The Changing Property Tax in the West: State Centralization of Local Finances

Diminished local government autonomy and increased fiscal centralization in the hands of state government are the consequences of the restrictions on the local property tax imposed in the western states in the past twenty years. While the trend is a national one, it is more evident in the West than in other regions. Statewide voter initiatives account for some of the restrictions, particularly the more severe ones, but legislatures and governors also impose these limitations. In tracing the recent course of the centralization of local finance, this article details the property tax restrictions adopted in individual western states, examines the initiative and conventional legislative sources of these actions, and provides quantitative and qualitative evidence for the centralization thesis. In many western states the property tax has lost much of its local character, becoming in large part a fiscal and political tool for state policymakers.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Federalism in Latin America

In contrast to years of centralization when the national governmentdominated the states and municipalities, fiscal decentralizationis now taking place throughout Latin America. This study considersthe reasons for this change. Fiscal decentralization meritsseparate attention because the financial independence of subnationalgovernments ultimately determines their success and power. Competingpolitical and economic explanations are tested on a sample of17 countries between 1985 and 1995. While federalism is a significantpredictor of greater fiscal decentralization, other factorssuch as presidential power, structural adjustment, level ofdevelopment, and country size also determine the level of fiscaldecentralization.     

How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization

This study empirically examines the roles of gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups in vertical fiscal imbalances across US states via a two-step generalized method of moments estimation during a 22-year period (1987–2008). States' share of intergovernmental transfers and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are often affected by interaction between governors and interest groups, as are expenditure centralization and revenue/expenditure centralization. Revenue decentralization and the local share of intergovernmental transfers are frequently influenced by cooperation between governors and interest groups via mutual support. Long-term cooperation and gridlock each influence expenditure centralization, revenue/expenditure centralization, and revenue decentralization. Long-term cooperation is not statistically significant in terms of the state and local shares of intergovernmental transfers; that is, governors and interest groups cooperate in pursuit of short-term benefits rather than long-term results. Long-term political influence also has no impact, affirming a short-term-oriented political viewpoint.     

Fiscal Centralization in the American States: Findings From Another Perspective

Studies of the determinants of fiscal centralization have produced conflicting results. The difficulty may lie in reliance on cross-section analyses and their presumptions of the sources and nature of change. Studies of the current relative positions of political units ignore historical factors which may have "pushed" units away from some sort of normal position. An historical analysis of the American states demonstrates these points.     

Centralization, Access, and Influence: The Reagan Administration and the Semiconductor Industry's Trade Complaints

This article explores how the relative centralization of decisionmaking authority can affect a societal group's ability to achieve its interests. It examines the US semiconductor industry's efforts to persuade the Reagan administration to press Japan on its import barriers and its firms' trade practices. I find that the industry's eventual success was facilitated by an institutional change that centralized the structure of decisionmaking authority. Centralization proved more favorable to the industry's influence in this case because it reduced the number of competing state interests involved in policymaking and concentrated authority in state units that shared the industry's preferences. To account for the change in this structure I focus on the interplay between government officials and policy windows. The analysis suggests that centralization may under some conditions be more conducive than decentralized structures to societal influence, and that modest institutional changes can have significant policy implications.     

Policy learning and change during crisis: COVID-19 policy responses across six states

Whereas policy change is often characterized as a gradual and incremental process, effective crisis response necessitates that organizations adapt to evolving problems in near real time. Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in the case of COVID-19, which forced subnational governments to constantly adjust and recalibrate public health and disease mitigation measures in the face of changing patterns of viral transmission and the emergence of new information. This study assesses (a) the extent to which subnational policies changed over the course of the pandemic; (b) whether these changes are emblematic of policy learning; and (c) the drivers of these changes, namely changing political and public health conditions. Using a novel dataset analyzing each policy's content, including its timing of enactment, substantive focus, stringency, and similar variables, results indicate the pandemic response varied significantly across states. The states examined were responsive to both changing public health and political conditions. This study identifies patterns of preemptive policy learning, which denotes learning in anticipation of an emerging hazard. In doing so, the study provides important insights into the dynamics of policy learning and change during disaster.     

Testing Riker's Party-Based Theory of Federalism: The Argentine Case

This study seeks to advance our understanding of the institutionalunderpinnings of federalism by evaluating William H. Riker'sstudy of party causality. Using data from federal funds transfersin Argentina, a federation exhibiting high levels of fiscaldecentralization despite its centralized party system, it isshown that when governorships are held by opposition parties,the overall amount of federal funds transferred to provincesincreases considerably. In addition, changes in the partisancomposition of the national government are also associated withsteep increases in the share of provincial federal funds, whereas,more controversially and challenging prominent recent studiesof decentralization in Latin America, divided government atthe national level leads to centralization of intergovernmentalfunds. These findings support Riker's contention that politicalparties exercise a decisive influence over the distributionof fiscal powers between states and the national government.     

Adapting Danish Interests to European Integration

When Denmark became a member of the European Community in 1973, political institutions as well as private business had to and did in fact make adaptations to the new and unaccustomed political environment. With the exception of the Common Market Committee of Folkelinget , however, the Danish polity did not change much with regard to the EC until the late 1980s when the Community gained new momentum. Now, traditionally corporatist patterns of decision-making are adapting to a European polity much more complex and pluralist by nature. Political and administrative institutions are developing new ways of influencing EC policies, though their lobbying activities still remain basically ad hoc and reactive. As to private interests, agriculture occupies a unique position with its long tradition of aggressive lobbying, while lobbying by manufacturing companies is still in the making. However, an overall weakening of national corporatist patterns of decision-making in response to the integration process, which one might perhaps have expected, has not taken place. Rather, we observe a strengthening. Thus, our case poses questions as to the relevance of existing corporatist notions for an understanding of the general nature of the policy-making process in the Community and the prospects for interest organizational centralization at the European level.     

The political economy of centralization and the European Community

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz' law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin (Jacques Delors, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 July, 1988, No. 2-367/140).     

More than Pathological Formalization: Understanding Organizational Structure and Red Tape

Most research has conceptualized red tape as being a pathological subset of organizational formalization. This article argues that focusing on a single dimension of organizational structure as a red tape driver is unrealistically narrow. Specifically, the article advances hypotheses as to how organizational centralization and hierarchy affect perceived red tape, in addition to formalization. This reasoning is tested using survey data from employees of three local government organizations in the southeastern United States. All three hypotheses are supported: higher levels of organizational formalization, centralization, and hierarchy are associated with more red tape. Open‐ended comments also indicate that red tape is not solely perceived as related to formalization. The findings imply that red tape is a multifaceted perception of organizational structure rather than perceived pathological formalization.     

Parliamentary elites in times of political transition: The case of Eastern Germany

This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of elite and institutional (in this case parliamentary) changes in times of political transitions, and more specifically, to a better understanding of the political changes currently under way in Germany. In doing so, it illuminates patterns of élite change by looking at the composition of the state diets (Landtage) in the five new federal states which were created in October 1990. The focus is on predictors of explanation in elite recruitment and elite replacement. Elite replacement in 1990 was thorough and continued in 1994. Members of parliament display remarkably similar background and career characteristics within and across states. In turn, commonalities of origin and career have facilitated efficiency in parliamentary work.     

A Reassessment of Federalism as a Degree of Decentralization

The central argument in this article is that it is wrong toconceive of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization.Decentralization can only be applied meaningfully to federalismin matters that belong to the central government. Even then,unlike unitary decentralization, which is entirely at the discretionof the central government, federal decentralization is bothmandatory and guaranteed. Much more than this, however, thekey to distinguishing federal systems from nonfederal systems,which also have "degrees of decentralization," lies in the conceptof noncentralization by which is meant that matters belongingto the states cannot ordinarily be centralized unilaterally.It is this noncentralization, which opposes decentralization(because decentralization presupposes centralization), thatmakes federalism a highly distinct form of "decentralization."     

How do interests,ideas, and institutions affect multisectoral governance? The case of tobacco governance in two Pacific small island developing states

Multisectoral governance has been recognized to be vital to regulate harmful commodity industries, yet countries struggle with reaching policy coherence due to government agencies' conflicting mandates and industry interference. Limited empirical evidence is available on how interests, ideas, and institutions intersect and influence multisectoral governance in low- and middle-income countries, particularly in Pacific small island developing states (PSIDS), often exploited by vested industry interests and whose non-communicable disease crisis commands urgent action to regulate harmful commodities. This study assessed the ways interests, ideas, and institutions intersect and shape multisectoral tobacco governance in PSIDS. Interviewee data collected in Fiji and Vanuatu show that the idea of individual responsibility, the limited recognition of commercial determinants of health, the centralization of authority, and the vulnerabilities of small island developing states, (including small population, land, economy, geographic isolation, and status as a developing economy), prevent these states from achieving policy coherence in multisectoral tobacco governance.     

Das institutionelle Erbe des „Treuhand-Regimes“ in Ostdeutschland: Zentralisierung oder Auflösung in der bundesstaatlichen Normalverfassung?

The unification of Germany in 1990 deeply affected the traditional structure and mechanisms of the former West German federal state. The grave and deeply rooted economic problems in East Germany as well as the strong position of the federal government and the relative weakness of the East German state governments during the economic transformation made it highly possible that a centralization within the federal state even beyond East Germany would occur. Empirical research on the privatisation agency ‘Treuhandanstalt’ and its successor organisations, which is presented in the article, demonstrates what development the relationship between the federal and the East German states has taken in this policy area since 1990. The article further analyses if the centralization thesis can be confirmed and what can generally be concluded about the essential characteristics of the current federal system.     

Holding Back the Storm: Target Populations and State Climate Adaptation Planning in America

This paper investigates the landscape of state‐level adaptation planning in the United States. We answer three primary research questions: First, how are states planning for climate change? Second, who are states targeting for climate adaptation? Third, what tools are states using to motivate climate adaptation efforts? We develop and implement a coding scheme using Schneider and Ingram’s Social Construction Framework (SCF) to characterize variation in 2033 individual adaptation goals mentioned in all 14 American states with explicit adaptation plans. We use these data to understand the types of tools used to motivate different actors (governmental, private, nonprofit) to adapt to climate change. We find that the most frequent target of state adaptation planning is the state itself, which provides an opportunity to extend the SCF to a target group often not mentioned in public policy. Specifically, we find that states target themselves with mandates or tools designed to acquire information. Other stakeholders in adaptation are more likely to be the targets of capacity building tools. Private actors are the only population more likely to be targeted by incentives. The project expands the Social Construction Framework to include targets and tools of planning efforts. Practically, our article offers a methodology by which to compare the vastly heterogeneous efforts to adapt to climate change at the subnational level.     

Regional Mobilization in the New Europe: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

This conclusion links the various contributions in light of the introductory framework. In line with our framework, scepticism towards the EU has increased since 2004 across most of the EU regions (old and new) and state-centric approaches (regional influence mediated through the central executives) have become the dominant strategy for regional mobilization. Unmediated access through direct regional representation in Brussels remains an important side-strategy though, especially for sub-state nations and regions with the highest level of regional authority, as theoretically expected. Regional authority—more so than the difference between competitive versus cooperative multi-level designs—is an important predictor against centralization pressures resulting from European integration. Overall, changes in the ‘New Europe’ have intensified but not transformed the dominant patterns of regional mobilization, while system-level and regional variables mediate impacts of Europeanization.     

政绩晋升效应与地方财政民生支出——一个案例研究

在收入集权的财政体制下,中央财政通过转移支付将大量的财政资金下拨给地方政府来实施民生工程。这笔庞大的财政资金是否真的能够"达到它所希望到达的地方"?地方政府实施民生工程的动力在哪?用过程追踪的个案研究方法,通过江西省南昌市D区的个案研究发现,基于官员对职务晋升的追求,上级政府以政绩考核的方式推动着地方政府改变支出结构,将财政资金投入到民生工程中,以地区竞争的方式来获得上级的认可以求晋升。这一研究表明以"一票否决"资格赛为基础,规定考核任务为核心,"面子工程"获加分的"三位一体"式的政绩考核机制,有力地保障了民生工程的实施效果。但这种考核机制是否能够通行于其他政策的实施过程,还有待更进一步的研究。     

A Matter of Fairness: The Equity of Urban General Assistance

General assistance is the "safety net" of the welfare system, γet, most general assistance programs reflect the goals of cost containment more clearly than the goal of equity. Data from a 1982 survey of general assistance programs provide the basis for a causal analysis. The substantial variation across states seems based on willingness to provide services, rather than need. State welfare commitment is the most influential explanation on general assistance coverage, although per capita income, percent metropolitan, political culture, and percent unemployment also have some effect. Perhaps centralization at the federal level will provide equitable coverage; however, the current political environment makes such an outcome unlikely without major changes in public opinion.     

The Impact of Fiscal Crisis on Decision‐Making Processes in European Governments: Dynamics of a Centralization Cascade

The Great Recession resulted in fiscal crises for governments across the Western world. Significant cuts in government programs were initiated as many governments scrambled to reduce their growing budget deficits. This article explores how European governments reacted during the recent crisis. In particular, the authors focus on the interlinkages between shifts toward more centralized decision making. The article uses a survey of thousands of public sector executives in 17 European countries. The authors find evidence of a centralization cascade, such that centralizing one element of the decision‐making process leads to greater centralization throughout the system. Results also show that having a high number of organizational goals and facing clear sanctions for failing to achieve goals lead to greater centralization, but greater organizational commitment reduces the need to centralize.     

The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of arguments and practices in European countries

This paper addresses the arguments in favour of both the decentralization and centralization of public policy making. It points out that the same arguments are sometimes used to advance either claim and that in different countries opposite arguments are used to support the same claim. Clearly, the inherent features of centralization and decentralization are far from obvious. A closer look at the attention given to the issue by political parties at the national level in four European countries reveals that decentralization becomes an issue in these countries at different periods and as a cause of different arguments, which rather reflect the dominant values in the political culture than refer to inherent properties of decentralization itself. An analysis of opinions of local elites points at the relation between their opinion on decentralizing responsibilities in a specific field and the support for existing institutional arrangements, their own influence in the policy field and the predisposition towards decentralization tendencies. This results in the conclusion that the support for decentralization tendencies is more closely related to existing specific institutional arrangements, and to the degree to which it is expected to influence one's own position, than to its inherent merits.