combat terror groups. However, the article demonstrates that Afghan history, the Taliban's ideology, and the vicious circle of instability, economic stagnation, and further chaos are likely to subvert China's goals.     

The ending of Japan's ODA loan programme to China—All's well that ends well?

Official Development Assistance has been the most important instrument of Japan's foreign policy towards China since 1979 and has been useful in softening many difficulties in the bilateral relationship. Most of Japan's ODA to China consists of yen loans. Usually the Japanese government adheres to certain economic indicators set by the international banking institutions in order to phase out ODA programmes. However, in 2005 the Japanese government decided abruptly without applying the usual guidelines to end its loan aid to China by 2008, the year China will stage the Olympic Games. The article concludes that the decision was taken for political reasons, taking into consideration the criticism of certain Chinese policies, the deterioration of Japan's relations with China, the fast economic development of China with its implications for Japan's interests, and a general aid fatigue of public opinion against the backdrop of Japan's economic and budgetary problems. The process leading to this decision throws an additional light on all the complexities of the bilateral relationship, including the historical legacy.     

India's “Look East” Policy

A combination of economic, strategic, and domestic considerations has led India to pay greater attention to its eastern neighbours since the 1990s. India's steadily growing ties with East and Southeast Asian countries have become an increasingly important element of India's foreign policy. India is working with these countries bilaterally as well as through regional frameworks like the EAS, ASEM, and ASEAN, and sub-regional organizations like BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. The main driver remains economic, and India has many ongoing and planned FTAs with the countries of this region. Of late, defence and security ties too have grown. However, India's relations with China remain tense and troubled, with persisting differences over the border, Tibet, and China's patronage of India's South Asian neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Asia's major players will have to overcome internal rivalries and consciously evolve a cooperative paradigm for Asian security and cooperation to enable Asia to play a leading global role.     

Reassessing the power of regional security providers: the case of Algeria and Morocco

Abstract

The concept of power and the ways to measure it are central to the literature on regional security providers. The predominant model has power rooted in material capabilities. This article recognizes that such capabilities are important but contends that for a state to be become a regional security provider, it must meet certain preconditions, foremost amongst them: possession of necessary material and ideational capacity; judicious employment of such power resources; and regional recognition of its leadership. Obvious as it may sound, effective leadership is also heavily contingent upon the domestic performance of regional powers. In this regard, the choice of Algeria and Morocco provides an interesting comparative case to broaden the traditional determinants of how to categorize regional security providers. Surprisingly, Morocco has been neglected in studies on regional security in the Maghreb and Sahel despite its rising ideational and economic influence in the region. Even Algeria has seen few studies use an integral approach to analyze its roles, orientations and performance as a regional security provider.     

Domestic politics of Chinese foreign policy: where will Xi Jinping bring China?

ABSTRACT

Xi Jinping has concentrated his power since he acceded to the Chinese presidency. Where will Xi bring China? In this review essay I discuss four single-authored books – one in English and three in Japanese – to explore security implications of Xi’s reform and foreign policies. In her recent book, Elizabeth Economy is critical of Xi, arguing that he is turning away from Deng Xiaoping’s reform and internationalist policies. The three Japanese China specialists concur, and further highlight the interconnectedness of domestic politics and international relations. In sum, the four books show that Xi has struggled to commit to the state-owned enterprise reform and to cooperative foreign policy due to Chinese domestic politics, and as a result, has threatened regional security in the Asia-Pacific.     

China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping

Since taking power, the new Chinese President Xi Jinping has talked of “striving for achievements,” signaling a new theme in Chinese diplomacy. This article first examines the changes in Beijing’s foreign policy structure before moving on to examine the three major schools of thought on China’s immediate relations with its neighbors, implying that the policy focus will lie with the “advance westward” school. Moreover, this article highlights how China is maximizing its influence through economic interaction, whilst noting that economics is also being used to punish hostile countries. Furthermore, it notes that China’s next step is to influence change using the multilateral frameworks of the international system, remolding global rules to China’s benefit. The article concludes by examining Beijing’s leadership role, particularly its commitment to non-alliance, and whether Beijing and Washington can rebuild a more suitable model to reflect both country’s ambitions on the world stage.     

The European Union (EU) in Asian Security: Actor with a Punch or Distant Bystander?

The EU calls itself a “soft power,” making “soft power” contributions to Asian security. That is undoubtedly what the EU is and does in Asia and the track record of European contributions to Asian peace and stability through economic and financial as well as development aid and technical assistance over the decades is not unimpressive. As will be shown below, over recent years Brussels and the Union's individual member states have sought to increase their involvement and role in Asian “hard security,” attempting to get rid of its reputation of being security a “free-rider” enjoying but not sharing the burden of US regional security guarantees. While the EU will continue to be a “hard security” actor in Asian security within limits, it is advised to concentrate its security cooperation with like-minded partners such as Japan and the US as opposed to hoping that talking to Beijing on regional or global security issues produces tangible results. As will be shown below, it clearly does not as Beijing continues to conduct very assertive and at times aggressive regional foreign and security policies insisting on the “principle of non-interference” in Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Consequently, EU influence on Chinese foreign and security policies in general and its increasingly aggressive policies related to territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas will continue to exist on paper and paper only.