Truman's revenge: Social control and corporate crime

Many criminologists have found that corporate crime does more harm than street crime, whether measured by property lost, money stolen, or lives taken. Yet, public concern about crime is almost exclusively focused on street crime and “just deserts” for the offender. The authors argue that corporate criminality is more likely than individual criminality to be planned and subjected to cost/benefit analysis than street crime and therefore more likely to be deterred by raising the costs of corporate criminality. The Model Penal Code is used to demonstrate that both individual and corporate crime produce a comparable array of avoidable harms. Public policies that demand just deserts for individual offenders (natural persons) are revealed as highly inconsistent with policies that protect corporations (juristic persons) from accountability for the harms they create. A philosophical and legal foundation for corporate crime control strategies is provided. The authors propose a sanctions regime for corporate criminals comparable to the sanctions regime imposed on natural persons for street crimes. Strategies to avoid risk shifting by corporations are suggested. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Changes in corporate organization of the health care system

Health care financing has undergone numerous structural changes over the years. Change continues while extreme growth seriously affects the health care focus. The author examines the multiclass system and health financing trends. Restructuring techniques are also discussed.     

The cost of delegated control: vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance

Vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance are three systems for attaining judgment-proof or disappearing injurers’ precaution through the direct control of a second party (the vicariously liable principal, the secondary liable party, or the insurer). In this way, the legal system delegates control over some injurers to private entities. Such mechanisms generate monitoring costs. In this paper, we consider who bears the cost of such monitoring, and the effect thereof on the equilibrium level of precautions under different liability rules. We use these findings to explain some of the patterns in the coupling of substantive standards of liability and legal regimes of delegated control.     

Asymmetries of control: Surveillance,intrusion, and corporate theft of privacy

This paper deals with the asymmetry in relations between the individual actor and the corporation. In particular the paper focuses on the impact of corporate use of technologies of surveillance, ostensibly to reduce crime and to increase efficiency. A case is made that the use of these technologies to invade citizens' personal privacy in order to procure personal information without consent is a still-unrecognized form of corporate theft. Steps toward a remedy are suggested.     

Crime control through saturated community policing: A corporate policing model

Police officers in Western countries do not run day‐to‐day security operations in private companies and corporations. In contrast, Chinese police are directly involved in corporate security management. Responding to the criticisms that comparative studies in the West have overemphasized general and macro‐sociological analyses, this paper will introduce a specific Chinese corporate policing model based on the researcher's two‐month field research recently. The corporation under study is managed through a score keeping system, where security scores are concretely established, and a comprehensive approach is utilized which embodies the use of technical, formal, administrative, educational, and community control measures.     

海事强制令新论

针对<海事诉讼特别程序法>的规定,论述海事强制令的法律性质,比较海事强制令与国外相关制度的异同,分析该制度在司法中遇到阻力的原因,提出将海事强制令改造为海事禁令,正确界定其功能,并完善和细化相应程序的建议.     

海事强制令新论

针对《海事诉讼特别程序法》的规定,论述海事强制令的法律性质,比较海事强制令与国外相关制度的异同,分析该制度在司法中遇到阻力的原因,提出将海事强制令改造为海事禁令,正确界定其功能,并完善和细化相应程序的建议。     

Anomie and corporate deviance

This paper elaborates on Merton's theory of anomie, while aiming at the enhancement of our understanding of processes conducive to corporate deviance. It attempts to consolidate points made by theorists operating in diverse, often considered as conflicting, orientations or perspectives. A synthetic or integrated scheme is, thus, put forward, which can help appreciate the background against which corporate deviance is likely to occur. Moreover, it is argued that contemporary societies are inherently conducive to anomic trends. Such trends bring about not only lower-class deviance and crime — to which anomie theory has been traditionally applied — but also high-class and corporate deviance. Against claims by some scholars that the former is a matter of greater concern, it is suggested that the latter is at least as serious a problem and that it has significant implications for the social order.Parts of an earlier version of this paper were presented at the 10th International Congress for Criminology held in Hamburg, FRG, in September 1988.     

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.     

African corporate lawyering and globalization

Influenced by processes of globalization and localization, many fields of social and commercial practice – including legal services – across Africa are undergoing rapid transformation. It should come as no surprise that these processes of globalization and transformation include the ongoing transformation of corporate lawyering. Lawyers from Johannesburg to Algiers – not to mention Khartoum and Ouagadougou – are experiencing and participating in rapid global change in their profession and everyday work. This article identifies some of the questions and issues that emerge from this process, as well as providing a vignette of the South African corporate legal sector and tentatively outlining the emergence of an African corporate lawyering field. It does so in order to propose a research agenda into the trends and potential pathways of growth in this field. It does so in four steps, moving from a theoretical frame to one of the Global South to a portrait of the South African jurisdiction and ending with an agenda for African corporate lawyering.     

Co-evolution of politics and corporate governance

In the OECD countries, there exists a negative cross-country correlation between an economy's degree of employment protection and its degree of corporate ownership dispersion. One explanation is that employees’ political rights influence corporate governance: systems characterized by strong employees’ rights tend to be balanced by strong and concentrated owners. In this approach, the separation between ownership and control is only possible when unions and social democratic parties are sufficiently weak. In this paper we argue that causation runs also in the opposite direction (from strong concentrated ownership to strong employees’ protection) and leads to multiple equilibria characterized by alternative co-evolution paths of politics and corporate governance. To empirically assess our theoretical arguments we estimate a simultaneous equation model for workers rights’ protection and corporate ownership structure determination by three-stage least squares in a sample of 21 OECD countries. We conclude by arguing that the relative relevance of each flow of causation has important economic policy implications.     

Repositioning the corporate criminal: comparing and contrasting corporate criminal liability in Canada and Finland

ABSTRACT

Over the past two decades, a number of states in the Global North have introduced laws aimed at holding corporations criminally liable. While there is an important literature examining these legal regimes there is a paucity of comparative work interrogating the different political struggles and processes leading to corporate criminal liability (CCL) legislation. This paper addresses this lacuna by comparing and contrasting the development of CCL in Canada and Finland. By scrutinizing the law reform processes in each jurisdiction, the paper documents how CCL emerged under different conjunctures in each country, yet were shaped similarly by hegemonic beliefs in the non-criminal status of corporation, the importance of advancing private enterprise and established jurisprudence. Of particular note are the ways in which dominant notions of legal individualism and the universal legal subject constrained legislative efforts to hold corporations criminally to account therein preventing corporate misconduct from being processed as “real” crimes.     

以强制性和禁止性规范为视角透视法律规避制度

强制性和禁止性法律规范的界定是国际私法实践中法院地所在国适用法律规避制度的前提条件,但何谓法律规避中本应适用的强制性和禁止性法律规范在学理探讨中却仍属空白.本文旨在结合案例论述法律规避中强制性和禁止性法律规范的学理认定标准、立法规定,进而阐述法律规避、直接适用的法律与公共秩序在适用中的相关理论问题,以期于学理上能拓展对国际私法中法律规避制度的认识,在实务中可以为司法提供借鉴.