Consequences of an Anti-Corruption Experiment for Local Government Performance in Brazil

Decentralization reforms, implemented to improve efficiency and service provision, pose a challenge for federal governments that would like to ensure that federal resources are used appropriately by local governments. To overcome this challenge, some federal governments have implemented costly oversight programs aimed at improving municipal governance. For instance, in 2003, the Brazilian federal government introduced a randomized auditing program with the goal of improving municipal performance by exposing episodes of corruption and mismanagement. Yet, we know little about whether these types of programs actually lead to improvements in local outcomes, especially in terms of service delivery. We argue that audits provide opportunities for learning that should improve performance outcomes. To test this argument, we examine municipal performance in over 5,000 Brazilian municipalities from 2001 to 2012. We utilize the random assignment of audits and estimate difference-in-differences regressions. We find that audited municipalities experience greater improvements in performance overall compared to unaudited municipalities, though the effect size is modest. We also find evidence that the auditing program indirectly improves municipal performance. These results indicate that top-down oversight programs, such as the Brazilian one, are useful not only for improving transparency and accountability, but also for the provision of public services as well.     

Strategy in Local Government

One aspect of the study of local government organization is the role of consultants and the models they have introduced in order to help the local government reorganize. One of these models is "strategy", and this article sets out to consider the implication for these organizations if "the logic of strategy" were to be implemented. A common denominator of all the local governments studied is that "strategy" does not function, and the question is why this is so. Two distinctly different explanations can be considered. One states that "strategy" is difficult and that the politicians and administrators will need time to adjust to new ways of working. The other explanation, which is applied here, focuses on whether local government as an institution can be reconciled with the demands and premises inherent in "strategic thinking". My conclusions arc negative. "Strategy" is a model from the private sector and more specifically from the competitive sector of society and it is not appropriate for wider use. In this article the arguments are restricted to local government, and do not necessarily apply to other types of public organization.     

Local Elections and Local Government Performance

Over the past couple of decades, the level of turnout in Norwegian local elections has shown a steady d. This decline is paralleled by a greater range of variation in turnout across Norwegian municipalities. Arguing from the perspective of rational utility-maximizing voters, the article examines to what extent such variations in the level of turnout may be accounted for by the policy performance of local authorities – in addition to certain structural features of the municipalities and local communities. Using aggregate data on turnout and measures of policy performance. the analysis testifies to the suggestion that policy exerts an influence in determining the level of turnout, indicating a turn in the direction of more rational voting behaviour as far as local elections arc concerned. It is also evident from the analysis that the appearance of smaller single-issue parties does have a mobilizing effect in local elections while the Downsian suggestion about the effect of party competition on turnout levels is not supported by the mule of the analysis.     

Devolution and Local Government

Devolution was introduced amid a rhetoric of democratic renewaland promised the active engagement of local government. Localgovernment has responded in different ways in different partsof the United Kingdom. In Scotland and Wales local authoritieshave built on their advocacy of devolution before 1997 to realizea close partnership with devolved government. In London, too,local authorities have come to engage closely with regionalgovernment. In the rest of England local authorities were atbest ambivalent about the possibility of regional government,preferring to work in a national context with UK governmentinstitutions. Northern Ireland local government is parochialand appears suspicious of engagement with devolved government.These differences express some of the wider relationships ofthe component societies of the United Kingdom to the UK stateand have helped to embed continued centralized government inEngland.     

Accountability for Performance in Local Government

The nature of accountability for performance in the public sector is explored in this paper by attempting to answer three questions: (1) How important is accountability for performance? (2) Which of the stakeholders consider themselves accountable for organisational performance, including contracts? (3) Does information asymmetry between stakeholders in regard to performance information affect accountability? This paper reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government based on the responses to a questionnaire by councillors and tier one and two managers. The results of the survey indicate that there is an understanding of accountability for performance, that both managers and councillors are considered to be accountable for performance but that information asymmetry and accountability relationships are problematic.     

Budgeting for Contracting in Local Government

While the amount of contracting out seems to be leveling off, the number of larger, long‐term contracts seems to be increasing. Such contracts are generally not well described in local budgets. Recent efforts in some cities to shift to more outcome‐oriented performance budgeting should push toward more clarity in reporting on major contracts in the budget. This article examines how a handful of major cities handle contracts in their budgets—in some cities contracts are omitted from the budget or all merged into one budget line—and makes some suggestions for improvements.     

地方政府创新的驱动模式——地方政府干部视角的考察

由地方政府推动的创新是一个国家政治体制改革的风向标,地方政府创新的发展特征可以展现出这个国家的政治文化和政治发展活力.以"中国地方政府创新奖2007-2008"年度20个地方政府创新获奖项目为研究单位,通过问卷调查收集和分析地方政府干部对本地政府创新项目的认知和态度,从创新动因、创新动力和阻力、创新价值取向、创新的参与性和可持续性五个方面出发,得出研究结论:由地方政府推动的改革创新具有突出的"低风险取向",创新过程中公共参与不足,地方领导的"精英作用"和基层政策空间是推动地方政府创新的主体力量,创新的可持续性也主要取决于能否获得体制内的认可和支持.本文的研究方法和研究结论为观察和判断中国政府改革和政治发展提供了新的视角和信息.     

Integrity Systems and Local Government

Australia's third sphere of government is local government, consisting of about 675 councils nationally, responsible for an average of 6 percent of total public sector expenditure (around $18 billion) annually. This article reviews key integrity issues confronting local government, based on experience in NSW and Queensland. Current issues confirm integrity to be a significant concern manifesting in a large variety of forms, both in council administration and in local government politics. A new generation of responses are increasingly tailored to recognising local government as a permanent, elected sphere of government, accounting directly to the public, while, supported by state regulators, individual councils also pursue better practice in the management of their own administrations.     

Bourgeois Theories of Local Government

This paper offers an historical analysis of the principles of local government organization that have been accepted in Britain and the United States. The central thesis is that these principles express an 'economist' conception of politics and the state. Local governments have been variously conceived—as business corporations, consumers' cooperatives, and institutions of the state—but in each case they have been assigned a restricted, essentially instrumental purpose. This purpose is connected to economic welfare, which, it is supposed, requires centralization of government. Thus the prevalent economist conceptions of local government condemn the local polity to a tenuous existence.